1. Beginning with a discussion of the levels of analysis of conflict, identify the main empirical factors that contribute to international conflict according to Quackenbush. Also, discuss how the political aspect of war (Gray and Clausewitz) interacts with these factors to produce volatility in the international system. Discuss two wars of your choice within this context, identifying how each empirical factor played a role as well as the political nature of the onset and termination of the wars.
There are many levels or ways to classify war and international conflict. There is interstate war where it is a fight between two or more countries where at least one thousand battle deaths occur. There are extrastate wars where …show more content…
Decision-theoretic deterrence theory focuses on the interplay of the outcomes, choices and preferences in determining interstate conflict behavior. Under decision-theoretic deterrence theory, it is believed that nuclear war is a costly endeavor that only an unreasonable actor would contemplate it as a means to resolve conflict. This theory looks at interstate conflict and goes to prescribe solutions as to how states must act once presented with conflicts that don’t end in the usage of nuclear weapons. Under this theory of deterrence there is strategic uncertainty because you can never be certain of the intentions of others. There is rationality, because each state picks a strategy that will harvest the maximum possible utility and there is subjectivity also because states base their activities on how they identify others might …show more content…
The first was called nuclear revolution theory. Nuclear revolution theory is when the incredibly rapid and destructive effects of nuclear weapons create a strong disincentive for armed state to engage. The second is risk manipulation, escalation and limited war. This empathizes the issue of risk in confrontations between states who are in possession of nuclear weapons. The last is nuclear irrelevance, this is the argument that nuclear weapons are different in their effect from conventional military forces. These three ways of thinking bring you to three conclusions also. The first is that wars among states that have nuclear weapons in possession are improbable. If conflicts occur among states that fit that mold, it is less likely that war is started because ultimately the fear of the damage that can be done to each other. The second is that crisis among nuclear powers has a high probability and the third is that nuclear balance does not determine crisis