Psych 240 Ch. 7

Front 1

Representation:

Back 1

the form for what you know in your mind about things, ideas, events in the outside world.

Front 2

declarative knowledge:

Back 2

refers to facts that can be stated, such as date of birth, name of friend, or way a rabbit looks.

Front 3

procedural knowledge:

Back 3

refers to knowledge of procedures that can be implemented; steps involved in tying shoelaces, adding numbers, driving a car

Front 4

richer code visual theory:

Back 4

incorrect theory. Says we remember visual things with more detail better because of all that is there to help us remember.

Front 5

compromise theory:

Back 5

store things in efficient propositional format, something goes in there and builds images. Compromise between propositional and depictive.

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Analogue (depictive) codes:

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resemble the objects they are representing. picture is relatively similar to real-world object it represents; shows concrete attributes like shape and size. Movement of hands on Analog clock are analogous to passage of time.

Front 7

Symbolic (propositional) codes:

Back 7

relationship between the word and what it represents is arbitrary. Digital watches uses arbitrary symbols (numerals) to represent passage of time.

Front 8

Imagery:

Back 8

mental representation of things that are not currently seen or sensed by the sense organs

Front 9

dual-code hypothesis:

Back 9

we use both pictorial and verbal codes for representing information in our minds. Two codes organize information into knowledge that can be acted on, stored and later retrieved for subsequent use. Related, but different than depictive v. propositional debate.

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propositional theory:

Back 10

suggests that we do not store mental representations in the form of images or mere words. May experience them as images, but they are secondary and derivative phenomena that occur as a result of other more basic cognitive processes. Representation more closely resembles a meaning underlying a particular relationship among concepts. Neither in words or images; abstract form representing the underlying meanings of knowledge.

Front 11

parallelogram experiment:

Back 11

people couldn’t identify a parallelogram within a star of david; suggests use of propositional rather than analogical code.

Front 12

ambiguous figures:

Back 12

something that can be interpreted in more than one way. Used to figure out whether mental representations of images are analogical to perceptions of physical objects

Front 13

functional-equivalence hypothesis:

Back 13

although visual imagery is not identical to visual perception, it is functionally equivalent, or strongly analogous, to it. Suggests we use images rather than propositions in knowledge representation for concrete objects we can picture.

Front 14

Mental rotation experiment and results:

Back 14

involves rotationally transforming an object’s visual image. Participants asked to observe pairs of pictures showing 3-D geometric forms, which were rotated from 0 to 180 degrees either in the picture plane or in depth. Were also shown distractor forms and were asked whether given image was or wasn’t a rotation of original image. Responses showed that for each increase in the degree of rotation of figures, there was an increase in response times.

Front 15

neuroimaging evidence that mental rotation involves visual cortex:

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some suggestions that areas of cerebral cortex have representations resembling 2D spatial arrangements of visual receptors in the retina; fMRIs have found that brain areas involved in perception are also involved in mental rotation tasks.

Front 16

image scaling experiments & results:

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we represent and use mental images in ways that are functionally equivalent to our representations and uses of percepts. Seeing details of large objects is easier than seeing details of small ones. In a study with 4 pairs of animals, took longer to describe details of smaller objects than it did longer ones

Front 17

image scanning experiments & results:

Back 17

images can be scanned in much the same way as physical percepts can be scanned. In experiment, participants studied a map with various objects until they could reproduce it from memory. Objects were read aloud and participants had to identify proper location of it by pressing a button. Results found an almost perfect linear relation between distances separating pairs of objects in mental map and amount of time it took to press a button. Encoded the map in the form of an image.

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Demand characteristics:

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subjects’ perceptions of what is expected of them when participating in an experiment could result in confirmatory results in image research.

Front 19

Lateralization of function left hemisphere:

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only can manipulate imaginal components and symbols and to generate entirely new information; is more proficient in representing and manipulating verbal and other symbol-based knowledge.

Front 20

Lateralization of function right hemisphere:

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appears to represent and manipulate visuospatial knowledge in a manner similar to perception. Represents knowledge in a manner analogous to our physical environment.

Front 21

Dissociation between visual and spatial imagery:

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images may be stored in different formats in the mind depending on type of image involved. Visual imagery is the use of images that represent visual characteristics like colors and shapes; spatial imagery refers to images that represent spatial features such as depth dimensions, distances and orientations.

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Cognitive maps:

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internal representations of our physical environment, particularly centering on spatial relationships. Seem to offer internal representations that simulate particular spatial features of our external environment.

Front 23

Heuristics:

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informal, intuitive, speculative strategies that sometimes lead to an effective solution and sometimes do not; rules of thumb or cognitive strategies that influence estimations of distance.

Front 24

right-angle bias:

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people tend to think of intersections as forming 90-degree angles more often than the intersections really do

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symmetry heuristic:

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people tend to think of shapes as being more symmetrical than they really are.

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rotation heuristic:

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when representing figures and boundaries that are slightly slanted, people tend to distort the images as being either more vertical or more horizontal than they really are.

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alignment heuristic:

Back 27

people tend to represent landmarks and boundaries that are slightly out of alignment by distorting their mental images to be better aligned than they really are. Actually imagining a map

Front 28

relative-position heuristic:

Back 28

relative positions of particular landmarks and boundaries is distorted in mental images in ways that more accurately reflect people’s conceptual knowledge about the contexts in which the landmarks and boundaries are located, rather than reflecting the actual spatial configurations. Has more to do with knowledge

Front 29

semantic clustering:

Back 29

categories may influence imaginal representations on maps: guessed shorter distances between similar landmarks, and shorter distances between less similar landmarks.