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22 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
Assault (Rule) |
1. intent, such that the intent is to cause offensive contact, OR the intent is to create the apprehension of offensive contact; 2. Plaintiff is placed in apprehension of imminent offensive contact; AND 3. Plaintiff’s apprehension is reasonable, i.e., a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s shoes would experience the same apprehension. |
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Assault (Cases) |
Read v. Coker: There was not an assault because there was not a gesture towards another in the case. There was just a mere threat. Navratil v. Parker: The police officer could not beheld liable for damages because a reasonable person would not experience the same apprehension. (argued otherwise in class) |
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Battery (Rule) |
1. Intent, as for an assault intent to cause offensive contact intent to cause apprehension of offensive contact 2. Offensive Contact results |
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Battery (Cases) |
Vosberg v. Putney: When one boy hit another during the course of class, damages could be recovered because defendant had intent to the offensive contact, and the contact resulted. Garrett v. Dailey: Brain Dailey needed to know with substantial certainty (see policy section) that his action would have resulted in the offensive contact. Cusseaux v. Pickett: The case that set the president for battered woman’s syndrome in New Jersey. Battered Woman’s Syndrome is not recognized in all jurisdictions |
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False Imprisonment (Rule) |
Actors intent is to directly or indirectly to confine a person confinement within fixed boundaries confinement is complete Confined party is conscious of confinement |
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Prima Facie Tort (Rule) |
intentional infliction of harm resulting special damages no excuse or justification the act is otherwise lawful |
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Prima Facie Tort (Case) |
Burns Jackson Miller Summit and Spitzer v. Lindner: The transport workers union goes on strike and a law firm sues on a Prima Facie Tort. The court says that the test fails on the “Double Duty intent” element. |
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IIED (Rule) |
Actor bears intent or recklessness as to both volitional conduct and the harm that the plaintiff alleges “Double Duty Intent” Actor engages in extreme and outrageous conduct. - A average reasonable person would exclaim “That’s Outrageous” Conduct results in plaintiff’s severe emotional distress, manifested in physical symptoms |
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Outrageousness (Factors) |
the conduct itself relationship between the parties the known susceptibility of the plaintiff |
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IIED (Cases) |
Russell v. Salve Regina: The plaintiff argues on two points. 1. That she is a vulnerable college student - The susceptibility point. That there is a special relationship between the parties - The relationship puts her in a special position 2. That there was not only intent to the contact, but to the damages. Jones v. Clinton: Clinton successfully argues that the intent was not to the damages but just to engage in sexual intercourse with the plaintiff. Jones’ Outrageousness argument was to the conduct - The hotel incident, the relationship as a governor and state employee, and her known susceptibility. |
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Fraud (Rule) |
Defendant made a false representation of fact D acted with intent or recklessness as to false representation, the latter meaning def. knew the statement was false or acted in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity D intended P to rely on the false representation D induced P’s reliance, which is to say that the false representation was material to P’s decision making P’s reliance was justified (objective test) P was injured as a result of the reliance, not merely in dignity but through economic loss or physical injury |
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Fraud (Case) |
Starbucks Case: A reasonable consumer would understand that some portion of the beverage would contain ice. This would mean that Starbucks was not trying to mislead consumers. |
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Affirmative Defense: Merchant's Privilege |
The actor reasonably believes that the detained party has taken goods from the premises or is attempting to leave the premises without paying for goods or services rendered AND the detention is reasonable with respect to the following: the investigative purpose of the detention (including the summoning of law enforcement authorities) the area or physical scope of the detention (including the force used to effect detention) the duration of the detention |
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Affirmative Defense: Defense of Others |
As Self-Defense, Supra but on behalf of another, ANDReasonable belief in necessity to avert harm must be factually correct |
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Affirmative Defense: Defense of Personal Property |
Def is exerting force to dispossess P or defendant’s personal property Request for return has been made and failed or would be useless force is not deadlyforce is employed only to the extent necessary |
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Special Rule on Personal Property in relation to defense of real property |
as defense of property defense is engaged in immediate or continuing fresh pursuit |
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Affirmative Defense: Defense of Real Property |
Plaintiff is intruding on Defendant’s real Property request that the plaintiff or intruder leave has failed Force is not deadly force employed only to the extent necessary |
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When is deadly force permitted in defense of real property? |
Deadly Force is permitted when the defender reasonably believed that the intruder poses a death threat to the defender or to a third party whom the defender is privileged to protect |
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Affirmative Defense: Consent |
Plaintiff’s willingness for intentional otherwise tortious conduct to occur and Plaintiff’s subjective intent to consent |
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Front (Term) Defendants reasonable belief for self defense |
D is protecting against a threat of physical harm The threat is immediate Harm would result from intentional acts of the other D is employing force only necessary to avert the harm |
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Recklessness |
d knows or has reason to know: that their conduct creates an unreasonable risk of harm that there is a high degree of probability that harm will result harm results |
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Self Defense with Deadly Force |
(1) as self-defense, supra; AND (2) one of the following, per def.’s reasonable belief: (a) safe escape (a.k.a. retreat) is not possible; OR(b) safe escape (a.k.a. retreat) is possible, but defendant is in own home that is not also the attacker’s home. |