Philosophy On Mind

Front 1

Rylean Behaviourism

Back 1

asserts that to talk about minds is not to talk about ghostly inner states or spooky non-physical minds, but is rather a way of talking about dispositions to behave in certain ways given certain sensory inputs. The mind isn't something over and above the body;it's just for your body to be disposed to act in certain ways given certain censory inputs.

Front 2

Identity theory

Back 2

asserts that each kind mental state is identical with (or the same thing as) some kind of physical brain state. On this theory, being in pain (which is a kind of mental state) just is to be in a particular kind of brain state (say, having one's c-fibres firing).

Front 3

Functionalism

Back 3

asserts that what's important about mental states is not that they can be identified with or reduced to a particular kind of brain state (as the identity theorist asserts), but that mental states bear a certain causal relation to i)sensory stimulation, ii)to other inner states, and to iii)behavioral output.

Front 4

Pain in functionalism

Back 4

is that which is i)caused by pinpricks, machetes, and sunburns;ii)leads to anxiety and worry;iii)leads to groaning and wincing;and ultimately leads to the nursing of the wound.

Front 5

Eliminative Materialis

Back 5

(Churchland) our fold psychological notions - belief, desire, hope, fear, pain- are just plain false. Once we have a perfect neuroscience at our disposal, we'll see that there really are no such things as pains, fears, beliefs, hopes, and desires. Such folk psychological notions will be eliminated from our way of speaking in much the same way as caloric and phlogiston have been eliminated from our way of speaking. In the future, our fole-psychological way of speaking will be replaced with an advanced neuroscientific way of speaking.

Front 6

Problem with behaviourism

Back 6

by confining its attention solely to sensory input and behavioural outpupt (or dispositions to act in certain ways), behaviourism totally ignores your inner life. But having an inner life is what is distinctive about the mind.

Front 7

Problem with the identity theory

Back 7

asserts that to be in a particular kind of mental state (pain, for ex) just is for one's (human) brain to be in a particular kind of neurological state; to be in pain is just to be in a particular type of neurological/chemical state. But the identity theory seems to be false because there are many different kinds of neurological states that can give rise to mental states. Mental states, thus, are multiply realizable. This is the multiple realizability objection to the identity theory.