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47 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Deterrence
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-strategy where nation A assures a ridiculous retaliation to prevent nation B from taking aggressive actions
-very effective with the advent of WMDs and nuclear weapons |
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Mutual Assured Destruction
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-goes along with deterrence in that nations are prevented from using nuclear weapons because they know they'll also be destroyed
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Thomas Schelling
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-political scientist
-said Korean War all about US and reputation and that it was worth it |
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Dispositional Attribution
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-constructivist
-attribute actions to inherent character |
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Situational Attribution
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-constructivist
-attribute actions to situations -doesn't carry over to different situations |
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Analogies
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-Khong
-reliance on historical analogies to figure out the stakes; calculate risks, and prescribe actions -when situation linked to analogy that favors caution, leaders will be cautious (Korea) |
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"Another Munich"
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-Khong
-situation that favors showing resolve, leaders more likely to move in that direction |
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"Another Korea"
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-role of reputation
-Truman thought failure to fight in Korea would be open invitation to new acts of aggression -failure in Korea - analogy -Khong-analogy for caution |
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Quasi-alliance
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-Victor Cha
-fear of US abandonment plus common external threat and historical/cultural animosity plus insecurity/vulnerability lead to a degree of cooperation(quasi-alliance) -ex. Japan, South Korea, US -fear of abandonment grows symmetrically -fear of entrapment |
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Guam Doctrine
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-July 25, 1969
-aka Nixon Doctrine -US expects allies to take care of own military defense -pursuit of peace through partnership w/ US allies |
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General agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
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-provided framework for all free countries to lower tariffs
-part of liberal internaitional economic order |
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Threat credibility
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-need to be able to back up a threat
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Role of reputation (realist)
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-role it plays in threats and promises (for realists)
-a promise will be more credible if a nation stakes its reputation for resolve -reputation can be treated like a material good ex. Korean War |
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Liberal International Economic Order (LIEO)
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1. confidence in international medium of exchange: regulates trade, prevent inflation
-US backed w/ own gold-exchange rates 2. confidence in resolution of payment imbalances (IMF) -US doesn't want to be directly responsible 3. loans and foreign aid to help countries get out of debt 4. Mechanism for reducing trade barriers and preventing cheating (GATT) 5. market for distress goods 6. security of trade routes and overseas investments |
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Role of reputation (Constructivist)
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-Mercer
-reputations for resolve that are valuable across situations don't form -situational/dispositional attribution |
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distress goods
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-when a nation is in debt and needs to sell certain goods
-part of LIEO |
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public goods
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-goods that everyone benefits from
-like LIEO -realist view: in anarchy, nations worry about relative gains so it will be difficult to provide public goods |
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in-group/out-group
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-Mercer
-out-group: people you don't completely identify with -includes allies and adversaries -in-group: you |
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issue-linkages
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-Christina Davis
-counteracts domestic obstacles to liberalization by broadening negotiation stakes -have to look at agenda |
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voluntary export restraint (VER)
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-evidence of tension and breakdown in cooperation
-basically forced export restraint but called voluntary -US and Japan |
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Prisoner's Dilemma
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-game theory
-self-interest; you always defect -both sides lose -need communication, transparency, information, trust, iterated games |
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Export-led Peace
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-East Asian economic way is export-led
-high domestic savings, small states, possibilities for rapid catch-up growth, government coordination -says focus on exports leads to peace because need trading partners |
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Asian Financial Crisis
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-economic growth led to vulnerability to financial liberalization
-foreign investors pull out; banks bust -fleeing capital, borrowers unable to pay back |
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IMF solution
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-applied typical solution to differnt problem (Latin American solution)
-Washington Consensus Policies: raise interest rates, cut government spending, liberalize more -Asian countries needed to keep money in countries, keep interest rates low to pay debts |
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AMF
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-doesn't exist but it might help
-US-Japan conflict over creating aMF -Rapkin: blocking power of nations |
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NK explosion
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-history of aggression
-don't want to provoke NK to attack esp. w/ nuclear development |
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ARF
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-18 nations meet in ASEAN Regional Forum
-has provided forum for talking - hasn't prevented aggressive actions |
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ASEAN Way
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-sovereignty, equality, territorial unity, non-interference in internal affairs, right to choose one's own social system
-consensus, no commitment to meet again, no secretariat -flexible consensus and soft regionalism |
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NK implosion
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-NK economic stagnation since 1970
-has lost allies since end of Cold War -refugee flows to SK and other neighbors |
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Informal Talk Shop
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-where junior government officials talk things out
-track 2 diplomacy |
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Agreed Framework
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-1994
-avoid war between US and NK by Jimmy Carter -NK shut down reactor and put spent fuel under IAEA supervision -US, Japan, and South Korea set up institutions to build new nuclear reactors -US gives 500,000 tons of fuel oil to NK -deal collapes -NK never that into it, US didn't really come through |
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soft landing
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-challenge w/ NK
-give up aggressive policiies -gradual economic liberalization -stop selling missile technology and just printing more money -gradual integration of Koreas -avoid implosion and explosion |
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sunshine policy
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-SK policy towards NK
-emphasize peaceful cooperation and short-term reconciliation |
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soft regionalism
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-part of ASEAN way
-allow nations to basically do what they want in their regions |
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flexible consensus
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-part of ASEAN way
-don't need absolute consensus because policies aren't binding |
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stag hunt
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-game theory
-assurance game -you want to work together to get the stag over the rabbits -iterated games |
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Six Party Talks
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-US, SK, NK, Japan, Russia, China
-China's worries about escalating tension and uses its influence to force NK and US to come to talks -lead to joint statement |
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engagement strategy (China)
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-more economic interaction
-current US strategy |
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containment strategy (China)
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-build up US military strength in East Asia
-demonstrate resolve -reinforce Asian alliances -put CoCom-type limits on trade w/ China |
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entrapment
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-fear of getting trapped in allies' problems
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abandonment
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-fear of being left alone to deal with a problem
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Hegemonic Leadership
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-where the hegemon takes over (ex. US, China)
-think hegemonic stability theory (Gilpin) |
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Bretton Woods System
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-made GATT there
-US agreed to back up money with it's own gold -work out exchange rates -fixed exchange rates to the $ |
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Hegemonic Leadership
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-where the hegemon takes over (ex. US, China)
-think hegemonic stability theory (Gilpin) |
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historical antagonisms
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-analogies
-enemies that have been enemies, historically, will continue to be enemies |
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Revisionism
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-Chalmers Johnson
-new school of thought in 1980s -while US has trusted Japan, Japan has been building up and will overtake the US -Japan is sneakily closing it self off and then selling its goods at high prices -ex. semiconductors |
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Nixon shocks
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-1971
-Nixon closes gold standard on value and reduces value of $ by 10% -leads to inflation and worries about future of dollar |
