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25 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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The Reagan Era
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strengthened bilateral ties: cont. increase military coop., joint econ dvlpmt grp, 1984 Shimon Peres elected and initiated econ stabilization program
policy disagreements: Reagan sold SA fancy planes, PM Begin surprise attack on Iran's nuclear reactor w/o int'l support criticized by Reagan, U.S. opened dialogue with PLO criticized by Israel |
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Madrid Peace Conference
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background: co-sponsored by U.S. and USSR, first time all parties were convened beyond Israelis and Palestinians including Syrians Lebanese and Jordanians
conference: everyone had hard line stances and was televised, 2-level game and domestic concern was first after int'l, Palestinian officials were taking orders from PLO results: symbolically significant but not much achieved except that Palestinian question finally dealt with, PLO considered terrorist organization by U.S. and Israel until this point and Israel had previously had policy of not negotiating w/ terrorists |
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Oslo Process and Accords
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new Israeli gov't: Shamir subsidizing W. Bank living for Russian Jews, asked for $400 mill from U.S. for settlements didn't get it, historic '92 election Labor Party Rabin beat Moderate Conservative Shamir which is the first Labor gov't since 70s, due to Palestinian uprising and bad U.S. relations
process: resulting from Madrid Peace Conference, Israeli scholars met secretly w/ PLO, Rabin didn't like the idea of working with PLO but promised progress so sent Peres, PLO was more accommodating than in Washington talks accords: 1993, between Israeli PM Rabin and PLO Chair Arafat, established Palestinian Authority, mutual recognition PLO amended charter, divvied land (Israel w/draw from heavily Palestinian land and Israeli control of Israel populated places joint control of mixed areas), called for final status settlement within 5 years of establishment of Palestinian Authority |
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Camp David II
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background: July 2000, Clinton Israeli PM Ehud Barak and Palestinian Authority Chair Arafat, Barak pressured Clinton on summit, bad timing Clinton is almost done, bad personality mix Arafat was not bold decision making and not ready, Barak lacked cultural and social IQ
major disagreements: Temple Mound Arafat denied temple ever existed for Jews, refugees PLO wanted right of return, borders Barak willing to w/draw 90% W. Bank PLO wanted 100% outcome: Barak made Clinton go between him and Arafat b/c didn't want to deal directly Arafat just kept saying no, viewed by Barak as exacting as many concessions from Israelis as possible without intending to reach agreement, Barak looked like a fool |
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The Second Intifada/ Al-Aqsa
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resulted from Sharon visiting Temple Mound, Arafat may have played role in sparking it, Palestinian uprising, bloody
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Taba Summit
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January 2001, in Egypt, Arafat Barak and Clinton, got as close to an agreement as ever, lays out Clinton's Parameters for Peace, ran out of time
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Ariel Sharon
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policies: blamed Arafat for all of Intifada, erects the barrier w/ intention of temporary separation, gives speech at La Trun and shocks with Palestinian state solution, speech at Herzlia announcing intention to withdraw from W. Bank,
politics: PM win was big shock, radical for right wingers internal battle with Netanyahu fighting him for settlers and super right wing support, leaves and forms centrist Kadima Party in 2005 |
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Elusive Peace: Israel and the Arabs
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tensions between two prong game for each party, pre-requisites held back the peace process
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Saudi Peace Plan
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background: 2002, proposed peace plan for the first time, possibly due to fact that they had an image problem after 9/11 bombers were Saudi
policies: offered peace and normalization to Israel in exchange for '67 borders and Israeli acceptance of refugees and Jerusalem had to be divided turned into Arab Peace Initiative b/c Arab League always revisits it |
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Road Map for Peace
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background: April 2003, proposed by Bush, wanted to see progress somewhere in ME
policies: bottom up structure w/ 3 stages, 1) mutual recognition, end of terrorism by P end of settlements by I 2) est. P state w/ temp borders, restore econ. links to I 3) negotiations over core issues ex. borders, refugees, Jerusalem failure: Sharon accepted but only partially fulfilled, unilaterally w/draws from Gaza, sequential process guiding principle of reciprocity, if one phase doesn't work the rest won't work, stage 1 problems never resolved |
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Ehud Olmert
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background: succeeds Sharon, wants to cont. Sharon's policies, also Kadima party, participates in Annapolis Conference, not much progress, scandals forced resignation in 2009, replaced by Netanyahu
policies: supports 2 state solution, used to be hardliner in Likud, opposed Camp David accord, |
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Mahmoud Abbas
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aka Abu Mazen, replaces Arafat, PM Salam Fayyad, participates in Annapolis Conference
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Annapolis Conference
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background: Nov. 2007, W. Olmert and Abbas, bottom up structure, simultaneous final negotiations, didn't really take off, some progress between Olmert and Abbas in secret talks but Olmert was forced to resign in '09
obstacles: settlements continued, distractions such as Lebanon War Gaza War Olmert corruption scandal, Olmert conceded a lot of W. Bank in negotiations |
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Obama's ME Objectives
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improving U.S. reputation in Arab world- all time low during W. yrs, Cairo Speech in 09 new beginning, called for cooperation, est. of Pal. state, led to disappointment b/c of high expectations set
Iraq War- war ended 12/11, costly in $ and lives Redefining U.S. alliances after Arab spring- inconsistent responses, relations w/ leaders not peoples, didn't take sides like in Tunisia, Isr. saw Obama's stance on Mubarak as betrayal, criticism of handling of Syria non-intervent. Resolving Isr.-Pal. conflict- every past prez had tried, failed |
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Obama & Israel
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Relationship w/ Netanyahu- 1) personality clashes Obama is straightforward businesslike cold, BB is arrogant pragmatic hawkish 2) substantive differences on Palestinian state, BB's stance not clear 3) settlements Obama's early demands included freeze, BB won't do removal, Obama learned not to pressure BB on this, Abbas willing to renegotiate if BB willing to stop expand 4) Iran same goals but different red lines, U.S. red line Iran possessing nukes, Israeli red line is capable of turning enriched uranium into nuke
Suppport for Israel- 1) security unprecedented defense coord., largest joint exercise this fall, Austere 12, Iron Dome anti-missile system, new 10 yr sanctions against Iran 2) diplomacy opposing Pal. request for UN admission, opposed efforts to delegitimize Israel ex. BDS 3) empathy weakest point for Obama until trip |
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Obama & Peace Process
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questions: will it be revived? results from trip? 2nd term difference? kerry v. hillary?
situation: Hamas non-cooperation, Abbas has credibility issue and needs to repair repute, could bypass Net. and appeal to Israeli public, time as factor for action |
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Factors behind U.S.-Israel "Special Relationship"
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sentimental factors- Jews supported FDR New Deal, moral debt after WWII, Truman recog., Tru Counsel Clifford advocated self determination, Wilson convinced by European nationalism
common values- Judeo-Christian morality, democratic (peace theory), Kant's perpetual peace, only dem. in ME, bipartisan support strategic factors- first decade post-recognition not seen as asset and had no arms, security guarantee from Ike, JFK and LBJ increased strategic cooperation hawks and jets, Isr. seen stronger then, Cold War against USSR Reagan |
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Foreign Aid Facts and Figures
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50s and 60s aid was low, increased during Nixon admin, today all aid comes in form of military aid, economic aid ended in 2007
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Checkbook Diplomacy
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used for punishments or positive econ. inducement strategy, ex. PM Shamir requested $400 million loan from H.W. in exchange he called for pause in settlements but they refused
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U.S. Strategic Interests in ME
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Nixon Rogers Plan, Kissinger Shuttle Diplomacy, Carter Camp David, H.W. Madrid Conference, Washington Talks, Oslo Accords, on and off talks now
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Israel as Strategic Liability or Asset
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liability- too vocally opposed to rest of ME, needs too much reassurance, view selves as david rather than goliath, not recognized by neighbors and vulnerable
asset- regional superpower, intel on Iran and other regional threats |
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AIPAC
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background: since 50s, only one til 90s, largest registered
policy: supports strong U.S.-Isr. relations supposedly non-partisan opposition: during 93 Oslo process, 94 Rabin frustrated AIPAC didn't support PLO-Isr. mutual recognition and started Israel Policy Forum later absorbed by CAP |
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J Street
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started 2009, led by a Clinton aide, countering AIPAC, promotes peace process,
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The Christian Right
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support: CUFI right wing, Armageddon-focused, Messianic fervor support for Israel
against: not every Christian group supports though ex. Churches United for BDS, pro-Palestinian networks exist |
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Walt-Mearsheimer Thesis
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argument: domestic interest groups like AIPAC drive U.S. politics towards ME, U.S. and Isr. interests not the same and these groups makes the U.S. act against own interest ex. AIPAC instrumental to entering Iraq War
significance: shattered taboo of not challenging pro-Israel movement critiques: flawed scholarship of conjecturing, not Israeli experts overextending, lobbies don't have integral role in U.S. politics, strategic interests more important, goes against realism, Presidents make own decisions, ex. Reagan recognized PLO against AIPAC interest, other domestic players in ME/policies involving Israel, public opinion not taken into account |
