Philosophy Test One: Flashcards (Abel)

Front 1

Euth. I. 1. What brings Socrates to the court of the king-archon?

Back 1

He was charged formally by Meletus by crimes (impiety/corrupting youth)

Front 2

Euth. I. 2. What brings Euthyphro to the court?

Back 2

For prosecuting his father for murder. (For Greeks, parents were like gods)
His father tied up a servant and threw him in the ditch for killing another servant, and didn't know what to do with him. He died in the ditch.

Front 3

Euth. I. 3. What reason does Socrates give Euthyphro for wanting to become his pupil?

Back 3

Euthyphro is considered pious and Socrates is considered unpious.
If Socrates became a pupil of Euthyphro, he could pass the blame (claims to not know about piety).

Front 4

Euth. II. A. 1. According to Socrates, why cannot piety be defined as prosecuting the wrongdoer?

Back 4

It does not include the whole field of pious actions.
e.g. All animals are not dogs, but all dogs are animals.

Front 5

Euth. II. B. 1. According to Euthyphro, about what kind of things do the gods disagree?

Back 5

What is just, beautiful, ugly, good, and bad.

Front 6

Euth. II. B. 2. If the gods disagree, why cannot piety be defined as "what is dear to the gods?"

Back 6

The gods do not always agree, so something cannot be pious and impious at the same time.

Front 7

Euth. II. C. 1. Why is it irrelevant to Socrates' quest for the definition of piety whether all the gods agree that Euthyphro's action regarding his father is just?

Back 7

It is a quality of piety, but it isn't necessarily what makes something pious.
(God-loved because it is pious)

Front 8

Euth. II. C. 2. According to Socrates, if the pious is loved by all the gods because it is pious (and not pious because it is loved by all the gods), why cannot piety be defined as what is loved by all the gods?

Back 8

It is only a quality of piety- there are more components; it's not what MAKES it pious.

Front 9

Euth. II. C. 3. In what way do Euthyphro's statements resemble Daedalus's statues?

Back 9

His statements move around/keep changing.

Front 10

Euth. II. D. 1. Why does Socrates reject the poet's claim that, in terms of parts and wholes, fear is the part and shame is the whole ("where there is fear there is also shame")?

Back 10

For example, if one is afraid of disease, it is not necessarily shameful. But, there is shame when there is fear.

Front 11

Euth. II. D. 2. Using the notion of parts and wholes, what definition of piety does Socrates suggest to Euthyphro?

Back 11

The "whole" of justice

Front 12

Euth. II. D. 3. According to Euthyphro, what are the two parts of justice? Which part is piety?

Back 12

Care for the gods, and care for the people...piety is care for the gods.

Front 13

Euth. II. D. 4. Why does Euthyphro reject the idea that care of the gods is similar to care of animals?

Back 13

Caring of animals is making them better... but caring of gods is not making them better (you cannot make gods better, they are perfect)

Front 14

Euth. II. D. 5. What does Euthyphro say he means by care of the gods? What question does Socrates ask about this definition?

Back 14

He means "care" as service to the gods.
"How to give and beg from the gods."
But what is the achievement (goal) of service to the gods? (Like shipbuilders building a ship, etc.)

Front 15

Euth. II. E. 1. What problem does Socrates raise regarding the notion of giving to the gods?

Back 15

What does god need? (all-perfect, all-powerful, all-knowing)

Front 16

Euth. II. E. 2. How does Euthyphro's explanation of "giving to the gods" bring him back to a definition of piety he had proposed earlier?

Back 16

It gives them praise, reverance, and gratitude, which is dear to the gods (second definition, circle).

Front 17

Euth. III. 1. What reason does Euthyphro give for ending his conversation with Socrates?

Back 17

He is in a hurry (prosecuting his father (pious)) and has to leave.
He realizes he doesn't know about piousness, but he needs to do something pious.
He's been told what it means, he believes it, but he doesn't understand it.

Front 18

What is the dialectical method?

Back 18

The "Socratic" method, in which answers lie deep in our soul to "life's questions"
Knowledge has to be "ground in" yourself
Asking questions to determine whether tradition is right or wrong.

Front 19

Desc. I. 1. Why is it impossible for Descartes to be deceived about the fact he exists?

Back 19

He is thinking about not existing, and you need to exist to think.
"I think, therefore I am."

Front 20

Desc. I. 2. Why does Descartes exclude the body from the "I" that exists?

Back 20

He is not certain that he has a body, because you can doubt you have a body.

Front 21

Desc. I. 3. What attributes of the soul does Descartes exclude from the "I"?

Back 21

Nutrition, movement, sense perception

Front 22

Desc. I. 4. What is the nature of the "I"?

Back 22

A thing that thinks.

Front 23

Desc. I. 5. Why is the imagination unable to disclose the nature of the "I"?

Back 23

Because the soul is not a physical thing (imagination --> image)

Front 24

Desc. I. 6. What is the essence of the piece of wax that Descartes describes? By which faculty is this essence percecived?

Back 24

The essence is extension (3D)
-extension cannot be seen
-grasped by the mind

Front 25

Desc. I. 7. Why is the existence of the "I" more certain than the existence of the piece of wax?

Back 25

He is certain that he thinks there is a piece of wax, but it does not prove there is a piece of wax.

Front 26

Desc. II. 1. Why is it as certain that God exists, as it is that a shape or a number has a certain property?

Back 26

A definition of a shape or number is the same as a defintion of God.

Front 27

Desc. II. 2. Why is it false to say that existence of God can be separated from the essence of God?

Back 27

existence = something "is"
essence= 'what' something "is"
You can be thinking of a unicorn (its essence) but it doesn't necessarily exist.
Normally, existence and essence can be separated, but in God's case, they are one in the same.
God's essence includes existence because God is the all-perfect being.

Front 28

Desc. II. 4. Why is it false that Descartes' thoughts about God impose necessity on God?

Back 28

The fact that God exists does not depend on Descartes' thoughts on the existence of God.
The nature of God is making Descartes think about the existence of God.

Front 29

Desc. III. 1. What principle does Descartes use to determine whether two things are distinct and can exist separately?

Back 29

Just because they are never seen apart, does not mean that they can't exist apart.
If they can be conceived as separate, it is possible.
(unlike six, and a half dozen)

Front 30

Desc. III. 2. How does Descartes use this principle (two things distinct are distinct and can exist separately) to show that the mind is distinct from the body and can exist without it?

Back 30

The mind is thinking and non-extended. The body is non-thinking and extended.
If you destroy the body, it is possible that God could make the mind exist without it, since they are not the same thing.

Front 31

Desc. III 3. What is the difference between passive and active faculties of sensory perception?

Back 31

passive- something done unto you (mind taking in ideas)
active- something you do (something active is causing something)

Front 32

Desc. III 4. Why must the active faculty exist in a substance other than me?

Back 32

Descartes says it can't be 'me,' because things happen that are against our own will.
If God was a 'good person,' he wouldn't be tricking us (being a deceiver is against the nature of God)

Front 33

Desc. III 5. Why must the cause of my sensory perceptions be physical things themselves, rather than ideas of physical things implanted in my mind by God or some other creature?

Back 33

It must be a physical object because it can't be God, spirit or spirit other than God (against God to deceive). This makes clear that the external world absolutely exists.

Front 34

Desc. III 6. What evidence does Descartes give to show that the mind and body are "very closely joined?"

Back 34

When you don't eat, you feel hungry, etc. Mind cannot be 'mixed' with body.
Both are not physical.
The causation of the mind/body problem.

Front 35

Arm. I. 1. According to the view that is becoming predominant in modern science, human nature can be completely explained in what terms?

Back 35

Human nature can be explained in physical and chemical terms.
Science can't prove moral issues, only belief.

Front 36

Arm. II. 1. Why is science more authoritative than other disciplines in explaining human nature?

Back 36

There is a consensus about scientific conclusions as opposed to religious beliefs.
H2O is H2O to everyone, but a terrorist bombing could be good/bad for different groups.
Science has testable data.

Front 37

Arm. II. 3. What is Armstrong's answer to the claim that science is not competent to answer certain kinds of questions, such as the complete nature of human beings?

Back 37

Science is limited--only talks about reality-- what "is."
-You can't know about God, values, soul, spirit.
-Don't have expertise to talk about it.
-Gremlin example- no testable data
-Scientific method is the best way of obtaining the truth

Front 38

Arm. III. 1. According to the initial version of behaviorism, what is the mind? What objection does Armstrong raise against this theory?

Back 38

Behaviorism- a mental state IS the behavior
-nothing deep or profound about it
-The mind is outward behavior (external)
PROBLEM: You can have emotion (mental state) and not show it.

Front 39

Arm. III. 2. How did Ryle use the notion of disposition to formulate a revised version of behaviorism? What objection does Armstrong raise against this theory?

Back 39

Scientific disposition: an internal state that leads to behavior (something inside that makes it do what it does (newspaper is flammable, not necessarily on fire)
Ryle's disposition- if 'x', then 'y' (nothing internal...wine glass is brittle, not a cause of breaking- if the glass is struck, then it will break)

Front 40

Arm. III. 3. What aspect of behaviorism does Armstrong accept?

Back 40

ARMSTRONG IS NOT A BEHAVIORIST!
There's a logical connection between a mental state and behavior
-not a definition

Front 41

Arm. III. 5. Why does Armstrong's account of a mental state not require a physicalist (materialist) theory of the mind?

Back 41

"Inner" (mind) could mean brain OR spiritual
Both are possible, but not plausible (probable)
-brain IS plausible (evidence-scientific)

Front 42

Arm. III. 6. How does the scientific view of dispostions differ from the behaviorist view?

Back 42

Scientific disposition: an internal state that leads to behavior (something inside that makes it do what it does (newspaper is flammable, not necessarily on fire)
Ryle's disposition- if 'x', then 'y' (nothing internal...wine glass is brittle, not a cause of breaking- if the glass is struck, then it will break

Front 43

Arm. III. 7. What is Armstrong's revised conception of what a mental state is?

Back 43

A state of the person apt to do certain behaviors
-still doesn't prove physicalism...possible

Front 44

*Arm. IV. 1. What plausible objection does the example of automatic driving raise against the materialist view that consciousness is simply something going on within us apt to cause certain sorts of behavior?

Back 44

aware vs. aware that you are aware
automatic vs. conscious is the SAME behavior (none)
but consciousness is the state of mind...
different states of mind between automatic and conscious
*mental state needs to have a behavior, but it has no behavior (must define behavior associated with consciousness

Front 45

Arm. IV. 2. What kind of selective behavior does sense-perception give an animal the capacity for?

Back 45

-regarding sense-perception or consciousness (rats with red and green lights> selective behavior towards the environment)

Front 46

Arm. IV. 3. What does consciousness perceive?

Back 46

behavior toward mental states

Front 47

Arm. IV. 4. What kind of selective behavior does consciousness give us the capacity for?

Back 47

to be aware that you are sensing
to see that you are seeing
choosing to look at one part of your mind with another part

Front 48

Arm. IV. 5. What connection does Armstrong see between his account of consciousness and a physicalist theory of the mind?

Back 48

'One part of the mind' can be physical (brain) or spiritual
Armstrong- brain (one set of neurons looking at another set)

Front 49

Arm. V. 1. What did Armstrong try to achieve in his article?

Back 49

A purely physicalist theory of the mind is plausible.

Front 50

Nag. I. 1. What poses the most serious problem for reductionist theories of the mind?

Back 50

Consciousness
People who have tried to reduce consciousness (Armstrong) have not done their job
Objective: scientific (what things are like from no particular point of view)
Subjective: personal (has my point of view)

Front 51

Nag. II. 1. What does Nagel mean by the subjective character of experience?

Back 51

There is something it is like to be something
subjective (being a bat)
objective (can't know what it's like based on fact)

Front 52

Nag. II. 2. Why are conscious mental states not analyzable in terms of their functional or causal roles?

Back 52

functional role- pain is to protect an organism
Problem: leaves something out, point of view is involved, need experience
Robots: program to feel pain (heat)
Common sense: robots don't feel pain...it is more than the function it performs
Causal role (Arm.): inner state that makes you do something
-stopping at a stop sign
-it's a quality, but not a definition

Front 53

Nag. II. 3. Why does the fact that subjectivity involves a "point of view" make it difficult to give an objective analysis of subjective experience.

Back 53

Subjective- how you experience something; having a point of view
-no one has exactly same point of view
-objective are from no specific point of view...how it IS
-it's explaining a point of view from a non-point of view

Front 54

Nag. II. 4. Why does Nagel choose bats to illustrate the notion of subjective experience?

Back 54

Primitive things (wasps) are sort of machines
High evolution (monkeys) are too much like humans
Bats do not have the same POV as us...like seeing with hearing

Front 55

Nag. II. 5. Why is it impossible for us to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat?

Back 55

We are non bats, and we are very different from bats.

Front 56

In what cases is it possible to take another being's point of view? In what cases is it impossible?

Back 56

Biologically similar, possible (chimps)
Impossible if not.

Front 57

Nag. II. 8. Why could a Martian scientist understand lightning as a physical phenomenon but be unable to understand it as a human experience?

Back 57

Martian could understand electrical discharge (fact of nature)
Could not understand as human experience
Lightning could cause terror/fear in humans...different POV

Front 58

Nag. II. 9. Does Nagel hold that we can attain a completely objective understanding of things, wholly independent of our human point of view?

Back 58

Science is 'how things are'
You can't jump outside of your brain/take in data without using data.
It's tough to say anything is totally objective (increasingly objecctive, but never totally independent unless you are God)

Front 59

Nag. II. 10. What is paradoxical about the claim that experience can be understood objectively, apart from any particular point of view?

Back 59

By definition, experience IS a point of view

Front 60

Nag. II. 11. Why does moving from appearance to reality seem to make no sense in the case of subjective experience?

Back 60

Science- moving from experience to reality
an appearance cannot go deeper
-you can't know what it really is...can't explain POV without POV

Front 61

Nag. III. 1. Why does Nagel avoid concluding that a physicalist theory of the mind is false?

Back 61

Physicalism: mind=brain (Arm.)
no one can know the truth behind the mind

Front 62

Nag. III. 2. Why does the phsyicalist statement, "Mental events are physical events," have only apparent clarity? What would be needed to understand the statement?

Back 62

By saying 'x is y' can make sense.
By saying 'mind is brain' there is a problem (saying a subject is an object) no framework/theory
You cannot 'sense' a subject...cannot be reduced to neurons.

Front 63

Hume I 1. How do impressions differ from ideas?

Back 63

Impressions- a vivid sensation (what you are sensing right now)
Idea- a copy of an impression
-less vivid
-imagining something

Front 64

Hume I. 2. How does a simple perception differ from a complex perception?

Back 64

Simple- can't be broken down
Complex- many different parts
Simple impression- "redness" of an apple"
complex impression- many simple impressions
Same with simple/complex ideas

Front 65

Hume I. 3. How does the resemblance between simple ideas and simple impressions differ from the resemblance between complex ideas and complex impressions?

Back 65

Simple ideas come from simple impressions "one to one correspondence"
Complex ideas can come from complex impressions, or based upon things you have seen, if you have not experienced the thought itself

Front 66

Hume I. 4. What is the origin of every simple idea?

Back 66

A simple impression

Front 67

Hume II. 1. How does Hume's doctrine of impression and ideas lead to the conclusion that we have no genuine idea of a self?

Back 67

an idea can be genuine of bogus (not really having an idea)
bogus: cannot be traced back to an impression
the 'self' is permanent/unchaing (idea)
to have an impression of yourself, you must have an impression of something unchanging...therefore, no genuine idea of self

Front 68

Hume II. 2. What does Hume discover when he looks inside what he calls himself?

Back 68

The self is simply a bundle of impressions.
all you experience is impressions, and nothing more

Front 69

Hume II. 3. How is the mind like a theater? How is it unlike a theater?

Back 69

It is 'on stage': everything is moving all the time (like a theater)-similar to mind
The mind is not a physical place, like a theater (just perceptions w/o physical place to perceive

Front 70

Hume II. 4. How does our imagination lead us to substitute the notion of identity for the notion of diversity?

Back 70

identity=same, diversity=different
indentical: understandable/comprehendable (Hume says nothing is identical)
objects are different from one moment to the next
we know this, but we say they are the same (because we are lazy...imaginations can't make distinctions)

Front 71

Hume II. 5. What leads us to posit the fictions of soul, self, and substance?

Back 71

They are made up words that don't mean anything...deep inner principle.
We don't want to admit things (we) are different.

Front 72

Hume II. 6. How does Hume's doctrine that we cannot perceive real connections (bonds) among objects show that we cannot conclude that a person has a self?

Back 72

we cannot perceive connections because there are not any
cause vs. effect...we think we experience it, but we don't
you see events 'a' and 'b', but not causality
self is supposed to be the connector of bonds (of perceptions) but cannot be

Front 73

Hume II. 7. What objection does Hume raise against the theory that memory produces personal identity?

Back 73

John Locke said- Memories make us the same.
You can't remember yourself when you were one year old, and you forget things...how can it be you?

Front 74

What is the mind-body problem, and why does Descartes theory of human nature raise this problem?

Back 74

It is the problem of how the mind is connected to the body (if the mind is spiritual, and the body is physical). Descartes believes he exists, but he doesn't understand what "he" is (body, mind, etc.)

Front 75

What is the pineal gland hypothesis (mind-body problem) and what is the main objection philosophers raise against it?

Back 75

Descartes believed that the mind was the pineal gland in the brain (the brain is symmetrical, except for this). Descartes believed it to be the "seat of the soul," but philosophers object because the mind isn't a 'place,' it isn't anywhere.

Front 76

What is behaviorism, and why is it attractive to physicalists?

Back 76

Behaviorism is the idea that a mental state IS the behavior. There is nothing deep or profound about it.
Physicalists are appealed by this because everything about behaviorism is physical (nothing mental).

Front 77

What is reductionism, and how does it apply to the mind/body problem?

Back 77

Reduction is explaining one thing in terms of something else. Consciousness can't be broken down into something smaller, which is a problem.