My Experience in the 35Batallion
In June 2008, I was appointed as the 35Batallion staff officer in charge of operations and training. This position was important but challenging especially because the Battalion was undergoing a UN peacekeeping pre-deployment training and was to be deployed in one of the most insecure place of Darfur. The Battalion Hq was to be established in Kabkabiya locality which was the most insecure area of Darfur because it was also known as the Headquarter of Janjaweed militias, a pro-government militia group that was conducting ethnic cleansing on behalf of the Sudan government. In addition, it was to be my first experience in the UN peacekeeping operations. More unfortunately, the 35BN Commanding officer Col K John …show more content…
Considering the fact that I was the pivotal staff officer of the Battalion, I decided that I should see both Colonels separately in order to encourage them to sit down and solve the matter. A solution to the misunderstanding between the two commanders needed calculated procedures for more efficiency. The first I talked to was the Deputy Commanding officer. I first talked to him about the negative impact of their personal issues on the Battalion operations, on the command climate and the image of our country in the peacekeeping community. I shared with him my analysis of the causes of their lack of cooperation, resulting mainly from his redundancy. The Deputy commander kept listening to me as I spoke. At the end, he told me that although I had a point, a Captain was not entitled to reconcile two colonels. I agreed with him but told him that he should accept to bear the responsibilities of consequences from their differences in case they were not resolved. However, I left his house with a determination to continue my initiative. Drawing from my unfruitful discussions with the Deputy Commander, I decided to form team of officers to go with for my next meeting with the Commanding Officer. The formed committee included the Battalion S4 and S5. I had to convince them that they do not risk anything in bringing together the two leaders. They finally accepted but asked me to speak on their behalf, which I accepted. I and my colleagues met the Commanding officer and I told him of our disappointment on the current command climate in the Battalion resulting from his differences with the Deputy Commanding Officer. I told him that the main issue was the Battalion structure that did not give responsibilities to the Deputy CO, which made him to be redundant. The CO agreed with me and accepted that we call the Deputy CO to that meeting. At his arrival, the debate started to be heated, as
In June 2008, I was appointed as the 35Batallion staff officer in charge of operations and training. This position was important but challenging especially because the Battalion was undergoing a UN peacekeeping pre-deployment training and was to be deployed in one of the most insecure place of Darfur. The Battalion Hq was to be established in Kabkabiya locality which was the most insecure area of Darfur because it was also known as the Headquarter of Janjaweed militias, a pro-government militia group that was conducting ethnic cleansing on behalf of the Sudan government. In addition, it was to be my first experience in the UN peacekeeping operations. More unfortunately, the 35BN Commanding officer Col K John …show more content…
Considering the fact that I was the pivotal staff officer of the Battalion, I decided that I should see both Colonels separately in order to encourage them to sit down and solve the matter. A solution to the misunderstanding between the two commanders needed calculated procedures for more efficiency. The first I talked to was the Deputy Commanding officer. I first talked to him about the negative impact of their personal issues on the Battalion operations, on the command climate and the image of our country in the peacekeeping community. I shared with him my analysis of the causes of their lack of cooperation, resulting mainly from his redundancy. The Deputy commander kept listening to me as I spoke. At the end, he told me that although I had a point, a Captain was not entitled to reconcile two colonels. I agreed with him but told him that he should accept to bear the responsibilities of consequences from their differences in case they were not resolved. However, I left his house with a determination to continue my initiative. Drawing from my unfruitful discussions with the Deputy Commander, I decided to form team of officers to go with for my next meeting with the Commanding Officer. The formed committee included the Battalion S4 and S5. I had to convince them that they do not risk anything in bringing together the two leaders. They finally accepted but asked me to speak on their behalf, which I accepted. I and my colleagues met the Commanding officer and I told him of our disappointment on the current command climate in the Battalion resulting from his differences with the Deputy Commanding Officer. I told him that the main issue was the Battalion structure that did not give responsibilities to the Deputy CO, which made him to be redundant. The CO agreed with me and accepted that we call the Deputy CO to that meeting. At his arrival, the debate started to be heated, as