In October 2016, it was announced that a Saudi Imam would be visiting Nigeria in the near future to improve relations between the two countries; no doubt this Imam would condemn the actions of al-Barnawi and his followers as it would aid in the political aim of his mission. truly byzantine leader would do well to seize this as an opportunity to inflame the Sharia north through one of two COAs: coercing the Imam to denounce hostile action against Boko Haram; failing that, eliminating the Imam under a false-flag operation. Unless the Imam in question is a whole-hearted radical like the followers of al-Barnawi, coercion or otherwise convincing the religious official to spread pro-insurgent sentiment would be incredibly difficult as he would
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As stated by US diplomat Henry Kissinger, “The conventional army loses if it does not win. The guerrilla wins if he does not lose.” The strategic aim of al-Barnawi, once gaining rapport with local leaders and improving his troops’ competency, would do well to consolidate his position in the Sambisa Forest in which Boko Haram is presently confined. The forest, already heavily mined, could become the Nigerian army’s Vietnam War; by booby trapping, mining and otherwise sabotaging roads and trails towards insurgent held positions, the guerrillas would cripple and demoralize future inlays into the forest. Creating a defence-in-depth system of trenches in the deeper woods would further discourage the army from marching where they are not welcome. By lightly manning the forward trenches and feigning retreat, encouraged coalition forces could be lured deeper into the woods and slaughtered by further booby traps and awaiting militants. This sort of discouraging strategy would make even the most ambitious Nigerian officer think twice about barreling into enemy territory without vastly superior forces; at which point, the insurgents could simply retreat from their camps, allowing their foe to waste their resources on largescale probes into the heavily mined and sabotaged forest. The Nigerian and coalition forces would be forced to adopt a passive defence on the outskirts of the forest, rendered unable to advance due to attritional and morale damages. It is important to note that, in news articles published in November 2016, that the Nigerian Navy is currently deploying sailors to the region in order to supplement the Army and deploy gunboats onto Lake Chad; with the government being forced to deploy it’s navy onto dry land speaks to the desperation in which the Nigerian government seeks to quickly and decisively end the
As stated by US diplomat Henry Kissinger, “The conventional army loses if it does not win. The guerrilla wins if he does not lose.” The strategic aim of al-Barnawi, once gaining rapport with local leaders and improving his troops’ competency, would do well to consolidate his position in the Sambisa Forest in which Boko Haram is presently confined. The forest, already heavily mined, could become the Nigerian army’s Vietnam War; by booby trapping, mining and otherwise sabotaging roads and trails towards insurgent held positions, the guerrillas would cripple and demoralize future inlays into the forest. Creating a defence-in-depth system of trenches in the deeper woods would further discourage the army from marching where they are not welcome. By lightly manning the forward trenches and feigning retreat, encouraged coalition forces could be lured deeper into the woods and slaughtered by further booby traps and awaiting militants. This sort of discouraging strategy would make even the most ambitious Nigerian officer think twice about barreling into enemy territory without vastly superior forces; at which point, the insurgents could simply retreat from their camps, allowing their foe to waste their resources on largescale probes into the heavily mined and sabotaged forest. The Nigerian and coalition forces would be forced to adopt a passive defence on the outskirts of the forest, rendered unable to advance due to attritional and morale damages. It is important to note that, in news articles published in November 2016, that the Nigerian Navy is currently deploying sailors to the region in order to supplement the Army and deploy gunboats onto Lake Chad; with the government being forced to deploy it’s navy onto dry land speaks to the desperation in which the Nigerian government seeks to quickly and decisively end the