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194 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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group think
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mode of thinking that people engage when the cohesiveness of their group is high and the members striving for unanimity overrides
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Rational Actor Decision Making
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government as person- gov acts as individual- rational unitary actor
decision: act of will outcome: optimal decision allows you to maximize affect/output or minimize input/cost |
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Organization Process Decision Making
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government as organization - compnay
outcome- satisficing- good enough if outcome fixes prob- it'll do standard operating procedure |
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Bureaucratic Politics Decision Making
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government as arena of conflict and coalition of influential actors
decisions are result of compromise or confusion outcome when delay no more possible |
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Kinship decision making
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huntington
not so much national interest as long as are of that kind |
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Singer
Requirements for an analytical model |
description of phen
explanation of rx among phen prediction |
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Singer
Level of Analysis Probs Adv or Disadv |
Description: system more comprehensive and total pic of IR
nation- richer detail, greater depth, more intensive portrayal explanation: nation: more thorough, causation replaces correlation prediction: similar utility: both |
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Singer
free will vs determinism |
nations move toward outcomes of which they have little knowledge and over which they have less control but that they prefer and select particular outcomes and attempt to realize them by conscious formulation of strategies
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Singer
Int'l system as LoA |
Most comprehensive
study patterns of interaction which the system reveals generalize about phen only this level allows for examination of whole without a comprehensiveness descriptive purpose: adv: comprehensive disadv: dearth of detail expl : exaggerates impact of system on national actors disadv: deterministic and postulates high degree of uniformity and discount differences among national actors not enough for causal statements but ok for correlative ones reasonable for prediction focuses on patterns of interactions which the sys reveals : power configs, alliance formation, conditions of stability |
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Singer
National State as LoA |
state as primary actor
differentiation among actors does not preclude comparison and contrast no assurance that will produce sophisticated approach Allows to avoid inaccurate homogenization BUT may lead to exagg of differences among sub sys ethnocentrism allows for study of decision making processes |
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Singer
Levels of Analysis |
int'l sys
nation state |
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Singer
what state behavior to study? |
objective factors that influence state behavior?
perception of these obj factors? |
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Yalem
Young's definition of an approach to analysis |
a complex intellectual comstruct encompassing the statement of philosophical perspectives, the delineation of a series of interrelated definitions and concepts, the specification of initial postulates, a discussion of the types of hypothesis derivable from the approach, and some criteria concerning the selection of data relevant in substantiating hypotheses derived from the approach
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yalem's additional level of analysis
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region- bc of increase of regional activity and organization
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yalem
how are national and int'l levels related |
interdependent and complimentary
knowledge of national system behavior would itself remain inadequate without the development of analyses of the patterns and variations of the flow of transactions to which the national actor responds |
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yalem
proper function of analytical model |
not description but the abstraction from reality of a set of interrelated explanatory hypotheses
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yalem
distinctive feature of international as opposed to toher types of systems |
constant risk of war
bc of absence of supranational institutions with the capacity to regulate the behavior of nation states |
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yalem
what is a region? |
lack of consensus as to definition of a region
may be a subordinate/regional system on the basis of common ehtnic linguistic cultural social and historical bonds latin america, middle east, western europe, southeast asia, west africa subsys dev and transformation, stability, interaction, intrusive penetrative behavior, perip behavior, orientations and issues, goals and roles core sector, periphery sector, intrustve systm which refer to the active members of a regional system, alienated members imp in politics of the regional sys, extra regional |
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yalem
regionalism as predictive tool |
dependent on the capacity to explain complex rx
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yalem
critiques singer |
models are distinct from LoA
models: explanatory hypotheses LoA: a perspective from which to look at IR Models: not descriptive but explanatory: doubts if causal rx can be established in Ir at any level predictive pwoer of IR models: limited to probabilistic statements |
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yalem's conclusions
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no one knows how to integrate the 3 levels
knowledge accumulated in each is not additive parallesims of approaches is the only way out grand synthesis unlikely |
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yalem on systemic level of analysis
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useful: liberates study of IR from parochialism of the study of FP
too detached from reality0 nondescritpive and hardly verifiable marred with determinism adequately explains security policy of major states (deterrence) |
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yalem on nation state as LoA
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descriptive power superior to systemic: more data narrower
accounts for differnces among states and for the discretionary element in FP formation explanatory powe: underestimates sytemic determinants of FP predictive power: not very impressive |
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yalem on regional subsys LoA
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increasing importance of regionalism
what is a region? descrip: better than systemic, worse than nation state explanatory: which are the regional variables? predictive power: unknown since explanatory capabilities not developed |
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Hoffman
what is IR |
attempt at studying systematically patterns of conflict and cooperation among mutually alien actors
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hoffman
3 advances in IR |
concept of int'l system
lterature on deterrance attempt to study pol roots, originality and effects of econ interdep |
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hoffman
probs of ir |
level of analysis prob
fragmentation at each level function fragmentation methodology usefulness |
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hoffman
why IR so receptive in US |
intellectual predisposition
political circumstances institutional opportunities |
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inis claude
7 myths about state |
1. peas in pod/myth of similarity
2. myth of solid state/solidarity: pol society marked by consensus 3. myth of monolithic government: institutional unity/myth of singleness of state gov 4. myth of almighty state: omnipotent: capable of generating/wielding power 5. myth of blood thirsty state 6. myth of immoral state 7. myth of outmoded state |
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Wolfers
nation state as sole actor? |
lose sight of humans for whome and by whome the game i supposed to be played
but if seen as mass of individuals th game of states appears as inhuman interference in lives of ordinary people |
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wolfers
nation state |
after napoleonic wars
ascribed acts that accounted for charges in the distribution of pwer for alignments and counter alignments for expansion and colonial conquest for war and eace concpt of multistate sys composed of entities of strikingly similar character and behavior appeared realist |
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wolfers
why minds of men theory inadequate/misleading? |
as long as men identify themselves with their nation and cling to such national possession as national sovereignty, territorial integration, and national security, the establishment of harmonious private relations across national borders will have little impact on the course of international political events and encounters
individual as private and public |
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wolfers
why do states act the same even if looking at individual |
men acting for states share common universal traits of human nature (place exceedingly high value on core possessions of nation and react in fear against any threats against them)
environment in which governments are required to act (anarchical multistate sys creates condition of constant danger |
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wolfers
state as actor |
establishes national actions and rx of state in int'l situations
almost any nation which has suffered a loss of territory or has been subjected to discrimination will take action to redress grievances fall into revisionist category, regardless of personal character of leaders or peculiarities of national culture BUT if ignore impact of individual or national differences on behavior of states that express dissatis with status quo |
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young
state |
central ol units without regard to internal make up
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young
nation |
integrated community held together by some combination of ethnic similarity, linguistic compatibility, shared traditions, and common culture
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young
pol sys/orthodox concept of WP |
external sovereignty - formal equality
principle of territoriality wide variety of human activites =precludes analysis of wide range of logically possible and empirically interesting models of WP |
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young
attacks of state centric world view |
accurate reflection of contemp realities of WP?
integrationists- state becoming obsolete bc of communications, transport, tech= worldwide pol community to replace/supplement world state transnationalists boundaries of established states and NS too confining- econ or peace groups decline of territorial state |
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young
discrepencies |
usage of state/ns becoming meaningless
basic attributes of state (territorial base, stable pop, viable govern, external sov) confusing now plus increased interdep state as hard shell- now vertical layering of human activity expansion of roles of non state actors new patterns of human loyalties |
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young
mixed actor system |
several qualitatively different types of actors interact in the absence of any settled pattern of dominance submission/hierarachy rx
state centric world to mixed actor world view number of distinguishable patterns of pol rx leaves room for continuity of role of state/ns (yes, imp in decline but still important) |
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young
conclusions |
basics of state centric view remain
but shift toward mixed actor happening doesn't mean state/ns will become unimp no need to be so radical in criticizing national states states- make them more mixed- where states are predom actors but not only ones in state sys |
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Carr
harmony of interest |
identity of interests: every state has identical interest in peace and that any nation that disturbs peace is irrational/immoral
=anglosaxon origin masks nations desire to maintain status uo without having to fight for it/change status quo having to fight in order to do so. |
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carr
foundations of realism |
machiavelli as foundation
1. history is sequence of cause and effect theory does not create practice = practice creates theory 3. politics are not a fx of ethics- ethics a function of politics (no effective morality) |
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carr
realist critique of the harmony of interests |
harmony of interest- assumption of prosperous and privileged class
invoked as moral device by privileged groups to justify and maintain their dominant position |
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carr
nature of Int'l law |
different than municipal law
law undeveloped lacks three institutions (judiciary, executive, legislature) respect for law will only be maintained only in so far as the law recognized effective pol machinery through which it can itself be modified and superseded |
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carr
change of status quo |
to establish methods of peaceful change is fundamental problem of int'l morality and int'l pol
can only be achieved by compromise successful FP- must oscillate between force and appeasement |
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20 yrs crisis
utopian approach |
general harmony everyone has equal interest in peace
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How is carr different than Morgenthau
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carr- reason for war is war itself bc int'l system is anarchy
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utopianism/realism distinctions
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1. transformation of society
U: by act of will, wants world peace, but can't bring it about R: society is product of causality, can't be changed by act of will, limited ability to modify chain 2. theory vs practice U: theory from action, necessity of utopia, confusion btw what is and ought to be R: theory derives from practice, descriptive (what IS), theories/solutions developed as problems present selves 3. actor U: intellectual R: bureaucrat: bound with existing order/ truth from practice 4. pol spectrum U: progressive/leftist, radical R: conservative/rightist 5. morality U: as guide to policy R: derives from PREDOMINANT POWER, has ability to see pol action from both angles |
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morgenthau
modern political thought comprised of |
conflict between realism and idealism
Idealism: rational and moral pol order, derived from universally valid abstract principles, essential goodness of human nature and attributes the failure of the social order to measure up to the rational standards on lack of knowledge or the depravity of certain isolated individuals/groups education, reform, and sporadic use of force can remedy shortcomings realism- imperfect- result of forces intrinsic to human nature- world composed of opposing interests/conflicts |
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Morgenthau
6 principles of political realism |
1. politics governed by objective laws (roots in human nature, rational and objective)
2. interest defined in terms of power (indifferent towards pol ideals and moral principles) 3. interest: objective category with specific meaning (universally valid, interest as essence of politics, unaffected by time/place) 4. moral significance of pol action (strain between moral command and successful pol action, must be filtered through circumstance of time/place, cannot be applied to states in absract universal moral principles) 5. rejection of morality (specific nation morals not equal to moral law of universe) 6. autonomy of politics (do not impose other standards of thought relevant to other sphere on pol sphere) |
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morgenthau
political power |
always the immediate aim
as means to nation's ends |
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morgenthau
power in realism |
is man's control over the minds and actions of other men
3 sources: fear of disadvantages expectations of benefits respect or love for men/institutions |
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morgethau
power distinctions |
power/influence
power/force usable/unusable power legitimate/illegitimate power |
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morgenthau
two roots of depreciation of pol power |
19th c philosophy
the american experience |
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Waltz
where are the major causes of war to be found? |
within man
within the structure of the separate states within the state system |
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waltz
to accurately understand IR, which image should be used? |
combination of the three rather than any one of them
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waltz
first image |
locus of imp causes of war found in nature and behavior of man
selfishness, misdirected aggressive impulses, stupidity elimination of war: through uplifting and enlightening men or securing their psychic-social readjustment human nature as good or evil? |
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waltz
second image |
internal organization of states is key to understanding war/peace
good state/bad state? liberal or socialist? free trade? |
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waltz
3rd image |
anarchical state system
no enforceable law among them each state judges grievance and ambitions according to dictates of own reason/desire conflict bound to cocur no higher authority self help system look out for themselves lack of automatic harmony froce to achieve goals passion over reason kant- perpetual peace among states by establishment of voluntary sys of int'l law relative gain more imp than absolute no guarantee of security - everybody's strategy depends on everybody else's at minimum- wish to survive BoP economics, politics, history |
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waltz
third image rousseau |
humans are weak
cautious to enter into conflict society develops these vices that lead to war humans only leave peaceful state of nature and conflict emerges when they are forced to cooperate stag hunt states-not indiv are primary actors in int'l pol conflict permanent feature states always present a particular will all risk 'unjust' war only a change in the structure of int'l politics could bring about an end to war- specifically federal government with leg body- coercive fore |
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waltz
man, state, and war conclusions |
no single image is ever adequate
calculations of each comprehended element come from more than one image wilson all causes are interrelated/prescriptions derived form a single image are incomplete bc partial analysis states are shaped by int'l environment as are men by both the nat'l int'l environment world gov only solution but impossible |
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waltz
1st and 2nd image in relation to third |
the structure of the state system does noes not directly cause state A to attack state B
special circumstance: location size power interest gov type past history (immediate/efficient causes) individual and state behavior modification cannot eliminate war through improvement of men or states ===some acting units cannot improve while others continue in their old ways |
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waltz
second image why not good enough |
The second image of international relations sees the internal organization of states as the key to
understanding war and peace. Thus the perception is that defects in states cause wars among them—peace and war are the products of good and bad states. However, Waltz emphasizes that no prescription for international relations written entirely in terms of the second image can be valid because the approach itself is faulty—it relies on the generalization of one pattern of state and society to explain peace or war in the world. Bad states can lead to war but the reverse—that good states mean peace in the world—is a doubtful theory. Just as individuals must be examined in the context of society, the actions of states must be examined in the context of the international system—“ the international political environment has much to do with the way states behave” |
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waltz
first image why not good enough |
According to the first image of international relations “the locus of the important causes of war is
found in the nature and behavior of man” (p. 16). Waltz outlines the arguments of various philosophers such as Spinoza, Rousseau and Niebuhr who believed that war was the direct result of human selfishness, misdirected aggressiveness and stupidity and, thus, to achieve peace men must be changed in their moral-intellectual outlook or their psychic-social behavior. Waltz agrees that though the events of world history cannot be divorced from the men who made them, the importance of human nature as an independent variable in the causal analysis of social events is reduced by the fact that this very same nature (no matter how it is defined) has to explain an infinite variety of social events. It is erroneous to explain social forms on the basis of psychological data—an uncritical analysis from the parts to the whole (individual to group) is problematic. While human nature undoubtedly plays a role in causing war, it cannot by itself explain both war and peace. |
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claude- power and int'l r
what are the 3 basic concepts relevant to the management of power and how do they differ? |
balance of power: extreme decentralization- laissez faire arrangement in sphere of power pol
collective security: solve problem by superimposing a scheme of partially centralized management of power upon a situation in which the possession of power remains diffused among national units world government: institutional system involving a monopoly of power, comparable to that alleged to exist in a well ordered state -related to each other as successive points on continuum- differ most fundamentally on degree of centralization of power and authority |
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claude- power and int'l r
Balance of Power as ambiguous concept |
as situation: equilibrium (power rx between states or groups is one of rough or precise equality) ; (disequilibrum (favorable balance); majestic neutrality
as policy as system (automatic self regulating character or wholly dependent on manipulation carried out by shrewd statesmen) as universal instrument of FP (inevitable outgrowth of struggle for power. inevitability? redundancy) as symbol (of realistic and prudent concern with the prob of power in intl rx) |
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claude power and int'l r
critique of BoP |
nature of BoP system ambiguous (many confusing meanings)
refers to type of system for the conduct of rx among states distribution of power maintains itself without effort like unseen hand 3 system 1. automatic equilibrium variable bi product- unwilled dividend of state interplay 2. semiautomatic- balancer state 3. mutually operated- policies of most states must be rationally directed toward that obj |
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claude power and int'l r
merits of equil |
crucial objective of power management in present era is prevention of war
relevance of BoP in preventing war- controversial champions don't claim it- keep the peace fx is to safeguard independence of states, to frustrate drives for universal hegemony, BUT war may be req'd by equilibrium or it may be prevented by equil |
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claude power and int'l r
BoP |
device for the creation/preservation of equil
war may be necessary means to this end expectations that equil will produce peace those who deny BoP should be judged as peace preserving sys are right- charac feature of sys is assumption that the constituent states are fundamentally devoted to self preservation and will fight if necessary to avert subjugation on other hand- should be regarded as a device for the prevention of war- right- considered as war inhibiting situation or a barrier to universal empire imply BoP promotes peace conceived as sys which provides framework for conduct of basic political reasons among states |
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claude power and intl r
3 weaknesses of BoP |
1. uncertainty
2. unreality 3. inadequacy |
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claude power and intl r
BoP req's |
effective power to be diffused among substantial number of major states
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claude power and intl r
wilsonian critique |
BoP as poorly suited for management of pwer
reservations about proposition that balance was ever a notably useful/successful mechanism bop= instability failed to prvent wwi |
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influence
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ability to turn capabilities ito desired outcomes
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concept of power
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2 aspects: power and influence
rational phen capability- base power and capability- contextual phen- capabilities alone don't determine outcomes- fungibility of power |
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national capabilities
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tangible elements
-geography, demography -econ and mil resources -indexes of power intangible elements -quality of leadership -pol sys -econ -social sys -intelligence |
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exerting influence
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diplomacy
negotiation and bargaining conflict resolution military measures rewarding others military aid use of force econ measures - coercion and rewards dependence and interdependence |
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claude
demerits of BoP |
hegemony may be better peace preserver (But think of quality of hegemon)
preponderance may be a better peace preserver is right hegemon is in power BoP not recipe for perfect peace |
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deutsch analysishow to measure power
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weight of power
domain of power range of power scope |
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two main traditions
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liberalism
realism |
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realism
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highlights power rx, pol rx, maintenance of peace and security, multipolar world, bipolar world
doesn't neglect econ or other rx/institutions- just don't think it's the most imp criticized as too simplistic superficial in way it treats conflict recipe for peace not working bc it's BoP |
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functionalism and neofunctionalism
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neofx claims to be better fx
use dif methodology to develop theorie first debate between idealism and realism in 50s/60s - create discipline in social science to look at states from political perspective |
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traditionalist vs scientists
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scientific approach- empirical evidence
empirically verify more quantifiable |
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pioneer of integration theory
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mitrany
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working peace system
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argument for functional development of int'l org that would function properly
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functionalism
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-human nature is good (org > welfare, peace, harmony)
-administration of things preferable to rule over people (politicians integrate those behind them AGAINST others) -harmony/disharmony - pol territorial state as obstacle to peace (destroy feelings of solidarity, tech progress allows depoliticization) |
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2 strains of development of int'l orgs in 19th c
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1. conference/congress system: leaders meet and decide pol issues of the day
2. development of technical organization: force countries to coop in technical/econ dev econ coop > technical coop > change world |
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int'l implications of fx
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working peace preferable to BoP
over time would administered by mesh of technical agencies, acting regardless of pol boundaries state becomes irrelevant |
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Working peace
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a web of functional connections among professionals and experts > would side step state
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functional theory of change
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automatic process at end of which nationalism will be transcended
attitudinal reorientation on basis of learning |
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4 fx separations
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power and welfare
gov tasks pol from technical loyalties |
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critique of fx
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power and welfare not separable
success in one functional sphere not automatically transferable to others the expert/politician distinction does not hold satisfaction of needs does not automatically alter human loyalties |
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conclusion on fx
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fx needs to be refined
to serve as a real alternative to the blind alley of realist analysis |
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Deutsch
security community community |
group of people which has become integrated
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Deutsch
integration |
attainment of a sense of community and of institutions within a certain territory by establishing institutions and practices to ensure peaceful change in the long run
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Deutsch
sense of community |
belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to an agreement on at least this point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of peaceful change
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Deutsch
peaceful change |
resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures without resort to large scale physical force
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Deutsch
security community |
one in which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically but will settle disputes in peaceful ways
-if entire world were sec com, war would be eliminated goal by which long term peace can be ensure |
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Deutsch
two types of security communites |
1. amalgamation
2. pluralistic security community |
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Deutsch
amalgamation |
formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit with some type of common government
unitary or federal US |
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Deutsch
pluralistic security community |
retains the legal independence of separate governments
US/Canada integration usually leads to this two different decision making centers wihtout merging each other |
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Deutsch
popular beliefs |
1. today more international
no. amalg harder. nationalism higher. 2. growth of state/expansion of territory resembles snowball no. earlier amalg has no effect 3. principle motive for the pol integ of states has been fear of anarchy/warfare OR if member is stronger than rest no. integ,amalg, responsiveness possible without BoP |
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Deutsch
strengths of pluralism |
easier to attain/preserve than amalg
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Deutsch
threshold of integration |
nature of integration
narrow threshold with serious possiblity of warfare in one end and ruling out that possibility in anoter war between two states might still be considered possible by some although no preps for it made OR routine prep for defense made but conflict unthinkable the achievement of sec com crossing the threshold, from a situation where war between political units concerned appeared possible and was being prep'd for to another situation where it wasn't |
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Deutsch
sense of community leads to |
political integration
mutual sympathy and loyalties, trust, and mutual consideration partial identification in terms of self images and interests mutually successful predictions of behavior, communication, perception of needs and responsiveness in process of decision making =no peaceful change without it |
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Deutsch
cores of strength |
larger stronger more politically administratively economically and educationally advanced units
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Deutsch
rising capabilities |
1. capacity to act of a political unit such as size power, economic strength, administrative efficiency
2. ability of a unit to control its own behavior and to redirect its own attention |
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Deutsch
burdens |
military/financial
manpower/wealth drains risk from pol or mil commitments cost of social/econ readjustments |
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Deutsch
background conditions |
helpful but not essential
previous administrative or dynastic union ethnic/linguistic assimilation stron gecon ties foreign mil threats |
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Deutsch
requirements for the establishment of amalgamated security communities |
1. mutual compatibility of main values - soc and pol
2. distinctive way of life 3. expectations of stronger econ ties or gains 4. marked increase in pol /administrative capabilities of at least some participating unites 5. superior econ growth on part of at least some participating units 6 unbroken links of soc communication- geograph between territ and sociolog between soc strata 7. broadening of pol elite 8 mobility of persons 9 multiplicity of ranges of communication and transaction addtional three 10. compensation of flows of communic/transac 11 not too infrequent interchange of group roles 12 considerable mutual predictability of behavior |
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Deutsch
background conditions conducive to disinteg |
conditions that increased burdens
considtions that reduced capability of such gov to cope with burdens put on them excessive mil commitments |
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Deutsch
special feature of pluraistic com |
only 3 essential
1. compatibility of major values relevant to pol decision making 2 capacity of participating pol units or govs to rspond to each other's needs/messages/actions quickly 3 mutual predictability of behavior why? bc make joint decisions only about limited range of subjects |
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Deutsch
pol integration as dynamic process |
new range of communications/transaction
timing strong core area decline of party divisions |
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Deutsch
functionalism as pathway to amalg |
functionalism is partial amalg- some gov fx are delegated by participating units on a low or high level of decision making
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take-off
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for integration
period in which small, scattered, and powerless movements change into larger and more coordinated ones with some significant power behind them before TO- pol integ may be matter of theorists after TO- integ matter of broad pol movements, govs, major interest groups before- matter of theory after- pol process |
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Deutsch
early issues of integ |
habit breaking
1. emergence of distinctive way of life (change in behavior, loyalties) 2. presence of external challenge to emerging new way of life 3. new generation in politics |
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Deutsch
way which movements spread |
involve formerly disinterested/passive
1. motivated by econ, pol, soc concerns 2. motivated to accidental pressure like famine, econ depression, existing pol institutions fail 3. pol appeal: rights/liberties 4. methods: set up orgs, pol isntituions, symbols, legislation, oppose unpop insti, propaganda |
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Deutsch
forming of pol institutions |
originality/innovation
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Deutsch
pol process of establishing a pluralistic sec com |
increasing unattractiveness/improb of war among pol units
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Deutsch
sec com |
concept alternative to war
peaceful change through coop and institutionalized procedures bound by sense of com two types (Amalg or plur) |
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Deutsch
two broad conditions facilitate formation of pluralistic sec com |
1. capacity of the participating pol units or gov to respond to each other's needs, message, and actions quickly, adeq, without resort to violence
2. compatibility of major values relevant to pol decision making |
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Nyepeace in parts
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peace through integration
makes economic sense irreversible- success of integration- spillover into dif contacts reach threshold islands of people spillover- deepening integ in one sector spillover into another if european example can be applied to other areas- foster processes of integ around world integ in one area> spillover build peace in parts around world- islands of peace |
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nye
possible for third world to do peace in parts? |
difficult
hard for them to depoliticize not automatic process latin american experts highly politicized no epistemic communities formed wealther more cohesive countries- easier= social consensus |
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nye
conclusion |
threshold of integration
no such thing as irreversible spill over process dependent on political decision NOT a natural development of westphalian system integration only possible if pol commitment is there |
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nye
phasing and consequences of integration process |
1. politicizaiton
2. redistribution 3. reduction of alternatives 4. externalization |
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nye
reasons for creation of regional econ org |
rise of reformist elite
external environ pol legit leaders |
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nye
4 processes of mechnisms that follow creation of common market + 3 that may enhance creation |
1. inherent linkage of tasks
2. increasing transactions 3. deliberate linkages and coalitions 4. modern economic group 5. involvement of external actors 6. regional ideology and intesification of regional identity 7. elite socialization |
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nye
integrative potential |
set of conditions that determine the type of response that the process mechanism stimulates
affect commitment to org structural and perceptual 1. symmetry or econ equality of units 2. elite value complementarity 3. existence of pluralism 4. capacity of MS to adopt and respond to internal noise 1. perceived equity of distribution of benefits 2. perceived external cogency 3. low or exportable visible costs |
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nye
reality/implications will integ lead to federation |
not without structure of incentives offered is seriously altered
reg orgs don't make efficient incursions on sov |
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nye
haas neofx |
Through an automatic and gradual process of politicization of actors’ purposes which had initially been technical or non controversial, an organization that scored high in their categories would be transformed into a political union even if some were far from enthusiastic
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nye
neofx two outcomes |
The inconvenience caused by the integ of some sectors and not others and the pol pressure of groups eager to preserve their gains from sector integration would lead national governmental decision makers to agree to increase the initial grant of power to the regional institutions
Group activities and eventually mass loyalties would increasingly flow to the regional center |
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waltz blue
reductionsit |
the whole is understood by knowing the attributes and the interactions of its parts
places causes at national and subnational level problem: different states produce similar as well as different outcomes and similar states have produced different and similar outcomes |
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waltz blue
econ theory of imperialsim |
concentration of wealth in hands of few
consumption can't keep pace with increases in productive power price level- returns profit- demand will be infsufficent to clear markets = malfunctioning= maldistribution gov (tax/spending) job to sustain econ in full employment look abroad but gains go to tiny minority while costs great and backward country develops own resources lenin- capitalists control gov don't permit redistribution problems= econ theory does not imply imperialism as the way in which cap states generate surpluses does not determine how they will be used imperialists exported capital, did not produce surplus, while some not capitalist redux approach isn't adequate for construction of int'l pol theory- diff state produce same results vice versa |
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systemic approach
waltz theory of IR |
reduces the entity to its discrete parts and examines their properties and connections
element sof the whole are studied in simplicity and then combined to make whole |
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waltz theory of IRsystem
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structure at one level and interacting units at another
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waltz theory of IR
structure |
constraining condition which cannot be seen or examined but produces a uniformity of outcomes despite a variety of inputs
molds and limits units and affects behavior through socialization of actors and through competition between them |
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waltz theory of IR
how system ordered |
decentralized
anarchic self regarding units self help no system wide authority ensure survival |
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waltz theory of IR
character of units |
sovereign
functions not differentiated perform silmilar tasks- esp providing own security capability to perform differs |
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waltz theory of IR
distribution of capabilities |
defines structure
POWER -attributes of units but their distribution is a system wide concept relative not absolute power |
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security dilemma
waltz theory of IR |
states uncertain about others' future intentions
avoid situations win which the status quo distribution of capabilities is upset |
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waltz theory of IR
benefits to anarchy |
moderate demands
limit manipulations avoid high costs of organization associated with hierarchic order seek settlement before escalation of disputes preserve autonomy |
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waltz theory of IR
balance of power |
exists in anarchy
when primary units' all strive for survival only distinctly pol theory of IP state are unitary actors who at min seek preservation and at max drive for universal domination use internal efforts to increase capability or external efforts expectation= BALANCE WILL BE RESTORED ONCE DISRUPTED= NOT MAINTENANCE power is means not end |
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waltz theory of IR
number of powers |
fewer the better
collusion, bargaining stability- difficult to enter structure larger stakes incentive to maintain mutual vulnerability costs of breaking down relations bipolarity is best- peaceful distribution of power accustomed to one another peaceful coexistance |
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waltz theory of IR
force |
not using it is a sign of strength
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waltz theory of IR
power |
old defintion: state as agent is powerful if affects others more than they affect him (confuses process with outcome)
now power is a means and the outcome of its use is uncertain |
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purpose neorealism
|
make it more scientific (morgenthau too impressionistic)
theoretical- refine morg |
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gilpinwhat happens wehn US hegemony ends?
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cyclical process
from one hegemony to the other way to challnege declining power inconclusive conclusion |
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gilpin
strengths of work |
order thinking on tendency of int'l sys towards equilibrium- how very structure orders state behavior
shows why coop in int'l r so difficult follow relative distribution of benefits first to focus on change |
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gilpin
hegemon |
different that dominance (in ir, one country subjugates another)
position of country that enjoys econ preponderence bc of strength of economic base, can shape world in interest and of interest of other sets rules of the game |
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gilpin
hegemonic war |
war between challenger and declining hegemon
heg mpositon can't be maintained anymore another country wants to take over position done in pas trhough all out war not war to establish bop war that determines which state will be dominant and govern sys |
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juncture
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occurs when rules of game imposed no longer reflect
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gilpin
main hyp |
actors enter social struc to advance interest (reflect relativ e powers of actors)
over time, intersts change actos who benfit most form change in social sys and who gain power to effect such change will seek to alter the sys in what that favor their interests changedsys will reflect new distribtuion of pwer |
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gilpin
precondition for change |
lies in disjunction between the existing social system and redistribution of power toward those actors who would benefit most
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gilpin
equil and volatility |
equil - when no one will gain from changing the sys
unlikely to maintain system will change and a new equil, reflecting redistrib of power volatile: expansion has limits, costs of maintaining equil internal reasons: dinismighin return, increasing cost of war, consumption grows faster than GDP, structural change in econ toward service, corrupting affluence external: increasing costs of dominance, loss of econ and techno leadership peaceful resolution possible principal mech of change- hegemonic war |
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gilpin
strategices to stave off change |
inc resources
reduce commitments preventive wa expand to more secure/cheaper defense perimenter reduce int'l commitment |
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gilpin
if stave off strategies fail |
hegemonic war
or can deliberate choice for peaceful adjustment (theoretically) |
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wallerstein
inequalties of core/periphery |
stages of development
feudal vs cap accident institutionalized |
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wallerstein
how did non cap society like ussr indust |
no less a capitalist
since engages in market |
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wallerstein
3 structural positions of world |
core
periphery semiperiphery |
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wallerstein
semiperiphery |
exploited and exploiter
upper stratum is not faced with unified opposition bc of middle |
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wallerstein
3 strats for transformation |
3 strategies of transformation
1. chance 2. invitation 3. self reliance |
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galtung
3 phases of imperialism |
colonialism
neo colonialism neo neocolonialism |
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galtung
harmony/disharmony of interest |
interest/conflict of interest- special case of conflict-
situation where parties are pursuiing incompatible goals |
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galtung
imperialism |
system taht splits up collectivities and relates some of the parts to each other in relations of harmony of interests and other parts in disharmony/conflict of interest
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galtung
2 types of imperialism |
vertical interaction relation: peopel and nations have different values that complement each other and then engage in exchange; looting, highly unequal exchange, or highly differential spinoff effect due to processing gaps
fedual interaction structure: maintains and reinforced his inquality by protecting it |
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5 types of imperialism
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econ
pol mil communication cultural |
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strange
challenges validity and usefulness of regime concept |
1. the study of regimes is, for the most part a fad, one of those shifts of fashion not too difficult to explain as a temporary reaction to events in the real world but in itself making little in way of a long-term contribution to knowledge
2. imprecise and woolly 3. value biased 4. distorts by overemphasizing the static and underemphasizing the dynamic element of change in WP 5. narrowminded, rooted in a state-centric paradigm that limits vision of a wider reality |
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keohane nye
depdence interdependence |
dep means a state of being determined or significatnly affected by external forced
interdependence means muual dependence in WP refers to situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in dif countries |
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interdependent relationships will
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always involve costs since interdependence restricts autonomy
impossible to specify a prior whether the benefits of the rx will exceed the costs |
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keohane nye
two perspectives for analyizeing cost/ben of interdep rx |
1. joint gains and loses
2. relative gains and distributional issues |
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keohane nye
int'l interdep |
asymmetrical interdependencies as sources of power among nations
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keohane nye
regime |
networks of rules, norms, and procedures that regularize behavior and control its effect
intermediate factors betweeen power structure of an intl sys and pol and econ bargaining that takes place within it structure of system is the distribution of power resources among states profoundly affects nature of regime regime affects and tome extent governs the pol bargaining and daily decision making that occurs |
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complex interdependence
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world in which actors other than states participate directly in Wp
clear hierarchy of issues does not exist force is an ineffective instrument of policy 1. mutliple channels connect societies 2. the agenda of interstate rx consists of multiple issues that are not arranged in a clear consistent hierarchy 3. military force is not used by governments toward other governments within region |
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keohane nye
CI distinctive pol processes which translate power resources into power as control of outcomes |
linkage strategies
agenda setting multiple channels of contact among societies/transationa dn transgovernmental reltaions role of international orgs |
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keohane nye
realism and CI differ on |
goals of actors
instrument sof state policy agenda formation linkages of issues roles of international organizations |
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keohane nye
ci |
International regimes undermined from time to time by econ and techno change but they will not disintegrate entirely – quickly reconstructed to adapt to economic and techno conditions
Pol reality: govs continually sacrifice econ efficiency to security, autonomy, and other values in policy decisions. |
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keohane nye
models for WP explanation |
overall power
int'l org issue structure |
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keohane nye
outcomes of complex interdep |
absence of hierarchy
military force not usable if realist models should be replaced, what hsould replace? doesn't eliminate power structure gives more chances for smaller actor |
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krasner struc causes
regimes |
principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue are
intervening variables standing between basic causal factors and outcomes and behavior changes in principles and norms are changes of regime itself if the principles, norms, rules, and decision mkaing procedures of a regime become less coherent, or if actual practice is increasingly inconsistent with principles, norms, rules, and procedures, then a regime has weakened -change within a regime involve alterations of rules and decision making procedures, but not of norms and principles change of a regime involves alteration of norms and principles weakening of a regime involves incoherence among the components of the regime or inconsistency between regime and related behavior |
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krasner struc causes
do regimes matter? |
intervening variable between basic causal variables (power and interest) ad outcomes/behavior
don't arise on own but once in place affect behavior and outcomes basic fx- coordinate state behavior to achieve desired outcomes in particular issue areas can't be relevant for zero sum situations either useless or extremely pervasive =conventional structural arguments do not take regimes seriously: if basic causal variables change, regimes will also change regimes have no indep impact on behavior modified structural arguments represented here by a number of adherents of a realist approach to int'l relations, see regimes as mattering only when indep deiciosn making leads to undesired outcomes groatian perspectives accept regimes as a fundamental part of all partterned human interaction |
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krasner struc causes
what is the rx between basic causal factors and regimes? |
causal variables:
1. egoistic self interest 2. political power 3. norms and principles 4. habit and custom 5 knowledge |
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krasner regimes and limits of realism
what distinguishes the regime concept as it has been used from lineage? |
70s- scholars working from realist perspective developed an alt to conventional billiar bal model
vs sov states differentiated by power capabilities only |
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autonomy of regimes
krasner limits of realism |
lags: situations in which the relationship between basic causal variables and regimes becomes attentuated
uncertainty feedback: processes by which established regimes alter power and interest regimes alter actors calc of how to max interests, alter interests, regimes as source of power ; regimes may alter the power capabilities of dif actors |
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krasner
criticize realism |
1. billiard ball methphor- states solely
no external environment max power no room for int'l regimes 2. complicated universe- impact of distribution of state power on some external environ more approp metaphor tectonic plates when regimes first created- little pressure, over time pressure develops - may be relieved by imperceptible incremental movements high level of incongruity- more dreamatic ultimate earthquake- realign plates |
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after hegemony
harmony |
refers to a situation in which actors' policies (pursued in their own self interest without regard for others) automatically facillitate the attainment of others' goals
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after hegemony
cooperation |
cooperation requires the actions of spearate individuals and orgs- which are not in pre-existent harmony- be brought into conformity with one another through a process of negotiation = policy coordination
only in situations in which actors perceive that their policies are actually or potentially in conflict without conflict- no need to cooperate |
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after heg
regime |
definition of norms simply as standards of behavior where adopted on grounds of self interest or otherwise
define in general the purposes that their members are expected to pursue norms contains somewhat clearer njunctions to members about leg and illegit behaivor 4 distinct compents: principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures not new int'l order but as arrangements motivated by self interest |
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after heg
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failure of a given attempt at cooperation in WP
interests of the states involved were incompatible with one another discord was a natural result of charac of actors |
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after heg main idea
|
waning of US heg
norms ofcooperation previous norms would be maintained harmony don't need harmony of interest for cooperation |
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collective action
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A situation in which everyone (in a given group) has a choice between two alternatives and where, if everyone involved chooses the alternative act that is Individualistically Rational (IR), the outcome will be worse for everyone involved, in their own estimation, than it would be if they were all to choose the other alternative (i.e., than it would be if they were all to choose the alternative that is not IR).
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ashley
neorealism |
attempt to reformulate classical realism
move away from focus on individual to focus on the relationship between structures and isntitutions in international systems keeps realist emphasis on power, national interst, historically effective political agency of the state |
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ashley
four failures of realism |
1. too subjective, too dependent on historical context and interpretation of actions by statemen or analysts
2. doesn't adequately distinguish between subjective and objective aspects of interational pol life, poor in theoyr 3. not well grounded in social theory and closed off from other schools of though 4 autonomy of policial spehere? |
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ashley
orrery of errors |
statism
utilitarianism positivist discourse structuralism |
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ashley
dialetical competence model |
condtitions that make the unitary sov state possible
discuss current state of affairs as historically contingent critical 3. elements of a dialectical competence model 1. account for the emerg3ence, reprod, and transformation of a world-deominant public political apparatus: a tradition of regime anchored in the BoP power scheme and constitutive of the modern states system. PRODUCES sovereign states who embody the regime, as a condition of sovereignty Regime beound within the identities of the participant states- observations of its rules and expectations become acts of self-realization BoP regime |
