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79 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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how is information stored?
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Engrams, Templates, Memory Traces
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Engrams
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physical changes as a result of experience
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templates
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memory frameworks that can be restored
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memory traces
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neural patterns that when repeated yield original information
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categorization
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ability to group information on the basis of some relevant criteria. serve to organize experience
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basic units of categorization
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CONCEPTS (ideas, semantic /symbolic units, category rules), REPRESENTATIONS (mental pictures/imagery)
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concept levels
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Superordinate (Fruit), Basic (ex. Apple), Subordinate (ex. Red Delicious)
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combining concepts can form?
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Categories: a grouping of related concepts; Schemas: a framework (structural) of related concepts; Scripts: procedural (temporal) framework
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Feature-based (classical) theories vs. Probabilistic theories
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Aristotle; Bruner; Medin & Schaffer= Concepts are lists of necessary and sufficient properties. Determining features; classical (abstract) concepts, artifacts. vs. Posner & Keele= typicality. Categories (concepts) are grouping of likely properties Characteristic features, fuzzy concepts, natural items
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Typicality
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not all exemplars are equally good members of a category
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Prototypes vs. Exemplars
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Both depend on similarity as basis for how categories are formed. Prototype is storing just the image/ category in which all others are branched from. Exemplar is seeing each branch as its own and referring back to prototype if needed.
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2 arguments concerning similarity
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That similarity is primitive= it cannot be further broken down; That similarity itself is something that can (and should) be explained (similarity can be modeled)
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how do we test the similarity issue?
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QUESTIONS: How are objects represented psychologically? How are these repre used to arrive at similarity? TASK: given a pair of objects, determine their similarity on a scale from 1 to 10 ANALYSIS: Ratings are arranged in a matrix. Once placed in format, data is used to aid in making inferences about underlying organization (mental).
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Distance-Based or Geometric Model of Similarity?
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Objects are modeled as “points” in a geometric space (Similarity dec as distance inc b/w objects)
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Models of addressing systems?
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Hierarchal, Spreading Activation, Distributed Representation
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Hierarchal model
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semantic network; Property Inheritance: concepts inherit properties on concepts above them in the hierarchy
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Spreading Activation model
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Links now represent associations between semantically related topics
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Distributed Representation/ Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP)
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1. Graceful Degradation 2. Can “learn” (back propagation training), 3. No sharp distinction b/w genuine memory & (re)construction
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Graceful Degradation
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if part of the system is damaged/ malfunctions it doesn’t shut down (performance decreases but the system is somewhat functional)
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two classes of representations
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external (pictorial, symbolic) and internal (imagery, semantic). In both cases representations are ‘models’ of events and objects in the world (concepts).
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external representation types
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PICTORIAL: ‘analogue’ surrogates for real-world events/objects. Mapping b/w repre and item being represented is essentially direct. Best convey the concrete/spatial aspects of real-world. SYMBOLIC: ‘rule-based’ surrogates for real-world events/objects. Mapping b/w the two is arbitrary. Convey abstract/categorical aspects of real world item.
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Internal Representations types
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IMAGERY: characterized as ‘internal perception’. Like pictorial repre, imaginal (analogue) repre are essentially mental ‘copies’ of real-world events/objects. SEMANTIC: verbal/ symbolic repre of real-world events/objects. Mapping is arbitrary- but rule or proposition based. Performance/ Neurological studies suggest that these types of repre are coded diff & in diff areas than “imaginal” repre (imagery).
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- Evidence for imagery- performance based:
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Pavio= Dual coding (pictorial versus verbal); Shephard and Metzler= Mental Rotation; Kosslyn, Ball, & Reiser= Mental travel
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Evidence for imagery:
neurologically based |
Kosslyn & Thompson= fMRI similar activation when perceiving & imagining. Classic: Roland & Friberg: metabolic similar b/w perception & imagery; topological similar b/w object & neural activation= monkey studies
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what is visual imagery
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experience that resembles the experience of perceiving some object, event, or scene, but that occurs when the relevant object, event, or scene is not actually present to the senses
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what is visual imagery for?
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process which allows us to form useful theories of how the world works based on likely sequences of mental images, without having to directly experience that outcome
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shephard & metzler results showed?
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Shows us that we often try to mentally try something out before we commit to it physically, that is, we engage in activity imagery. Also revealed that mental imagery seems to be spatially organized, that is, we seem to be ‘traveling’ a distance in our head that is similar to what it might take us to achieve that distance in real life.
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what are the 2 theories that account for the representational source of imagery?
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Propositional Representation and Visual Representation
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Visual Representation
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Kosslyn; Visual source; doesnt define a specific relation, but instead must be inferred; no syntax; truth value only when described; does preserve the geometric qualities
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Propositional Representation
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Pylyshyn; Verbal source; Defines a specific relation b/w an object and a quality; Conforms to rules of syntax (grammatical rules for sentences); Has a truth value; Does not preserve the geometric qualities of an object
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what do we use imagery for?
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Where things are, What things are, Mental Practice (Anticipating/rehearsing) future events
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Inspection
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allows you to determine what a visual image IS.
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how does imagery aid in mental rehearsal
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Mental rehearsal produces impulses along neural pathways associated with actions; Results show that imagery helps more than no practice, but not as good as physical practice; Imagery seems to improve performer’s intrinsic motivation
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how does mental rehearsal affect different skill levels?
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Experts – highly temporal and key in on important aspects. Intermediates – trying to account for too many aspects of the skill. Novices – have no idea what to key in on.
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mental rotation
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you get a sensation (like you’re seeing it in your head), so you assume the sensation is responsible for completing the task.
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Propositional Hypothesis
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this framework asserts that we dont store representations as images. Rather they are stored as propositions or abstract relations among concepts. Any imagery that occurs is a side-effect of having these propositions.
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how does neuroscience contribute to imagery?
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If the underlying source is a proposition= language centers should be active during imagery. If vision is the underlying source= visual centers should be active. Imagery is supported by activity in the primary and secondary VISUAL cortex. However, if the ‘image’ is auditory (imagine hearing a sound), the AUDITORY cortex is activated. Activation centers observed during imagery are the same as those used to support VISUAL Perception
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The Problem of Perception
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Information overload; The Retina and the inverse projection problem, The “constancies”(Size, Form, Light, Object); Ambiguities & Illusions
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The Problem of Motor Control
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to many degrees of freedom
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major frameworks of perception
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Information Processing, Ecological
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information processing vs. ecological
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IP= *info comes from senses (environment) *meaningless until ‘processed’ in brain *unconscious inference, constructive, intelligent. ECO= *info from environment is orderly (already has structure), * just ‘pick’ it up, not ‘process’ it *perception & action cycle, affordances
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Motor Programs
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set of movement instructions and parameters used to initiate actions.
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CPG
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“programs” stored in spinal column – rhythmic actions
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GMP
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program for a ‘class’ of actions (e.g., throwing) for which a few varying parameters must be set. *Invariant features: Order, relative timing, relative force *Variant features: Overall duration, Absolute force, Muscle selection
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Open loop
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actions which do not need feedback (operate in a feedforward or ballistic manner
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Closed loop
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actions which use feedback (guided or aimed motions)
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Response-chain hypothesis (RC)
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*Open-looped *Movements begin w/ external/internal signal causing muscular contraction *contraction generates sensory information *then uses feedforward to correct subsequent movements
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Problems for RC
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*Deafferent animal studies= animals can move their limbs in nearly normal patterns after dorsal root is cut *‘Spinalized’ animal studies= animals can produce some basic movements (e.g., walking gait) after spine is cut so no efferent or afferent info reaches body. *Anticipatory Postural Adjustments= Muscle activation in postural muscles prior to activation of primary mover. restricted to only predictable actions
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support for motor program theory
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Wadman three burst pattern, agonist- tricep, antagonist-bicep, agonist- tricep. same thing happened when muscle was blocked. movemetn of muscles was pre-programmed
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why wont motor program work when throwing a ball two different ways?
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*Force is required to hold arm against gravity at end point in the first situation*Implies that the motor system must ‘know’ where the shoulder position is prior to action (i.e., feedback about initial position is a must!)
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Types of Motor Program Errors
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selection errors- Moving left, when you should have moved right, Selecting the right program, but wrong timing pattern. execution errors- Person produces the appropriate action, but some unexpected event occurs that disrupts the movement
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problems with MP theory
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storage problem, novelty
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Dynamic Systems Theory
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Suggests that motor coordination is an example of a complex system, whose behavior is functionally appropriate and self organized.* determined by organism, task, and environmental constraints.
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DST advantages
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*Explains how all dof become organized *Accounts for nonlinear interactions *solves storage problem: not much is stored if behavior is self-organized *solves novelty problem: specific coordinations can differ depending on organization of constraints, but still result in highly reproducible behavior
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DST problems
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*little insight into what cognitive processes DO contribute to motor control. *Have not developed adequate tools for measuring self-organized behavior or nonlinear interactions
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Classical Decision Theory
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assumed that people made their choices based on rational assessments of the situation
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are 2 models for how we make decisions
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Normative Models, Rational Model
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normative model
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values some choice over others; expected value or utility
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rational model
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Refers to being internally consistent. Description invariance- choice based on the problem. Procedural invariance- choice based on preference
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psychic budget
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concern how we mentally categorize money we have spent or are contemplating spending.
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Sunk Cost
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– refers to time, money, or other investment that is irretrievably spent, and therefore should not affect current decision making, and yet does.
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loss aversion
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Unpleasantness of a loss is larger than the pleasure of a similar gain
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Satisficing
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we choose the first option that meets our needs (even if a better choice exists).
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heuristics
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Cognitive “rules” that are easy to apply and that usually yield acceptable decisions but can lead to errors.
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three common heuristics
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Representativeness, Availability, Anchoring & adjustment
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Representativeness
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The degree to which something is similar to the population it is derived from or degree to which it embodies the features of the process that generated it
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Availability
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judgments are based on the ease of which one can produce instances of a given event.
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Anchoring and Adjustment
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Where the initial conditions or items will influence judgment of the set of items or solution.
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Biases
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systematic influence of information (even if the information is irrelevant).
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Illusory Conjunctions
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falsely attributed cause and effect relations
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Overconfidence
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inflated belief in one’s abilities
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Hindsight
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retrospective evaluation of events yields ‘obvious’ clues.
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Confirmation Bias
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tendency to seek information that supports a decision rather than refutes it.
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Inductive
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progressing from specific cases to general knowledge, or data to theory. (e.g., if that monkey communicates, then monkeys can communicate.). tends to be probabilistic (can make errors). susceptible to bias/use of heuristics
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Deductive
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progressing from general knowledge to specific cases, or theory to data. (e.g., if schizophrenia is inherited, then concordance between identical twins should be high.) has formal means of assessing validity, validity does not imply truth
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Conditional
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Follows the form:
if p, then q |
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Syllogistic
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Linear, Categorical
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Modus Ponens vs. Modus Tollens
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confirming the antecedent- p exists,then q exists vs. disconfirming the consequent- q doesnt exist, then p doesnt exist
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Wason Card Problem
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Below are four cards. Each card has a letter on one side and digit on the other side. You are to verify whether or not the following rule is true: If there is a vowel on one side, there is an even number on the other side. You should verify this rule by turning over the minimum number of cards. *This problem is the same as the “If P, then Q” conditional statement.
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