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10 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Does Aquinas maintain that one must believe that there are notions in God and agree on what they are?
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No. We can disagree - SO LONG AS we don’t mean to hold anything that is against the faith.
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Why does Aquinas call the Father a principle but not a cause of the Son and the Holy Spirit?
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Because “principle” is simply that from which something proceeds
Meanwhile, “cause” implies a disparity in perfection and power between cause and effect. |
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Jesus calls the Father “Father.” What theological reasons might we give for this? I.e. how is “Father” a better name than “Begetter”?
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The Father is distinguished by his paternity - therefore, he is named by this relation.
This is a better name than begetter since “begetter” signifies something in process, while “Father” signifies something that has been completed. |
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How does the Father exemplify fatherhood more perfectly than human fathers? After all, human fathers can have many sons and daughters, but the Father only has one.
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Because the divine Son is EVERYTHING that the Father is - the ENTIRE likeness has been begotten.
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In ST I, q. 33, a. 3, Aquinas asserts that “Father” as applied to God is first of all a personal name. What does he mean? I.e. how is it personal, how is it essential, what does this mean for the adoption of creatures?
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It is personal in that it primarily signifies the Father’s relation to the Son.
It is essential in that it secondarily signifies the Trinity’s relation to creatures. While we have been joined to the Son, and can thence call the Son “brother,” our adoption into the Son primarily makes us sons of the whole trinity. Father is only secondarily applied to the whole Trinity and primarily to the Father since inter-trinitarian relations take precedence over missions to creatures. |
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In what ways may God be said to be the Father of creatures? What does Aquinas’ analysis of this in ST I, q. 33, a. 3, suggest about the place of humans in the universe?
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Despite our union to the Son, there is still a distinction between the created and uncreated realms, so we still have a filial relationship to all three persons of the Trinity.
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To whom does Aquinas say that the Our Father is addressed, and what is the theological point he is making by taking this (unmodern) position?
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The whole trinity.
All three persons are equally the uncreated source of creatures. |
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How might we reply to the objection that innascibility cannot be a notion, because every notion must affirm something positive?
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Because first and simple things are known by negations.
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In what sense can the divine essence be said to be “unbegotten”? (q. 33, a. 4, ad 3; class notes on heresies) How might Aquinas’ insight here resolve the ancient agenetos vs. agennetos problem exploited by Eunomius?
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In a sense, “unbegotten” means “uncreated,” and can thus be used as an essential term.
Eunomius: either the Son is the essence AND the Father, or he is neither; and the essence is innascible, and thus can’t be possessed by the Son, who has an origin. Aquinas answers this here by saying that the essence is innascible substantially (in the sense of being uncreated) but not in the sense applied to the Father, who is innascible relatively speaking. |
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How does Aquinas demonstrate that there cannot be two innascible beings?
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- Because this would be to suppose two Gods;
- one God would not be from the other; - they would not be distinguished by relative opposition, and therefore instead by diversity of nature - neither would be one God as the source of all which means there would have to be something beside them as a source - which is impossible |
