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34 Cards in this Set

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  • Back
governments use coercion~ they are able to bring about departures from the consumption or production pattern that a utility-maximizing individual or profit maximizing firm would prefer
social contract
Rousseau's ideal solution by which rights and duties of the state and the citizens are defined
in collective decisions EVERYONE MUST AGREE- would ensure a pareto improvement in efficiency- a Voter would not favor a proposal if it promised to reduce his or her utility
majority rule
the most common type of rule- would allow a minority to suffer losses in the majority, more than half of those voting, favored a proposal
voluntary acceptance of coercion
why self interested individuals might submit to binding decision rules even though some group decisions may not be in their best interest
decision making costs
costs of time and effort that go into making choices if an individual is part of the decision group (these costs increase as the size of the decision group increases)
political externality costs
costs that arise when an individual is NOT part of the group. This term was coined by Buchanan and Tullock to describe how political processes can impose costs on unrepresented individuals, just as imperfect markets impose costs on unrepresented individuals
voice your concern to those that make decisions
if you are dissatisfied with the price or quality of a market good, you can usually exit by switching to another market good
aggregation of preferences
how to add votes
noting a relation in which one element in relation to a second element and the second in relation to a third element implies the first element is in relation to the third element
Arrow problem/ voters paradox/ vote cycling
a mathematical proof that shows there is no way to aggregate preferences without violating at least one of these five reasonable axioms of assumptions (next 5 definitions: pareto opt -indp of irre alt)
Pareto optimality
everyone preferes ome alternative x to another alternative, the collective choice process should prefer x to y
no individual has full control over the collective choice process such that that individuals preferences over alternatives are always decisive, even when everyone else prefers just the opposite
unrestricted domain
the collective choice process is capable of reaching collective decision for all possible combinations of individual preferences orderings of all alternatives
the collective choice is rational; 1st in the sense that it can completely rank all alternatices bt stating x is preferred to y, or y is preferred to x, or x and y are equally desirable so we are indifferent; and second, that all rankings display the property of transitivity
independence of irrelevant alternatives
the eslection of either or two alternatives must depend on the individuals orderings over only those two alternatives, and not on individuals orders over other alternatives
agenda control
some person, group, precedent, or law decides that will be acted on, and by implication, what will not be acted on
single dimensional issues
the choice among X, Y, and Z must rest on a single underlying evaluative dimension by which all three voters mark various land uses
single peaked preferences
Roughly speaking, a group of voters, consumers or agents have single-peaked preferences over a group of outcomes if: 1) they each have a ideal choice in the set; and 2) outcomes that are the farther from their ideal choice are preferred less.
the median voter
It posits that in a majority election, if voter policy preferences can be represented as a point along a single dimension, if all voters vote deterministically for the politician who commits to a policy position closest to their own preference, and if there are only two politicians, then a politician maximizes their number of votes by committing to the policy position preferred by the median voter. The median voter will be decision IF there is a single unifying dimension such as ideology or budget size, if all voters vote and if voting is repeated without limit
ideology as a dimension
ideology is a key dimension that may lead to single peaked preferences, and thus stability in majority rule voting
spatial distances
on the graph Utilty (Y) and Ideological Dimension (X), the intervals between P1, P2, and P3 are often referred to as spatial distances on an ideological spectrum
Types of voting 1- Unanimity
the one voting procedure that offers pareto improvement; someone becomes better off and no one becomes worse off
Types of voting 2- plurality rule
this type of voting would select that candidate ranked by the largest number of voters. it isnt very decisive and you may have to give up equality among voters
Types of voting 3- Condorcet criterion
this voting method takes into accound the entire range of voter preferences; each of these previous methods considers only the most-favored candidate. each candidate is compared with each other candidate; the one who defeats all others by the majority rule wins. the diadvantage if the possibility that no clear winner will emerge
Types of voting 4- Borda count
this type of voting allows each voter to assign each of the m candidates a score of 1 -> m. the top candidate receives m points with the next best at m-1
modified Borda count
if there are ten candidates but a voter ranks only five, then their first preference will receive only five points; their second preference will receive 4 points, their next 3, and so on. This method effectively penalises voters who do not rank a full ballot, by diminishing the number of points their vote distributes among candidates.
approval voting
a voter casts a vote for any and all candidates of whom he or she approves
Demand Revealing Process
the one voting-like procedure that offers promise for reaching efficient outcomes, but probably not outcomes that would please the majority is known as Demand Revealing Process
Clarke tax
an outcome is reached by adding up the dollar values for the various options; the one with the most dollars is the winner. A tax is then levied on each voter, based on her impact on the outcome
the most common and effective action for an intense minority is usually to form a coalition with another intense minority
minimum winning coalition
winning coalitions that would cease to be wining if some member were subtracted
a promise between two voters (pr frequently, btw their representatives) to exchange votes; A promises to vote to please B on an issue of B's choice if B will do likewise on an issue of A's choice