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81 Cards in this Set
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Consequentialism |
x is right if, and only if, x has the best consequences |
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Maxi-min (Epicurus) |
Epicurus thinks happiness is the highest good, or most valuable thing in life happiness=pleasure |
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Epicurus on happiness and pleasure |
we ought to minimize the amount of pain we experience in life we do this by reducing unnecessary desires so, living moderately is conductive to happiness achieve tranquility and don't fear death |
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Act Utilitarianism (Mill) |
Consequentialism: x is right if and only if x has best consequences |
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Greatest Happiness Principle |
best consequences= most total happiness (Maxi-total) |
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Act utilitarianism, generally |
morality depends on the consequences of the partiular action |
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Nozick's objection |
happiness is not the only thing we desire as intrinsically valuable |
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why? |
bc it's not always the case that one should plug into the experience machine, utilitarianism is false we value contact with reality we want to actually do certain things, and be certain people-don't want to merely have experiences of doing things |
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Rule Utilitarianism (Smart) |
morality depends on the consequences of that kind of action -an action is right if and only if that action conforms to a rule that, when followed, tends to maximize happiness -an action is wrong if and only if that action violates a rule that, when followed tends to maximize happiness |
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Smart on Rule utilitarianism |
when rules conflict, go with the action that will promote the greatest happiness in this case |
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Ethical Egoism Hobbes |
ethical egoism is what morality would look like in the state of nature; everyone should and will act for their own benefit |
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Intrinsically valuable |
a valuable end, or something vlauable in its own right ex: happiness |
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instrumentally valuable |
a means to a valuable end ex: money |
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Utilitarianism |
happiness/pleasure is the ONLY thing that is intrinsically valuable |
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Mill |
happiness is the ONLY THING that each person desires for its own sake |
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SO... |
each eprson's happiness is the only intrinsically valuable thing the total happiness of the world is the only intrinsically valuable thing |
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Tranquility (Epicurus) |
freedom from physical pain freedom from trouble in the soul |
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Attaining T |
reduce unnecessary desires, and don't fear death |
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cont. |
pleasure is the only good, pain is only bad when you're dead you feel neither pain/pleasure therefore being dead isn't good or bad for you |
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Higher v. Lower Pleasures; the Competent Judges Test |
objection to Mill's Act Utilitarianism |
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Pig Objection |
Mill makes pleasure of the senses morally good |
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Response |
there are higher and lower pleasures and no amount of lower (sensual) pleasures are as good as a higher (intellectual) pleasure |
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pig thing |
"better to be a human being dissatisfied, than a pig satified; better to be a Socrates dissatisfied, than a fool satisfied" |
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The competent judges test |
"Of 2 pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference…there is the more desirable pleasure" |
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Ground of Morality |
what makes an action right |
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Decision procedure |
how we should decide what to do |
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Deontology |
x is right iff x does not violate a moral rule |
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Cultural Relativism (Rachels) Is morality just a matter of opinion? |
1. what is morally good and morally bad is relative to each culture
2. actions that a society approves of are morally good for people in that culture, and actions that a society dissaproves of are morally bad for ppl in that culture |
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Moral differences argument |
P different cultures disagree about morality C therefore, morality is subjective |
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IS this a valid argument? |
no the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises |
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the lessen |
disagreement by itself is not sufficient to show that morality is subjective |
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CR is false if... |
there is any action that is morally wrong even though most people in that culture believe it is OK |
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Plato's Euthyohro dilemma |
is something right because God commands it, or does God command it because it is right? |
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DCT |
an action is morally right because God commands it an action is morally wrong because God forbids it |
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Objection to DCT |
suppose God commanded us to torture (torture is morally right) it seems as if DCT would get this case wrong |
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Adams |
according to DCT, there is nothing inherently wrong with torturing a child -so there is no reason to think that it's impossible for God to command us to do so |
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We must assume God has a certain kind of character Adams: |
God's commanding x makes x right But only bc God is loving, kind, fair, etc. |
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DCT |
God's command-->rightness/wrongless |
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M-DCT |
God's nature AND God's commands--> rightness/wrongness |
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General Problem for Hobbes's Social Contract Theory |
we are worse off pursuing our unrestrained self-interest but it is not rational to show restraint without 3rd part enforcement |
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SCT's solution |
1. make an agreement that we will limit our self-interest 2. grant a 3rd part permission to enforce that agreement 3. keep the agreement |
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State of Nature |
No one with the authority and power to enforce laws all persons should and will act for their own benefit (ethical egoism) scarce resources perceptual state of war |
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The solution: form a social contract |
grant authority to a soverign to make and enforce laws agree to live by those laws--consent |
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MLK Jr. |
consent to the social contract- agreeing to live by the laws- is not sufficient for morality; not the right thing to do this is bc sometimes the law can be unjust |
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Rawls |
imagine we find ourselves in The Original Position- this is a hypothetical social contract establishing the basis for political authority |
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we- as rational agents- |
need to decide how to distribute social goods |
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but we are behind a veil of ignorance |
no one knows which place in society they will occupy |
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Rawls says: |
the principles of justice are what we would choose in the Original Position |
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In short, we should respect The Difference Principle |
"social and economic inequalities, for example inequalities of wealth and authority, are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone" maxi-min |
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Hypothetical Imperatives |
depend on what you want they are conditional: if you want x, and y is the means to attain x, they do y |
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A categorical imperative |
does not depend on what you want they are unconditional: do x they are universal: everyone has a reason to do x |
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The Universal Law formulation of the Categorical Imperative |
"act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it becomes a universal law" |
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maxim |
a reason for action states what you are about to do, and why you are about to do it |
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Can a maxim be universalized? three step test |
1. state the maxim 2. imagine a world in which everyone follows that amxim 3. can the goal of my action be achieved in that world? |
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If we violate the CI... |
we are inconsistent we will that everyone follow this rule, but if we break it, we make an exception for ourselves |
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Doctrine of Doing and Allowing |
it is always morally worse to do harm that to allow that same harm to occur |
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2 kinds of euthanasia, for example |
doing something to end the person's life, and allowing that person to die. According to DDA, active euthanasia is morally worse than passive euthanasia |
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Rachels |
if this is untenable- if active euthanasia is at least sometimes morally equal, then DDA is false |
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R's argument |
1. if an action promotes the best interest of everyone concerned and violates no one's rights, then that action is morally permissible |
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2 |
in some cases, active euthanasia promotes the best interests of everyone concerned and violates no one's rights |
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C; |
so in some cases, active euthanasia is morally acceptable |
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DDA on Foot's trolley cases |
do nothing both times: don't switch the track and don't push the fat man |
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Singer and the DDA |
no morally relevant difference between allowing a child to starve by not sending $200 in an envelope and not saving a drowning child (ruining your $200 shoes) |
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Narveson's Response |
we need to distinguish between duties of charity and duties of justice. |
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With respect to duties of justice, there are at least two: |
1. do not kill persons 2. do not cause the deaths of persons |
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N on responsibility |
if A has harmed B in the past, then A does have a responsibility to help B overcome that hardship. If A has not harmed B in the past, then A does not have a responsibility to help B overcome a hardship |
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N also rejects the principle of comparable moral significance |
if you can prevent something bad from happening without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance, then you should do it. |
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N's requirement of charity |
if by expending a modest effort you can greatly benefit someone else, then you should do it |
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Doctrine of Double Effect |
it can be morally permissible to cause a harm as a forseen but unintended side effect, even if it is never morally permissible to intend to bring about that harm |
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DDE on the Trolley Problem |
trolley case: pull the lever fat man case: do nothing |
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Duty to help vs. duty not to harm (Foot) According to Foot, what should you do with regards to the fat man case? |
The duty not to harm always outweighs the duty to help. So you should not push the fat man |
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Foot on the trolley/lever case? |
in either case, you will violate the same duty not to harm so you have a good reason to minimalize the harm. So you should pull the lever |
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What is one justification for legal punishment? For Primoratz, retributivism |
the person deserves to be punished |
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Principle of Retribution |
If A wrongly deprives B of some good, then A ought to be deprived of a good of equal value |
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Ethical Pluralism |
there is more than one fundamental moral principle that determines whether an action is right or wrong |
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Prima Facie Duties (Ross) 2 kinds of duties |
1. prima facie duty: a duty to do x that may be outweighed by other duties 2. all things considered duty: the duty you should act on (after weighing all the prima facie duties) |
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There is a prima facie duty to do x if and only if |
1. there is always a duty to do x 2. the duty to do x is sometimes outweighed by other reasons 3. if there are no other duties to not do x in a particular case, then we are morally required to do x |
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Ross on Right action |
x is right if and only if it's a persons all things considered duty to do x in that situation all things considered duty= the prima facie duty that outweights all other conflicting duties (if any) |
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2 kinds of moral actions for Aristotle |
1. right action: doing the action that a virtuous person would do in this situation 2. acting virtuously: doing the right action in the same way as a virtuous person would do that action in this situation |
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How to act virtuously? |
1. the agent must know that the action conforms with what virtue requires 2. the agent must choose to do it bc that action conforms with what virtue requires 3. the agent must have a stable disposition to act in conformity with this virtue |
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Virtue is a state of character |
it is a stable disposition to think, feel, and act in certain ways |
