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243 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Raw elements needed for nuclear bomb |
Uranium or plutonium |
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Why are fissile materials hard to secure? |
Uranium needs to be taken from the earth then enriched plutonium made via nuclear reactor and refining process Both processes are very complicated and required high level tech and money |
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Critical mass |
Amount needed for a self-sustaining chain reaction |
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Two types of bomb |
Fission Fusion |
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Fission Bombs |
Cutting an atom kiloton range and thousands of tons on tnt |
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Fusion |
bonding an atom harder more desructive Megaton range, millions of TNT |
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Bottom line on raw materials |
most difficult aspect of aquiring nuclear weapons either need uraniam ore and/or enrichment capability or a nuclear reactor and reprocessing plant or plutoniukm |
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Hyman's Two type of states |
Legal rational Neo patrimonial |
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Legal rational |
governed by rules fosters growth of knowledge Has specialists and kowledge based competence AUTONOMY |
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Neo-patrimonial |
governed by power and connections Everything is political no spheres of autonomy |
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Legal rational states and proliferation |
they respect their scientsis. listen to them, give them authority over things they would know. high morale and commitment |
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Neo patrimonial states and proliferation |
Very politicized meddling from non-experts Scientists fear the government Dictator clip Iraq |
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Iraq as a neo patrimonial state |
Hussein's son in law set unrealistic deadlines Demanded technical changes that made it impossible to build on prior work arrested top scientist Proliferation failed |
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"Atoms for Peace" |
Speech by Eisenhower at UN arguing for peaceful use of nuclear energy |
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Atoms for peace and effect on proliferation |
launched program to export nuclear reactors for research and power generation to other countries gave many states nuclear reactors and capabilities (SA, INdia, Pakistan) Gave states that would never have a chance to have nuclear proliferation, chances at nuclear proliferation |
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Nuclear Rings |
created as a side effect of Atoms for peace talk These second teir nuclear suppliers Trading nuclear and missile technology/supplying it to other countries |
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Dual use technology |
tech like nuclear reactors that can be used for civilian use like power but also military use came about after atoms for peace |
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Furhmann Theory |
Civilian nuclear infrastructure lowers cost of nuclear weapons programs Elevated threat created demand for nuclear weapon THEREFORE, countries with civilian programs and high threat should initiate weapons programs and would be more likely to succeed |
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Furhmann experiment (dependant varible, independent varible, results) |
dependent- decision to start weapons prog acquisition of weapons independent- count of nuclear cooperation agreement, militarized interstate disputes Results- he was right-combo of high threat and many nuclear agreements raises chance to proliferate and accquisition |
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Main commodities being sold/traded |
Centrifuge parts and plans missile tech |
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Main suppliers |
Pakistan North Korea |
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Proliferation Security Initiative |
Agreement to interdict ships that might contain nuclear or missile related tech |
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UNSC Reslution 1540 |
Mandate to prohibit support to non-state actors seeking such items to adopt and enforce effective laws prohibiting the proliferation of such items to non state actors |
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BOTTOM LINE supply/peace for atoms etc etc |
Is supply really such an obstacle to proliferation? There are many ways around it. Policy makers focus on these supply issues to regulate-much easier than demand but demand would be better, maybe impossible |
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Sagan's three models as to why countries proliferate |
Security Domestic Politics Norms |
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Security model |
States will proliferate if they feel as if there is an immediate and direct security threat to their state and their state's soverignty States are driven and make decisions based on security concerns |
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Proliferation as a chain reaction |
part of sagan's security model Proliferation as a chain reation. One country gets it..so then another one gets it becuase they are threatned..so on so on |
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Problem of security model |
Some states are just expansionist and agressive, may not do it for security purposes |
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US policy implications of security model |
If US was worried about proliferation they should ensure/provide security to potential proliferation state so they dont feel the need to |
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How does security model explain nuclear reversal? |
Decline in a state's threat (South Africa) |
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Domestic Politics |
State will proliferate if it is beneficial to actors within the state |
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Good example and why of domestic politics |
India! China tested nuclear bomb, if they were worried about threat they would have proliferated- instead they waited 10 years- debated within the country and only happened afeter change in domestic politics |
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Nuclear reversal explained by domestic politics? |
Chabge in government could cause a reversal |
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Policy implications for US if domestic is true |
They should affect domestic balance of power in states they do not want to proliferate |
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Norms model of proliferayion |
Idea that says the bomb is a symbol more than an actual thing. It can be used a measurement of greatness to teh world or just a symbol to their own citizens and international community |
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Good example of norms model? |
Ukraine, used its non proliferation and denuclearization to show a smbpol of compliance with wotkd and NPT treaty |
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US policy implications |
US should work to make and establish a new norm with an equally similar power the bomb has |
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Monteiro and Debs perspective |
strategic perspective |
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Strategic perspective |
Combination of demans and supply sides of proliferation |
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Three actors in strategic proliferation |
potential proliferator allies adversaries |
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Proliferator needs two things |
opportunity to proliferate Willingness to proliferate |
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Opportunity to proliferate dependent on what? (5 things) |
relative power of state, cost of preventive war, level of ally commitment, security benefit of proliferation and level of security |
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Willingness to proliferate dependent on (3 things) |
level of security threat security benefit cost of proliferation |
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Monteiro and Debs argument |
Security threat provides the motive to proliferate if state has no powerful ally and the state is strong- proliferate if no ally and it is weak- dont proliferate |
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if state has a power ful ally and ally offers complete protection |
no need to proliferate |
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has ally- incomplete protection |
need for proliferation remains |
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Security model explanation for India |
Threat from China and Pakistan Security guarentee from Soviet Union |
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Domestic politics model India |
length of time to develop the bomb State's indicicivness on what type of government they wanted to run Timing of the tests helps prove this as the best model |
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Norms model in INdia |
Desire for prestige post-colonial complex wanting to prove itseld |
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Security model and Pakistan |
security threat from INdia Looked like they were following India's lead. reacting to what they were doing |
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Domestic politics model in Pakistan |
Military Rule Muclear weapons and proliferation end to benefit the military (keep money flowing into programs) |
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Norms politics model in Pakistan |
Expressed willingness to join NPT if INdia does too |
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India-Pakistan conflict First Kashmir War |
1947-1948 Over disputed teriroty Pakistan supported a muslim insurgence in Kashmir India gave arms assistant to government in Kashmir to fight off rebellion Territory eneded up remaining in dispute |
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Second Kashmir War |
Pakistan, fearing INdia's gain in power attacked again in Kashmir 1965 1966 Pakistan withdraws-agreement made |
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Bangladesh War |
Pakistan in civil war 1971 India invades east pakistan in support of east pakistan people becomes bangledesh-independent country |
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US Pakistan relations |
US-Soviet Rivalry gave way to US helping Pakistan intially Later US passes Pressler agreement Sanctions from US come down on Pakistan |
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Pressler agreement |
Made pakistan confirm they had no nuclear weapons not followed well |
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Spiral Model |
Supports the idea of arms control Idea that states grow more fearful of the other states when that state builds up weapons, this causes the state to bild up weapons which causes the original state to build up more weapons... spiral Fear drives further arms building Reassurance can be achieved through arms reductions |
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Two types of states within the spiral model |
security seeking (nice guys, dont want any trouble, just to be safe) Expansionists (bad guys, aggressive) Not easy to tell which one a state is all the time assumes that both states are security and the fear that one is expansion causes this cycle |
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Tragic predicament in Spiral Model |
Arms increase cause fear in the other side even if both are security Innocent intentions can lead to bad outcomes for both sides- tragic result |
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Deterrence Model |
Anti arms control Hawks Bush administration, neo-conservative foreign policy |
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Two componets of stregnth on deterrence model |
Will power Physical strength |
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Arms increase in the deterrence model |
kills two birds 1. you have more arms so you increase physical power 2. acts as a signal of your willpower to use said nuclear weapons |
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Arms races in detterrence model |
Contests of strength |
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Detterence Model |
So states build nuclear weapons to show strength and to be better and more powerul and more will power than adversaries. if you have more weapons, they wont pick on you or invade you etc |
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North Korea Events (6) |
1991 joint declaration `1994 crisis Agreed framework 2001 6 party talks 2005 joint statement |
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1991 joint declaration |
NK and Sk sign declaration of the denuclarization of the Korean peninsula Us leaves SK UK agrees to inspections IAEA leaves after couple years |
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1994 crisis |
IAEA not allowed in NK reactors Us puts units in SK Jimmy carter goes over |
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Agreed framework |
US and NK NK nuclear reactors and reprocessing facilities shut down/dismantled IAEA inspections continue NK rejoins NPT Nuclear Fuel out of NK Us says they wont attack NK Us supplies them with fuel for the ones lost with reactors gone |
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2001 |
Bush admin- ish changes drops negotiatins axis of evil dropped Agreed framework falls apart |
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6 party talks |
Us, Nk SK CHin japan russia Attempt to reach nuclear agreement with NK Nk instson security assurance and economic aid from US Us is like not till you stop first Bush admin not really on same page-they stall/fail |
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2005 joint statement |
NK abanndos all nuclear weapons and exisiting nuclear program- goes to NPT again, IAEA checks Us confirms no nukes in SK Joint denuclearization of Korean penisula revisite broken soon once more |
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Motivations behind NK weapons |
state security State expansion Regime stability |
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Policy implication for US: Spiral model |
NK and US locked in tragic cycle of fear/misunderstanding US and SK should return to sunshine policy |
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Policy implication for Us; deterrence model |
NK is an expansionist testing US willpower stregthn detterrent forces |
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Policy implications for US via Domestic POlitics model |
NK is generating threat to perserve regime Us should ignore NK |
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Hill's unification strategy |
INcentivize SK and China to Unite Put missile defense systems in SK Deter power of NK nuclear power "Defang it" |
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Fitzpatrick Unification |
immediate regime change not needed get NK people as much information as possible on the outside world balloon down pamphlets on information, help NK black market Dont use military force, just use pressure |
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Kydd's unification plan |
China is key here Us and china need to get on same page Us out of Sk Talks would need to be done in secret |
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Why talks in secret for Kydd? |
Us commitment to its allies could be in question if public NK and China tensions would rise and provide instability |
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Two strategies of development |
Import substitution and Export led devleopment |
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import substiution |
Weaken dependence on foregin supliers by devleoping industries for comestic consumpsion popular in latin america what you dont have, you make in your country |
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export led development |
pursue international compartative advantage by building up exporting industries popular in east asia what you dont have you trade what you do have to get it |
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Two Coalitions |
Nationalist :iberalizing |
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Nationalist |
See benefits of proliferation as high, satisfies desire for autonomy cost of proliferation low, becuase international links are devalued more self centered |
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Liberalizing |
Cost of proliferation is high becuase internaltional integration is important benefit of proliferation is low, conflicts should be resolved peacfully to permit economic growth |
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Two sets of policies |
Autonomy Integration |
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Autonomy |
Reduce internaltional trade build up role of state in economy |
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INtegration |
increase openness to world economy, abide to tinternational norms, reduce rols of state in economy |
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National identity |
a key driver in decisions |
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Two varible in National identity |
How nationalist is the idenetity how oppositional is the identity |
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Oppositional identity... |
produces fear |
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Nationalst identity produces |
pride |
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Oppositional nationalist Example |
believes in nations greatness and is concerned about threatening nature of other nation FRANCE |
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Non-oppositional nationalist |
Believes in nations greatness but not threat of other nations so need for bomb, might want it for pride doe AUSTRALIA |
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Seurity model explanation of Brazil/Argentina |
Succesful reassurance between the two so no need for bomb |
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Democratic peace explanation |
Argentina brazil Transition to democracy correlated ending nuclear weapons program |
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Soligen's theory to argentina brazil |
New democratic regimes were pro free trade, neo-liberal economic policies were pursued.. so a bomb and the sanctions they would get wasnt worth it |
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Hyman's thoery on Argentina brazil |
Agrentina is a non-opposional nationalist Nationalt esp in response to US You cant tell Argentina what to do! |
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Spiral model response to Have arms races caused war? |
YES! Fear causes war |
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Spiral model/arms race Fear causes war in what two ways |
premption (to counter immediate threat) preventive war (to counter long term threat) Fear leads to arms races which leads to war |
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Spiral model and arms race example |
Argument that WWI was due to arms race/explained by spiral model |
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Deterrence model and if arms races cause war |
NO! Political differences are at the root of war, not arms races EX: WWII |
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Burdensome Coast Argument |
Military spending . for an arms race is so high, that war looks like a more attractive option |
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Historical records for each argument |
Clear that some arms races did not end in war so a hit on the spiral model there could argue that some arms races . were just not big enough to ever have ended in war |
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WWI as an arms race argument considers two races |
Anglo-German Naval race Continental Land Arms race |
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Anglo-german Naval Race |
Brits vs german brits had best naval german passes laws to try to build up to britian Brits not dettered Caused Britts to be suspicous tho and allign with germany's enimies |
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Continental land race |
Germany, austria-hungry, italy vs brits france Russia All about size of army via men and advanced machinery |
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WWI Arms race or detterrence? |
Can be seen as a culmination of these races or as Britain's lack of response to deter germany |
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Three positions if proliferation is good or Bad Waltz Mueller Sagan |
Waltz- good Mueller-neither Sagan-Bad |
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Waltz |
Nuclear weapons raise cost of war, therefore reduce liklihood of war |
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HIstorical evidence for Waltz |
no great war againsst great powers since 1945 proliferation will continue new actors will be put under same constraints as the current proliferators |
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Waltz argument...We should care |
about cost of war not number of wars |
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The expected cost of war |
Waltz argument likelihood of war X cost of war |
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Three things must hold for Waltz to be right |
1. Can't have preventive war 2. Accidental strike cant happen 3. Need second strike capability |
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Sagan- proliferatiion is? |
More proliferation is bas |
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Sagan argument |
Proliferation causes more preventive and premptive war due to small windows of opportunity Smaller arsenals make states more vunerable, less likely to fight |
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Historical Argument/evidence for sagan |
US and USSR were both far away , both rich, not afraid of invasion and still almost came to a nuclear war due to proliferation |
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Organizational politics |
Militaries are less constrained in developing worlds Militaries biased in favor of preventive war- so that will happen if these less developed countries start proliferating |
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Sagan's argument in terms of US national interest |
nuclear proliferation weakens US leverage in many situations but in some case, proliferation of certain countries would help US |
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Fundmental difference between waltz and Sagans arguments |
Sagan does not think states in the real world act rational Waltz opperates in where states behave in rational interest |
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Mueller-proliferation |
doesnt matter if good or bad WWII was costly enough to deterr attacks have not had a major impact on diplomacy or international events |
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Stability-instibility paradox |
Could nuclear weapons make the world safe for conventional war? Stability at the strategic nuclear level leads to instability at the conventional level |
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Iraq- why did Hussein pursue nuclear weapons |
He was an expansionist/aggressive leader |
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Deterrence explaniation for iraq invasion |
saddam was expansionist we werent concerned on the status of weapons more motivated by general iraqi hostility and past weapons programs Source of war was really political disagreement on who should run region |
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Spiral model explains iraq invasion |
Iraq fear of iran led to 1980 attack and invasion of Kuwait US was fearful of Iraqi expansionist behavior and increase of fear of terrorism post 9/11 both were security seeking but war caused due to fear |
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US did not prevenive attack on china why? |
Lack of soviet support Anticipated lack of international support decided china would not be much more agressive with bomb China would not have delivery capability for a long time US would retain first strike capability for a while even after china got bomv |
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Usa vs china arsenal |
Ours is much much bigger not sure how much |
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Likelihood terrorists could get a bomb |
Seems unlikely for many reasons some estimates say impossible, some say 50% in next ten years knowledge of nuke is widespreade fissile material and technology is hard to come by/be smart ebough to do. hard to do at home |
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NUclear smuggling |
not as hard as it may seem uranium and plutonium easily concealed and would be hard to detect in a customs check |
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Two streatgies of terrorism that might call for WMD |
Attition Provacatin |
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Attrition |
designed to inflict cost on enemt, communicate stregthn to enemy |
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Provocation |
Designed to generate enemy attack which persuades domestic population that enemy is evil |
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To use WMD or not if Terrorist To Use |
Maximize destructive power inflicts greater cost on enemy in war of attrition Bigger provoxation leads to greater reactino by enemy |
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Case against using WMD if terrorist |
At high levels o destruction, states win Reaction to provocation may destroy suporrters rather tahn alienate them States have more destructive capacity than terrorist groups Group may splinter -members have moral objections Danger of retaliation could prove to high for some State sponsors of the group would object to not suffer retliation |
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non-rational terrorism |
imitat God Bring on the end of the world/apocalypse Revenge |
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Al Qaida |
very ambitious Very long term goals Willingness to take costs and losses-Matyrdom Pursued WMD pre-9/11 Lost charismatic leader Lost state sponsor |
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ISIS |
more popular world wide controls territory Losing ground Develop chemical weapons, maybe biological not nuclear tho |
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First Use Conventional wisdom as to why US droppped Bomb |
TTo encourage japanese surrender and save US lives that would be lost if US invaded Japan |
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Other Ideas as to why US dropped bomb |
Intimidate Soviets, show US willingness to use Nukes, US and USSR had start having a little friction to se what the bomb could do on a city |
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Was dropping justified? conventional answer? |
yes! japan started the war, refused to surrender and US justified to limit own losses |
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Revisionist answer to was it justified |
No Japan would have surrendered anyway Us should have offered to let them keep their emperor US just want to use bomb/intimidate soiets |
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Morally Justified |
Just war theory is a catholic doctrine Ideas in war that atack from self-defense and proportionaly and distinction |
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Political effect of the bomb conventional view |
Bomb led to japanese surrender and had a great political effect |
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political effect of bomb revisionist effect |
Not grreat japense leaders could care less Dozen cities already destroyed |
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Deterrence model if this revisionist theory is true |
Takes a major hit If no one is truly scared of the bomb would give other states no reason to fear countries with nuclear weapons |
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Wilson's arument about bomb |
revisionist had no effect on surrender |
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Wilson said what effected surrender of japanese |
Soviet invasion Japanese id not want to surrender to USSR, prefered if US was in control of their country, if they surrender to US, USSR leaves cause they are alllies |
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Deterrence |
pursuading others to not do something you do not want them to do |
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Deterrence by denial |
Pursuading enemy not to attack by saying, if you attack it will not work |
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Deterrence by punishment |
pursuading enemy not to do something by saying if you do, you will get punished by us |
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direct deterrence |
deter attack on homeland |
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extended deterrence |
deter attack on ally or other lesser interest thought harder to achieve |
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First strike |
Initiaion firing first |
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splendid first strike |
first strike that wipes out enemies capabilities of second strike |
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Second strike |
retaliation to forst strike |
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secure scond strike |
all weapons could not be destroyed by enemies first strike |
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Counterforce |
Aim bombs at enemies weapons more bombs needed first strike accuracy and speed required |
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Countervalue |
second strike aim bombs at cities fewer bombs |
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Nuclear supremacy |
Ability to strike adversary without fear of nuclear retaliation US had it from 1945 to 1960 |
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Strategic Air Command |
In charge of most nuclear forces peace is our profession |
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Single Integrated operational plan |
plan of targets to hit with nuclear bombs list of cordinates of coviet and chinese tagets targets were comman and control, military and industrial based |
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Strategic Triad |
nuclear diversity good for second strike capability ICBM SLBM Bombers |
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Mutal Assured Destruction |
Began in 1960 Each side has second strike capability so each country would be destroyed strategy or just a way of life |
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Finite deterrence |
No need for arms race if both have enough for a second strike capability |
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Damage Limitation |
Incentive to strike first even if MAD Idea that a first strike could hurt enemies arsenal making their second strike not as powerful |
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the fundamental problem of credibility |
will you actually use nuclear weapons would they retaliate after first strike |
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Brinkmanship model |
Schelling's answer to fundamental credibility problem threat that leaves something to chance the act or practive of pursuing dangerous policy to the limits of saftey before stopping two climbers linked by a rope on slope, one falls, both does |
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Hawk's answer to f.c.p |
warmanship need usable nuclear options and more the better counterforce weapons and strageic plan for fighting a nuclear war makes us credible |
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Decapitation |
Target enemy's capitol; command and control/communication links Attempt to reduce ability to launch a cordinated second strike |
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How other states should/will/do respond to US nuclear program Short term |
Maintain countervalue targeting Launch on warning o earlier increase alert staus |
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how other states repsond to us nuc program long term |
build mobile missiles-not fixed silos build balistic submaries invest in anti0-sub warefare |
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If US on a conscious pursuit of supremacy |
yes |
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Should they be tryna be primacy? Case For |
Has conflicts of interests with many aversaries Need credible options agains them Otherwise we will be deterred from launching conventional attacks on hem |
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case against s |
will cause others to adopt risky launch on warning policies Will encourage hawkish pres to intervence against nuclear armed states will increase likelihood of nuclear detonation in urban area for us |
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calculation n US first strike capabilities vs Russia |
95% certainty that we would wipe out their first strike capability |
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Three types of Nuculear postures |
catalytic, assured retaliation and asymmetric escalation |
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catalytic |
goal of this posture is deterrence to being attacked Countries have ability to assemble some nuclear weapons Very ambigous on capaility and deployment Isreal, south africa, early pakistan |
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Assured retaliation |
gol is to deterr enemines and use bomb to coerce other countries they have survivable second strike forces open about capabilities, ambiguous about deployment CHina INDia |
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Assymetric escalation |
deter even conventional war and threaten first strike use capable of first strike unambigous on deployemnt and capability FRANCE, PAKISTAN now |
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Pakistan shift |
Shift from catayitic to assymetric escalation designed to stop INdia inflict costs on India |
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China and Pakistan compared |
Different/oppostie strats similar concerns generated from them China is no first strat Pakistan will if INdia invades |
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Missile Defense |
Very difficult challenge shooting a bullet with a bullet Pursued mainly by US and Russia now lil Isreal too |
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National Misile defense |
system of defense/ a mechanism that woul protect US from limited strikes by high velocity missiles |
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Why Us shifts to NMD |
icrease public pressure to do so new tech advances makes it easier to do, more effiecent, less expensive |
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NMD is good |
Payne has potential to aliviate risk of rouge states targting US Limits attack on homeland-which is ky if US want to remain superpower in international peacekeeping |
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NMD is Bad |
Miller "Modest in capability and imperfectly inefective" expensive acquired at risk of provoking adverse diplomatic stategic consequences still vunerable to terrorist attacks |
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Taboo |
Nuclear bio and chem weapons subject to special moral condemation moral views on war established long time ago |
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Chemical weapons good/bad props |
good-kills people does not destroy building, cost of war goes down bad-somwhat indiscriminate on who it kills but not more so than artilary/conventional bombs |
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chemical weapons |
associated with poison, which is a descpeicable weapon first used by germans in WWI Not in WWII becuase of deterrence-both sides did not want to give other an excuse to use it Stigma that is used by really bad states Us-anti-first use on them |
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Biological weapons good/bad props |
bad props- if contagious, danger of being idiscriminate on who it kills good props-bildings not destroyed |
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biological weapons moral issues |
disease is universally feared doctors supposed to cure illnes, working on bio weapons seen as morally wrong and opposite of what they do |
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Bio weapons use |
Japanese and Russians used in WWII backfired and got their own men sick Outlawd in Geneva protocol |
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Nuclear weapons good/bad |
good- so bd that they may deterr any use, so kinda good bad- maximally indiscriminate/could end all of civilization |
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Nuclear weapons |
taboo essentially implies a no first use poliy Russia does not have that china does |
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Causal mechanisms of nuclear taboo |
domestic public opinion world opinion personal conviction |
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three effectrs of taboo |
permissive constitutive regulative |
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permissive effects |
draws attention from conventional weapons that are about as bad and they are deemed norm becuase its taboo to use nukes |
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constitutive effects |
because nuclear weapons are taboo this sets up new ators, behaviors or interests |
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Regulative effects |
creates what behavios a stae can and can not do |
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Logic of appropriateness |
Human ation is driven by rules of appropriate or exemplary behavior, organized into institution. Rules are followed becuase they seem natural, rightful, expected, legit |
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logic of consequences |
actions are one by subjective assesments of outcomes of alternative courses off action and if its worth it |
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Press/sagan/valentino findings on taboo |
Evidence that nuclear strike may not be so taboo |
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Crtiques of finding |
Dont really test the tannwald hypothesis on taboo they tested post 9/11 about rouge states and terrorism tannwald didnt mention thgese things |
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Epistemic communities |
a network of professionals with recognized knoweldge and skill in a particular issue Share a st of beliefs, which provide a value-based foundaton for the actions of members |
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Arms control epistemic community |
Harvard white educated men in tweed jackets |
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Goals of arms countrol |
Reduce likelihood of war reduce cost of war |
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Strategic stability |
Would make accidental war less likely basically assuring other sie they have nothing to fear |
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How would they reduce likelihood of war |
Reduces the first strike adcantage increase second strike Reduce vunerability of forces but maintain vunerabilit of population Reduce liklihood of accidents that could spark war |
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Reduce cost of war, how would they do that |
Move missiles away from cities conflict of making war unlikey and bad here is tough considered second to reducing likelihoo |
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Self restraint and stability |
restratint leads to stability |
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What model is critique on anti-arms contol based in |
Deterrence model |
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anti-arms control critque |
Deterrence model enemy is agressive arms increase is a signal of strength strength deters enemy Arms increase prevents war War does not happenby accdnt strategic stability is bad and an admission of weakness |
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Biggest contradiction of arms control |
arms control is eithimpossible or irrelevant impossible when relations are bad irrelevant when they are good |
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Case supporting arms control |
Spiral MOdel! |
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Sttategic Arms Limitation Talks |
SALT I negotiations began in 1969 Agreement signed 3 year later ratified by both parties imposes freeze on launchers prohbits converting light missiles to heavy launchers ABM treaty Us critized for giveing Soviets higher totals |
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ABM treaty Anti-ballistic missile treaty |
limited each side to two site, one at capitol one at an ICMB field Prohibits missile detection radars |
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Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty |
INF Gorb and Regan Required destruction of the parties ground launched ballistic and cruise missiles Their launchers and associated support structures and equipment within 3 years had to be destroyd Extensive on site inspection procedures |
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Did INF help end the cold war? Spiral model |
yes! Cold war was still going on Significant cuts in arms eased tensions Affected western punlic opinion of soviet intentions |
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DID iNF help end cold war? Deterrence model |
NO! Soviets were in economic decline needed to cut back It was a prduct of strong barganing of US and weakness of soviets |
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NPT negotiated by who |
US USSR UK |
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NPT divides world to |
have and have nots |
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6 man articles |
nuc states pledge to not tranfer weapons or tech non-nuc wont develop weapons non-nuc agree to IAEA cheks of facilities All free to pursue nuc tech non-nuc have acess to peaceful nuc explosions nuc pledge to work towards disarment |
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Asymmetry of NPT |
power in the nuclear states dont have to give up their eapons-but others can get weapons |
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whats in it for non-nuc |
to be an international team player stigma that if tyoure not in it, youre bad sharing peaceful nuclear tech |
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Limited test ban treaty |
First major arms agreement btween US and USSR Banned testing in atmospher, ocean an outer space after issues of nuclear fallout from testing occured could test undergound |
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comprehensive test ban treaty |
Band nuclear explosions regardless of size or purpose |
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nuclear latency |
how close a state is to nuclear weapons |
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South africa proliferation and dismentlement Security |
Didnt have a thrat to really worry about |
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SA domestic politics |
dealing with a partide |
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Sa Norms |
Need to solidify interna before trying to secure a bom |
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Liberman's argument on sa proliferation to disarm in three models |
They can not explain why SA did that alone |
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Levites argument |
external security guarentee from outside party change in domestic regime and norms that engage nuclear weapons lead to nuclear reversal |
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coercive diplomacy |
forceful persuasion try to get a state to acquiesce with threat of force or ecomonomic threat |
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key factors in corecive diplomacy |
has to be proportional- end goal propotional to the steps they have to take reciprocity-linkage between coercers demands and what they will give up crdibility-has to be reason to beleive the corercer will follow thru |
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Provisions of Iran nuclear deal |
Reduction of uranium stock pile reduction of centriguges reactor changed to make less plutonium increases acess for IAEA investigation/inspections Sanctions lifted |
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Advantages of iran deal |
reduce uranium stockpile monitoring makes secret breakout unlikely makes them preferable to a military attack |
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Disadvantages/argument on deal |
Iran continues to improve uranium enrich capabillity breakout time at the end of the deal may be 0 sets a bad precedent for other states |
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Why disarm? |
Lack of utility expense danger of unauthorized/acciedental detonation danger of theft could help non-proliferation efforts is diarm |
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why not disarm hawk view |
We want them even if no one else has them can use them to deter conventional challenges |
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why not diarm moderate view |
we need them becuase others have or might have them main use is to deter their use by others |
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The breakout problem |
as you go down in number, small differences matter more difference between o and 1 is bigger than 10 11 and 100 to 101 |
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Breakout time |
time required to produce enough weapon grade uranium for one nuclear weapon |
