In 1969 after discussing the prospects of an anti-US embargo, the CIA believed that an oil embargo against the United States would never last long due to the strong inner conflicts and opposing objectives within the Arab world (Qaimmaqami & Keefer 34). In fact, there were already divides among Arab nations during the OAPEC discussions on production cuts because Saudi Arabia, contrary to many other countries, was hesitant to adopt a complete embargo against the United States (Alnasrawi 90-92). However, on October 19, 1973, after President Nixon asked Congress for 2.2 billion dollars for military aid to Israel, even Saudi Arabia was angered and allowed OAPEC enacted a complete oil embargo against the United States and other pro-Israel countries (Avneri 763; Alnasrawi 90-2; Zahlan 57; Al-Sowayegh 127-9; Ryan 72). However, even after enacting the embargo, the divisions reemerged. Despite the fact that the goal of the embargo was to restore Palestinian rights and free occupied Palestinian territory from Israel, the Palestinians were never involved in the Oil Embargo discussions, (Alnasrawi 105). Furthermore, localized political objectives and interests triumphed over Arab solidarity in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Alnasrawi 157). Saudi Arabia, intent on maintaining its friendship with the United States, increased the oil exports to other nations in December 1973 and supported an early end to the anti-US embargo (Alnasrawi 112). The Saudi support of the United States was very influential because Saudi Arabia has the world’s largest known oil reserves (Ryan 17). Additionally, most other Arab nations relied on a functioning US economy, so they also supported an early end to the embargo (Ali 62; Alnasrawi 106). The Arab solidarity quickly faltered against the weight of national self-interest, and the
In 1969 after discussing the prospects of an anti-US embargo, the CIA believed that an oil embargo against the United States would never last long due to the strong inner conflicts and opposing objectives within the Arab world (Qaimmaqami & Keefer 34). In fact, there were already divides among Arab nations during the OAPEC discussions on production cuts because Saudi Arabia, contrary to many other countries, was hesitant to adopt a complete embargo against the United States (Alnasrawi 90-92). However, on October 19, 1973, after President Nixon asked Congress for 2.2 billion dollars for military aid to Israel, even Saudi Arabia was angered and allowed OAPEC enacted a complete oil embargo against the United States and other pro-Israel countries (Avneri 763; Alnasrawi 90-2; Zahlan 57; Al-Sowayegh 127-9; Ryan 72). However, even after enacting the embargo, the divisions reemerged. Despite the fact that the goal of the embargo was to restore Palestinian rights and free occupied Palestinian territory from Israel, the Palestinians were never involved in the Oil Embargo discussions, (Alnasrawi 105). Furthermore, localized political objectives and interests triumphed over Arab solidarity in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Alnasrawi 157). Saudi Arabia, intent on maintaining its friendship with the United States, increased the oil exports to other nations in December 1973 and supported an early end to the anti-US embargo (Alnasrawi 112). The Saudi support of the United States was very influential because Saudi Arabia has the world’s largest known oil reserves (Ryan 17). Additionally, most other Arab nations relied on a functioning US economy, so they also supported an early end to the embargo (Ali 62; Alnasrawi 106). The Arab solidarity quickly faltered against the weight of national self-interest, and the