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11 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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What is Functionalism?
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Functionalism: The Computer Model
Mental kinds (e.g., pain, desire, etc.) are functional kinds Examples of non-functional kinds: • horse • water • gold Functionalism: The Computer Model Mental kinds (e.g., pain, desire, etc.) are functional kinds So: What it is to be in pain isn’t to be in a particular sort of brain state. Rather, it’s to have your brain or nervous system in a certain sort of functional state. What makes a state of the brain a pain state is the causal role played by that brain state in the overall functional economy of the organism Leads to Uploading problems. |
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What is Substance Dualism?
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Minds are immaterial substances.
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What is Properly basic belief?
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In other words: Perhaps belief in other minds is “properly basic”.
A belief b is properly basic if it is properly held not on the basis of other beliefs. |
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What is the Turing Test?
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The Imitation Game
A machine wins the imitation game if it can carry on a conversation like a human being. • Turing test: Anything that can win the “imitation game” is intelligent (and so has a mind). |
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Who is Blockhead?
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Comprehensive script: allows for simulation without intelligence or consciousness (Ned Block’s ‘Blockhead’)
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What is The hard problem of consciousness?
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The “Hard Problem of Consciousness”
Easy Problems: • Problems about how information is processed in the brain • Questions about how we produce verbal reports on our internal states The “hard problem of consciousness” is the problem of subjective experience… …the problem of accounting for the fact that physical processing somehow gives rise to qualitative experience.” Significance • A theory of the mind is adequate only if it solves the “hard problem” of consciousness • Dualists typically insist that no materialist theory of the mind can solve this problem • Searle’s Chinese Room thought-experiment lends support to the dualist’s objection Solving the Hard Problem Chalmers’s Proposal: • Consciousness is a fundamental, irreducible feature of reality, governed by laws relating conscious experience to elements of physical theory. Chalmers is a ‘property dualist’; but note how this opens the door to substance dualism. |
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What is The “Chinese Room” ?
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Main Point:
Symbol manipulation and simulating the input/output capabilities of a native Chinese speaker isn’t sufficient for understanding; so there’s no reason to think that a computer that can do these things really understands anything. The Chinese Room Objections – The System Reply: the system, not the individual, understands – The Brain Simulator Reply: suppose the system simulates the behavior of an actual brain… |
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What are Q-memories and q-intentions?
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• Q-memory: x q-remembers an experience e if (i) x seems to remember e, (ii) e is in fact someone’s experience, and (iii) x’s apparent memory of e is dependent upon e in the same way in which a genuine memory of an experience is dependent upon it.
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what is Psychological connectedness (as Parfit defines it)?
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• Psychological connectedness: x and y are psychologically connected if and only if at least some experiences, actions, beliefs, intentions, and apparent memories of x and y are q-related (e.g., x q-remembers y’s experiences; y q-intends x’s actions; etc.)
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What is Psychological continuity (as Parfit defines it)?
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Psychological continuity: x and y are psychologically continuous if and only if x and y are both links in a chain of psychologically connected person-stages
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What is Animalism?
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Animalism is the thesis that you and I are
human animals, organisms, members of the primate species Homo sapiens: |
