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53 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
What is another name for Cartesian dualism?
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substance dualism
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What term describes that the mind and body are distinct substances that are only contingently related?
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Cartesian dualism
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What does it mean to say that the mind and body are distinct substances?
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the mind is immaterial and the body is material
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What are criticisms of Cartesian dualism?
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causal interaction and verifiability
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What are the Materialist Monist views?
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behaviorism, mind body identity theory, eliminative materialism, functionalism
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What is the theory that only observable features of human or animal activity need be studied to provide an adequate scientific account of that activity?
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Behaviorism
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What are the three versions of behaviorism?
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hard, soft, and logical
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The version of behaviorism that views that there are no minds and that, therefore, psychology can study only behaviors?
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hard version
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Which version of behaviorism has an ontological view?
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hard version
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The version of behaviorism that views that there is no need to include minds in the scientific study of humans, whether or not minds exist?
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soft version
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The study of behaviors and their physical causes is sufficient for a complete psychology (t/f)
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true
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Which version of behaviorism has a methodological view?
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soft version
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The version of behaviorism that has an epistemological view that all meaningful mentalistic terms must ultimately be traceable back to some observable behavior, and not back to some purely mental facts?
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logical version
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This term states that the ontological view that minds and brains are not two different kinds of things, rather that all references to minds and mental states are really references to brains and brain states
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mind-body identity theory
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This term states that a materialistic theory of mind according to which sentences that appear to refer to nonmaterial conscious states will be capable of being eliminated in favor of more accurate sentences referring to material states.
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Eliminative materialism
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This term states a theory of mind that says mental states are functional states.
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functionalism
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According to functionalism, the mind is what the brain does (t/f)
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true
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Functionalism is always a materialist view (t/f)
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false
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What type of person is Wolf Larsen?
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individualist, materialist and hedonist
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Individualism is equal to egoism (t/f)
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true
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What are the two senses of egoism?
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psychological and normative
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What are the two senses of materialism?
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strict philosophical and loose and popular
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What sense of materialism states only material things exist?
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the strict philosophical sense
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What sense of materialism states the only worthwhile human pursuits are for material goods and comforts?
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the loose and popular sense
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What are the two senses of hedonism?
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psychological and normative
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What sense of hedonism states pleasure is the only thing humans desire?
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psychological hedonism
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What sense of hedonism states pleasure is the only thing intrinsically valuable?
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normative hedonism
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The term that means "we always act on our strongest desire"
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a desire-satisfaction theory of action
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What is the conjunction of Wolf Larsen's egoism, materialism, hedonism and his desire-satisfaction theory of action?
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Wolfism
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No human action is the result of desire (t/f)
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false...all
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The term that states someone is identical with their present self.
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numerical identity or identity in the strict philosophical sense
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The term that states exact similarity.
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qualitative identity or identity in a loose and popular sense
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According to Sam Miller's Cartesian Strategy, "what is fundamentally you is not your body, but what?...
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your soul or self or mind
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The Cartesian soul, self, or mind (used interchangeably) are what?
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immaterial substances
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Gretchen and Sam disagree on the thought that because the soul or self or mind is not made up op matter, it cannot be experienced with the five senses (t/f)
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false
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What is Miller's first answer to the question "So if it cannot be experienced with the five senses, on what basis can we claim that there is such a thing?
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Miller proposes the principle, "same body, same self"
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What does Miller's first answer prove?
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it proves impossible for Sam to establish in the case of others
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What is Miller's second answer to the question "So if it cannot be experienced with the five senses, on what basis can we claim that there is such a thing?
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Miller proposes the principle, "sameness of psychological characteristics, same self"
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What example is supposed to show that sameness of characteristics does not imply sameness of substance?
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The Blue River example
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What example is supposed to show why it is impossible to establish in the case of others?
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the caramel example
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Can "same body, same self" be established in one's own case?
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if the soul cannot be observed, it cannot be observed to be the same
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What is the conclusion regarding the Cartesian strategy drawn by Gretchen and agreed upon by Sam?
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while we regularly make correct attributions of personal identity, we never do nor can we ever make those attributions on the basis of our knowledge of an immaterial soul
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What term states that X is the same person as Y if and only Y can remember experiencing X's experiences?
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The Memory Theory of personal identity
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The correct relation, according to the memory theory is spelled out in terms of....
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an experience and the subsequent memory of that experience
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What is Gretchen's objection to the Memory theory
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false memories
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What is meant by a false memory?
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we must distinguish between actually remembering and only seeming to remember
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What example is used as an example of a false memory
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the hypnotist case
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What term states that Sam proposes to distinguish actual memories from false memories by saying that the actual memories are those that were experienced by the same person as the one who now seems to remember?
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Sam's circular reasoning
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What is proposing to define personal identity in terms of memory but defining memory, in part, in terms of identity an example of?
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circular reasoning
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Y remembers experiencing what X experienced if and only if:
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1. Y seems to remember experiencing what X experienced
2. X and Y are the same person |
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The term that claims that instead of distinguishing actual memories from apparent memories in terms of identity, we should do so in terms of the correct causal chain that runs from the experience to the subsequent apparent memory?
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Cohen's Clever Contribution
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Accoridng to Cohen's Clever Contribution, Y remembers experiencing what X experienced if and only if:
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1. Y seems to remember experiencing what X experienced
2. The apparent memory is caused in the right kind of way |
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Cohen's clever contribution says that what makes a memory an actual memory is that it is cause in the right kind of way (t/f)
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true
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