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25 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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What is an "Influence Market"
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"the use of wealth to seek influence within strong political and administrative insutitions - often with politicians putting their own acces out for rent"
Work "within the system" which is why corruption scores for these countries is good. wealthy interests seeking political influence dominate Influence Markets create - reduced public trust and widespread perceptions of abuses of power and privilege |
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What determines incentives for corruption in democracies?
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the organization of electoral and legislative processes, and on the methods of campaign finance
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Explain the happy medium between a system where no party stays in power for long, and a monopoly power system...
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The happy medium is found when the state is organized to give incumbents an incentive to take a long-run view and to anticipate that they have a good chance of either winning or losing the next election. Helps reduce corruption from instable govts.
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When are even legal contributions dangerous to the legitimacy of political campaigns?
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When they are not made public and if the quid pro quo is not itself obvious to voters
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centrifugal and centripitle incentives
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centrifugal - pull made by the interest groups on the candidate to their respective sides
centripital - pull by informed voters on candidate to move towards the median voter |
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contributions from SIG are proportional to what?
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to expected benefits (which are prob friendly politican wins and policy politician chooses)
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What are Elite Cartels?
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interlocking groups of top politicans, business figures, bureaucrats, military and ethnic leaders share corrupt benefits among themseves they can build netweords and aliances that solidify their power and stave off the opposition.
Institutions are newer, politically instable |
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How do EC differ from IM?
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In EC, policies are NOT sold to the highest bidder.
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Three countries with EC?
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Italy, Botswana, South Korea
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If contributions are allowed in an Indirect informative campaign...then what happens?
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Voter might choose "good" quality candidate that sold out, or "bad" quality candidate that has their policy preference
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If contributions are not allowed in IIC?
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Voter does not know if he is choosing "good" or "bad" quality, but always chooses the policy preferred
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In DIC what happens?
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If voter does not see campaign, thinks the candidate is "bad"
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When should ban on campaign contributions take effect?
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If quality is not that important
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When does public finance benefit voters?
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During a directly informative campaign
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Cumbersome campaign restrictions increase the probability of be forced to rely on....
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personalistic networks
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What effects the "lottery" of chosing corruption over accepting the bureaucratic wage?
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Probability of getting caught
difference between wage as a bureaucrat and wage in the private sector |
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"captitulation wage"
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offer them less than in private sector
let them steal |
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Bureaucrats actually value what 'type' of money?
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CLEAN
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When does the efficiency wage matter?
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at intermediate monitoring
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(Neo-liberal) regulation should only do what?
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correct market failures
should not redistribute income and/or award rents |
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how to lessen active and passive wastes
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active - more monitoring
passive - increased bureaucratic delegation |
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if the agency switches to using consip...what type of waste is present?
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passive
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if public bodies perfectly efficient
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positive relationship between price paid before consip and prob. of switching
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if public bodies perfectly honest
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negative relationship between price paid before consip and prob of switchin
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which agencies wast more?
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neo-polionic > US agencies > semi-autonomous
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