In his work, “Certainty,” he presents the dream argument as being inconsistent. I agree with Moore because of his “logical inversion” which is the way he flips Descartes’ dream argument around. He makes sure to point out various instances where he was aware of where he was because of the way he was able to at least have a slight idea of his current state of being. Moore actually uses part of Descartes’ argument in order to form his own argument: “I agree, therefore, with that part of this argument which asserts that if I don’t know now that I’m not dreaming, it follows that I don’t know that I’m not dreaming, it follows that I don’t know that I am standing up, even if I both actually am and think that I am” (Moore, pg 30). His argument takes the idea of certainty when using what he does know from the clues that his senses give him versus what he doesn’t know. Moore uses his senses in his argument as the assurance of the certainty of his state of existence, as opposed to Descartes who uses it as the reason for his continuous doubt. Moore raises a very good point in that he exposes the inconsistency in Descartes argument by using Descartes’ acknowledgement of his past dreams. Moore agrees with Descartes to an extent but he believes the inconsistency lies within his second premise: “Can he possibly know therefore that dreams have occurred? I do not think that he can; and therefore I think that anyone who uses this premiss and also and also asserts the conclusion that nobody ever knows that he is not dreaming, is guilty of an inconsistency” (Moore, Certainty, pg 31). Moore is bringing up the inconsistency of how Descartes’ is deciding to doubt his state of existence. Throughout his dream argument, Descartes speaks about being unaware of whether or not he is dreaming. He explains the instances where he does know that he was deceived by his dreams: “Yet at the moment my eyes
In his work, “Certainty,” he presents the dream argument as being inconsistent. I agree with Moore because of his “logical inversion” which is the way he flips Descartes’ dream argument around. He makes sure to point out various instances where he was aware of where he was because of the way he was able to at least have a slight idea of his current state of being. Moore actually uses part of Descartes’ argument in order to form his own argument: “I agree, therefore, with that part of this argument which asserts that if I don’t know now that I’m not dreaming, it follows that I don’t know that I’m not dreaming, it follows that I don’t know that I am standing up, even if I both actually am and think that I am” (Moore, pg 30). His argument takes the idea of certainty when using what he does know from the clues that his senses give him versus what he doesn’t know. Moore uses his senses in his argument as the assurance of the certainty of his state of existence, as opposed to Descartes who uses it as the reason for his continuous doubt. Moore raises a very good point in that he exposes the inconsistency in Descartes argument by using Descartes’ acknowledgement of his past dreams. Moore agrees with Descartes to an extent but he believes the inconsistency lies within his second premise: “Can he possibly know therefore that dreams have occurred? I do not think that he can; and therefore I think that anyone who uses this premiss and also and also asserts the conclusion that nobody ever knows that he is not dreaming, is guilty of an inconsistency” (Moore, Certainty, pg 31). Moore is bringing up the inconsistency of how Descartes’ is deciding to doubt his state of existence. Throughout his dream argument, Descartes speaks about being unaware of whether or not he is dreaming. He explains the instances where he does know that he was deceived by his dreams: “Yet at the moment my eyes