Transportation Laws Mrc

Front 1

Pedro De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. L-47822, 22 December 1988

Back 1

Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom as “a sideline”). It also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does it distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the “general public,” i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population.

Front 2

Philippine American General Insurance Company vs. Pks Shipping Company, G.R. No. 149038, 9 April 2003

Back 2

Much of the distinction between a “common or public carrier” and a “private or special carrier” lies in the character of the business, such that if the undertaking is an isolated transaction, not a part of the business or occupation, and the carrier does not hold itself out to carry the goods for the general public or to a limited clientele, although involving the carriage of goods for a fee, the person or corporation providing such service could very well be just a private carrier.

Front 3

Spouses Perena vs Spouses Nicolas, GR No. 157917, August 29, 2012

Back 3

Persons engaged in the business of transporting students from their respective residences to their school and back are considered common carrier. Despite catering to a limited clientele, they operated as a common carrier because they held themselves out as a ready transportation indiscriminately to the students of a particular school living within or near where they operated the service and for a fee.

Front 4

Unsworth Transport International (Phils.) vs. Court of Appeals ,G.R. No. 166250, 26 July 2010

Back 4

A freight forwarder’s liability is limited to damages arising from its own negligence, including negligence in choosing the carrier; however, where the forwarder contracts to deliver goods to their destination instead of merely arranging for their transportation, it becomes liable as a common carrier for loss or damage to goods. A freight forwarder assumes the responsibility of a carrier, which actually executes the transport, even though the forwarder does not carry the merchandise itself.

Front 5

Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. vs. Glodel Brokerage Corporation, GR No. 179446, January 10, 2011

Back 5

A customs broker whose services were engaged for the release and withdrawal of the cargoes from the pier and their subsequent delivery to the consignee’s warehouse and the owner of the delivery truck whom the customs broker contracted to transport the cargoes to the warehouse are both common carriers. The latter is considered a common carrier in the absence of indication that it solely and exclusively rendered services to the customs broker. Thus, when the truck failed to deliver one of the cargoes, both the broker and owner of the truck are liable. Being both common carriers, they are mandated from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, to observe the extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them according to all the circumstances of such case. Thus, in case of loss of the goods, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently.

Front 6

Westwind Shipping Corporation vs. UCPB General Insurance Co., GR no. 2002289, November 25, 2013

Back 6

The arrastre operator is likewise liable. The functions of an arrastre operator involve the handling of cargo deposited on the wharf or between the establishment of the consignee or shipper and the ship’s tackle. Being the custodian of the goods discharged from a vessel, an arrastre operator’s duty is to take good care of the goods and to turn them over to the party entitled to their possession. While it is true that an arrastre operator and a carrier may not be held solidarily liable at all times, the facts of these cases show that apart from the stevedores of the arrastre operator being directly in charge of the physical unloading of the cargo, its foreman picked the cable sling that was used to hoist the packages for transfer to the dock. Moreover, the fact that the packages were unloaded with the same sling unharmed is telling of the inadequate care with which the stevedore handled and discharged the cargo.

Front 7

Unknown Owner Of The Vessel M/V China Joy vs. Asian Terminals Inc. G.R. No. 195661, 11 March 2015

Back 7

The functions of an arrastre operator involve the handling of cargo deposited on the wharf or between the establishment of the consignee or shipper and the ship’s tackle. Being the custodian of the goods discharged from a vessel, an arrastre operator’s duty is to take good care of the goods and to turn them over to the party entitled to their possession. The legal relationship between an arrastre operator and a consignee is akin to that between a warehouseman and a depositor. As to both the nature of the functions and the place of their performance, an arrastre operator’s services are clearly not maritime in character.In Insurance Company of North America v. Asian Terminals, Inc., the Court explained that the liabilities of the arrastre operator for losses and damages are set forth in the contract for cargo handling services it had executed with the PPA. Corollarily then, the rights of an arrastre operator to be paid for damages it sustains from handling cargoes do not likewise spring from contracts of carriage. However, in the instant petition, the contending parties make no references at all to any provisions in the contract for cargo handling services ATI had executed with the PPA. Notwithstanding the above, the petitioners cannot evade liability for the damage caused to ATI’s unloader in view of Article 2176 of the New Civil Code.

Front 8

R Transport Corporation vs. Pante, GR No. 162104, September 15, 2009

Back 8

When a bus hit a tree and house due to the fast and reckless driving of the bus driver resulting in injury to one of its passengers, the bus owner is liable and such liability does not cease even upon proof that he exercised all the diligence of a good father of family in the selection and supervision of its employees.

Front 9

Asian Terminals, Inc vs. Simon Enterprises, Inc. GR No. 177116, February 27, 2013

Back 9

Though it is true that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently if the goods transported by them are lost, destroyed, or deteriorated, and that the common carrier must prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence in order to overcome the presumption, the plaintiff must still, before the burden is shifted to the defendant, prove that the subject shipment suffered actual shortage. This can only be done if the weight of the shipment at the port of origin and its subsequent weight at the port of arrival have been proven by a preponderance of evidence, and it can be seen that the former weight is considerably greater than the latter weight, taking into consideration the exceptions provided in Article 1734 of the Civil Code.

Front 10

Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Lucita Suyom et al., G.R. No. 143360, 5 September 2002

Back 10

In an action based on quasi delict, the registered owner of a motor vehicle is solidarily liable for the injuries and damages caused by the negligence of the driver, in spite of the fact that the vehicle may have already been the subject of an unregistered Deed of Sale in favor of another person. Unless registered with the Land Transportation Office, the sale — while valid and binding between the parties — does not affect third parties, especially the victims of accidents involving the said transport equipment.

Front 11

William Tiu, doing business under the name and style of “D’ Rough Riders,” vs. Pedro A. Arriesgado, G.R. No. 138060, 1 September 2004

Back 11

The principle of last clear chance only applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations, for it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver and its owner on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.

Front 12

Spouses Cesar & Suthira Zalamea vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104235 November 18, 1993

Back 12

When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular flight, on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises, and the passenger has every right to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date. If he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage. Where an airline had deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive some passengers of their seats in case all of them would show up for the check in. For the indignity and inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last minute, said passenger is entitled to an award of moral damages.

Front 13

Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd., vs. Spouses Daniel Vazquez And Maria Luisa Madrigal Vazquez, G.R. No. 150843, March 14, 2003

Back 13

Spouses Vazquez had every right to decline the upgrade and insist on the Business Class accommodation they had booked for and which was designated in their boarding passes. They clearly waived their priority or preference when they asked that other passengers be given the upgrade. It should not have been imposed on them over their vehement objection. By insisting on the upgrade, Cathay breached its contract of carriage with Spouses Vazquez.

Front 14

Heirs of Josemaria Ochoa vs. G&S Transport Corporation, March 19,2011 as affirmed in the July 16, 2012 decision

Back 14

In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier is at fault or is negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. In fact, there is even no need for the court to make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier. This statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence. Unfortunately, the common carrier miserably failed to overcome this presumption as the accident which led to the passenger’s death was due to the reckless driving and gross negligence of its driver.

Front 15

Victory Liner, Inc. vs. Rosalito Gammad, G.R. No. 159636, November 25, 2004

Back 15

A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard to all the circumstances. In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. Unless the presumption is rebutted, the court need not even make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier. This statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence.

Front 16

Antonia Maranan vs. Pascual Perez, et al, G.R. No. L-22272, June 26, 1967

Back 16

The basis of the carrier’s liability for assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rests either on (1) the doctrine of respondeat superior or (2) the principle that it is the carrier’s implied duty to transport the passenger safely. Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the act of the employee is within the scope of his authority and duty. It is not sufficient that the act be within the course of employment only. Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it is enough that the assault happens within the course of the employee’s duty. It is no defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier’s orders.The carrier’s liability here is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by its own employees. As can be gleaned from Art. 1759, the Civil Code of the Philippines evidently follows the rule based on the second view. At least three very cogent reasons underlie this rule: (1) the special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its passenger that full measure of protection afforded by the exercise of the high degree of care prescribed by the law, inter alia from violence and insults at the hands of strangers and other passengers, but above all, from the acts of the carrier’s own servants charged with the passenger’s safety; (2) said liability of the carrier for the servant’s violation of duty to passengers, is the result of the former’s confiding in the servant’s hands the performance of his contract to safely transport the passenger, delegating therewith the duty of protecting the passenger with the utmost care prescribed by law; and (3) as between the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear the risk of wrongful acts or negligence of the carrier’s employees against passengers, since it, and not the passengers, has power to select and remove them.

Front 17

Jose Pilapil vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 52159, 22 December 1989

Back 17

A tort committed by a stranger which causes injury to a passenger does not accord the latter a cause of action against the carrier. The negligence for which a common carrier is held responsible is the negligent omission by the carrier’s employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the same could have been foreseen and prevented by them.

Front 18

Alberta Yobido vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113003, 17 October 1997

Back 18

A fortuitous event is possessed of the following characteristics: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligations, must be independent of human will; (b) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. Under the circumstances of this case, the explosion of the new tire may not be considered a fortuitous event. There are human factors involved in the situation. The fact that the tire was new did not imply that it was entirely free from manufacturing defects or that it was properly mounted on the vehicle. Neither may the fact that the tire bought and used in the vehicle is of a brand name noted for quality, resulting in the conclusion that it could not explode within five days’ use.

Front 19

Fortune Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119756, 18 March 1999

Back 19

Despite the report of Philippine Constabulary agent Generalao that the Maranaos were going to attack its buses, Fortune took no steps to safeguard the lives and properties of its passengers. The seizure of the bus of the Fortune was foreseeable and, therefore, was not a fortuitous event which would exempt petitioner from liability.

Front 20

Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131621, 28 September 1999

Back 20

Loadstar was at fault or negligent in not maintaining a seaworthy vessel and in having allowed its vessel to sail despite knowledge of an approaching typhoon. In any event, it did not sink because of any storm that may be deemed as force majeure, inasmuch as the wind condition in the area where it sank was determined to be moderate. Since it was remiss in the performance of its duties, Loadstar cannot hide behind the “limited liability” doctrine to escape responsibility for the loss of the vessel and its cargo.

Front 21

Smith Bell Dodwell Shipping Agency Corporation vs. Catalino Borja, G.R. No. 143008. June 10, 2002

Back 21

Negligence is conduct that creates undue risk of harm to another. It is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby that other person suffers injury. Petitioner’s vessel was carrying chemical cargo—alkyl benzene and methyl methacrylate monomer. While knowing that their vessel was carrying dangerous inflammable chemicals, its officers and crew failed to take all the necessary precautions to prevent an accident. Petitioner was, therefore, negligent.

Front 22

Aniceto Saludo, Jr. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95536, March 23, 1992

Back 22

The oft-repeated rule regarding a carrier’s liability for delay is that in the absence of a special contract, a carrier is not an insurer against delay in transportation of goods. When a common carrier undertakes to convey goods, the law implies a contract that they shall be delivered at destination within a reasonable time, in the absence, of any agreement as to the time of delivery. But where a carrier has made an express contract to transport and deliver property within a specified time, it is bound to fulfill its contract and is liable for any delay, no matter from what cause it may have arisen. This result logically follows from the well-settled rule that where the law creates a duty or charge, and the party is disabled from performing it without any default in himself, and has no remedy over, then the law will excuse him, but where the party by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good notwithstanding any accident or delay by inevitable necessity because he might have provided against it by contract. Whether or not there has been such an undertaking on the part of the carrier to be determined from the circumstances surrounding the case and by application of the ordinary rules for the interpretation of contracts.

Front 23

Virgines Calvo doing business under the name and style Transorient Container Terminal Services, Inc. vs. Ucpb General Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 148496, 19 March 2002

Back 23

The rule is that if the improper packing or, in this case, the defect/s in the container, is/are known to the carrier or his employees or apparent upon ordinary observation, but he nevertheless accepts the same without protest or exception notwithstanding such condition, he is not relieved of liability for damage resulting therefrom. In this case, Calvo accepted the cargo without exception despite the apparent defects in some of the container vans. Hence, for failure of Calvo to prove that she exercised extraordinary diligence in the carriage of goods in this case or that she is exempt from liability, the presumption of negligence as provided under Art. 1735 holds.

Front 24

Provident Insurance Corp., vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118030, January 15, 2004

Back 24

The bill of lading defines the rights and liabilities of the parties in reference to the contract of carriage. Stipulations therein are valid and binding in the absence of any showing that the same are contrary to law, morals, customs, public order and public policy. Where the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of the stipulations shall control. In light of the foregoing, there can be no question about the validity and enforceability of Stipulation No. 7 in the bill of lading. The twenty-four hour requirement under the said stipulation is, by agreement of the contracting parties, a sine qua non for the accrual of the right of action to recover damages against the carrier.

Front 25

Keng Hua Paper Products Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 257, 1998

Back 25

A bill of lading serves two functions: First, it is a receipt for the goods shipped. Second, it is a contract by which three parties, namely, the shipper, the carrier, and the consignee undertake specific responsibilities and assume stipulated obligations. A bill of lading delivered and accepted constitutes the contract of carriage even though not signed, because the acceptance of a paper containing the terms of a proposed contract generally constitutes an acceptance of the contract and of all its terms and conditions of which the acceptor has actual or constructive notice.

Front 26

National Development Company vs. The Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-49469, August 19, 1988

Back 26

The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs the liability of the common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or deterioration (Article 1753, Civil Code). Thus, the rule was specifically laid down that for cargoes transported from Japan to the Philippines, the liability of the carrier is governed primarily by the Civil Code and in all matters not regulated by said Code, the rights and obligations of common carrier shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by special laws (Article 1766, Civil Code). Hence, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, a special law, is merely suppletory to the provision of the Civil Code.

Front 27

Aboitiz Shipping Corporation vs. Insurance Company of North America, G.R. No. 168402, August 6, 2008

Back 27

Under the Code of Commerce, the notice of claim must be made within twenty four (24) hours from receipt of the cargo if the damage is not apparent from the outside of the package. For damages that are visible from the outside of the package, the claim must be made immediately. Provisions specifying a time to give notice of damage to common carriers are ordinarily to be given a reasonable and practical, rather than a strict construction. Understandably, when the goods were delivered, the necessary clearance had to be made before the package was opened. Upon opening and discovery of the damaged condition of the goods, a report to this effect had to pass through the proper channels before it could be finalized and endorsed by the institution to the claims department of the shipping company. The call to Aboitiz was made two days from delivery, a reasonable period considering that the goods could not have corroded instantly overnight such that it could only have sustained the damage during transit. Moreover, Aboitiz was able to immediately inspect the damage while the matter was still fresh. In so doing, the main objective of the prescribed time period was fulfilled. Thus, there was substantial compliance with the notice requirement in this case.

Front 28

Ucpb General Insurance Co., Inc., vs. Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, et. al., G.R. No. 168433, February 10, 2009

Back 28

The Court has construed the 24-hour claim requirement as a condition precedent to the accrual of a right of action against a carrier for loss of, or damage to, the goods. The shipper or consignee must allege and prove the fulfillment of the condition. Otherwise, no right of action against the carrier can accrue in favor of the shipper or consignee.

Front 29

Philam Insurance Company vs. Heung A Shipping Corporation, G.R. No. 187701 &G.R. No. 187812, 23 July 2014

Back 29

Common carriers, as a general rule, are presumed to have been at fault or negligent if the goods they transported deteriorated or got lost or destroyed. That is, unless they prove that they exercised extraordinary diligence in transporting the goods. In order to avoid responsibility for any loss or damage, therefore, they have the burden of proving that they observed such diligence. As the carrier of the subject shipment, HEUNG-A was bound to exercise extraordinary diligence in conveying the same and its slot charter agreement with DONGNAMA did not divest it of such characterization nor relieve it of any accountability for the shipment. However, the liability of HEUNG-A is limited to $500 per package or pallet because in case of the shipper’s failure to declare the value of the goods in the bill of lading, Section 4, paragraph 5 of the COGSA provides that neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable for any loss or damage to or in connection with the transportation of goods in an amount exceeding $500 per package.

Front 30

Oceaneering Contractrors (Phils), Inc. v. Nestor Barreto, doing business as NNB Lighterage , GR No. 184215, February 9, 2011

Back 30

Where the agreement executed by the parties was a time charter where the possession and control of the barge was retained by the owner, the latter is, therefore, a common carrier legally charged with extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by him. The sinking of the vessel created a presumption of negligence and/or unseaworthiness which the barge owner failed to overcome and gave rise to his liability for the charterer lost cargo despite the latter’s failure to insure the same.

Front 31

Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., et. al., G.R. No. 131166, September 30, 1999

Back 31

A charter party is a contract by which an entire ship, or some principal part thereof, is let by the owner to another person for a specified time or use; a contract of affreightment is one by which the owner of a ship or other vessel lets the whole or part of her to a merchant or other person for the conveyance of goods, on a particular voyage, in consideration of the payment of freight. A contract of affreightment may be either time charter, wherein the leased vessel is leased to the charterer for a fixed period of time, or voyage charter, wherein the ship is leased for a single voyage. In both cases, the charter-party provides for the hire of the vessel only, either for a determinate period of time or for a single or consecutive voyage, the ship owner to supply the ship’s store, pay for the wages of the master of the crew, and defray the expenses for the maintenance of the ship. Under a demise or bareboat charter on the other hand, the charterer mans the vessel with his own people and becomes, in effect, the owner for the voyage or service stipulated, subject to liability for damages caused by negligence. If the charter is a contract of affreightment, which leaves the general owner in possession of the ship as owner for the voyage, the rights and the responsibilities of ownership rest on the owner. The charterer is free from liability to third persons in respect of the ship. It is only when the charter includes both the vessel and its crew, as in a bareboat or demise that a common carrier becomes private, at least insofar as the particular voyage covering the charter-party is concerned.

Front 32

Chua Yek Hong vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74811, 30 September 1988

Back 32

The term “ship agent” as used in the foregoing provision is broad enough to include the ship owner. Pursuant to said provision, therefore, both the ship owner and ship agent are civilly and directly liable for the indemnities in favor of third persons, which may arise from the conduct of the captain in the care of goods transported, as well as for the safety of passengers transported. However, under the same Article, this direct liability is moderated and limited by the ship agent’s or ship owner’s right of abandonment of the vessel and earned freight. The most fundamental effect of abandonment is the cessation of the responsibility of the ship agent/owner. The ship owner’s or agent’s liability is merely co-extensive with his interest in the vessel such that a total loss thereof results in its extinction. “No vessel, no liability” expresses in a nutshell the limited liability rule. The total destruction of the vessel extinguishes maritime liens as there is no longer any res to which it can attach.

Front 33

Dela Torre vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 160088, July 13, 2011

Back 33

The LIMITED LIABILITY RULE cannot be availed of by the charterers/sub-charterer in order to escape from their liability. The Code of Commerce is clear on which indemnities may be confined or restricted to the value of the vessel and these are the – “indemnities in favor of third persons which may arise from the conduct of the captain in the care of the goods which he loaded on the vessel.” Thus, what is contemplated is the liability to third persons who may have dealt with the SHIPOWNER, the AGENT or even the CHARTERER in case of demise or bareboat charter.
The Charterer cannot use the said Rule because it does not completely and absolutely step into the shoes of the shipowner or even the ship agent because there remains conflicting rights between the former and the real shipowner as derived from their charter agreement. Therefore, even if the contract is for a bareboat or demise charter where possession, free administration and even navigation are temporarily surrendered to the charterer, dominion over the vessel remains with the shipowner. Ergo, the charterer or the sub-charterer, whose rights cannot rise above that of the former, can never set up the Limited Liability Rule against the very owner of the vessel.

Front 34

Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc., vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131621 September 28, 1999

Back 34

Inasmuch as neither the Civil Code nor the Code of Commerce states a specific prescriptive period on the matter, the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) — which provides for a one-year period of limitation on claims for loss of, or damage to, cargoes sustained during transit — may be applied suppletorily to the case at bar. This one-year prescriptive period also applies to the insurer of the goods.

Front 35

Wallem Philippines Shipping vs SR Farms, GR No. 161849, July 9, 2010

Back 35

Under Section 3 (6) of the COGSA, notice of loss or damages must be filed within three days of delivery. Under the same provision, however, a failure to file a notice of claim within three days will not bar recovery if a suit is nonetheless filed within one year from delivery of the goods or from the date when the goods should have been delivered. The filing of an amended pleading does not retroact to the date of the filing of the original. It is true that, as an exception, an amendment which merely supplements and amplifies facts originally alleged in the complaint relates back to the commencement of the action and is not barred by the statute of limitations which expired after the service of the original complaint. The exception, however, would not apply to the party impleaded for the first time after the service of the amended complaint. In this case, petitioner was not impleaded as a defendant in the original complaint filed on March 11, 1993. It was only on June 7, 1993 that the Amended Complaint, impleading petitioner as defendant, was filed. Considering this circumstances, clearly, the suit against the petitioner was filed beyond the prescriptive period of the filing of claims as provided in the COGSA.

Front 36

Asian Terminals Inc., v. Philam Insurance Co. G.R. NO. 181262 , July 24, 2013

Back 36

In any event the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within one year after delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered: Provided, That if a notice of loss or damage, either apparent or concealed, is not given as provided for in this section, that fact shall not affect or prejudice the right of the shipper to bring suit within one year after the delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered.

Front 37

Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119571, March 11, 1998

Back 37

The one-year period of limitation is designed to meet the exigencies of maritime hazards. In a case where the goods shipped were neither lost nor damaged in transit but were, on the contrary, delivered in port to someone who claimed to be entitled thereto, the situation is different, and the special need for the short period of limitation in cases of loss or damage caused by maritime perils does not obtain.

Front 38

New World International Development Corporation vs NYK-FilJapan Shipping Corporation, GR No. 171468, August 24, 2011

Back 38

Notwithstanding the fact that the case was filed beyond the one-year prescriptive period provided under the COGSA, the suit (against the insurer) will not be dismissed if the delay was not due to the claimant’s fault. Had the insurer processed and examined the claim promptly, the claimant or the insurer itself, as subrogee, could have taken the judicial action on time. By making an unreasonable demand for an itemized list of damages which caused delay, the insurer should bear the loss with interest,

Front 39

Insurance Company of North America vs. Asian Terminals, Inc. GR No. 180784, February 15, 2012

Back 39

The term “ carriage of goods “ covers the period from the time when the goods are loaded to the time when they are discharged from the ship; thus, it can be inferred that the period of time when the goods have been discharged from the ship and given to the custody of the arrastre operator is not covered by the COGSA. Under the COGSA, the carrier and the ship may put up the defense of prescription if the action for damages is not brought within one year after delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered. However, the COGSA does not mention than an arrastre operator may invoke the prescriptive period; hence, it does not cover the arrastre operator. The arrastre operator’s responsibility and liability for losses and damages are set forth in the contract for cargo handling services executed between the Philippine Ports Authority and Marina Port Services.

Front 40

Lhuillier vs British Airways, G.R. No. 171092, March 15, 2010

Back 40

Under Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for damages before: 1) the court where carrier is domiciled; 2) the court where the carrier has its principal place of business; 3) the court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been made; or 4) the court of the place of destination. In this case, it is not disputed that respondent is a British corporation domiciled in London, United Kingdom with London as its principal place of business. Hence, under the first and second jurisdictional rules, the petitioner may bring her case before the courts of London in the United Kingdom. In the passenger ticket and baggage check presented by both the petitioner and respondent, it appears that the ticket was issued in Rome, Italy. Consequently, under the third jurisdictional rule, the petitioner has the option to bring her case before the courts of Rome in Italy. Finally, both the petitioner and respondent aver that the place of destination is Rome, Italy, which is properly designated given the routing presented in the said passenger ticket and baggage check. Accordingly, petitioner may bring her action before the courts of Rome, Italy. Thus, the RTC of Makati correctly ruled that it does not have jurisdiction over the case filed by the petitioner even though it was based on tort and not on breach of contract.

Front 41

Philippine Airlines Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119706, March 14, 1996

Back 41

While the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in the Philippines, being a treaty commitment by the government and as a signatory thereto, the same does not operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances when a carrier shall be liable for breach of contract or as an absolute limit of the extent of liability, nor does it preclude the operation of the Civil Code or other pertinent laws. The acceptance in due course by PAL of Mejia’s cargo as packed and its advice against the need for declaration of its actual value operated as an assurance to Mejia that in fact there was no need for such a declaration. Mejia can hardly be faulted for relying on the representations of PAL’s own personnel. In other words, Mejia could and would have complied with the conditions stated in the air waybill, i.e., declaration of a higher value and payment of supplemental transportation charges, entitling her to recovery of damages beyond the stipulated limit of US$20 per kilogram of cargo in the event of loss or damage, had she not been effectively prevented from doing so upon the advice of PAL’s personnel for reasons best known to themselves. Even if the claim for damages was conditioned on the timely filing of a formal claim, under Article 1186 of the Civil Code that condition was deemed fulfilled, considering that the collective action of PAL’s personnel in tossing around the claim and leaving it unresolved for an indefinite period of time was tantamount to “voluntarily preventing its fulfillment.” On grounds of equity, the filing of the baggage freight claim, which sufficiently informed PAL of the damage sustained by private respondent’s cargo, constituted substantial compliance with the requirement in the contract for the filing of a formal claim.

Front 42

Philippine Airlines Inc. vs. Hon. Adriano Savillo, et. al., G.R. No. 149547, July 4, 2008

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Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention provides for liability on the part of a carrier for “damages occasioned by delay in the transportation by air of passengers, baggage or goods.” Article 24 excludes other remedies by further providing that “(1) in the cases covered by articles 18 and 19, any action for damages, however founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this convention.” Therefore, a claim covered by the Warsaw Convention can no longer be recovered under local law, if the statute of limitations of two years has already lapsed. Nevertheless, the Court notes that jurisprudence in the Philippines and the United States also recognizes that the Warsaw Convention does not “exclusively regulate” the relationship between passenger and carrier on an international flight. The Court finds that the present case is substantially similar to cases in which the damages sought were considered to be outside the coverage of the Warsaw Convention.