The medieval thinker Algazali states that the “sun and moon, stars and elements, are in subjection to His command. There is none of them whose activity is produced by or proceeds from its own essence” (272). Algazali wrote this as a criticism of the philosopher’s postulated theory of cause and effect. His reason for this polemic was to uphold the omnipotence of God, for if necessary causal effects could be found in nature, the effects would not be acts of Gods will. Below, this paper will accomplish two things; first it will outline the first two points of Algazali’s argument put forth against the philosopher’s notion of necessary causation as it is found in “The Incoherence of the Philosophers”, and second it will offer a critical evaluation
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This proves that one event occurs “together with the other”, and not “that one occurs through [the agency of] the other” (284). When witnessing a flame burn a piece of cotton, what one can objectively assent to is the fact that a set of events have occurred, not that there is any necessary causal connection between these events. For Algazali the cause of everything is God, meaning that the ultimate cause is not temporally proximate, but “beyond our observation” (285). This holds to non-observable cases such as those “concerning the… introduction of the spirit… into the semen of animals” (284), and to observable cases such as fire burning cotton or of a “blind man” who falsely believes that the “opening of his sight” is the necessary cause of his vision, and not the light of the sun (284).
Due to the fact that the ultimate cause is transcendent, the philosophers concede that the “Giver of Forms”, an angelic mediator between humanity and God, creates all of the “accidents and things which come to be” through succession and change (285). This incorporeal agent emanates forms into the world which give human beings access to knowledge through the formation of concepts. Both parties agree on this point, but the philosopher’s notion of the Giver of Forms has a caveat, namely it does not act
This proves that one event occurs “together with the other”, and not “that one occurs through [the agency of] the other” (284). When witnessing a flame burn a piece of cotton, what one can objectively assent to is the fact that a set of events have occurred, not that there is any necessary causal connection between these events. For Algazali the cause of everything is God, meaning that the ultimate cause is not temporally proximate, but “beyond our observation” (285). This holds to non-observable cases such as those “concerning the… introduction of the spirit… into the semen of animals” (284), and to observable cases such as fire burning cotton or of a “blind man” who falsely believes that the “opening of his sight” is the necessary cause of his vision, and not the light of the sun (284).
Due to the fact that the ultimate cause is transcendent, the philosophers concede that the “Giver of Forms”, an angelic mediator between humanity and God, creates all of the “accidents and things which come to be” through succession and change (285). This incorporeal agent emanates forms into the world which give human beings access to knowledge through the formation of concepts. Both parties agree on this point, but the philosopher’s notion of the Giver of Forms has a caveat, namely it does not act