Reading...
Play button
Play button
Use LEFT and RIGHT arrow keys to navigate between flashcards;
Use UP and DOWN arrow keys to flip the card;
H to show hint;
A reads text to speech;
157 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
|
provides capability to plan, task, execute, monitor and assess activities of assigned/attached forces; senior C2 element of Theater Air Control System (TACS) including personnel & equipment; ensures effective conduct of Air & Space Operations (com. ops. intel, etc.)
|
Operations Command Center of JFACC "Falconer"
|
|
|
develops, refines, disseminates, and assesses progress of JFACC’s strategy; responsible for long-range planning; publishes daily Air Operations Directive providing JFACC’s guidance for each ATO to the successive planning steps
|
Strategy Division
|
|
|
- responsible for near-term (48-72 hrs) air & space ops planning; develops detailed plans for application of air resources based on JFACC-approved guidance received from Strat Division; four teams
Target Effectiveness Team/Joint Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting Team (TET/JGAT) Team - produces JIPTL Master Air Attack Plan (MAAP) Team - develops daily MAAP to accomplish JFACC task and objectives ATO/ACO Production Team - Tech and Distribution of ATO, ACO and SPINS C2 Planning Team - develops detailed C2 execution plans and data link architecture |
Combat Plans Division (CPD)
|
|
|
- responsible for monitoring & executing current ATO; focal point for monitoring joint and combined operations such as time sensitive targeting; comprised of Offensive Operations Team, Defensive Operations Team, Meteorological Support, & Operations Support
|
Combat Ops Division (COD
|
|
|
provides ISR support to airspace planning and execution activities; provides oversight/management of JFACC ISR processes internal/external to AOC to ensure that the appropriate ISR reporting, planning, tasking, and deconfliction occur = source threat and targeting picture.
|
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division (ISRD)
|
|
|
plans, coordinates, tasks, and executes air mobility mission; responsible for coordinating intrathreater/intertheater airlift requirements, refueling requirements, and MEDEVAC airlift requirements
|
Air Mobility Division (AMD
|
|
|
Describe the development of the ATO within the AOC
|
Strat Division publishes a daily Air Ops Directive that provides guidance for each ATO to the successive planning steps; Combat Plans transmits the ATO to the Combat Ops Division for execution; COD monitors and executes current ATO; ISRD is responsible for producing reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acq ATO annex; AMD ensures air mobility missions are reflected in the ATO/ACO; ATO/ACO Production team responsible for technical production/distribution
|
|
|
Responsible for mission accomplishment/assessment; includes AEW/CC, staff/group commanders; focal point for wing C2, reporting and threat warnings; receive ATO from AOC in draft form and check ability to meet projected taskings
|
Describe the Battle Management Center
|
|
|
Responsible for sustainment and survivability so the mission can continue; comprised of personnel with expertise in force protection, CE, and medical; critical for handling crisis
|
Survival Recovery Center
|
|
|
threat assessment produced allowing CC to make smart decisions
|
contingency planning process
Phase I |
|
|
well-defined task w/ specific purpose; creates essential tasks; JFC writes mission statement (defines all but the “how”)
|
contingency planning process
Phase I |
|
|
developing assumptions (worst-case scenarios)
|
contingency planning process
Phase I |
|
|
COA development (5 stages) defines “how” tasks are accomplished and offer viable options to accomplish mission
|
contingency planning process Phase II
|
|
|
COA submitted to CJCS/SECDEF for approval, then developed into a plan
|
contingency planning process Phase II
|
|
|
Strategic Guidance (when a need is found in JSCP); tasks are assigned to a Combatant CC (CCDR)
|
Phase I
|
|
|
Concept Development (CCDR develops CONOPS to direct planning)
|
Phase II
|
|
|
Plan Development (activities accomplished concurrently depending on time)
|
Phase III
|
|
|
Force planning where Service component CCs ID forces needed to accomplish plan
|
contingency planning process Phase III
|
|
|
Support planning ID quantity of supplies/equipment/replacement personnel to sustain
|
contingency planning process Phase III
|
|
|
/deployment planning to produce feasible movement to support CC’s COA
|
contingency planning process Phase III
|
|
|
Plan Refinement
|
Phase IV
|
|
|
OPLAN documented in Joint Ops Planning/Execution Sys (JOPES)
|
contingency planning process phase IV
|
|
|
Submitted to CJCS for final review/distro/published
|
contingency planning process phase IV
|
|
|
Situational Awareness (monitoring situation at all levels of war)
|
crisis action planning process
Phase I |
|
|
CCDR provides assessment of crisis to POTUS/SECDEF/CJCS.
|
crisis action planning process
Phase I |
|
|
Strategic Guidance (conducted in a compressed amount of time)
|
crisis action planning process
Phase II |
|
|
CJCS issues WARNORD (strategic guidance) to initiate development of COAs and request for recommended COA; also IDs mission/constraints
|
crisis action planning process
Phase II |
|
|
CCDR reviews existing COAs for modification; send CJCS estimate of situation w/recommended COA to resolve
|
crisis action planning process
Phase II |
|
|
Concept Development
|
crisis action planning process
Phase III |
|
|
CJCS review/recommend to POTUS/SECDEF; ALERTORD issued upon approval (does not authorize execution)
|
crisis action planning process
Phase III |
|
|
PLANORD may be issued prior to ALERTORD by SECDEF/CJCS to initiate detailed planning
|
crisis action planning process
Phase III |
|
|
OPORD developed by CCDR ID forces/sustainment/resources sent to POTUS
|
crisis action planning process
Phase III |
|
|
Plan Refinement
|
crisis action planning process
Phase IV |
|
|
CJCS issues DEPORD or EXORD to initiate execution of COA (military resolution)
|
crisis action planning process
Phase IV |
|
|
6-24 months available to plan
|
Contingency Planning
|
|
|
hours to 12 months available to plan
|
Crisis Action Planning
|
|
|
plan for potential contingency
|
Contingency Planning
|
|
|
plan for actual crisis
|
Crisis Action Planning
|
|
|
situational awareness/planning
|
Contingency Planning
|
|
|
SA/planning/execution
|
Crisis Action Planning
|
|
|
Three broad operational activities:
|
Situation Awareness, Planning, Execution
|
|
|
Four planning functions:
|
Strategic Guidance, Concept Development, Plan Development, Plan Refinement
|
|
|
Designed to achieve unity of effort; plan for series of related mil ops in given time/space; contingency & CAP planning
|
Campaign Plans
|
|
|
I am an American, fighting in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.
|
Article I Code of Conduct
|
|
|
I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command, I will never surrender the members of my command while they still have the means to resist.
|
Article II Code of Conduct
|
|
|
If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and to aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.
|
Article III Code of Conduct
|
|
|
If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information or take part in any action, which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command, if not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way.
|
Article IV Code of Conduct
|
|
|
When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am required to give my name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and it allies or harmful to their cause.
|
Article V Code of Conduct
|
|
|
I will never forget the I am an American, fighting for freedom, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America.
|
Article VI Code of Conduct
|
|
|
using only necessary amount of force, and not more, to overcome the enemy
|
Military Necessity
|
|
|
Requirement to distinguish between military objectives and civilian objects
|
Distinction
|
|
|
Military advantage balanced against civilian impact; avoid/minimize civilian causalities.
|
Proportionality
|
|
|
Limit unnecessary suffering and destruction; unlawful weapons: poison, glass bullets, personnel landmines
|
Humanity
|
|
|
Waging war IAW well-established formalities; permits lawful ruses (camo, false radio signals, mock troop movements); forbids treacherous acts (misuse of symbols, false surrender)
|
Chivalry
|
|
|
authorized by govt/LOAC to engage in hostilities; member of regular or irregular armed force; commanded by someone; marked with recognizable distinctive emblems (uniforms); must carry arms openly
|
Lawful combatants
|
|
|
participate in hostilities w/o being authorized by govt/intl law; those who violate LOAC
become lawful targets; may be killed or wounded; may be tried as war criminals |
Unlawful combatants
|
|
|
not authorized by govt/LAOC to engage in hostilities; includes civilians accompanying forces; combatants that are out of combat; cannot be object of direct attack.
|
Noncombatants
|
|
|
should doubt exist as to whether an individual is lawful, noncombatant, or unlawful combatant, such person shall be extended protections of Geneva POW Convention until status is determined; tribunal to determine
|
Undetermined status
|
|
|
selecting targets to produce physical and psychological consequences in order to achieve an objective; actions taken with the intent to produce a distinctive desired effect
|
Effects-based targeting
|
|
|
Characteristics, capabilities, or localities, from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight
|
Center of Gravity (COG)
|
|
|
Describe each of Col (ret) Warden’s Five Rings
|
Leadership – enemy command structure
Organic essentials – needed for maintenance (electricity, petroleum) Infrastructure – transportation system (rail, air, highways bridges, ports) Population – people of the nation Fielded Military Forces – means to an end to protect inner rings |
|
|
Four components of the Dr. Strange Model
|
Centers of Gravity (CG)
Critical Capabilities (CC) Critical Requierment (CR) Critical Vulnerabilities (CV) |
|
|
Centers of Gravity (CG)
|
moral/physical strength, power, and resistance centers; leaders, bases, military forces (nouns)
|
|
|
Critical Capabilities (CC)
|
make the CG function; gather intelligence, maneuver, attack, project (verbs)
|
|
|
Critical Requierment (CR)
|
essential conditions, resources and means for a CC to operate fully; money, fuel, information, communication links (nouns or verbs)
|
|
|
Critical Vulnerabilities (CV)
|
CRs (or their components) that when attack would achieve effects based results, they are the target sets we attack; communication sets, POL facilities (nouns or verbs)
|
|
|
Nodal Analysis
|
technique used to model a system, breaking the system into its component parts (nodes); determine how a system works in order to best pick which targets and how much power to drop on them
|
|
|
Key concepts contained in FM 100-20
|
Land and air power co-equal and interdependent forces; air weapons useful tool to help army gain tactical objectives; airmen see as strategic weapon; success only if airpower was centralized and controlled by the air commander;; strategic air operations should strike “vital centers”; gain and maintain air superiority; isolate battlefield through “Air Interdiction”; “Close Air Support”; flexibility is airpower’s greatest asset
|
|
|
How FM 100-20 influenced today’s air and space power doctrine
|
gain & maintain Air Superiority of Theater; Air Interdiction - isolate battlefield by preventing the movement of hostile troops & supplies; CAS - destruction of selected objectives in battle area, in the immediate front of friendly ground forces
|
|
|
Why the United States intervened in the Persian Gulf following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait
|
Kuwait friendly to west and an important economic center of gravity (10% of world oil); sovereign territory invaded
|
|
|
key members of the US-led coalition developed after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait
|
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Britain, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and United Arab Emirates (not Israel)
|
|
|
national objectives set forth by National Security Directive 54
|
Immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; restore Kuwait’s government; protection of American citizens abroad; promotion of the security and stability of the Persian Gulf
|
|
|
major innovations of INSTANT THUNDER
|
Focus on targeting centers of gravity to obtain strategic paralysis (instead of field forces in Kuwait); A JFACC in control of all Air Assets (Centralized Control, Decentralized Execution); no gradual escalation
|
|
|
transformation of INSTANT THUNDER plan into the phased air campaign plan for Operation DESERT STORM
|
Instant Thunder was kept but named offensive campaign phase I of four phase attack; four phases: strategic air campaign in Iraq, air campaign against Iraqi forces in Kuwait, neutralize rep guard/prepare Kuwaiti battlefield, ground attack to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait; Lt Gen Horner decided against allowing the Pentagon to plan a campaign for them
|
|
|
operational elements that contributed to success in Operation DESERT STORM
|
Logistics
Technology Information Targeting Science Deception |
|
|
key historical events within the Persian Gulf region and their impact on Operation DESERT STORM
|
Iraq shot skuds against Israel to try to get them involved but US patriots launched to intercept; Sadam ordered Iraqi III Corps to take Khafji; US used Leavy air attacks on Iraqi forces to support the Marines; proved unprotected ground troops vulnerable to air attack
|
|
|
impact of coalition warfare on our ability to conduct air and space operations
|
Large coalition caused increased complexity in air ops; targets had to be approved by numerous intl govts
|
|
|
how OAF illustrated the existence of limits to the flexibility of air and space power
|
Needed boots on ground for better intel
coalition hit multiple targets but failed to disrupt Serbian forces until it attacks vital COGs |
|
|
similarities and differences between the role and employment of air and space power in Operations ALLIED FORCE and DESERT STORM
|
Allied Force - air forces were the supported commander (no ground troops)
Desert Storm - worked parallel w/ ground troops (supporting) |
|
|
reasons for US involvement in OEF
|
September 11; Afghanistan base of operations for Bin Laden/Al Qaeda training; Taliban refused to give up Bin Laden
|
|
|
national objectives for OEF
|
Destroy al-Qaeda’s grip on Afghanistan
destroy al-Qaeda terrorist training camps help people of Afghanistan recover from the Taliban’s reign of terror help Afghans put aside long-standing differences to form a new interim government that represents all Afghans – including women |
|
|
operational objectives for OEF
|
Make clear to the Taliban leaders and their supporters that harboring terrorists is unacceptable and carries a price; acquire intelligence to facilitate future operations against al Qaeda and the Taliban regime that harbors the terrorists; develop relationships with groups in Afghanistan opposing Taliban regime and the foreign terrorists that they support; alter military balance by denying Taliban offensive systems that hamper the progress of opposition forces; provide humanitarian relief to Afghans suffering truly oppressive living conditions under the Taliban regime; make it increasingly difficult for the terrorists to use Afghanistan freely as a base of operation
|
|
|
contextual elements taken into account for OEF
|
Political
International Sociocultural Economics Leadership Environmental Public Opinion |
|
|
operational elements employed in OEF
|
Logistical
Technology Information Targeting Scienc Deception Training |
|
|
reasons why the US engaged in OIF
|
Iraqi non-compliance with UN Resolution 687/688/Iraqi no-fly resolution violations
|
|
|
objectives of OIF
|
A stable Iraq
destabilize, isolate, and overthrow Iraqi regime and provide support to new, broad-based govt destroy WMD capability and infrastructure, free individuals unjustly detained |
|
|
Air Force Doctrine at the beginning of OIF
|
Operation DESERT STORM example; employment of OCA and DCA; employment of Strategic Attack
|
|
|
effects of contextual elements on the employment of airpower doctrine in OIF
|
Personal ties within Chain of Command (Bush/Cheney legacy)
|
|
|
distinctive capabilities
used in OIF |
Air & Space Superiority
Information Superiority Rapid Global Mobility Global Attack Agile Combat Support Precision Engagement |
|
|
characteristics of SOF
|
Careful selection process
composed of mature and experienced personnel, regionally oriented |
|
|
different types of missions SOF may conduct
|
SO Principal Missions
Special Ops Collateral Activities |
|
|
SO Principal Missions (nine)
|
Direct Action (DA); Special Reconnaissance (SR); Foreign Internal Defense (FID); Unconventional Warfare; Combating Terrorism (CBT); Psychological Operations; Civil Affairs; Counterproliferation (CP) of WMD; Information Ops
|
|
|
Special Ops Collateral Activities
|
Coalition Support; CSAR; Counterdrug (CD); Countermine (CM); Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA); Security Assistance (SA)
|
|
|
Joint Air Operation Plan Development
|
a 6-phase process in which the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) and his/her staff consider the Joint Force Commander's (JFC) mission and objectives, determine the best coarse of action for the joint air effort, and detail how that course of action will be conducted in order to accomplish the JFC's overall objectives
|
|
|
purpose of the Joint Air Estimate Process
|
to develop a Joint Air Operations Plan, which outlines the strategy that will be used to integrate and coordinate the air operations of joint force components.
|
|
|
Phases of the Joint Air Estimate Process
|
1. Mission Analysis
2. Situation and Course Of Action (COA) Development 3. COA Analysis 4. COA Comparison 5. COA Selection 6. Joint Air Operations Plan (JAOP) Development |
|
|
JFACC mission statement and what it includes
|
describes who (the JFACC) will act, what objectives will be achieved, when (timing) and where (location) the actions will take place, and why (reason)
|
|
|
JFACC intent (commander’s intent) and what it includes
|
purpose and method of the operation and how its desired end state
supports the joint campaign and follow-on operations. |
|
|
JAEP Phase I (Mission Analysis)
|
gather enough information about the environment in which the conflict will be fought to be able to write the mission statement
|
|
|
JAEP Phase II (COA Development)
|
to refine and analyze data from the phase I and develop possible courses of action that will accomplish the JFACC mission, achieve the desired end state, and support the joint force commander's (JFC) objectives for the joint air task.
|
|
|
JAEP Phase III (COA Analysis)
|
ensure each COA is a valid option that addresses all JFC and JFACC objectives and to eliminate or alter those that do not meet these criteria.
|
|
|
JAEP Phase IV (COA Comparision)
|
compare the COAs against predetermined criteria to identify strengths, weaknesses, advantages, and disadvantages of each
|
|
|
present a COA recommendation to the JFACC, who approves the recommendation or selects an alternative and makes any necessary adjustments before submitting it to the JFC, who determines the final COA based on air, land, and maritime requirements.
|
JAEP Phase V (COA Selection)
|
|
|
methodology of COA Analysis
|
achieved through wargaming, tabletop discussion, and/or "what-if" drills
|
|
|
methodology of COA Comparison
|
JFACC staff develop an objective Decision Matrix that compares each COA's ability to meet established criteria.
An alternative, but more subjective, method is and Advantages & Disadvantages Matrix |
|
|
List the operational domains
|
Physical Domain (Air/Sea/Land/Space); Virtual Domain (Cyberspace/Info); Human Domain (Social/Moral)
|
|
|
mission/role of the US Army
|
Mission - support & defend the Constitution
Role - serve as decisive component of land war; fight & win nation’s war but also deter/conduct peacetime activities |
|
|
Army Corps
|
largest tactical unit in the Army(Lt Gen)
|
|
|
Army Division
|
basic unit of maneuver at tactical level(Maj Gen)
|
|
|
Army Brigade
|
basic warfighting unit in a division(Col)
|
|
|
Army Battalion
|
lowest echelon at which firepower/maneuver/intel/support are combined under a single commander(Lt Col)
|
|
|
Army’s view of airpower
|
Provide CAS and Interdiction; use airpower for increased mobility; ISR; own the air defense artillery
|
|
|
four types of Marine Air-Ground Task Forces
|
Marine Expeditionary Force
Marine Expeditionary Brigade Marine Expeditionary Unit (SpecOps capable) Special Purpose MAGTF |
|
|
Marine Expeditionary Force
|
largest warfighting echelon (20-90K Marines); exists in peacetime & wartime(Lt Gen)
|
|
|
Marine Expeditionary Brigade
|
premier response force for small-scale contingencies (up to 20K Marines); able to rapidly deploy for full range of ops(Brig Gen)
|
|
|
Marine Expeditionary Unit
|
)-“first-on-the-scene” force; execute NEO and other ROMO ops(Col)
|
|
|
Special Purpose MAGTF
|
task organized, trained, equipped for variety of ops (specific missions/humanitarian/crisis response/regional exercises); example: SPMAGTF Somalia
|
|
|
USMC perspective on airpower
|
CAS & deep air support; antiair, assault support, air recon
|
|
|
concept of maneuver as the Marine’s war fighting philosophy
|
Single campaign w/ air/land/seas aspects
engage from position of advantage; Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare-securing strategic landscape/beyond amphibious ops |
|
|
missionof the US Navy
|
maintain, train and equip combat-ready Naval forces capable of winning wars, deterring aggression and maintaining freedom of seas
|
|
|
role of the Navy
|
protect external frontiers, strategic deterrence, power projection, sea control, sealift
|
|
|
Navy’s Type commands
|
responsible for admin/training/readiness of naval forces; Air (COMNAVAIRLANT), Surface (COMNAVSURFLANT), Submarine (COMSUBLANT)
|
|
|
Navy’s Operational commands
|
Operational Commands-numbered fleets w/ specific AOR
|
|
|
Navy’s view of airpower
|
Primarily for fleet defense; CAS for Seals & Marines; performs offensive ops by themselves or jointly; enables rapid mobility w/ aircraft carriers and ability of sea or land-based ops
|
|
|
levels of Enlisted Force Development
|
ALS
NCOPD NCOA Chief Leadership Course |
|
|
requirements of the Air Force Training Program comprising Enlisted Force Development
|
1 basic training/ AB
3 tech school/ AB 5 OJT/CDCs/ E-1 - E-4 7 NCO Acad advanced tech school SSgt - MSgt 9 Experience / SMSgt CMSgt |
|
|
Enlisted Evaluation System functions
|
Performance Focussed
|
|
|
how EPRs affect promotions
|
1/4 of the points from EPR go to total points in weighted points promo system
|
|
|
purpose of the enlisted force structure
|
specific responsibilities for each rank, their relationship, how each fits in organization
|
|
|
three tiers of the Enlisted Force Structure
|
Airmen AB - Sra
NCO SSgt - TSgt SNCO MSgt - CMSgt |
|
|
ISR Intelligence
|
- information and knowledge gathered about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, understanding
|
|
|
Surveillance
|
systematic observation of aerospace, surface, subsurface of areas, places, persons, things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic or other means
|
|
|
Reconnaissance
|
mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about activities and resources of an enemy, or to secure data concerning the characteristics of an area
|
|
|
Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)
|
derived from photography, infrared sensors, lasers (images)
|
|
|
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
|
intercepted electronic emissions on capabilities, intentions, formations, locations
|
|
|
Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT)
|
analysis of data derived from technical sensors for purpose of identifying distinctive features associated with the target
|
|
|
Human Resources Intelligence (HUMINT)
|
use people for insight into enemy plans, intentions, research, capabilities
|
|
|
Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT)
|
uses information of intelligence value that is available to the public
|
|
|
AF ISR principles
|
Integration
Accuracy Relevance Timeliness Fusion Accessibility Security Survivability/Sustainability/Deployability Unity of Effort Interoperability |
|
|
ISR Integration
|
close relationship btwn ISR process and strategy, planning, and execution functions
|
|
|
ISR Accuracy
|
reliability requires corroboration and analysis of all information
|
|
|
ISR Relevance
|
suitability of information and format
|
|
|
ISR Timeliness
|
available in time to plan and execute
|
|
|
ISR Fusion
|
fused info from multiple sources
|
|
|
ISR Accessibility
|
easily retrievable, appropriate clearance, lowest possible classification
|
|
|
ISR Security
|
protect classified info and sensitive sources
|
|
|
ISR Survivability/Sustainability/Deployability
|
redundancy, protection/maintain duration/rugged, small, imm connectivity
|
|
|
ISR Unity of Effort
|
minimize duplication, maximize sharing
|
|
|
ISR Interoperability
|
wide variety of users
|
|
|
AF ISR Process seven steps
|
Planning
Tasking Collecting Analyzing Disseminating Evaluating Applying |
|
|
ISR Planning
|
with current/anticipated threats, necessary tactics, weather/ geographics
|
|
|
ISR Tasking
|
J-2 task at strategic level, COMAFFOR ISR managers task at theater level (peacetime – scheduling messages, wartime/contingency – ATO)
|
|
|
ISR Collecting
|
accomplish assigned ISR mission, evaluating risks
|
|
|
ISR Analyzing
|
converting info into finished intel
|
|
|
ISR Disseminating
|
giving user info (electronic, hardcopy, imagery, reports, briefs)
|
|
|
ISR Evaluating
|
feedback on product
|
|
|
ISR Applying
|
meet needs of operational mission
|
