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41 Cards in this Set
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Issue
Whether the Dartmouth College’s private corporate charter was constitutionally protected against any state law designed to interfere with the nature and purpose of the original charter. Opinion In a 6-1 decision, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the Dartmouth College charter was a contract and was unconstitutionally interfered with by the new laws enacted by the New Hampshire legislation. Chief Justice Marshall stated that the College charter was a contract protected by the Constitution and the state of New Hampshire was bound to respect the original charter. |
Marbury v. Madison
1803- Marshall |
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Issue
Whether the state of Maryland had the right to tax a federal agency which was properly set up by the United States Congress. Opinion In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the “power to tax involves the power to destroy,” and that the federal government’s national bank was immune to state taxation. The Court reasoned that Congress could set up a United States Bank and write laws “necessary and proper” to carry out its constitutional power to coin and regulate money. |
McCullough v. Maryland
1819- Marshall |
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Issue
Whether the New York statute that prohibited vessels licensed by the United States from navigating the waters of New York was unconstitutional and, therefore, void. Opinion Writing for the Supreme Court of the United States, Justice Marshall said that the injunction against Gibbons was invalid because the monopoly granted by the New York statute conflicted with a valid federal law. The Court used this case to put forth the position that Congress can legislate and regulate all matters of interstate commerce as long as there is some commercial connection with another state. While interstate commerce is regulated by Congress, power to regulate “completely internal” commerce (trade carried on in a state that does not affect other states) is reserved to the states. |
Gibbons v. Ogden
1824- Marshall |
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Issue
Whether the state of Georgia could enforce its state laws upon the Cherokee nation and deny the constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Opinion The Supreme Court denied the Cherokees request reasoning it had no jurisdiction to decide such a case. Chief Justice Marshall wrote, “this is not the tribunal that can redress the past or prevent the future.” |
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia
1831- Marshall |
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Issue
Whether Dred Scott, a slave, was a citizen of the United States and legally entitled to use the courts to sue. Opinion The Supreme Court of the United States ruled that slaves were property, not citizens and, therefore, Dred Scott was not entitled to use the courts. The Court focused on the rights of the owner, not the slave, saying that black people had no rights that white people were bound to respect. Justice Taney said that freeing Scott would be a clear violation of the Fifth Amendment because it would amount to depriving Sanford of his property without due process of law. He also said that Congress had no power to prohibit slavery in the territory and that the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional. [Justice Taney is considered one of the most prominent chief justices; however, Dred Scott has been widely criticized throughout history. Justice Taney believed that if he decided the case in favor of Scott, immediate civil war would have resulted. Associate Justice Curtis of Massachusetts disagreed so strongly with Taney’s decision that he left the Court.] |
Scott v. Sanford
1857-Taney |
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Issue
Whether the President of the United States or the United States Congress can replace civilian courts with military courts to try civilians. Opinion The Supreme Court of the United States unanimously held that the President acted unconstitutionally when he instituted trial by military commission for civilians. The Court further reasoned that neither Congress nor the President have the power to authorize military commissions to try civilians in areas outside actual war zones. The decision established that martial law must be confined to theaters of active military operations. |
Ex parte Milligan
1866-Chase |
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Issue
Whether the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments provided the United States Congress power to establish laws barring discrimination in privately owned accommodations. Opinion The Supreme Court of the United States ruled 8-1 that Congress had overstepped its authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, and therefore, the act was invalid. The Court cited that the Fourteenth Amendment only applied to discriminatory action taken by states, not the discriminatory actions taken by individuals in the private sector. The Court also reasoned that private discrimination does not violate the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition against slavery and involuntary servitude |
Civil Rights Cases of1883
1883-Waite |
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Issue
Whether Congress has the authority to regulate manufacturing; and whether the Sherman Anti-Trust Act outlawed manufacturing monopolies. Opinion The Supreme Court of the United States believed that there were certain aspects of economic life that should be regulated by the federal government and other aspects that should be left to the states to regulate. Here, where the federal government sued under the Sherman Act to break up the large sugar refining monopoly of Knight, the Court held that the federal government could not regulate refineries since they were “manufacturing operations” that were not directly related to interstate commerce. The Court reasoned that the states, under the Tenth Amendment, should have the right reserved to them to regulate “local activities,” such as manufacturing. [In subsequent cases, the Court modified its position and permitted Congress greater regulation of commerce.] |
U.S. v. E.C. Knight Co.
1895-Fuller |
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Issue
Whether laws which provided for the separation of races violated the rights of blacks as guaranteed by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Opinion The Supreme Court of the United States held that the Louisiana Act, which stated that “all railway companies were to provide equal but separate accommodations for white and black races” did not violate the Constitution. This law did not take away from the federal authority to regulate interstate commerce, nor did it violate the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery. Additionally, the law did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, which gave all blacks citizenship, and forbade states from passing any laws which would deprive blacks of their constitutional rights. The Court believed that “separate but equal” was the most reasonable approach considering the social prejudices which prevailed at the time. [The Plessy doctrine of “separate but equal” was overturned by Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (see p. 24), which held “separate but equal” to be unconstitutional.] |
Plessy v. Ferguson
1896-Fuller |
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Issue
Whether a law which limited the number of hours bakery employees were allowed to work interfered with the bakery owner’s right to make employer/employee contracts. Opinion The Supreme Court of the United States held that even though states have the power to regulate the areas of health, safety, morals, and public welfare, the New York law in question was not within the limits of these “police powers” of the State. [This decision marked the beginning of the “substantive due process” era, in which the Court struck down a number of state laws that interfered with an individual’s economic and property rights. It was overturned twelve years later in Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917).] |
Lochner v. New York
1905-Fuller |
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Issue
Whether the state of Oregon, through its regulation of women’s work hours, violated the “privileges and immunities” clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by forbidding the employment of women for more than ten hours a day in laundries and factories. Opinion The Court held that the Oregon law that barred women (who were viewed as a weaker class and in need of special protection) from certain factory and laundry work to be correct and sustained the legislation. The Court distinguished the Lochner case, where an employer’s “liberty to contract” outweighed the state’s interest to regulate bakery employees’ hours, from this case, which took into account the physical differences between men and women. The Court took judicial notice (based upon a famous brief submitted by then-lawyer, Louis D. Brandeis) of the belief that “women’s physical structure and the function she performs ... justify special legislation restricting the conditions under which she should be permitted to toil.” |
Muller v. Oregon
1908-Fuller |
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Issue
Whether Schenck’s and Baer’s First Amendment right to freedom of speech were violated when they were convicted of conspiring to obstruct the recruitment and enlistment of service. Opinion The Court unanimously upheld the conviction of Schenck, not for violation of the Espionage Act, but rather for conspiracy to violate it. The Court found that the First Amendment did not apply in this case, and that Schenck’s speech was not constitutionally protected because it posed a “clear and present danger” to the country. The nation was involved in World War I, and the Court saw Schenck’s speech and action as counter-productive to the national war effort. The Court reasoned that certain speech could be curtailed, using the example of a situation where one cannot yell “fire” in a crowded theatre |
Schenck v. U.S.
1919-White |
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Declared unconstitutional a minimum wage law for women on the grounds that it denied women freedom of contract.
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Adkins v. Children's Hospital
1923-Taft |
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Issue
Whether flag salute ceremonies in the schools violated students’ liberties as guaranteed by the First Amendment. Opinion The Supreme Court of the United States ruled, 6-3, in favor of Barnette and the other Jehovah’s Witnesses. The Court held that the Board of Education could not require daily flag salute and pledge as a condition that students must meet to receive a public education. The Court’s ruling provided students “scrupulous protection” of their constitutional liberties as guaranteed by the First Amendment |
Korematsu v. U.S.
1941-Hughes |
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Issue
Whether Executive Order #9066 of 1942, violated Korematsu’s Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the law and his Fifth Amendment right to life, liberty, and property; and whether, because of the special circumstance of the world war, Congress or the President had the power to violate Korematsu’s constitutional rights. Opinion In a rare decision, 6-3, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that an entire race could be labeled a “suspect classification,” meaning that the government was permitted to deny the Japanese their constitutional rights because of military considerations. Because a number of Japanese may have been disloyal, the military felt that complete exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry from certain areas was essential during wartime. The Court ruled that such exclusion was not beyond the war powers of Congress and the President since their interest in national security was “compelling.” |
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette
1943-Stone |
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The court forbade the internment of Japanese-Americans born in the U. S. (Nisei)
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Ex parte Endo
1944-Stone |
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Issue
Whether segregation of children in public schools denies blacks their Fourteenth Amendment right of equal protection under the law. Opinion The Supreme Court of the United States looked not to the “tangible” factors but the effect of segregation itself on public education. The Court decided unanimously that segregation of black children in the public school system was a direct violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It rejected the “separate but equal” doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 164 U.S. 537 (1896), and stated that this doctrine had no place in education. According to the Court, even if the facilities were physically equal, the children of the minority group would still receive an inferior education. Separate educational facilities were held to be “inherently unequal.” |
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas
1954-Warren |
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Issue
Whether Miss Mapp’s Fourth Amendment right to be secure from search and seizure was violated during the search of her home. Opinion The Supreme Court of the United States ruled that Mapp’s Fourth Amendment right to be secure from search and seizure was violated. The Court held that both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments protected persons from unwarranted federal and state intrusion of their private property. |
Mapp v. Ohio
1961-Warren |
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Issue
Whether the state of Florida violated Gideon’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, by not providing him with the assistance of counsel for his criminal defense. Opinion The Court ruled unanimously in Gideon’s favor, and held that the Fourteenth Amendment included state as well as federal defendants. The Court said that all states must provide an attorney in all felony and capital cases for people who cannot afford one themselves. Through the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to counsel applies to the states. [Gideon was retried in Florida and found not guilty.] |
Gideon v. Wainwright
1963-Warren |
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Issue
Whether the state of Illinois violated Escobedo’s Fourteenth Amendment protections, his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, and his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel by denying his request to speak to a lawyer before questioning. Opinion The Court found that the denial by the police of Escobedo’s right to counsel and their failure to inform him of his right to remain silent were clearly unconstitutional. Furthermore, the Court held that incriminating statements made by defendants are inadmissible as evidence unless the accused is informed of his rights before making the statements. |
Escobedo v. Illinois
1964-Warren |
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Extended the protection offered by the 1st Amendemt
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New York Times v. Sullivan
1964-Warren |
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Issue
Whether the United States Congress, under its authority to regulate interstate commerce, has the power to require private businesses within a state to comply with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prevents discrimination in places of public accommodations. Opinion The Supreme Court of the United States held that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was constitutional. The Court said that the commerce clause of the Constitution empowers Congress to regulate both commercial and non-commercial interstate travel. Since the motel served interstate travelers, its refusal to accommodate blacks posed a potential obstruction to their freedom of movement across state lines. Congress has a right to regulate individual businesses in the interest of promoting interstate travel. |
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S.
1964-Warren |
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Griswold was the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Both she and the Medical Director for the League have info, instruction, and other medical advice to married couples concerning birth control. Griswold and he colleague were convicted under a Connecticut law which criminalized the provision of counseling, and other medical treatment, to married persons for purposes of preventing conception
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Griswold v. Conneticut
1965-Warren |
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Issue
Whether the state of Arizona violated the constitutional rights of Miranda under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments when they interrogated him without advising him of his constitutional right to remain silent. Opinion The Supreme Court of the United States, in a 5-4 decision, ruled that the police were in error. The Court held that the police must inform suspects that they have the right to remain silent, that anything they say may be used against them, and that they have the right to counsel before the police may begin to question those held in custody. [Miranda established the “Miranda Warning” which police now use prior to interrogation of persons arrested.] |
Miranda v. Arizona
1966-Warren |
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Gerald Francis Gault, 15 years old, was taken into custody for allegedly making an obscene phone call. Gault had previously been placed on probation. The police did not leave notice with Gault's parents, who were at work, when the youth was arrested. After proceedings before a juvenile court judge, Gault was committed to the State Industrial School until he reached the age of 21
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In re Gault
1966-Warren |
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Issue
Whether Marybeth and John Tinker have a First Amendment right to free speech to wear black armbands as a symbol of protest in a public school. Opinion The Court decided that the students did have a right to wear the armbands. It reasoned that the wearing of the armbands was an exercise of the students’ right to free, silent, symbolic speech, which is protected under the First Amendment: “Students do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate, and therefore are entitled to the free expression of their views as long as there is no substantial or material interference of the educational process.” |
Tinker v. Desmoines School District
1968-Warren |
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This was actually three separate cases: Lemon v. Kurtzman, Earley v. DiCenso, and Robinson v. DiCenso. These cases from Pennsylvania and Rhode Island were joined together because they all involved public assistance to private schools, some of which were religious. The final decision has become known by the first case in the list: Lemon v. Kurtzman.
On June 28th, 1971, the Supreme Court unanimously (7-0) found that direct government assistance to religious schools was unconstitutional. In the majority opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, the Court created what has become known as the “Lemon Test” for deciding if a law is in violation of the Establishment Clause. |
Lemmon v. Kurtzman
1971-Burger |
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Issue
Whether Mr. Furman’s death sentence was a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Equal Protection and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Opinion In a 5-4 decision the Supreme Court of the United States struck down all existing state death penalty laws. The justices reasoned these death penalty laws left almost unlimited discretion to the judges or juries in deciding the sentence. The majority of the justices agreed that almost all those convicted in capital trials were black or poor or both, which they found “capriciously selective.” The Court did not declare capital punishment a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s “Cruel and Unusual Punishment” clause. Instead, it declared the existing death penalty laws violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. |
Furman v. Georgia
1972-Burger |
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Question
Is the sale and distribution of obscene materials by mail protected under the First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantee? Conclusion In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that obscene materials did not enjoy First Amendment protection. The Court modified the test for obscenity established in Roth v. United States and Memoirs v. Massachusetts, holding that "[t]he basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. . . (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." The Court rejected the "utterly without redeeming social value" test of the Memoirs decision. |
Miller v. California
1972-Burger |
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Issue
Whether state law which bans or regulates abortion violates a woman’s right to privacy or personal choice in matters of family decisions or marriage. Opinion The Supreme Court of the United States decided that states could regulate abortions only in certain circumstances but otherwise women did have a right to privacy and reproductive autonomy. The Court divided a woman’s pregnancy into three time periods: 1) during the first trimester (the first three months of pregnancy), states may not interfere with a woman’s decision to have an abortion; 2) during the second trimester, states could regulate abortions, but only if such regulation was reasonably related to the mother’s health; and, 3) during the third trimester, which occurs after the fetus (unborn child) reaches viability (the stage at which it can survive outside the mother’s body), states may regulate absolutely and ban abortions altogether in order to protect the unborn child. The woman’s right to privacy was held to be a fundamental right which could only be denied if a compelling state interest existed. Once the fetus reaches a “viable” stage of development, such a compelling point is reached because the unborn child is now given constitutional protection. |
Roe v. Wade
1973-Burger |
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Issue
Whether the United States violated President Nixon’s constitutional right of executive power, his need for confidentiality, his need to maintain the separation of powers, and his executive privilege to immunity from any court demands for information and evidence. Opinion By an 8-0 vote, the Court decided that President Nixon must hand over the specific tapes and documents to the Special Prosecutor. Presidential power is not above the law. It cannot protect evidence that may be used in a criminal trial. |
U.S. v. Richard Nixon
1974-Burger |
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Issue
Whether the University’s special admissions program, which accepted minority students with significantly lower scores than Bakke, violated Bakke’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights; and whether the University was permitted to take race into account as a factor in its future admissions decisions. Opinion The Supreme Court of the United States did not render a majority opinion in this case (i.e., one in which five or more of the nine justices agree). Six separate opinions were written, and no more than four justices agreed in whole in their reasoning. The Court ordered Bakke’s admission to Davis Medical School and invalidated the University’s special admissions program because the program barred people like Bakke from applying for the special admissions seats in the medical school. However, of much greater significance was the fact that the Court allowed institutions of higher learning to take race into account as a factor in their future admissions decisions. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackman said that this aspect was the central meaning of the case: “Government may take race into account when it acts not to insult any racial group but to remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial prejudice.” [While to some observers Bakke won a place in the school and the particular special admissions program at Davis was invalidated, the case really stands as a landmark civil rights-affirmative action decision. Race may hereafter be taken into account as a factor in college admissions.] |
Bakke v. Regents of the University of California
1978-Burger |
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Issue
Whether the Alabama law requiring a one minute silence period encouraged a religious activity in violation of the First Amendment establishment clause. Opinion The Supreme Court of the United States held that the Alabama law was a law respecting the establishment of religion and thus violated the First Amendment. The Court said that the First Amendment was adopted to limit the power of Congress to interfere with a person’s freedom to believe, worship, and express himself as his conscience tells him. The Amendment gives an individual the right to choose a religion without having to accept a religion established by the majority or by government. The Court said that government must be completely neutral toward religion and not endorse any religion. Therefore, statutes like the Alabama law requiring one minute for silence in the schools must have a secular or non-religious purpose to be within the Constitution. Since Senator Holmes, who was the primary sponsor of the bill, testified “that the bill was an effort to return voluntary prayer to our public schools,” the Court decided that the purpose of the Alabama law was to endorse religion and was solely an effort to return voluntary prayer to the public schools. It was, therefore, struck down as being inconsistent with the Constitution. |
Wallace v. Jaffree
1984-Burger |
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Issue
Whether the Hazelwood School District violated the freedom of expression right of the First Amendment by regulating the content of its school newspaper. Opinion The Supreme Court of the United States held that the Hazelwood School District did not violate the First Amendment right of the students. The Court ruled that although schools may not limit the personal expression of students that happens to occur on school grounds, Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), they do not have to promote student speech that they do not agree with. This decision gave schools the power to censor activities such as school plays and school newspapers as long as the school finances the activities and there are grounds for the censorship. The Court said in Tinker that in order to censor a student’s expression, the expression must substantially disrupt the school’s educational process, or impinge upon the rights of others. This case broadened that guideline to include censorship of unprofessional, ungrammatical or obscene speech, or speech that goes against the fundamental purpose of a school. |
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
1987-Rehnquist |
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Issue
Does a law against desecration of the American flag violate an individual’s right to freedom of speech as found in the First Amendment? Opinion In a 5-4 decision the Supreme Court of the United States found that desecrating the flag as an act of protest is an act of expression, an act protected by the First Amendment. The Court found that burning the American flag was political speech which Justice Brennan wrote “...is the bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment. Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” |
Texas v. Johnson
1989-Rehnquist |
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Issue
Did the Missouri laws infringe upon a women’s right to privacy and an abortion as provided for through the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments? Opinion In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld Missouri’s significant restrictions on abortion and ruled that prohibiting the use of public funds to support abortions does not deny an individual the right to an abortion as established in Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court ruled nothing in the Constitution requires a state to support funding an abortion. The Court also ruled that a state’s interest in viability testing is allowable. |
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services
1989-Rehnquist |
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Question
Is the 1990 Gun-Free School Zones Act, forbidding individuals from knowingly carrying a gun in a school zone, unconstitutional because it exceeds the power of Congress to legislate under the Commerce Clause? Conclusion Yes. The possession of a gun in a local school zone is not an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The law is a criminal statute that has nothing to do with "commerce" or any sort of economic activity. |
United States v. Lopez
1994-Rehnquist |
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Question
Using the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I as justification, can Congress temporarily require state CLEOs to regulate handgun purchases by performing those duties called for by the Brady Bill's handgun applicant background-checks? Conclusion No. The Court constructed its opinion on the old principle that state legislatures are not subject to federal direction. The Court explained that while Congress may require the federal government to regulate commerce directly, in this case by performing background-checks on applicants for handgun ownership, the Necessary and Proper Clause does not empower it to compel state CLEOs to fulfill its federal tasks for it - even temporarily. The Court added that the Brady Bill could not require CLEOs to perform the related tasks of disposing of handgun-application forms or notifying certain applicants of the reasons for their refusal in writing, since the Brady Bill reserved such duties only for those CLEO's who voluntarily accepted them. |
Printz v. U.S.
1996-Rehnquist |
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Issue
Does the Line Item Veto Act violate the separation of powers outlined in Article I, II and III of the Constitution of the United States? Opinion In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the Line Item Veto Law was unconstitutional. A law granting the President the ability to cancel provisions of a law would alter the very process by which a bill becomes law under the Constitution according to Article 1, Section 7, Provision 2. This fact would change the very nature of the separation of powers designed by the founding fathers. |
Clinton v. City of New York
1998-Rehnquist |
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Issue
Whether the 1996 Communications Decency Act violates the First and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution by being vague in its definition of the types of Internet communications it could find unlawful. Opinion The Supreme Court of the United States, in a 7-2 decision, held the Communications Decency Act violated the First Amendment. The Court reasoned the act did not clearly define “indecent.” The Court felt the act could establish a content-based blanket restriction of free speech and the act did not demonstrate an authority on the unique nature of the internet and its social value. |
Reno v. ACLU
1997-Rehnquist |
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Question
Did the Florida Supreme Court violate Article II Section 1 Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution by making new election law? Do standardless manual recounts violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution? Conclusion Noting that the Equal Protection clause guarantees individuals that their ballots cannot be devalued by "later arbitrary and disparate treatment," the per curiam opinion held 7-2 that the Florida Supreme Court's scheme for recounting ballots was unconstitutional. Even if the recount was fair in theory, it was unfair in practice. The record suggested that different standards were applied from ballot to ballot, precinct to precinct, and county to county. Because of those and other procedural difficulties, the court held that no constitutional recount could be fashioned in the time remaining (which was short because the Florida legislature wanted to take advantage of the "safe harbor" provided by 3 USC Section 5). Loathe to make broad precedents, the per curiam opinion limited its holding to the present case. Rehnquist (in a concurring opinion joined by Scalia and Thomas) argued that the recount scheme was also unconstitutional because the Florida Supreme Court's decision made new election law, which only the state legislature may do. Breyer and Souter (writing separately) agreed with the per curiam holding that the Florida Court's recount scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause, but they dissented with respect to the remedy, believing that a constitutional recount could be fashioned. Time is insubstantial when constitutional rights are at stake. Ginsburg and Stevens (writing separately) argued that for reasons of federalism, the Florida Supreme Court's decision ought to be respected. Moreover, the Florida decision was fundamentally right; the Constitution requires that every vote be counted. |
Bush v. Gore
2000-Rehnquist |
