1. In the summer of 1941, Admiral Kimmel received many warnings concerning the imminence of war. He took a plan about gave priority to training key personnel and supplying basic equipment to U.S. outposts in the Far East. In the late fall of 1941. Admiral Kimmel and his staff continued to cling to the policy to which they had committed themselves. On November 27, 1941, he received an explicit "war warning" from the chief of naval operations in Washington, which stirred up his concern but did not impel him to take any new protective action. This step he was short-circuited. Their vigilance seems to have been confined to paying careful attention to the way the warning was worded. Kimmel decided that the limited-alert condition that had been instituted
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Again, no effort was made to find out from Washington how the intelligence units there interpreted the message. On December 6, Kimmel's chief naval intelligence officer had reported to him that day, as he had on the preceding days, that despite fresh efforts to pick up Japanese naval signal calls, the whereabouts of all six of Japan's aircraft carriers still remained a mystery. Kimmel and his staff with regard to considering the possibility that Pearl Harbor itself might be one of the targets of a Japanese attack. On the afternoon of December 6, One member of the staff immediately reassured him that "the Japanese could not possibly be able to proceed in force against Pearl Harbor when they had so much strength concentrated in their Asiatic operations." At the end of the discussion, Kimmel "put his worries aside" and went off to a dinner party. Admiral Kimmel and his team ignored fresh warnings and even committed resources to training rather than defending the harbor because they held the belief that Japan would not attack American
Again, no effort was made to find out from Washington how the intelligence units there interpreted the message. On December 6, Kimmel's chief naval intelligence officer had reported to him that day, as he had on the preceding days, that despite fresh efforts to pick up Japanese naval signal calls, the whereabouts of all six of Japan's aircraft carriers still remained a mystery. Kimmel and his staff with regard to considering the possibility that Pearl Harbor itself might be one of the targets of a Japanese attack. On the afternoon of December 6, One member of the staff immediately reassured him that "the Japanese could not possibly be able to proceed in force against Pearl Harbor when they had so much strength concentrated in their Asiatic operations." At the end of the discussion, Kimmel "put his worries aside" and went off to a dinner party. Admiral Kimmel and his team ignored fresh warnings and even committed resources to training rather than defending the harbor because they held the belief that Japan would not attack American