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58 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Types of plea bargains
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1. Charge bargaining
2. Sentence bargaining 3. Sentencing recommendation 4. Wired plea 5. Release-dismissal agreements |
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Charge bargaining
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Plea agreement specifying that government will not bring charges or will move to dismiss other charges
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Sentence bargaining
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Gov't agrees to recommend or not oppose D's request for a particular sentence/sentencing range
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Sentencing recommendation
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Agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is appropriate
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Wired plea
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Such that D agreeing to a plea will lead to dropped charges against a co-D
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Release-dismissal agreements
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P agrees to dismiss charges or reduce sentencing recommendation if D agrees to release right to sue P
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Arguments for plea bargaining
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1. Ease judicial workloads
2. Reduce risk of wanton juries 3. Reduce costs 4. Increase efficiency 5. Spare both sides risk of losing 6. Spares judge risk of reversal 7. Defendants may be able to gain additional leniency 8. D's right to testify at trial makes D's less likely to go to trial, b/c they think that if they refuse to testify, juries will presume they are guilty 9. Consensual agreements |
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Arguments against plea bargaining
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1. Bargaining power isn't really equal--D has fewer resources, D's freedom is at stake, P has full power of discretion on charging/recommendation
2. Possibility of P using it for vindictiveness or threat 3. Mandatory sentencing makes P bargaining power higher than D's |
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BORDENKIRCHER + BRADY =
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The basic concept of plea bargaining is now unassailable
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HEUMANN on plea bargaining
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Ps and D attorneys start out with romance for each case, after a while learn that for prosecutors, job is to process factually guilty defendants, and that for defense attorneys, their job is to assess value of each case for the purposes of bargaining
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Possible consequences of banning plea barganing
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--Increase in bench trials
--Increase in # of trials --Increase in error rates of trials --Increase average cost of prosecution --D would depend more heavily on lawyer's expertise |
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Guilty pleas must be:
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1. Voluntary
2. Intelligently made |
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Voluntary guilty plea
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1. Not extracted by violence or threats
2. Guilty plea in exchange for "direct or implied promises" OK as long as proper assistance of counsel |
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Intelligently made guilty plea
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D doesn't have to have correctly assessed every relevant factor
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Possible challenges to bargain-induced pleas:
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1. Plea invalid under facts and circumstances of particular case
2. Inappropriate tactics used by prosecutors 3. Subject matter of bargain 4. 5A/6A |
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"Invalid plea" challenge
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Where gov'ts offer was not possible, ex. BRADY leniency offer was too extreme
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"Particular tactics" challenge
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Ex.--physical coercion of plea is not OK
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"Subject matter" challenge
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Challenge that bargain involved subjects not directly related to guilt/sentence, and thus should have been off limits; BUT
--Wired pleas OK if voluntary and knowing --Release-dismissal pleas OK if don't offend public policy --Waiver-agreements are ok if voluntary and knowing --Fast-track bargains not unconstitutional |
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"5A/6A" challenge
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--Ineffective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining
--unconstitutional waiver of right to exculpatory impeaching material before pleading guilty |
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Chief issues in plea bargaining
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1. Establishing that bargain has been struck
2. Interpreting bargain terms 3. Choosing remedy for breach |
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When does plea agreement become enforceable?
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--Upon acceptance by judge
--Reasonable and detrimental reliance (where D takes a "damaging action" relying on plea agreement) |
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Risk of bargain interpretation
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RICKETTS--D pursued interpretation of contract "at own peril"
RICKETTS dissent--Reasonable but erroneous interpretation of bargain should not be punished |
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Why are bargain vague?
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--uncertainty on both sides: P can't predict what D will say; P is vague about exactly what sentence will be recommended
--P wants to be vague so that D has incentive to stick to the agreed-upon story --D doesn't mind vague sentencing b/c forcing P to offer binding sentence likely makes it stiffer to account for risk |
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Possible remedies for bargain breach
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1. Specific performance
2. Damages 3. Recission |
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Bargain breach remedy: Specific performance
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P and D would have to do what they had originally agreed to do
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Why specific performance?
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May deter prosecutors from breaching
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When can courts force gov't to discharge a withdrawn bargain?
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Probably only where D can show "reasonable and detrimental" reliance, per MABRY and SANTOBELLO
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Must gov't fulfill every single part of plea bargain?
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SANTOBELLO and MABRY suggest that gov't only need fulfill those promises that induced D to plead guilty. If D relies on bargain and acts detrimentally, court must hold gov't to full agreement.
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Plea bargain breach remedy: Damages
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--No policy of damages in our court system, but a policy possibility
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Plea bargain breach remedy: Recission
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Would require P and D to rescind previous bargain completely, start again from square one
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Biggest issue with recission?
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D has already plead guilty; unclear whether you would go back to point of indictment? When plea was signed? How do you rebalance bargaining?
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Plea bargain breach remedy: who gets to decide?
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SANTOBELLO suggests courts should decide when there is a breach by prosecutor. Public policy concerns may push us to limit D's ability to choose remedy in the event of P breach, b/c doing so could limit retributive value of prosecution.
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What is an efficient breach?
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P and D agree to plea bargain based on current state of evidence; with new evidene, P wants to breach original bargain b/c it no longer makes sense.
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Possible issue--scope of immunity from prosecution?
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D pleads guilty through bargain, and then P breaches. Doesn't seem right that P can pull back explicit protections that induced D to plead guilty after the fact.
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What do we presume abut parties' bargaining power?
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We generally presume that both parties have relatively equal bargaining power
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BRADY v US: Facts
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D pleads guilty b/c P offers him a non-death penalty sentence; D later claims that inducing him by promising lower sentence was unconstitutional and violated the 5A
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BRADY v US: Holdings
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1. Where D has competent counsel and is able to fully assess the consequences of a plea vs. going to trial, bargaining for lower sentence is not unconstitutional; only threats, misrepresentations or improper promises like bribery would do that.
2. D cannot withdraw plea solely b/c he discovers he miscalculated risks of plea; this won't be taken to mean that decision was not intelligently made |
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BORDENKIRCHER v HAYES: Facts
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During negotiations, P tells D that unless he pleads, P will reindict under habitual offender statute that carries life. D doesn't plead, P redindicts, and D gets life. D files habeas, claiming 14A DPC violation for P to carry out threat made during plea negotiation
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BORDENKIRCHER v HAYES: Holding
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1. In "give-and-take" of bargaining, if P makes intentions clear from the beginning, no element of punishment or retaliation.
2. There is a violation if P tries to penalize D for using legal right to appeal conviction. |
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US v POLLARD: Facts
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D indicted for epsionage, P offers to reach deal with D's wife is D pleads guilty. D later claims plea was involuntary because wired pleas are unconstitutional under self-incrimination
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US v POLLARD: Holdings
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Wired pleas not unconstitutional b/c they don't violated 5A or DPC
Wired pleas not inherently coercive b/c leniency to others is acceptable part of bargaining process |
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MILES v DORSEY: Facts
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D gets bunch of charges, D's family also charged with accessory; P offers to drop charges against family in exchange for guilty plea. D pleas, then claims plea was involuntary
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MILES v DORSEY: Holding
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Wired pleas not unconstitutional, per POLLARD
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NEWTON v RUMERY: Facts
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D signs "release-dismisal" agreement, dropping right to sue gov't in exchange for dropping of charges. D later tries to sue, P says that bargain precludes it.
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NEWTON v RUMERY: Holding
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"Release-dismissal" agreement not unconsitutional; per contract policy, agreement only unenforceable if public policy interest in not enforcing more than interest in enforcing; sinc there was no strong public policy interest in favor of suit, nothing here. Also, R-D agreements not inherently coercive.
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US v MEZZANATTO: Facts
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Negotiating deal, P says D that to continue with negotiations, any statements can be used by P to impeach later; D agrees, doesn't plea, and statements used against him. Issue is whether this statutory right was waiveable?
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US v MEZZANATTO: Holdings
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This right is waivable; generally, presumption that statutory rights can be waived, unless waiving them would discredit the federal court system.
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US v MEZZANATTO: Dissent
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Souter: FRE meant to encourage deals, protecting rights of candor encourages deals, so purpose of 410 was that it should always stand and court should defer to Congress on this
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US v BURCH
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Statements made in negotiations can be used in gov'ts case in chief b/c it doesn't undermine fact-finding
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US v RUIZ: Facts
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D claims that "fast track" plea bargain offered by P, where D waives certain trial-related rights in return for P recommending lower sentence, is unconstitutional.
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US v RUIZ: Holding
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Fast track pleas are constitutional, because they are voluntary (key question for bargains).
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SANTOBELLO v NY: Facts
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D promised in bargain that in return for guilty plea, P would not recommend a jail sentence; new P assigned to the case, and recommends max sentence to judge. D claims 14A DPC violation.
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SANTOBELLO v NY: Holding
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Ct. finds for D, remands to Ct. to determine whether proper remedy is specific performance or rescission. Where the gov't offers certain concessions in bargain that induce D to plead guilty, courts are to enforce those concessions through specific performance or rescission. D do not get to choose remedy, that's up to the courts, which is different than normal contract law.
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MABRY v JOHNSON: Facts
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P offers D plea bargain of sentence to 21 concurrent years, then changes offer to 21 consecutive years, which D accepts and pleads guilty. D then claims DPC violation.
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MABRY v JOHNSON: Holding
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No DPC violation. Plea bargains are not constitutionally protected until "embodied by judgement of court," so changing offer prior to court acceptance is not breaching. Also, only attack on bargains is based on voluntariness or knowledge, and here D was both acting voluntarily and with knowledge.
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RICKETTS v ADAMSON: Facts
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D bargains with P for murder 2 charge in exchange for testimony against co-Ds. D then refuses to testify at retrials, so P files new information changing his charge from murder 2 to murder 1. D claims conviction under murder 1 violates double jeopardy.
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RICKETTS v ADAMSON: Holdings
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Court finds for P, saying that bargain was clear that remedy for breach would be rescission and reinstatement of original charge. D knew that refusing to testify at retrial went against intent of bargain, so actions were voluntary and intelligent.
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RICKETTS v ADAMSON: Dissent
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Brennan--key question is whether breach occurred, and D shouldn't be punished for interpretation of plea bargain that was erroneous but reasonable; plea agreements different from commercial contracts in that they are constitutional contracts, have to fall within limits of DPC and obligations guaranteed by Constitution
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