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68 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Political science
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Political Science is the science is the study of the way people act as they seek power.
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World politics-
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Narrow: Concerning the relationships among states (or countries). Broader: Study of state and non-state actors and their relationship to each other in the international system. International System: A patterned set of interactions among the major political actors on the international stage.
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scientific method
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phenomenon, theory, hypothesis, methods, data/results, discussion, conclusion.
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social science
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the branch of science that studies society and the relationships of individuals within a society. Systematic method of gathering evidence related to an idea about how the world works, usually results in a prediction. Objective, and not partisan.
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theory
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logically consistent set of statements that explains a phenomena of interest, will oversimplify things, make sure logically consistent and hypothesis- testable statement designed to see if the theory holds water.
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quantitative evidence
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statistical analysis of new or existing data, content analysis, large scale and qualitative evidence- interviews, process tracing, ethnography, content analysis, archival research, small scale. Both approaches have positives and negatives for individual researcher and for social science as a discipline.
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INGO
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international non-governmental organizations.
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actor's preferences
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When actors have different interests, their interactions usually involve bargaining, cooperation, or some combination of the two. Actors of interest differ in their preferences over world political. Institutions themselves have been shaped by actor's interests. Common groupings: states, domestic political groups, for-profit firms, bureaucracies, IGOs, NGOs. rank ordered preferences - identify 1st best outcome, 2nd best outcome, etc. See Mazlows hierarchy of needs.
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states
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central authority with the ability to make and enforce laws, rules, and decisions within a specified territory, typically thought of as sovereign within a territory. states operate in an anarchic system
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anarchy
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A social state in which there is no governing person or group of people, but each individual has absolute liberty (without the implication of disorder)
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national interests
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interests that belong to the state itself, generally driven by security and power
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military interests
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less likely to want to go to war, more likely to want to use overwhelming force.
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interactions
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- the ways in which the choices of two or more actors combine to produce political outcomes. it is the game that is played by actors with varying interests.
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best responses
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each actor is behaving to maximize their personal utility or interest, given the strategies of every other player
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cooperation
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(an interaction where no one is made worse off than before and at least 1 actor is made better off ) 2 actors, both have interests where they would like more of something. Cooperation creates additional value while bargaining only allocates a fixed sum of value between two different actors. Why not? BIG REASON: incentives to defect. Cooperation is self -sustaining - once coordination is achieved, no one can benefit by unilaterally defecting. 4 Factors that facilitate cooperation:
(1) Number and relative size of actors (2) Iteration and strategies of reciprocal punishment (3) Linkage (4) Information *Remember - some of these things can be done through institutions It is easier for a smaller number of actors to cooperate: easier to communicate and monitor. |
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bargaining
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(an interaction where actors must choose outcomes that make one better at the expense of another) Power: the ability of Actor A to get Actor B do something that B would otherwise not do. The more power an actor has, the more it can expect to get from others in the final outcome of bargaining. Bargaining can fail when:
1)There is incomplete information 2)Commitment to terms of deal is questionable 3)Disputed good is hard to divide 4)War itself is part of the bargaining process A state will accept a bargain that gives it at least as much as it expects from war. Must decide if deal is better than fighting. Likely outcomes and costs of war define the range of acceptable outcomes from crisis bargaining. |
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institutions
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rules of the game. set of rules that are known and shared by the community. many institutions get embodied in laws or organizations. can have profound impacts on cooperation and bargaining interactions. EX) ntergovernmental organizations (IGOs) - United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization. voting rules - democracy, who makes decisions regarding foreign policy, political economy.
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how institutions impact interactions
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1. can determine who plays the game. some actors, by the rules of the game, may not even have a say in the interaction. 2.determines the structure of the interaction. who moves first - challenger or defender. 3. determines which moves are ok. sets standards of behavior, regularity in interactions. 4. can verify compliance. often times, self-verify - countries can supply their own information that they are complying with the institution. 5. reduce the costs of joint decision making. regular schedule of interactions. 6. can create ways to resolve disputes. dispute settlement mechanisms - World Trade Organization. can allow an opportunity to opt-out derogable rights in human rights treaties, exibility in abiding to environmental standards in times of economic emergency.
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institutional design
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institutions themselves are the product of past interactions
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why comply with institution?
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They facilitate cooperation. some would contend, however, that institutions facilitate
cooperation only on things that would have happened anyway. Maintaining an institution may be less costly than creating a new one. institutions are sticky - once started, hard to get rid of. |
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Pareto efficient
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outcomes where no other outcome makes every player at least as well off and at least one player strictly better off, outcomes that can't be improved upon without hurting at least one player.
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status quo
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the outcome prior to the current interaction
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zero-sum game
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Gains for one side perfectly match the losses of the other
Bargaining is purely redistributive |
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defecting
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is adopting a uncooperative strategy that undermines the collective goal. Individual interest may lead actors to defecting - example: short term gains, desire to cheat. Individual incentive to defect undermines the collective interest to cooperate.
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coordination
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- Once actions are coordinated, there is no potential benefit from defecting. Cooperation is self -sustaining - once coordination is achieved, no one can benefit by unilaterally defecting. Battle of the sexes
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collaberation
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The problem of collaboration: Actors would benefit from cooperating but have a unilateral incentive to defect. Prisoners delima.
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public goods
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are socially desirable products defined by two qualities: Nonexcludable - if good is provided to one, others can't be excluded from enjoying it. Nonrival in consumption - if good is consumed by one, still there for others.
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collective action
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Efforts to produce public goods are hindered by collective action problems. Each individual has an incentive to free ride: Failing to contribute while benefiting from the efforts of others.
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issue linkage
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ties cooperation on one policy dimension to cooperation on other dimensions. Allows victims to retaliate by withholding cooperation on other issues.
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reversion outcome
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the outcome that occurs when no bargain is reached. This influences power and the outcome of bargaining of any bargaining interaction. is not always the status quo. Bargaining power belongs to actors most satisfied with, or most willing to endure , the reversion outcome. Power derives from the ability to make the reversion outcome better for oneself and/or worse for the other side.
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agenda setting
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- A party that can act first to set the agenda transforms the choices available to others. Agenda-setting power: actions taken prior to or during bargaining that make the reversion outcome more favorable for one party.
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game theory
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see lecture 4
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prisoners dilemma
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see lecture 4
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war
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an event involving the organized use of military force by at least two parties that satisfies some minimum threshold of severity. my addition: typically, one of the parties must be a state.
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bargaining model of war
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find it out
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interstate war
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at least two participants in sustained combat should qualify as members of the interstate system and there should be at least 1000 battle related fatalities among all of the system members involved. A state involved is regarded as a participant if it incurs a minimum of 100 fatalities or has 1000 armed personnel engaged in fighting.
major parties v. minor parties length of time in war battle deaths 2 parties, multiple parties |
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intrastate war
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fought within state borders between a government and non-government forces, the central government should be actively involved in military action with effective resistance for both sides, and there should be at least 1000 battle related deaths during the civil war. In order to constitute effective resistance, both sides must have been initially organized for violent conflict, or the weaker side must be able to inflict upon the stronger opponents at least five percent of the number of fatalities it sustains.
major parties v. minor parties length of time in war battle deaths 2 parties, multiple parties *key point: many of the same interactions, institutions, and interests are involved in intrastate war as involved in interstate war. |
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conflict
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a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, and results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.
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bargining space
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see lecture 6
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compellence
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threat of force used to change the status quo.
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deterrence
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threat of force to preserve the status quo
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extended deterrence
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threat of force to preserve status quo of a third party
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incomplete info
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Hard to get information on military capabilities of rebel group. size of rebel armies, financial flows, degree of support among population. Rebel groups likely to be protective about their info and have strong incentives to misrepresent. Hard for rebel groups to gage the resolve of the government. governments want to signal resolve to other possible rebel groups.
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indivisible issue
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n theory - should be easy example: alternating control of the presidency (in 1958
Colombia). From the government's point of view - issue may be indivisible because of fears of further rebel groups with grievances. |
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audience costs
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Tying Hands - try to make negative consequences felt at home if don't follow through.
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credible commitments and cilil war
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Biggest reason for civil wars - why bargain hard to get and why war, once started, hard to stop. Large power asymmetries between government and potential rebel groups - makes it easy for government to renege. rebel groups don't have the issue-linkage abilities to punish state if reneges.
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unitary actor assumption
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assumes that all within state have similar interests with regards to cost and benefits of war. sometimes domestic interests di
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rally effect
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people's tendency to become more supportive of their own government during a crisis.
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walk the dog
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Clinton/Lewinsky scandal and Operation Infinite Reach
(bombing of Afghanistan and Sudan 1998) - wag the dog |
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domestic interests in war
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Wars impose domestic political costs - could be too risky for all out war. generally, the extent to which civilians have political control
(final say) over the military influences whether the military has a private interest in favor of war fighting. |
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alliance
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written agreements, signed by official representatives of at least two independent states, that include promises to aid a partner in the event of military
conflict, to remain neutral in the event of conflict, to refrain from military conflict with one another, or to consult/cooperate in the event of international crises that create a potential for military conflict. 2 Alliances are formed for a variety of political, economic, and military interests - there is some evidence of both balancing and bandwagoning. 3 Alliances impact war outbreak by changing the costs and bene |
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democratic peace theory
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Mature democracies rarely fight each other.
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democratization and war
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Monadic: Democracies are peaceful in general - doesn't hold. Democracies do not fight one another. Systemic: As the proportion of democracies go up, less war overall (even between non-democracies).
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spurious correlation
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n which two occurrences have no causal connection, yet it may be inferred that they do, due to a certain third, unseen factor (referred to as a "confounding factor" or "lurking variable"). The spurious relationship gives an impression of a worthy link between two groups that is invalid when objectively examined. ( Ex. golf and way, mcdonalds peace theory.)
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democracy
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a political system in which candidates compete for political office through frequent, fair elections in which a sizeable portion of the adult population can vote. This includes two major aspects of democracy: contestation and participation
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types of alliances
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defense pact
offense pact alliance non-aggression pact Consultation Pact |
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types of alliances
1 Defense Pact |
written promises to assist an ally militarily in the event of attack on the ally's sovereignty or territorial integrity EXAMPLE: NATO.
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offense pact
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any promise not based on attack to sovereignty or territory EXAMPLE: Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact
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alliance
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- member promises not to join a conflict between one or more alliance partners and a third party on the side of the ally's adversary can still offer use of resources.
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non-aggression pact
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must promise specifically to refrain from the use of force in relations with the alliance partner, to refrain from participating in any action against the alliance partner and/or to settle all disputes peacefully in relations with the alliance partner tend to be between countries with different interests. more like peace treaties - may be associated with an increased chance of war between the allies.
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Consultation Pact
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promises to consult with one or more alliance partners in the
event of crises with the potential to become militarized conflicts. The consultation obligation must be (1) specific to militarized crises, and (2) imply a goal of policy coordination sometimes flowery language. |
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collective security organizations
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Institutions that facilitate cooperation among their members. Broad based institutions that promote peace and security among their members. Universal institutions intended to deter challenges to the status quo.
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entrapment
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being forced into risky war you didn't want)
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credible commitment
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democracies are more likely to comply with international agreements (even non-conflict) agreements. �ict)flicagreements
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incentive to misrepresent
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Rebel groups likely to be protective about their info
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ballance of power
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When two states must combine their capabilities to counter a security threat. Sometimes it pays to join the stronger / winning side - bandwagoning
there are often more than just 2 sides. Other interests still matter. |
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UN Security Council
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does require unanimous vote of all permanent 5 (US, UK, France, Russia, China). SC can identify act of aggression and threats and can determine a response. 1st - economic and diplomatic sanctions. 2nd - military operations.
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peacekeeping
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typically, invited in after hostilities have ceased host nation agreement watch as troops are withdrawn, monitor cease-fire lines
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