The war with Germany had ended, but America was still at war with Japan and there was no end in sight, at least there was no simple or quick end in sight. Despite their defeat, Japan had yet to give any indication that they would surrender. This left Harry S. Truman with the job of determining what would be the most ideal way to end the war. What is important to keep in mind is that the use of the atomic bomb was not the controversial affair it has become today. Above all else, Truman was focused on keeping American casualties to a minimum and his advisors had warned him that an invasion would surely do the opposite. There were several reasons why the bomb was dropped with limited hesitation or uproar from U.S. citizens, but the biggest question
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The author includes an excerpt from E. B. Sledge’s memoir where he shares his experience as a U.S. Marine in Japan. Because Sledge recalls a relentless, defiant attitude from the Japanese, the invasion was inevitable in his eyes. John Kenneth Galbraith, however, is sure that “the Japanese would have surrendered surely by November without an invasion” (Fussell 3). Fussell compares another difference in opinion between Joseph Alsop, who was captured by the Japanese, and David Joravsky, whose lack of fatal encounter with the adversaries influenced his conclusion that nuclear warfare could have been avoided. Each man’s stance on the morality of the bomb is shaped by their unique experiences in the war, and the author makes it a point to highlight this truth. As a follow up to Joravsky’s argument, Fussell stresses that American military had no way of knowing for sure that a Japanese surrender was on the horizon. All they really knew was that American vessels were sinking and the number of casualties were rapidly increasing. His overall conclusion contests that Truman’s decision to drop the bomb was not a haphazard one but one made to ‘shorten the agony of young Americans’ (Fussell …show more content…
Truman’s main goal, the speaker remarks, was to prevent an invasion of Japan. It is argued that the growing number of people who currently criticize the decision is a result of “limited historical knowledge” and likely a societal tendency to conform to popular opinion. The Japanese were facing limited amounts of food and fuel from the multiple U.S. attacks; military and civilian deaths had grown to roughly three million. In spite of all the destruction and fragility, Japan’s leaders were steadfast in maintaining defiance. The speaker, Father Wilson Miscamble, maintains that the only way the peace faction and Emperor Hirohito could have significant influence in urging surrender was if the a-bomb was
The author includes an excerpt from E. B. Sledge’s memoir where he shares his experience as a U.S. Marine in Japan. Because Sledge recalls a relentless, defiant attitude from the Japanese, the invasion was inevitable in his eyes. John Kenneth Galbraith, however, is sure that “the Japanese would have surrendered surely by November without an invasion” (Fussell 3). Fussell compares another difference in opinion between Joseph Alsop, who was captured by the Japanese, and David Joravsky, whose lack of fatal encounter with the adversaries influenced his conclusion that nuclear warfare could have been avoided. Each man’s stance on the morality of the bomb is shaped by their unique experiences in the war, and the author makes it a point to highlight this truth. As a follow up to Joravsky’s argument, Fussell stresses that American military had no way of knowing for sure that a Japanese surrender was on the horizon. All they really knew was that American vessels were sinking and the number of casualties were rapidly increasing. His overall conclusion contests that Truman’s decision to drop the bomb was not a haphazard one but one made to ‘shorten the agony of young Americans’ (Fussell …show more content…
Truman’s main goal, the speaker remarks, was to prevent an invasion of Japan. It is argued that the growing number of people who currently criticize the decision is a result of “limited historical knowledge” and likely a societal tendency to conform to popular opinion. The Japanese were facing limited amounts of food and fuel from the multiple U.S. attacks; military and civilian deaths had grown to roughly three million. In spite of all the destruction and fragility, Japan’s leaders were steadfast in maintaining defiance. The speaker, Father Wilson Miscamble, maintains that the only way the peace faction and Emperor Hirohito could have significant influence in urging surrender was if the a-bomb was