In 1975, Allan Gibbard proposed the following example in order to develop his case against Kripke’s theory of rigid designators: Imagine you have in front of you two lumps of clay. One is shaped like the bottom half of a statue; the other shaped like the top half. You take these two lumps and connect them, thus making the statue whole and in effect creating a new object. You name this statue Goliath. However, when you connected these two lumps you also create a new lump (the two lumps put together), which you name Lump1. Since Goliath and Lump1 refer to the same spatiotemporal object–i.e. they share the same referent–we say that Goliath and Lump1 are identical. However, suppose you take Goliath/Lump1 and you squeeze it into a ball. Surely by
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In this way, Goliath does not refer to an actual thing in the material world, but rather a form that a thing can take. Consider as an analogy a hoop. A hoop is in the shape of a circle, thus we can also refer to the hoop as a circle and in doing so refer to the same spatiotemporal object. Yet, when we refer to the object as a circle we are not referring to the actual object itself, but merely the form in which the object has been instantiated. In other words, We can also put this in terms of proper names; say Hoop1 refers to the hoop, while Circle1 refers to the circle. In this case, Hoop1 designates the actual object while Circle1 refers to the circleness of the hoop. In this way Circle1, denotes what is closer to what we would consider a property, rather than a thing. Thus, Goliath can be said to designate a property of Lump1, namely its statuesque figure. Consequently, Goliath≠Lump1 because there do not share the same properties, rather Goliath, in a sense, is itself a property of …show more content…
In Gibbard’s article, he only gives a criteria for persistence for Goliath/Lump1 in which Lump1 has more “power” of persistence, let’s call it. By this I mean, we only discuss scenarios in which Goliath could be destroyed and Lump1 remain, which gives the impression that Lump1 has is a stronger identifier than Goliath. Both the Kripkean counter arguments of constitution and elimination rely on this assumption, as they either consider less of a thing-identifier than Lump1, or they eliminate it as a thing-identifier altogether. However, the Kripkean does not give sufficient reason for assuming that a statue is less of a thing than a lump, instead they rely on the one scenario we are given which suggests that lumps have more power of persistence than
In this way, Goliath does not refer to an actual thing in the material world, but rather a form that a thing can take. Consider as an analogy a hoop. A hoop is in the shape of a circle, thus we can also refer to the hoop as a circle and in doing so refer to the same spatiotemporal object. Yet, when we refer to the object as a circle we are not referring to the actual object itself, but merely the form in which the object has been instantiated. In other words, We can also put this in terms of proper names; say Hoop1 refers to the hoop, while Circle1 refers to the circle. In this case, Hoop1 designates the actual object while Circle1 refers to the circleness of the hoop. In this way Circle1, denotes what is closer to what we would consider a property, rather than a thing. Thus, Goliath can be said to designate a property of Lump1, namely its statuesque figure. Consequently, Goliath≠Lump1 because there do not share the same properties, rather Goliath, in a sense, is itself a property of …show more content…
In Gibbard’s article, he only gives a criteria for persistence for Goliath/Lump1 in which Lump1 has more “power” of persistence, let’s call it. By this I mean, we only discuss scenarios in which Goliath could be destroyed and Lump1 remain, which gives the impression that Lump1 has is a stronger identifier than Goliath. Both the Kripkean counter arguments of constitution and elimination rely on this assumption, as they either consider less of a thing-identifier than Lump1, or they eliminate it as a thing-identifier altogether. However, the Kripkean does not give sufficient reason for assuming that a statue is less of a thing than a lump, instead they rely on the one scenario we are given which suggests that lumps have more power of persistence than