Despite burning airplanes and building structure issues, poor communication in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on 9-11 was the greatest factor to the loss of life. The efforts of the emergency personnel that came to help rescue the visitors and workers of the World Trade Center(WTC) were thwarted by the lack of communication and coordination between the police and fire departments and the towers’ security personnel. There were many aspects of poor communication that led to the loss of life, but the most devastating were the lack of communication between the fire departments (NYFD) and the police department (NYPD), the lack of communication and direction to the building call center and 911 operators, and limited distribution of information
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The book 102 Minutes authors Jim Dwyer and Kevin Flynn provide in depth insight of the communication failures of 9-11 by using eye-witness accounts gained from interviews with survivors and rescuers as well as phone messages, emails and transcripts from victims. Professor of Emergency Medicine Dr. Thomas Terndrup, who witnessed the communication failures first hand as a doctor working at a makeshift clinic a block away from the WTC on 9-11, and his colleague Nicholas Kman summarized the lessons learned from the poor communication on 9-11 and help communities devise plans to correct the issues that led to loss of life. After learning of the communication failures that led to an increase in the loss of life on 9-11 many emergency responders and community leaders have worked to provide better equipment, alternative portable communication systems, training, and better coordination and communication between fire departments, police departments, and emergency …show more content…
They encouraged workers who called them to stay on in their offices and wait for help. They even told employees from Fuji/Mizuho company who evacuated from the 80th floor of the south tower to return to their office. Phil Hayes, the retired firefighter who was the deputy fire director for the WTC announced, “There is no need to evacuate Building 2. If you are in the midst of evacuating the building you may use the reentry doors and elevators to return to your office” (Dwyer and Flynn 72). People watching the news reports in other states knew more than the emergency personnel and the 9-11 operators directing people into danger. Many people in the towers did not even know that airplanes had hit their buildings. Employees and visitors at the WTC didn’t follow their instincts and emergency training procedures that they had practiced to evacuate, instead they relied on bad information provided by uninformed emergency experts. Stairway A in the south tower was open and an available escape route, but that information was never give to the building command post or 911 operators taking calls from employees trying to find a way out. There was no protocol followed to provide building security workers and operators with the information
The book 102 Minutes authors Jim Dwyer and Kevin Flynn provide in depth insight of the communication failures of 9-11 by using eye-witness accounts gained from interviews with survivors and rescuers as well as phone messages, emails and transcripts from victims. Professor of Emergency Medicine Dr. Thomas Terndrup, who witnessed the communication failures first hand as a doctor working at a makeshift clinic a block away from the WTC on 9-11, and his colleague Nicholas Kman summarized the lessons learned from the poor communication on 9-11 and help communities devise plans to correct the issues that led to loss of life. After learning of the communication failures that led to an increase in the loss of life on 9-11 many emergency responders and community leaders have worked to provide better equipment, alternative portable communication systems, training, and better coordination and communication between fire departments, police departments, and emergency …show more content…
They encouraged workers who called them to stay on in their offices and wait for help. They even told employees from Fuji/Mizuho company who evacuated from the 80th floor of the south tower to return to their office. Phil Hayes, the retired firefighter who was the deputy fire director for the WTC announced, “There is no need to evacuate Building 2. If you are in the midst of evacuating the building you may use the reentry doors and elevators to return to your office” (Dwyer and Flynn 72). People watching the news reports in other states knew more than the emergency personnel and the 9-11 operators directing people into danger. Many people in the towers did not even know that airplanes had hit their buildings. Employees and visitors at the WTC didn’t follow their instincts and emergency training procedures that they had practiced to evacuate, instead they relied on bad information provided by uninformed emergency experts. Stairway A in the south tower was open and an available escape route, but that information was never give to the building command post or 911 operators taking calls from employees trying to find a way out. There was no protocol followed to provide building security workers and operators with the information