Operation HUSKY was the first major military operation following the Allied victories in North Africa. For the follow-on operation, the Americans favored a cross-channel invasion of Europe, but the British favored a peripheral approach to wear down the Axis. Ultimately, the decision to invade Sicily was the uneasy compromise reached at the Casablanca conference with the strategic goal of freeing Mediterranean shipping from Axis harassment, diverting German strength from the Russian Front and pressuring Italy to sue for peace. Senior leader’s inattention to planning to meet those strategic objectives plagued the operational plan from the start. Prior to the invasion, General Montgomery was critical of Alexander and Eisenhower for not taking
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The required trust runs vertical and horizontal throughout the chain of command. In Operation HUSKY trust was not as common as distrust. Alexander assigned the main effort of the campaign to Montgomery because he did not trust the American Army’s capabilities. Likewise, Patton did not trust Alexander or Montgomery and complained that Eisenhower sided too often with the British. Additionally, Inter-service rivalries compounded command relationship issues and prevented effective cooperation. In the extreme example, “the Air Force would not allow the Navy to communicate directly with the fighter cover ‘lest some naval commander attempt to control its fighter squadrons’” Ground commanders complained about close air support and inaccurate parachute drops, air commanders complained their aircraft about friendly fire losses and naval officers chided ground commanders for not using amphibious capabilities to outflank the enemy. As a result, the lack of trust at all echelons prevented joint integration and hampered the force’s ability to exploit advantages on the …show more content…
Unfortunately, those resources were not utilized in a coordinated manner to achieve unity of effort or mass. Air Marshal Coningham, commander of Allied tactical air forces established a cumbersome and unresponsive system to provide air cover that yielded the airspace over the beaches to the Axis. That system prevented the effective use of attack aircraft and left land commanders without aerial support. Additionally, Coningham’s policies had an effect on artillery and tanks. Because of the lack of air cover, Axis planes were free to attack spotter aircraft used to direct artillery and amphibious transports used to land tanks. Sherman tanks provided a tactical advantage, but were not able to offload quickly due to Axis air attack, rough seas and scattered landings on false beaches away from intended landing sites. The redeeming example of joint fires integration was the use of naval gunfire. Admiral Cunningham’s naval provided fire support from ship to shore, directed by imbedded navy teams. Naval gunfire repeatedly saved Allied ground forces during German counterattacks. Inter-service rivalries and distrust prevented the effective integration of joint fires and degraded the force’s ability to move and
The required trust runs vertical and horizontal throughout the chain of command. In Operation HUSKY trust was not as common as distrust. Alexander assigned the main effort of the campaign to Montgomery because he did not trust the American Army’s capabilities. Likewise, Patton did not trust Alexander or Montgomery and complained that Eisenhower sided too often with the British. Additionally, Inter-service rivalries compounded command relationship issues and prevented effective cooperation. In the extreme example, “the Air Force would not allow the Navy to communicate directly with the fighter cover ‘lest some naval commander attempt to control its fighter squadrons’” Ground commanders complained about close air support and inaccurate parachute drops, air commanders complained their aircraft about friendly fire losses and naval officers chided ground commanders for not using amphibious capabilities to outflank the enemy. As a result, the lack of trust at all echelons prevented joint integration and hampered the force’s ability to exploit advantages on the …show more content…
Unfortunately, those resources were not utilized in a coordinated manner to achieve unity of effort or mass. Air Marshal Coningham, commander of Allied tactical air forces established a cumbersome and unresponsive system to provide air cover that yielded the airspace over the beaches to the Axis. That system prevented the effective use of attack aircraft and left land commanders without aerial support. Additionally, Coningham’s policies had an effect on artillery and tanks. Because of the lack of air cover, Axis planes were free to attack spotter aircraft used to direct artillery and amphibious transports used to land tanks. Sherman tanks provided a tactical advantage, but were not able to offload quickly due to Axis air attack, rough seas and scattered landings on false beaches away from intended landing sites. The redeeming example of joint fires integration was the use of naval gunfire. Admiral Cunningham’s naval provided fire support from ship to shore, directed by imbedded navy teams. Naval gunfire repeatedly saved Allied ground forces during German counterattacks. Inter-service rivalries and distrust prevented the effective integration of joint fires and degraded the force’s ability to move and