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55 Cards in this Set

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Williams v. Hays

D sea captain reasonably became deranged because of his exertions in line of duty
*D did everything reasonably possible (cared for vessel 3 days/nights until overcome by exhaustion)
*D's mental disability resulted solely from his exertions in the line of duty (took quinine as remedy from exhaustion caused by his efforts to save ship (N ate/slept for 48 hrs))
*Onset of disability reasonable/involuntary (fores. could've happened to anybody) (extends Alexander v. Allen: reasonably screamed)
*D's defect distinct (temporary) (dist. Vaughan v. Menlove) (dist. Michael R: being a child)
No Liability defendant sea captain reasonably became deranged because of his exertions in line of duty
Vaughan v. Menlove
mentally challenged D constructed dangerous hayrick spont. ignited burned P's prop.
*D's defect general (lack of intellig.) (an. Michael R: being child) (dist. Williams: both Ps claimed N competent to make smrt decis.; here perman.ly defective)
*N D did everything reasonably possible (could've moved away from P/brkn up/imprvd chimney) (dist. Williams)
Liability mentally challenged defendant constructed dangerous hayrick which burned plaintiff out
Lynch v. Rosenthal
D N clearly warned mentally challenged P to stay clear of corn picker P hurt
*P had dist. (obvious) defect (moron who could not talk) (an. Williams v. Hays: obv.) (dist. Vaughan: dumb nonobv.)
No Liability [For Contributory Negligence] defendant did not clearly warn mentally challenged plaintiff to stay clear of corn picker and he was hurt
Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co.
D's turncock failed to clean ice off fire plug pipes burst and flooded P
*N reas. person would know risk (D acted from past experience but was wrong: cold front unprecedented) (dist. Vaughan: reas. person would know N to build hayrick that way)
*N D knew of dang. cond. (nobody knew it was a risk b/c cold frnt unprec.) (dist. Jasko)
*D did everything reas. poss. (D took precautions against av. frosts of past) (an. Williams)
*Distinct (obv. temp.) defect (lack of experience) (an. Lynch: obv.)
No Liability defendant failed to clean ice off fire plug pipes burst and flooded plaintiff
Jasko v. F.W. Woolworth Co.
D sold thousands of waxpaper–wrapped pizza pieces to be eaten on terrazzo floors; P cust slipped
*D knew of dangerous condition (D N had seatng so custs ate it standing on t. flr.-->
*Reas. prsn would've known risk (reas. prob. food will drop on flr-->will create dang. cond.) (an. Lynch: (D L) should've known must warn) (dist. Blyth)
*N D does everythng rsnbly poss. (dist. Williams)
*aff. act: sold pizza (an. Carmona) (dist. Hynswrth)
*spec. rel: P invitee (cust)
Liability defendant sold thousands of waxpaper–wrapped pizza pieces to be eaten on terrazzo floors
Gordon v. American Museum of Natural History
P slipped on wax paper from food stand operated by D's concessionaire
*N D knew of dang. cond. (N ev. D observed wax paper; paper N dirty/worn) (dist. Jasko Anjou)
*N rsnbl person would've known risk (an. Blyth) (dist. Jsko: here flr. prob. N slpry b/c granite steps; prob. N sold so many; less likely people would eat on stps) (dist. Lynch: D L should've known) (dist. Vaughan)
*N L B (would've had to hire guard)
*N CiF: guard may N have helped (paper fresh)
No Liability plaintiff slipped on wax paper provided by defendant’s concessionaire
Heath v. Swift Wings Inc.
D was a pilot of ordinary prudence but possessed substandard training and experience
*D has spec. skill but N meets min. stndrd of care (applicable to all pilots - shown b/c caused pln to crash) (an. Vaughan: failed to meet reas. farmer's standard)
*Reas. person would've known risk (an. Jasko) (dist. Blyth)
*D's defect general/nonobv. (dist. Lynch: obv. - D very diff. from norm; also there D invited to engage in dang. bhvr.) (dist. Williams: obv./temp.)
Liability defendant was a pilot of ordinary prudence but possessed substandard training and experience
Smith v. Lampe
D blew horn to distressed ship; drawn onto shoal
*N P possessed sup. skill/knowledge (D N boat cptn N knew naut. cstm that distressed ship will follow horn) (dist. Heath Jewell)
*N rsnbl person would've known risk (N boat cptn just trying to help) (an. Blyth) (dist. Vaughan Jewell Heath)
*D did everything reasnbly poss. (blew horn got coast guard to help) (an. Williams)
*Dist. (obv) defect (D lacked exp. guiding boats to safety) (an. Blyth: lack of sim. exp.) (an. Lynch: mental retard. dist. defect)
No Liability defendant blew horn to distressed ship and it was drawn onto shoal
Kerr v. Connecticut Co.
deaf ped. P walked close almost on D's trolley tracks struck when N heard warning gong
*N D takes precaut.s a rsnbly prudent person w/ his phys. challenges would (rsnbl deaf man'd know if he walks close to trolley rail can't hear gong get hit)
*N D does evrythng reas. poss. (an. Vaughan) (dist. Lynch: D did evrythng rsnbly poss. given disab.y) (dist. Williams)
*Disblty general (nonobv. to driver) (an. Vaughan) (dist. Lynch: both P's challenged; there disab.y dist./obv. to D; also in Lynch P invited to walk close to corn picker also in Lynch
Liability [For Contributory Negligence] deaf pedestrian walked almost directly on top of defendant’s trolley tracks and was struck when he did not hear warning gong
Davis v. Feinstein
blind P using cane fell into D's open cellar door adjacent to sidewalk
*D takes precaut.s as reasnbly prudent person w/ his phys. challenges would (used cane to touch tap ground/walls) (dist. Kerr)
*D does evrthg reas. Poss. (an. Williams Lynch) (dist. Vaughan)
No Liability [For Contributory Negligence] nonsighted plaintiff using cane to find his way nevertheless fell into defendant’s open cellar door adjacent to sidewalk
Dellwo v. Pearson
12–year–old motorboat driver crossed P's fishing line hurting P
*D engages in dangerous activity normally engaged in only by adults (driving motorboat) (an. Heath Vaughan) (dist. Lynch Purtle)
*N opp. for V precaut. (hard for P V to see fast-moving D a kid) (dist. Purtle: P knew hunting w/ another kid)
Liability 12–year–old motorboat driver crossed plaintiff’s fishing line hurting plaintiff
Dunn v. Teti
D 6–year–old negligently swung stick injuring P
*<7 (<7 incapable of negligence)
*N D engages in dangerous activity normally only engaged in by adults (dang. but 4 kids) (an. Purtle: deer hntg)
*Opp. for V precaut. (dist. Dellwo: boat too fast)
*Dist. disblty (obv. P child) (dist. Vaughan: dumb)
*Onset of disability was reasonable/involuntary (an. Williams v. Hays)
No Liability defendant 6–year–old negligently swung stick injuring plaintiff
United States v. Carroll Towing Co.
P's bargee absent when barge broke away and sank
*L B (bargee to be on board barge during working hrs. of daylight) (dist. Gordon: H B to hire grd w/ few people on strs)
*H P (WWII traffic in harbor/short Jan. days-->Anna C improperly retied/untied barge hit other barges) (an. Jasko)
*CiF: bargee would've noticed/could've called 4 help
Liability [For Contributory Negligence] plaintiff’s bargee absent when barge broke away and sank
Kathryn B. Guinan
D's scow with no attendant aboard suddenly sank taking P's ship with her
*H B (must hire pm watchman) (an. Gordon: must hire sec. guard) (dist. Carroll Towing: L B to have bargee fulfill duties)
*Diminishing returns (cptn. alrdy on board; addtl watchman would N reduce risk much)
*L P (that boat would inexplicably capsize take neighbor boat w/ her) (an. Gordon: granite steps)
*N D's axns contrary to custom (N custom to keep watchmen on boats in slips of NY Harbor)
*Less CiF here (watchman may N have noticed leak) (an. Gordon: wax paper fresh) (dist. Carroll: bargee would've noticed/called for help
No Liability defendant’s scow with no attendant aboard suddenly sank taking plaintiffs’ ship with her
Davis v. Consolidated Rail Corp.
D failed to blow horn before moving train and P caught underneath
*L B (blow horn/ring bell/employee who saw P radio notify train crew nearly costless;) (an. Carroll Towing: bargee perform duties) (dist. O'Donnell: slave to barge; Kathryn B.: pm watchman)
*H P (subst. when u add all poss. acc.s blowing horn might have averted) (an. Jasko)
*H L (severe/fatal injury; P had leg severed below knee/other foot sliced off)
*Note: P also CN for failing to hang metal blue flag as required by custom and regulation (L B H P H L)
Liability defendant failed to blow horn before moving train and plaintiff caught underneath
Fuentes v. Consolidated Rail Corp.
D ran its train into radiators on track; they tipped over onto sleeping P
*L B (making emerg. stop)
*H P (b/c N guardrail/ditch b/w sidewalk/tracks; hitting object could injure passersby/damge train)
*H L (severe injury/death (esp. if object was person); here P injured)
Liability defendant ran its train into radiators on track; they tipped over onto sleeping plaintiff
Adams v. Bullock
D failed to protect trolley wires
*H B (burying wires or putting guard around them) (an. Hill: impede hurricane response; the Kathryn B. Guinan: hire pm watchman) (dist. Fuentes: emerg. stop; Davis: blow horn)
*L P (wires 4'7 below bridge - L prob. someone would be dragging wire longer than that along bridge) (an. Hill Kathryn) (dist. Fuentes: hit people/damage trn) (Davis: add all risks B would've avoided)
No Liability defendant failed to protect trolley wires and plaintiff’s swinging wire contacted them injuring him severely
Pitre v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.
D failed to rope off baseball throw thrower hit P's deceased
*L P (that thower'd hit spectator) (dist. Carroll: mistie ropes in high traffic area) (an. Adams: that someone would drag wire >4'7 along bridge) (dist. Goode: both failed to put up fence; there H P kid'd drown in moat)
*N reasnbl person would've known risk (D's insured acted from past experience but was wrong) (witness operated 48 similar concessions over 20 yrs. never isolated participants from spectators) (an. Blyth)
No Liability defendant failed to rope off baseball throw and thrower hit plaintiff’s deceased
Greene v. Sibley Lindsay & Curr Co.
P dept. store cust. tripped over D's employee repairing cash register
*Opp. for V precaut. (looking before step) (dist. Weirum)
*L P (employee's position temp.; P's failure to observe unfores.) (an. Pitre Adams: thrower hit spect/long wire drag) (dist. Schwartz: H P kid would run across st. b/c of untaken precaut. of N waiting) (dist. Weirum)
No Liability plaintiff department store customer tripped over store employee who without warning had changed his position while repairing cash register
Wills v. Wisconsin–Minnesota Light & Power Co.
D failed to guard batter’s plate foul ball hit P
*L B (put screen behind batter's plate)
*H P (unscreened baseball diamond in amusement park w/ lots of passersby) (dist. Pitre)
*H L (struck by fast-moving baseball) (an. Davis v. Consol. Rail Corp Goode: severe/fatal injury) (dist. Pitre: from swinging arm of pitcher)
*Flip into NY Central RR v. Grimstad: witnesses testified ball went straight up from bat/hit P on top of her head)
Liability defendant failed to guard batter’s plate and foul ball hit plaintiff
Nevarez v. Thriftimart Inc.
driver killed P's child running to D's amusement park
*H B (forego fair have fair somewhere else/safer more guards) (dist. Weirum: there diff. contest here lg. loss of net fun to nghbrhd kids)
*Nonf. (failed to have fair in safer place) (dist. Schwartz: misf. promised to wait/drove up st.)
*N promise P relied upon (dist. Schwartz: D promised to wait for P up st incrsng risk to P; flip into Schwartz: kid ran to get candy promised by D concessionaire)
No Liability driver killed plaintiff’s child running to defendant’s amusement park
Brewster v. Rankins
Ds entrusted 4th–grader with golf club he acc. struck Ps' child
*L P (golf clubs N unrsnbly dang esp. when P trained in safety techs) (an. Pitre) (dist. Fuentes: obj. could hit passersby dmg train) (dist./flip into Carmona: kid during golf lessons @ school almost hit lots of kids b/c N'd follow safety instrxns)
*N D engages in dang. actvty normally engaged in only by adults (golf clubs N unreasnbly dang/kids golf) (an. Purtle Dunn v. Teti: deer hntng swinging stick) (dist. Dellwo: motorboat)
*Common activity (dist. Fredericks v. Castora: driving)
**IF D had been dangerously swinging club @ school result would be different
No Liability defendants entrusted 4th–grader with golf club and he accidentally struck plaintiffs’ child
Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co.
D's normal trash collection ops. frightened P's horse threw him
*D's activity has public benefit (grbg collection) (an. Adams: trolley lines)
*L P (although D knew bin near bridle path/horses susc. to fright N ev. D's employee saw P/horse/knew they were there (were behind D)) (an. Adams/Pitre: drag long wire; pitcher'd hit spectator) (dist. Davis: add risks avoided by B) (dist. Fuentes: person hit/trn dmgd)
*H B ((1) changing clxn hrs; 2) temporly blocking off area; 3) posting warning signs; 4) providing riders w/ sched. of clxn times - would all unreasnbly impair op.) (dist. Davis v. Consolidated Rail: blow horn) (dist. Fuentes: emerg. stop)
*N policy would protect Ds (all pot. Ds w/ prop. abutting Griff. Pk. would have to make sure actvties N frighened horses) (an. Cooley)
No Liability defendant’s normal trash collection operations frightened plaintiff’s horse which threw him
Cooley v. Public Service Co.
D failed to insulate electric wires/provide catcher baskets for them P received loud noise
*N B exists/prox. cause (no claim wires fell b/c of B: 1) provide catcher bskts; 2) insulate wires)(B may N help: 1) bskts may be ineff. or cause greater risk (an. Gordon: guard may N pick up wax paper in time) (an. Kathryn: pm watchman may N've seen leak) (dist. Fuentes Davis: B would avoid risk)
*B includes poss. injury to others greater than injury P sustained (2) insulated wires could hang live) (dist. Fuentes Davis)
*L P (tel. user receiving great inj. by great noise - although foreseeable wires might fall causing grt noise to subscriber) (an. Adams Pitre)
*N spec. rel. b/w D power co./P tel. subs.r; more special b/w D/man in st. who might be harmed by falling/hanging live wires if B taken
*D's activity has public benefit (uninsulated wires vs. insulated protect people on street) (an. Parsons: trsh clxn)
No Liability defendant failed to insulate electric wires or to provide catcher baskets for them and plaintiff received loud noise
Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Abeles
D failed properly to ground lightning arrester on P's phone he received loud noise
*L B (attach ground wire to lightning arrester) (an. Fuentes Davis: stop/blow horn)
*B exists (dist: Cooley)
*CiF (Apr. shower nothing xtreme) (dist. Cooley Nichols v. Marsland: big storm) (dist. Blythe: big cold front)
Liability defendant failed properly to ground lightning arrester on plaintiff’s phone and she received loud noise
Lyvere v. Ingles Markets Inc.
D failed to promptly fix wind–blown rug upon which P tripped
*H B (D's clerk promptly fix rug even though already warned) (an. Hill: removing ladder'd impede hurr. effic.) (dist. Southwestern Tel. Co.: attch ground wire to lgtng arrester)
*L P (dist. Fuentes) (an. Hill)
*L L(dist. Fuentes) (an. Hill)
*N asymm. of info (both D's clerk and P knew danger of blown rug - cond. obv.)
*N P distracted (an. Jewell; Fuentes (saw radators coming)) (dist. Dunn v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp: P L for CL when distracted by Vienna sausage sale)
*D's activity has public benefit (an. Parsons) (dist. Fuentes: superficial sim. opp. for P to take due care; dist. rug keeps people from slipping; not stopping doesn't have public benefit)
No Liability defendant failed promptly to fix wind–blown rug upon which plaintiff tripped
Danielenko v. Kinney Rent A Car Inc.
D failed to check car it rented to Ps for bombs and bomb exploded injuring Ps
*L P (unfores: N prior sim. occurrences D had N notice) (an. Ann M. Sharon P.: insuff. ev. of prior sim. crimes) (dist. Isaacs: prior crimes)
*What is B grdng vehicles more? diminishing returns: vehicles kept in basement of D's premises; 4 pm sec. grds + am security; Ds inspected cars before re-rental (an. Kathryn B. Guinan)
*N asymm. of info (neither D nor P knew bomb was in rental car) (an. Lyvere Jewell)
No Liability defendant failed to check its rental car; bomb exploded injuring plaintiffs
Chi Yun Ho v. Frye
D surgeon failed to remove sponge before closing patient
*D erroneously delegated his compliance vigilance (had nurses count sponges when it was his responsibility)
*res ipsa loquitur (sponge speaks of negl.) (an. Anjou)
Liability defendant surgeon failed to remove sponge before closing patient
Houserman v. Garrett
Ds failed to remove sponge before closing plaintiff’s surgical incision
*D takes every reasonable precaution (completed 3-part check but it was difficult to do visual and manual check b/c of messy delicate nature of surgery) (dist. Chi: N counted sponges though his respons.) (dist. Carroll Towing: N checked retied line as compliance req.)
*N D erroneously delegated her compliance vigilance (did check herself) (dist. Chi)
*Note: Houserman overrules Chi Yun Ho v. Frye (more Houserman approach modernly)
No Liability defendants failed to remove sponge before closing plaintiff’s surgical incision
Mackey v. Allen
D forgot to lock confusing door P fell down stairs leading from it
*D created trap that ensnared P: common sign over both doors sends aff.ly deceptive message that business (an. Maher: put coats in stairwell) (dist. Baer: there N sign; basements common (N trap); risk less in priv. res. than publ. st.)
*Asymmetry of info. (D knew of trap door N P) (dist. Baer: had exp. w/ bmnt drs could see bthrm through util. rm. had been to bsmnt b4)
*D could have foreseen risk (an. Chi) (dist. Prado Williams: would trip P by pushing crt; would go crazy from exertions/quinine)
Liability defendant forgot to lock confusing door and plaintiff fell down stairs leading from it
Prado v. City of New York
D's employee accidentally tripped P while pushing lg. cart on a NYC st.
*Opp. for V precaut. (an. Greene v. Sibley Lyvere) (dist. Mackey)
*N D could have foreseen risk (sticking out leg-->lady will trip over it) (dist. Fuentes: knew train would hit radiators) (dist. Mackey v. Allen) (dist./flip into Barker: D saw P hit w/ cart)
*(radical rule - NL for compl. error)
No Liability while pushing a large cart on a New York City street defendant’s employee accidentally tripped plaintiff
Barker v. City of Philadelphia
D's driver unaccountably hit lg piece of wrapping paper in which P's child was hiding
*D could have foreseen risk (Saw paper that it was dang. to go over it) (an. Fuentes Mackey) (dist. Greene: D N saw P'd trip over him) (dist. Prado: leg out-->trip lady)
*P is child (dist. Greene: P resp.)
*N B includes poss. injury to others greater than injury P sustained (dist./flip into Cooley: D ran over paper only to avoid child who had chased ball into street)
Liability defendant’s driver unaccountably hit large piece of brown wrapping paper in which plaintiff’s child was unluckily hiding
A.C. ex rel. Cooper v. Bellingham School District
D's teacher let piñata bat slip from her hands where it struck P a first-grade student
*D takes every reasonable precaution (had careful safety practices just made lapse on part. day) (an. Houserman: did 3-part check) (dist. Chi Yun Ho: del. resp. to count sponges) (dist. Fuentes: deliberately hit radiators; note: juries made decisions in both cases cts decided they would simply let jury decision stand) (dist. Barker: deliberately hit paper)
*Involuntary (an. Alexander v. Allen: scream) (Zabunoff: sneeze)
No Liability defendant’s teacher let piñata bat slip from her hands where it struck plaintiff a first-grade student
Zabunoff v. Walker
D sneezed and missed seeing P's oncoming vehicle
*D takes every reasonable precaution (was attempting to look both ways when he sneezed) (dist. Barker: deliberate misf.) (dist. Sinn: could've warned) (flip Sinn into this: robber holds bomb up saying I'm going to pull it right now instead of giving letter)
*D's compliance error is involuntary (an. Alexander v. Allen Laidlaw A.C. ex rel. Cooper Lobert)
*N D could have foreseen risk
No Liability defendant sneezed and missed seeing plaintiff’s oncoming vehicle
Rose v. Morris
D defendant hooked golf ball/neglected to shout fore ball struck P
*Involuntary (an. Zabunoff Alexander v. Allen Laidlaw A.C. ex rel. Cooper Lobert) (dist. Sinn)
*N D could have foreseen risk (N knew ball would hook N knew should shout fore) (an. Ornelas: old farm eqpmnt.) (dist. Barker: area where kid played suspicious-looking piece of wrapping paper in road) (dist. Keffe: unlocked RR turntable kids on b4)
*N assymetry of info (both knew there was risk prob. thought risk N prob.) (an. Knight v. Jewett) (dist. Mackey v. Allen)
No Liability defendant hooked golf ball and neglected to shout fore and ball struck plaintiff
Ballew v. Aiello
D passenger roused from sleep grabbed steering wheel causing car to crash into P
*Involuntary (half-asleep actions are involuntary) (an. Zabunoff Alexander v. Allen Laidlaw A.C. ex rel. Cooper Lobert Rose (a fort: more invol. here b/c reflex)) (dist. Sinn (gave letter) Barker (saw paper): deliberate)
No Liability defendant passenger roused from sleep grabbed steering wheel causing car to crash into plaintiff
The T. J. Hooper
D failed to have radios on tug to warn of storms
*N D uses uncustomary but low-B precaution (using radios) (an. SWern Telegraph: L B attach ground wire to ltng arrester) (dist. Cooley: H B b/c if insulated wires people on ground'd be electrocuted)
*There is no customary precaution but activity is inherently dangerous (boats) (an. MacDougall)
*D could've foreseen risk (an. Barker Fuentes) (dist. Mackey Prado Greene)
*Flip into NY Central RR v. Grimstad: The National Weather Service broadcast from Arlington had predicted fair weather for the day in question.
Liability defendant failed to have radios on tug to warn of storms
Ellis v. Louisville & Nashville Ry.
D failed to provide sandman with mask that many years later would have prevented his silicosis
*N D could have foreseen risk (D couldn't have predicted no mask would result in silicosis) (an. The Wagon Mound: SDK. Dang. but N fores.) (dist. T.J. Hooper) (dist. SWern Telegraph: D failed to properly ground ltng arrester on D's phone could foresee ld noise)
No Liability defendant failed to provide sandman with mask that many years later would have prevented his silicosis
MacDougall v. Pennsylvania Power and Light Co.
P electrocuted when he touched D's fuse box
*There is no customary precaution but activity is inherently dangerous (T.J. Hooper)
*D could have foreseen risk (D reasonably/inadvertently touched it) (an. U.S. v. Carroll Towing: rope mistied/barge collision in high traffic post-WWII area) (dist. Adams: drag long wire) (dist. Gilmore: advertently played Russian Roulette) flip into Gillmore: D knew it was dangerous and intentionally touched it) (dist. Ellis)
Liability plaintiff electrocuted when he touched defendant’s fuse box
Hanton v. Pacific Electric Ry.
P hurt himself by jumping on red car train after it had started
*N CiF (P injured either b/c P attempted to board train while it was in motion or b/c P was partially on train and train left anyways) (an. Conboy: P's migraines gave her unconscious spells b4 getting medi. from dr.)
No Liability plaintiff hurt himself by jumping on red car train after it had started
Anjou v. Boston Elevated Ry.
P slipped on black banana peel in D's station
*CiF (an. Jasko: pizza slice on terrazz. flr) (dist. Gordon: wax paper fresh; flip Gordon: wax paper trampled/dirty) (dist. Gray: luggage N there long; flip Gray: luggage sitting there for long time)
*res ipsa loquitur
*Double sign.: showed BoD and CiF
Liability plaintiff slipped on black banana peel in defendant’s station
Martin v. Herzog
P disobeyed statute requiring light on buggy
*P w/in class for whose protection the safeguard is designed: (P driver; statute that drivers must have light was designed to protect drivers - ord. for safety of drivers) (dist. Selger: purpose of statute for public convenience/maybe even health but not a safety statute)
*Proximate cause (N light-->collision)
Liability [For Contributory Negligence] plaintiff disobeyed statute requiring light on buggy
Tedla v. Ellman
P struck by D's car when plaintiff walking on nonstatutory side of highway
*N proximate cause/B would have accomplished purpose of statute (walking on stat. side more dang. b/c lots traffic and less traffic on nonstat. side) (dist. Martin v. Herzog: N lt-->collision)
*Statutory violation was justified
No Liability [For Contributory Negligence] while walking on nonstatutory side of highway plaintiff struck by defendant’s car
Tingle v. Chicago B. & Q. Ry.
D's engineer ran over P's cow on Sun. day when state statute prohibited the running of trains
*N Injury results from occurrence of type statute designed to prevent (designed to prevent people from working on Sun. N to prevent cow deaths) (dist. Martin v. Herzog: exact injury type stat. designed to prevent)
*N proximate cause (LESS of prox. cause - cow not killed b/c train ran on Sunday - could have been killed any day) (dist. Martin v. Herzog: no lights-->get hit)
No Liability defendant’s engineer ran over plaintiff’s cow on a Sunday a day when state statute prohibited the running of trains
Selger v. Steven Brothers Inc.
D failed to wash dog dropping from sidewalk outside P ped. slipped on it
*N P w/in class safeguard is designed to protect (more wholesome sidewalks N aimed @ part. type of people) (limits Martin v. Herzog) (an. Tingle)
*N injury results from occurrence of type statute was designed to prevent (only wanted to make sidewalks more wholesome not prevent people from slipping on poop) (an. Tedla)
No Liability defendant failed to wash dog dropping from sidewalk outside and plaintiff pedestrian slipped on it
Romero v. National Rifle Association
thief stole D's unlicensed gun and killed P's deceased with it
*N Injury results from occurrence of type statute was designed to prevent (gun registration statute N to protect guns from being stolen) (an. Tingle) (dist. Martin v. Herzog) (an. Richards v. Stanley - statute vs. leaving keys in car not just designed to protect against thieves)
*N proximate cause (Registration wouldn't have made a difference) (an. Tedla: walking on stat. side would've been worse)
*D takes every reasonable precaution (locked gun/ammo in closet in office and hid key in desk)
*N fores. (an. Kingrey v. Hill: that D would use gun to injure Ps)
*Note: case difficult to understand b/c maybe statute was meant to reduce # of guns; in that case you could argue injury did result from occurrence of type statute was designed to prevent
No Liability thief stole defendant’s unlicensed gun and killed plaintiff’s deceased with it
Alarid v. Vanier
D struck P's vehicle from rear after D's brakes unforeseeably failed
*D takes every reasonable precaution (recent model test drove car N sign of nething wrong w/ brakes had car serviced b4 acc.) (an. A.C. ex. rel. Cooper: teacher took approp. safety measures) (an. Tedla Romero) (dist. Chi Yun Ho: both Ds have responsibility (to maintain brakes; to count sponges); but there D erroneously deleg.d resp.)
*N prox. cause (N totally in control of sit: N D could prevent sit. by using due care) (dist. Chi Yun Ho: D could've prevented acc. by using due care counting sponges) (dist. Martin v. Herzog: flip Martin into this: light on buggy was working but unforeseeably failed when accident happened)
*N D had greater skill/expertise (so dr. in Chi Yun Ho was totally in control; here no special skill/experience so N totally in control)
No Liability defendant struck plaintiff’s vehicle from rear after defendant’s brakes unforeseeably failed
De La Cruz v. Ock Wee Leong
D rear-ended P's vehicle
*N D takes every reasonable precaution (didn't leave enough distance b/w his car and P's car) (an. Chi Yun Ho Martin) (dist. Alarid Tedla A.C. ex. rel. Cooper)
Liability defendant rear-ended plaintiff’s vehicle
Asmelash v. Braga
D struck P's sister in crosswalk and barely missed P herself
*Proximate cause (N stop-->hit sister) (dist. Alarid: D N could prevent brake failure by using due care)
*Injury results from occurrence of type statute was designed to prevent (stat. designed to prevent injury when D N yields RoW to peds in crosswalk) (an. Martin: lts required to prevent collisions) (dist. Tedla)
*P w/in class safeguard is designed to protect (ped. who narrowly missed being hit by D and who witnessed D's speeding vehicle strike her sister)
*N D takes every reasonable precaution (an. De La Cruz: N left enough space) (dist. A.C. ex rel. Cooper)
*N statutory violation was justified (dist. Tedla)
Liability defendant struck plaintiff’s sister in crosswalk and barely missed plaintiff herself
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman
P did not stop look listen at grade crossing
*N D takes every reasonable precaution (since he couldn't see down track he should have stopped and gotten out of his vehicle to look)
*Injury results from occurrence of type statute was designed to prevent (stop/look/listen so N get hit) (dist. Tingle Tedla)
Liability [For Contributory Negligence] plaintiff did not stop look listen at grade crossing
Pokora v. Wabash Ry.
P N stopped @ pt of danger to look for train
*Statutory violation justified (worse if stopped b/c truck already in zone of danger by time field of vision enlarged (boxcars in way) and stopping before that in truck wouldn't have helped him; nor would gettin out b/c of possibility boxcars would be shunted down upon him before he could regain his seat) (an. Tedla) (dist. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.)
*D takes every reasonable precaution (limits (some people would say it overrules but prof. doesn't think it did) Baltimore & Ohio (would have been worse for D if he had taken precaution of getting out of car - greater risk)) (dist. Martin: N buggy lt.)
No Liability [For Contributory Negligence] plaintiff did not stop at point of danger to look for train
Theisen v. Milwaukee Automobile Mutual Insurance Co.
D fell asleep at the wheel when driving P home
*=negl. per se (fores.: people N invol. fall asleep w/o plenty of notice here D exhausted from loss of sleep for 6 wks beforehand - should've known susceptible/N driven)
*N D takes every reas. precaution (D knew he was exhausted from loss of sleep for 6 wks prior; then stayed up late @ party/drove neway)
*Involved type of injury that is almost always foreseeable/homogeneous (see above for foreseeable; homog. b/c facts of falling asleep driving accidents don't vary much)
Liability defendant fell asleep at the wheel when driving plaintiff home
Matthews v. Greyhound Lines Inc.
D's driver drifted bus off hwy
*Falling asleep while driving=negligence per se (an. Theisen) (dist. Zabunoff: less vol. there)
*N statutory violation is justified (an. Martin) (dist. Tedla)
*Proximate cause (D Greyhound failed to screen D driver by calling checking reference; if they had would have found out he had already been in accidents from falling asleep at wheel had tendency to fall asleep at work)
*Involved type of injury that is almost always foreseeable/homogenous (an. Theisen)
Liability defendant’s driver drifted bus off the highway
Blaak v. Davidson
D crashed into the rear of plaintiff’s car when sudden dust storm engulfed highway
*D takes every reasonable precaut. (N negl. to fail to stop in dust storm b/c it might be more dang. to stop) (an. Tedla: walked on non-trffc side) (an. Pokora: worse if stopped) (dist. Theisen Matthews v. Greyhound Lines: D drove although susc. to falling asleep)
*N involved type of injury that is almost always foreseeable/homogenous (N foreseeable that not stopping would be more dangerous than stopping/N homogeneous b/c accidents involving drivers failing to stop b/c of obscured vision vary widely and auto accidents vary widely) (dist. Theisen)

No Liability defendant crashed into the rear of plaintiff’s car when a sudden dust storm engulfed highway

Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A.

#N/AHolmes incorrectly predicted that courts would reduce standards of care to objective rules