This could explain the longer unemployment period of workers who suffer involuntary job losses (Chan, Stevens 2001), as older workers will find less wage offers acceptable (Valletta 1991). Importantly, in Lazear’s model it is tenure and not age that could increase the longer unemployment period. Valletta (1991) allowed for nonlinear effects of age and tenure and found that although highest-tenure male workers were unemployed for a longer period, male workers’ and white-collar women’s unemployment period sharply increased in their 50s and 60s. Thus, Lazear’s contract does not fully explain the longer unemployment durations for older workers. In addition, the U.S. Department of Labor found that in 1965 60% of employers in cities without anti-age discrimination laws imposed upper age limitation (45-55 years old) on new hires. This further suggests that longer unemployment for older workers in not …show more content…
Adams (2001) found similar results. Importantly, although their test is weak, their research also suggests that the prohibition of mandatory retirement had no discernible effect. Similar finding come from earlier studies by Burkhauser & Quinn (1983) and Fields & Mitchell (1994). Adams (2001) also finds little evidence of effects of age discrimination laws on the relative probability that an older worker is a new hire and a reduced probability for 65-70-year-olds. Overall, the findings suggest that age discrimination laws boost the retention of older workers. Thus, more older workers remain in the labor force. Even if hiring probabilities may slightly worsen, the reduction in retirement leads to a net increase in retention and