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194 Cards in this Set
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Ansolabehere et al 2001
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Both parties and preferences influence roll-call voting; specifically, party effects are present in 40% of roll-call votes, particularly close votes, procedural votes, and important “party” votes (eg taxation), and not present in “conscience” votes (eg abortion, school prayer).
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Arnold 1990
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“…congressional decisions depend partly on what citizens (“C”) will allow, partly (on what coalition leaders (“CL”) propose; partly on what strategies CLs and opposition leaders adopt; and party on what legislators (“L”) themselves prefer” (p. 119). Electoral interests pervade all aspects of L and CL decisionmaking and can impel both particularistic and general policies.
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Baumgartner and Jones 1993
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The course of US public policy is not gradual and incremental, rather it’s disjointed and episodic.
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Cox and Poole 2002
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Using a spatial model, with the Rice index of party dissimilarity as the DV, Cox and Poole find that party influence is systematically higher for procedural, organization and label-defining votes.
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Downs 1958
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Downs posits that democratic governments act rationally to maximize political support. Parties act to maximize votes and citizens also behave rationally politics.
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Fowler 2006
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Legislative connectedness, ie the social distance between senators, predicts legislative influence (the # of successfully passed floor amendments) and roll call voting, even after controlling for ideology and partisanship.
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Groseclose et al 1999
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Nominal interest group scores (such as the ADA or ACA) do not appropriately measure inter-temporal or inter-chamber preferences; and adjusted score that does facilitate inter-temporal/chamber comparisons is needed and constructed.
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Kingdon 1979
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Legislators’ voting decisions can be understood as the workings of extremely simple decision rules, rules which are not generated in some arbitrary fashion but in a way which is consistent with quite a rich body of previous literature.
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Krehbiel 2000
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“Vote-based measures of partisanship are ineffective instruments for detecting genuine party-based voting, party strength, and leadership support.”
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Mayhew 1974
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US congressmen are single-minded seekers of re-election.
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Nokken 2000
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By analyzing the behavior (ie democratic agenda and leadership scores) of Senate and House party defectors, from 1947 to 1997, Nokken finds evidence of party effects. MC preferences are consistent within party; defectors die in the ideological boots of their new party (to use Poole’s famous words)
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Poole and Rosenthal 1991
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An abstract and parsimonious model can account for the vast bulk of roll call voting on a variety of substantive issues.
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Poole and Rosenthal 2007
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Throughout American history, congressional roll-call voting has had a simple structure: a two-dimensional spatial model that allows for a linear time trend; the primary dimension is concerned with political party and economic redistribution, and the 2nd, issues that split the parties, in particular race.
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Poole and Rosenthal 2001
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Since 1985, roll call voting has become more unidimenisonal; parties are more homogeneous and polarized.
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Snyder and Groseclose 2000
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Parties matter, especially on key procedural votes in the post-WWII period as well as on certain substantive issues (e.g., budget, tax, social insurance), and the partisan influence is about the same for the House as well as the Senate.
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Kingdon 1989
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Legislators (or MCs) are rational autonomous actors, influenced by their own preferences, fellow MCs, and constituents; their decision-making is bounded by rationality (pursuing goals in the context of imperfect information, increasing pressures and limited resources); and the legislative system is best seen as a set of narrowing boundaries, linking the mass public to the Congress.
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McCubbins and Schwartz 1984
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What appears to be congressional neglect of oversight responsibility really is the rational preference for “fire alarm” oversight over “police-patrol” oversight.
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McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987
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Administrative procedures constitute an important mechanism for legislators to achieve greater bureaucratic compliance and help account for the infrequency of visible oversight activities such as sanctioning.
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Moe 1989
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“American public bureaucracy is not designed to be effective. The bureaucracy arises out of politics, and its design reflects the interests, strategies, and compromises of those who exercise political power.”
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Weingast and Moran 1983
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Congress does influence agency decisions (the mix of cases at the FTC changes in response to changes on the relevant oversight committees in Congress).
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Krehbiel, Shepsle, and Weingast 1987
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Challenging Shepsle and Weingast (1987) [see notes], Krehbiel argues that congressional committees have never possessed an uncircumventable ex post veto and are very much constrained by their parent chambers. In response, Shepsle and Weingast defend their model of the foundations of committee power.
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Shepsle and Weingast 1987
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Committees, as agenda setters in their respective jurisdictions, are able to enforce many of their policy wishes because they possess an “ex post veto” in the penultimate, conference stage of the legislative process.
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Black 1948
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Mathematical models of "committee" (voting) behavior, including single-peaked preferences.
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Maltzman 1997
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Congressional committees respond to multiple principals' preferences, and their responsiveness is conditioned on majority-party strength.
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Weingast and Marshall 1988
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The committee system exists to deliver "property rights" in legislation in order to avoid the problems caused by legislative transactions in the absence of currency.
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Hall and Grofman 1990
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Existing measurements of preference outliers are imprecise, and we should go beyond roll-call voting to determine preferences. Once we do so, preference outliers aren't rare, just conditional.
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Londregan and Snyder 1994
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At least one-third of congressional committees in the House between 1951 and 1984 were composed of preference outliers.
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Adler and Lapinski 1997
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Using measures of district-level demand for government services, Adler and Lapinksi build a Monte Carlo simulation to construct random Congresses from 1943 to 1994 for 13 House committees. By comparing simulated memberships with actual memberships, they find that there are, indeed, "high-demand" committees--and that nobody wants to be on Post Office.
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Sheingate 2006
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Congressional opportunity structure (the nexus of jurisidictions of committees, as measured in committee entropy) affects issue attention in that institutions appear to change members' incentives for engaging in entrepreneurship. Committees with broader jurisdictions are pretty much fame whores, while narrower jurisdictions generate partisan conflict.
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Fenno 1962
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Fenno finds the House Appropriations Ctee to be well integrated (ie “mesh together” well and minimized conflict) due committee norms and internal mechanisms of control.
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Groseclose 1994
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Correcting for the problems related to existing tests of committee composition (assumed normality and cardinal meaning of data, the use of mean scores, and falsification of design), Groseclose finds little evidence in support of committee assignments being nonrandom.
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Hall 1987
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MCs are purposive actors motivated to behave (participating in committee decision-making) by different goals.
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Krehbiel 1990
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The preference outlier ctee is a “stylized fact.” Except for the Armed Services Ctee, most standing ctees in the 96th-99th appear to be microcosms of the House, ie they failed to be homogeneous or preference outliers.
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Krehbiel 1991
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Legislative organization of US Congress (eg rules, procedures, institutional arrangements) is more consistent with the informational theory than the distributive theory.
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Rhode 1994
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Rohde takes issue with Kriehbiel, addresses the inadequacy of his informational theory, and argues for a more integrative theory, essentially that a legislature’s choices about its organization will depend on the context of the decision (ie conditional party government applied broadly)
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Ansolabehere et al 2000
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The natural experiment of redistricting gives a window onto legislators' efforts to develop their personal vote/the effects of "homestyle".
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Abramowitz et al 2006
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Redistricting doesn't explain the decline in House election competitiveness--but partisan polarization and the incumbency advantage do.
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Box-Steffensmeier 1996
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Cox and Katz 1996
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The returns to quality campaigners, not the increase in incumbent resources, explain much of the increase in the incumbency effect over the past generation of House campaigns.
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Mayhew 1974
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Jacobson 1978
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Incumbents' principal advantages seem to lie in their greater name recognition, although this is not always advantageous. Challengers who are properly funded can overcome the name recognition barrier and thus unseat incumbents; challengers' spending is more efficient at vote-getting than incumbents.
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Jacobson 1987
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Measuring "marginal" district by vote share is misguided. When we measure it by probability of incumbents' re-election, it becomes clear that the marginals never vanished--that variance in vote share has increased along with the mean incumbent vote share.
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Jacobson 1990
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Panel data reinforces the message that challengers have more to gain from campaign spending than do incumbents and that, consequently, they have a higher marginal return from advertising expenditures.
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Ansolabehere et al 2001
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The Downs model seems to fail empirically, since district responsiveness has historically been low and because candidates espouse national party ideology instead of moderating to accommodate local ideological conditions. This may provide evidence for the conditional party government and Cox/McCubbins party cartelization model, since party policies may be chosen in response to heterogeneous districts' needs.
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Gerber 1998
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Using instrumental variables, Gerber argues that incumbent and challenger spending has the same marginal effect.
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Hall and Deardorf 2006
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Lobbying is a primarily a form of legislative subsidy—a matching grant of costly policy information, political intelligence and labor to the enterprise of strategically selected legislators.
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Hall and Wayman 1990
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Political money to legislators who were already predisposed to interest groups’ preferences/policy position is able to mobilize MCs’ committee participation (membership in the relevant committee, and leadership position mobilized ctee participation as well).
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Hojnacki and Kimball 1998
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For interest groups, the key determinants of which MC to lobby depends the strength of the groups’ organizations in the district and the MCs’ existing views/preferences on the issues.
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Wright 1990
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Representatives’ ctee voting decisions, particularly Ways and Means, are best explained by the number of lobbying contacts they receive from groups on either sides of the issues. Campaign contributions indirectly influences ctee voting decisions via the number of lobbying contacts.
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Denzau and Munger 1986
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unorganized, noncontributing voters may be effectively represented even in a situation in which interests groups are well organized and active.
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Bailey and Maltzman 2008
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Supreme Court justices are not just life-tenured policy maximizers; they have independent values about the importance of "law" and democratic values. But you can only tell that if you use a more complicated two-dimensional spatial model of judicial preferences.
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Aldrich and Rohde 2000
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Evidence shows that the majority and minority parties in Congress are not symmetric with regard to their ability to impact on choices and outcomes. This is contrary to Krehbiel’s assumptions but consistent with the premise of the conditional party government model.
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Cox and McCubbins 2005
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The “procedural cartel model”: responsible party government does operate in congress, but the key to majority party success is in its ability to set the agenda (both positively and negatively) rather than its ability to consistently marshal a cohesive voting bloc.
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McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2001
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The main influence of party discipline is not on the votes on specific roll calls but on the choice of ideal point made by the representative.
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Binder and Smith 1997
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The filibuster is not a popular part of the original Senate design and tradition of protecting minority rights on crucial issues. It's just a way for individual Senators to protect themselves.
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Sinclair 1995
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The power of the House majority party leadership has increased as members see more benefits from strong central organization.
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Binder 1995
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Partisanship in the early Congress shaped the institutional trajectory of the House and Senate.
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Binder, Lawrence, and Maltzman 1999
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Parties matter, because they explain how co-partisans voted in the A to Z affair. Alternately: Binder et al take down Krehbiel on his home turf.
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Polsby 1968
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Parties are weak, and the House is an institution unto itself. Consequently, blocking legislation is easier than passing it, committee assignments are made strictly by seniority, and there are fewer Sumner-style attacks than there used to be.
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Shickler 2001
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Congress' institutions are designed to find an optimal solution across numerous objective functions, not just any single theory of institutionalism.
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Binder 1996
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There is a partisan basis to procedural rights (ie minority rights) in the House; and inherited rules matter as well.
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Cooper and Brady 1981
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The institutional context of the House determines leadership power and style, which explains the hierarchical (“czar”) Cannon House to the bargaining Rayburn House, and the impact of the institutional context on leadership behavior is determined by party strength (ie strong party leads to centralized power, with goal-oriented leaders; when party is weak, power is decentralized and leaders are interested in maintaining leadership.
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Cox and McCubbins 1993
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Parties are a species of “legislative cartel,” that is, they usurp the power from the House to make rules governing the structure and process of legislation. Cartels seek to control the legislative agenda for their members.
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Cox and McCubbins 1997
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Cox and McCubbins refute Schickler & Rich’s (1997) against a partisan interpretation of procedural choice, and reaffirm their argument for a party government, with the key theoretical distinction to be made between whole set of rules at any given time versus particular rule changes at particular times.
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Krehbiel 1993
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A clear unique definition of significant party behavior (i.e. behavior consistent with known party policy objectives but that is independent of personal preferences) can unambiguously define party strength.
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Krehbiel 1998
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“To the extent that lawmaking outcomes in the US are not approximate legislative median outcomes, the probable cause is not partisanship, but rather, supermajoritarian institutions which allow pivotal players (veto and filibuster) to dampen only somewhat the strong tendencies toward policy moderation in weakly partisan voting bodies” (p. 185)
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Rhode 1991
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The primary driving force behind the resurgence in House partisanship of the 1980s was electoral change. Driven by MC preference, a conditional party government (that is, the majority party is effective) results when there is significant intraparty homogeneity and inter-party heterogeneity.
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Schickler 2000
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Siding with Krehbiel, Schickler rejects Cox and McCubbins’s legislative cartel model, Rohde/Aldrich/Binder/Dion’s conditional party government and argues instead that the shifts in the ideological balance of power on the floor, rather than change in the internal characteristics of the majority party, is the key determinant of changes in House Rules (ie when the median voter shifts to the majority party median, the rules change favor the majority party, and vice versa).
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Shickler and Rich 1997
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Schickler and Rich opt for a conditional party government thesis (a la Rohde) and argue that the procedural power the majority party (ie partisan control of the House) has been contested by ideological cross-party coalitions and depends on the majority party’s size, homogeneity, and the issue under consideration.
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Fiorina 1996
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Mayhew 2005
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Divided government is as productive as unified government.
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Binder 1999
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Because Mayhew fails to generate a theory of demand for major legislation, he is unable to explain gridlock. Binder believes she has done so and so has properly specified the conditions under which gridlock emerges.
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Coleman 1999
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Re-testing Mayhew (1991) with a variety of measures of "significant" legislation leads to the conclusion that the revisionists are probably wrong: unified government probably works.
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Bond and Fleisher 1990
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The distribution of partisan and ideological forces among Congressmen sets the basic parameters of presidential success or failure.
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Weingast 1979
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The observed “norm” of universal coalitions in Congress is better interpreted as legislators choosing the rules of the game to maximize their expected benefits.
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Fenno 1977
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Congressmen seek to develop and maintain electoral constituencies as individuals within their district through "home style".
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Hill and Hurley 1999
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Mass and elite opinions are multidirectional.
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Mansbridge 2003
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Forms of representation are diverse and deserve separate empirical and normative consideration.
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Weissberg 1978
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Dyadic representation is only half of representation.
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Burke 1774
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Burke's theory of representation as trusteeship
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Pitkin 1967
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Pitkin discusses representation from Hobbes to Burke and in the modern world, bringing forward the concept of "descriptive" and "symbolic" representations.
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Lee 2000
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Formal coalition theory predicts that small-state senators can extract a good price for their votes. And they can.
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Binder and Maltzman 2002
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Divided government a prominent cause of delaying senatorial confirmation of federal circuit court judges from 1947 to 1998, but it’s far from the prevalent influence; instead, senate institutions predictably allocate procedural rights to parties and committees, and interested senators are quick to exploit the rules in pursuit of their agenda, particularly during divided government.
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Binder and Smith 2002
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First systematic (ie multivariate) analysis of senate filibuster reveals that it is first of all a function of party strength, as well as the congressional calendar, the “tracking” system (ie setting aside the filibuster and address other issues), and the minority party’s closeness to the cloture threshold.
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Lee 2008
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Partisanships in the Senate has increased, partly because senators have collectively devoted more time to cleavage issue and less time to issues that do not divide the parties or within a party (ie the shifting agenda notably contributed to the rise in Senate partisanship).
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Schiller 2002
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Senate representation comprised of 4 intersecting dimensions: (1) partisan, (2) economic, (3) geographic, (4) and stylistic; thus, senators use different legislative tools to address the “interests” of their state on these four dimensions.
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Sinclair 1989
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Between 1950 and 1980, the combination of changes in membership, external policy environment, and internal institution structures resulted in a transformation of the Senate from an “old boys’ network,” to a highly open, participatory, diverse legislative body.
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Sinclair 2009
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The Senate of the 21st century is “characterized by fairly cohesive party contingents that aggressively exploit Senate rules to pursue partisan advantage, but also by the persistent of the Senate individualism that developed in the 1960s and 1970s.”
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Weber 1952
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Bureaucratic administration is fundamentally the exercise of control on the basis of knowledge.
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Wilson 1989
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Bureaucracy is more than just an institution with structure, purpose, and resource; there are differences in ensuring compliance that fundamentally shape agencies, and there are organizational cultures that shape compliance and objectives.
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Bickel 1962
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The Court navigates between upholding principles and exacting expediency.
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Caldeira and Wright 1988
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The presence of amicus briefs significantly and positively increases the chances of the justices binding a case over for full treatment (grant cert).
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Dahl 1957
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The SC is not a countermajoritarian institution; rather, it is inevitably an essential part (not merely agent) of the dominant national alliance.
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Melnick 1984
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Court action in the arena of environmental administrative law resulted in unintended non-beneficial consequences (eg mandate v. resources) that can be directly attributed to the courts’ institutional features.
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Mishler and Sheehan 1993
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Public opinion appeared to have influenced SC decision-making, especially prior to 1981, After 1981, the justices appear to be more insulated and ideological.
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Murphy 1964
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A Supreme Court justice is a policy-oriented justice, who makes rational decisions that efficiently utilize the tools at his disposal and minimize his constraints to maximize the outcome, which is to achieve his policy goals.
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Perry 1991
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The cert process (really 9 cert processes) is neither purely strategic/political (as political scientists have assumed/argued) nor purely jurisprudential/legal; it is both. A justice can be both a jurisprude as well as a strategic political outcomer.
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Rosenberg 1991
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Contrary to the “dynamic court” view (that the courts can affect social change when other branches of government fail), in-depth empirical analyses of the civil rights and women’s rights litigation uphold a “constrained court” interpretation, that the courts, by themselves, are unable to affect social reform.
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Spaeth and Segal 2002
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The attitudinal model, which focuses on the justices’ preferences, best explain (systematically and substantively meaningful) judicial decision-making (votes).
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Norpoth and Segal 1994
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If public opinion does sway the SC, its influence is indirect, through the court appointments by presidents who are influenced by the public mood.
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Maltzman, Springg, Wahlbeck. 2000
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SC justices behave strategically, as revealed by the process of opinion writing exhibit.
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Segal and Cover 1989
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SC justices’ (perceived) ideology (now known as the “Segal-Cover” scores), using a measure that is independent of their votes, is highly correlated (0.8) with their votes.
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Bailey 2007
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Using a bridging technique, Bailey constructs an inter-institutional and inter-temporal measure of ideology for the Congress, presidency and Supreme Court and finds that the new measure can substantively alter empirical results.
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Ranney 1954
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Representative party government, as a doctrine, is part of a central question about democracy ("By what mechanism can the people govern?") and has its origins in the very origins of (American) political science.
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Wattenberg 1998
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Party identification is no longer a central concept. Candidates and voters stand above, not with, parties.
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APSA Committee 1950
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Modern democratic government requires strong, centrally directed, and responsible parties.
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Cohen et al 2008
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Policy-driven party elites use a national "invisible primary" to select candidates for the presidency who are acceptable to them.
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Schattschneider 1960
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The people only kinda rule. Pressure politics is skewed toward higher-class members of the public. The American government is capable of absorbing massive change (e.g., from popular isolationism to progressive internationalism) without a violent revolution.
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Schattschneider 1942
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“The political parties created democracy and democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties.”
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Sundquist 1983
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The history of American party realignments shows that the American party system is dynamic, multidimensional, and varies over time – this makes it difficult to generalize about parties without considering factors such as the historical context.
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Aldrich 1995
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“…major political party is the creature of politicians, the ambitious office seeker and officeholder” (4).
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Fiorina 2006
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The American electorate has not polarized, but the political elites (activists and parties) have.
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McCarty et al 2007
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Changes in economic inequality and immigration are the “dance partners” of political polarization in America (that is, the relationship is one of take and give and the causality runs in both directions).
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Hochschild 1981
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There is no widespread socialist movement among poor Americans because Americans don't support the downward redistribution of wealth, and ambivalence about this makes passivity and acquiescence more likely than action.
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Johnston et al 2004
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Communication is critical in determining whether and if so how the economy, candidate traits, and issues function in a campaign – campaigns do matter.
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Rosenstone and Hansen 1993
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Mobilization, mobilization, mobilization…Personal costs and benefits are relevant but insufficient to explain political participation; strategic mobilization by politicians, parties, and interest groups is crucial to understanding patterns of participation over time.
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Erikson et al 2002
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The operation of the macro-political system produces a more sophisticated and intelligent response than we would expect from what we know about the individual actors who compose it.
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Fiorina 1981
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Party ID is a “running tally,” which voters update over time as they take into account parties’ past performance; retrospective voting is based on expectations about future welfare guided by evaluations of past end-states (both individual and societal).
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Gelman et al 2008
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The country is polarized in two ways: economically between rich and poor and culturally between upper-income Americans in red and blue areas.
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Page and Shapiro 1992
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Macro-level positions on policy issues have changed over time in ways that can be described as rational responses to the political environment.
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Verba et al 1995
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Participation in the US is “lively and varied” but also unequal in the sense that more affluent and educated citizens are overrepresented; differences in participation must be understood as differences in resources of various kinds; this includes understanding ways in which non-political participation (like religious activity, in which the less affluent are more likely to participate) engage citizens and give them politically relevant skills.
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Gerber and Green 2000
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Personal canvassing is a much more effective mobilization method than the direct mail and telemarketing approaches that have come to dominate in recent years.
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Hibbs 2000
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A simple “Bread and Peace” model shows that aggregate votes for president in postwar elections were determined entirely by weighted-average growth in real disposable personal income per capita during the incumbent party’s term and the cumulative numbers of American military personnel killed in action in Korea and Vietnam.
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Imai 2005
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Gerber and Green’s (2000) analysis is methodologically flawed due to incomplete randomization and some improper comparisons; when these flaws are corrected, phone calls increase (rather than decrease) turnout, and the cost effectiveness of direct mailings is improved. Field experiments must not take randomization for granted.
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Moe 1985
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The presidency is becoming more politicized and responsive as it becomes more personalized and elaborated.
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Edwards 2003
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When the president talks, the public isn't listening. Instead of going public, the White House should consider staying private.
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Kernell 1997
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Presidents go public in order to cope with an increasingly personalized/decentralized Washington political culture and because technology allows them to.
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Howell 2003
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The unilateral politics model explains that presidents can operate unilaterally when the judiciary is more deferential and when Congress is either deferential or at least divided. Separately, the new institutional economics provides for a richer and deeper understanding of politics than the "personalized presidency" model of Neustadt and others.
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Mayer 2001
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Executive orders matter, and presidents can use them to reshape their environments without resorting to bargaining or persuasion.
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Cameron 2000
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Vetoes matter, and they happen more frequently than you think. Also, rat choice rat choice rat choice.
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Rudavelige 2002
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Presidents exhibit "contingent centralization," bringing matters, agencies, and issues into the White House only under given circumstances (that is to say, that the White House is not always trying to bring everything "inside."
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Skowronek 1993
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Presidents make history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances encountered, given, and transmitted from the past.
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Arrow 1951
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When voters have three or more discrete options, no voting system can successfully aggregate individual preferences while still meeting a set of criteria that render it logical and respectful of individual preferences.
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Green and Shapiro 1996
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Empirical applications of rational choice theory in political science since the 1960s have been marred by a syndrome of methodological shortcomings that are rooted in the ambition to come up with a universal theory of politics and the belief that anything less cannot aspire to be genuine science.
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Ostrom 1998
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Extensive empirical evidence and theoretical developments in multiple disciplines stimulate a need to expand the range of rational choice models to be used as a foundation for the study of social dilemmas and collective action.
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Shepsle 1995
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The “rational choice revolution” has sought to build on the philosophical and behavioral traditions of political science and has played an important role in the rediscovery of institutional analysis.
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Riker 1990
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Rational choice models (as opposed to behavioral models) are required if social scientists wish to explain rather than simply predict phenomena.
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Key 1964
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Voters on average base their vote decisions on the issue positions of the candidates and on their expectations of hwo the candidates would perform as president.
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Nathan 1983
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Political chief executives should work to break the bureaucracy to their will.
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Wayne 1978
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The modern presidency is a legislative institution.
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Layman and Carsey 1998
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Party activists follow their parties when their candidate preferences, ideological orientations, religious and political affiliations, incentives, and home environment all align with parties' issue shifts.
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Iyengar and Kinder 1987
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Experiments show TV affects political attitudes.
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Berinsky and Kinder 2006
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Experiments show people remember facts that tell a good story
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Bailey et al 2003
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Presidents can move public intensity of opinion on "easy" issues by investing their personal popularity, but this may also cause some people to lower their opinion of the president.
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Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997
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Wilcox and Norrander
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Jennings and Niemi 1981
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Both change and stability abound.
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Gerber et al 2010
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The Big Five traits affect general lib/con, economic and social attitudes, and that the relationship b/t the traits and ideology is moderated by race.
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Levinson 1958
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From a personological approach, enduring personality characteristics influence political participation; hinder the acceptance of “unappealing” (incongruent) option, and facilitate the acceptance of others that are personally meaningful.
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Marcus et al 1995
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The public makes use of established values and beliefs when they make political tolerance judgments and that they take into account observations of the immediate circumstances.
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McCloskey 1958
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The inflexible and exacting features of conservative social doctrine are related to the prototypic personality attributes of conservative believers.
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Mondak et al 2010
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Personality traits directly impacts political participation, and the relationship is moderated by environmental/contextual factors.
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Winter 2003
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A review, Winter charts a middle course and argues for an integrative approach of personality and contextual considerations in studying political behavior
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Campbell et al 1960
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Voting behavior is amenable to empirical analysis, and party identification is persistent.
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Carmines and Stimson 1980
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Voters who base their choice on "easy" issues aren't engaged in sophisticated voting, but they may be participating in electoral realignments.
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Festinger 1957
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People change their facts to suit their mind.
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Converse 1964
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Elites have consistent and coherent beliefs about politics--but not the mass.
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Hastie 1986
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Information processing theory is superior to utility theory as an explanatory tool for individual behavior, and Kahneman and Tversky (1979) is the best of the information processing theories.
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Sniderman et al 1991
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Ordinary people reason through their decisions on political issues with the aid of heuristics.
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Carmines and Stimson 1989
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Issues evolve over time as a result of stochastic processes weeded out by party elites and interparty conflict.
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Greenstein 1965
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Important areas of adult political behavior (e.g., party) have their roots in the early political learning of children.
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Miller and Sears 1986
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Adult levels of social tolerance are influenced by both preadult and early adult attitudinal environments, providing support for the “revisionist” version of the “persistence hypothesis,” which argues that preadult learning of basic attitudes is persistent but is supplemented by socialization that continues into the important period of early adulthood.
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Sapiro 2004
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Political socialization research illuminating the origins of preferences remains important and holds the potential for addressing many critical issues across American, comparative, and international politics.
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Alwin, Cohen, and Newcombe 1991
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Basic political orientations are especially vulnerable to influence and change during the period of early adulthood, though parental influence does persist, but they demonstrate substantial stability thereafter.
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Beck and Jennings 1991
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People do tend to carry important political dispositions “inherited” from parents into adulthood, but this inheritance is not determinative and the nature of the post-childhood political environment also weighs on the maturing adult’s political orientation.
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Cook 1985
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The decline in scholarly interest in political socialization research is attributable to a “lack of theoretical confidence” due partly to the lack of an explicit psychological model of learning.
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Dalton 1980
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When indicator unreliability is taken into account in analysis of parent-child transfer of political values, intergenerational agreement is much stronger than what has been suggested by previous research (Jennings and Niemi in particular).
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Dalton 1982
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Parent-child correspondence in political values is attributable to both direct interpersonal transmission of values and shared social milieu.
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Hess and Torney 1967
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Children are socialized into an idealized norm of democracy and acquire core political values (e.g., attachment to country, respect for authority) and orientations (e.g., party ID) early in life; schools rather than families are the dominant socializing agents.
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Jennings and Niemi 1968
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Transmission of political values from parents to children peaks over relatively concrete, salient values susceptible to repeated reinforcement in the family, especially party ID.
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Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009
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This article confirms, using longitudinal data from multiple generations, that there is a role for family transmission of political values.
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Searing, Schwartz, and Lind 1973
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Many of the most common orientations in socialization research are generally unrelated to attitudes toward the outstanding political issues of the day, suggesting that the theoretical principles underlying previous socialization research may be overstated and calling into question the theoretical justification for a focus on preadult political learning.
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Sears 1989
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Diminished interest in political socialization research since the early 1970s is due to a “loss of faith in the strength and persistence of preadult socialization.”
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Sears and Funk 1999
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Core political predispositions such as party, ideology, and racial attitudes are quite persistent and stable through the life span.
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Stoker and Jennings 1995
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Marital status transitions influence political participation.
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Hyman 1959
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Niemi and Hepburn 1995
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Rebirth of the field is only possible if the problematic premises and findings are confronted, and future research should focus not on children but on the young adult (about 14-25) period.
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Inglehart 1971
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An economic socialization process had changed the underlying value preferences of post-industrial European countries, where the younger cohorts, socialized during a period of affluence, are more likely to hold post-bourgeois values that reflect needs of belonging/aesthetics/intellectual compared to the older generation, socialized during an era of economic insecurity, tends to hold more acquisitive/bourgeois values. Because these values tap a more structured, deep-seated attitudinal structure with linkages to partisanship, the post-bourgeois values lean toward “left” political parties, and are relatively stable once formed in childhood, the changes in the underlying values may have great implications for the political landscape.
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Inglehart 1990
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Mannheim 1928
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Mannheim proposes a formal analysis approach to studying generations
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Schuman and Scott 1989
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Memories are structured by age in a way that points clearly to generational differences, and youth is the primary source of political and social memories.
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Sears and Valentino 1997
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Regarding adolescent (preadult) acquisition of a stable, political disposition, it is often acquired through the exposure to political events. And such events are selective. Furthermore, b/c these events are episodic, potentially socializing events tended to be periodic than continuous.
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Alford Funk and Hibbing 2008
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Though many political scientists, like Charney, are uncomfortable with the possibility of genetic roots for politics, science does not advance by avoiding important relationships simply because they are complicated.
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Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2005
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Political attitudes are the result of both environmental and genetic factors.
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Charney 2008
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Alford, Funk, and Hibbing’s (2005) paper is flawed and part of the more general problem that researchers in human behavioral genetics have taken an overly simplistic view of human social behaviors and aptitudes.
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Dawes and Fowler 2009
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The presence of a specific gene is associated with partisan attachment and mediates an indirect association between this gene and voter turnout.
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Fowler and Dawes 2008
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Two specific genes associated with prosocial behavior help explain variation in voter turnout.
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Fowler, Baker, and Dawes 2008
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Genes account for a substantial amount of the variation on political participation.
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Hatemi et al 2009
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Genetic influences on political attitudes are absent prior to young adulthood but retain a sizable influence thereafter, consistent with the “impressionable years” model of political socialization.
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Alford and Hibbing 2008
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Attention to the apparent genetic basis for political and social orientations holds the greatest promise of advancing empirical biopolitics.
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Hatemi, Medland, and Eaves 2009
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Sex modulates the effects of genetic and environmental differences on political preferences.
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Litt 1963
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Students in different communities are being trained to play different political roles and to respond to political phenomena in different ways.
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Bailey 2007
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It's hard to compare ideal-points across institutions, but you can do it--using this method. Don't use Poole and Rosenthal at home, kids.
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Key 1964
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Among other things, three ways to think about parties: party in the electorate, party in government, party as organization; these components are related.
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