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48 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
Dualism
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-the world's composed of 2 kinds of things
1)physical 2)non-physical -minds are the negative definition of the physical |
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2 types of dualists
(come up with mind-body interaction theories) |
1)INTERACTIONISM
-minds & bodies can causally interact 2)PARALLELISM -there's a causal chain for everything mental and another causal chain for everything physical (they run forever parallel-one doesn't cause the other) |
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Interactionism
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-type of dualism
-descartes minds & bodies can causally interact |
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Parallelism
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-type of dualism
there's a causal chain for everything physical & one for everything mental but they run forever parallel (they never cause eachother) 2 explanations: 1)Occasionalism 2)Pre-Established Harmony |
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Occasionalism
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1 explanation for parallelism
a busy god at every moment correlates the mental & physical events (takes the occasion of hitting toe to sensation in mind then causes desire to massage toe) |
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Pre-Established Harmony
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1 explanation of parallelism
the correlation between mental/physical was set up at the beginning onf time---set causal chains in motion |
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Monism
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There is only 1 kind of substance
type: 1) materialism |
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Materialism
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type of monism
-ONLY PHYSICAL, no mental 2 forms of materialism: 1)Behaviorism 2)identity theory |
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Behaviorism
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type of materialism
-RYLE -the mind debate can be settled with words -"mind" refers to our ability to behave in response to stimuli -given the right stimulus you'll behave a certain way -"to behave kind is to be kind" -Davis criticizes w/ 2+2=4 & imagining an orange (what behavior's associated with this mental state?) -when we talk about the mind we're talking about speech/expressions/movement, not workings of liver/heart/etc -the mind isn't the brain, the mind is behavior |
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Identity Theory
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type of materialism
-minds & brains are the same thing (brain activity = mental activity) -EX. morning star & evening star are both venus |
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do behaviorists
& identity theorists think gammas & robots have minds? |
behaviorist: yes
identity theorist: no |
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what theory compatible with existence of a soul?
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dualism not materialism
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descartes Cogito Argument
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-(1)- If I can convince myself of something then I must exist as the thing which is being convinced
-(2)- If I’m being deceived then I must exist as the thing which is being deceived -(3)- I am, I exist -(4)- as a thinking thing [non-physical mind] -(5)- as often & as long as I think [existence doesn’t depend on physical nature] -(6)- Conclusion: “I think therefore I am” |
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Descartes IS
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-dualist
-interactionist -rationalist -mind & body can causally interact somehow |
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meditations
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-descartes
-M1:doubted everything ever taught -M2:how can we trust our thoughts? -tries to find something we can be certain of |
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Wax Example
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-descartes
-perception of wax affirms own existence -wax changes states but still beleives is same piece of wax --->it was always extended-always occupied space -it exists |
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Hume IS
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-not a dualist or materialist
-not sure if anything exists -beleives "BUNDLE THEORY" -->there is no "self" -Empiricist –knowledge is based on experience—not reasoning (rationalism) |
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Ryle IS
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-behaviorist
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Nagel IS
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-not sure what he is
-critical of materialism, functionalism, & dualism -consciousness-subjective awareness- makes all ^above arguments false |
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Functionalism
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-worry about what the mind DOES, not what its made up of
-input->internal processing->output |
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Descartes & extension
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physical objects are extended (occupy space)
minds aren't extended (don't occupy space) |
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"I'm a thinking thing, I'm not my body"
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Descartes
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"I exist as long as I'm thinking"
"I can exist w/o my body" |
Descartes
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Descartes reasoning for God
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-god goes with existence like mountain goes w/valley-can't exist w/o eachother
-god exists w/same certainty of mathematics |
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"the mind is entirely private"
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Descartes
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Counter position to Descartes?
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HUME
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ideas/impressions
who & what? |
all of our perceptions & experiences are either impressions or ideas.
-HUME -there are simple & complex impressions & ideas IMPRESSIONS: -experiences occuring right now -more forceful/lively IDEAS: -remembered impressions -used in thinking & reasoning SIMPLE ONES: -specific physical characteristics (smell, color, temp) COMPLEX ONES: -combination of simple ones into an object -can be distinguished into parts -red+crisp+shape=apple |
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Pineapple Example
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you can't have a simple impression without a simple idea
-you can't imagine the way a pineapple tastes without experiencing tasting it -you can't describe the way a pineapple tastes to someone HUME |
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Unicorn
& Space Shuttle example |
Unicorn:
false complex idea Space Shuttle: false complex idea until it was built |
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Hume's thoughts on "self"
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-there is no self
-self implies something unchanging within us -there's no unchanging impressions -every moment our bundle of perceptions is different than the last -there are no 2 moments when we're identical w/ourselves -over time small moment to moment changes add to big changes (like change after 5 years) |
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"we could have popped into existence 5 minutes ago with memories implanted"
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HUME
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"The controversy concerning identity is not a dispute of words, the 'identity' we describe is false"
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HUME
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Category Mistakes
describe and who? |
RYLE
category mistakes= ---a property's ascribed to something that can't have it ----mistake to treat the mind like made of immaterial substance -people put things in the wrong logical category -descartes is wrong in thinking the mind is a mysterious REAL THING -with analysis of language (mistaken categories) no mind-body problem exists **category mistakes are the source of the double life theory (that we have private mental & public physical life) |
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Ryle's Arguments against the "official doctrine"
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the "official doctrine" (that there's a mind and body and mind survives death) are wrong
-mental states refer to our ability to respond to stimulus -criticizing descartes = the "ghost in the machine"...how do mental and physical interact? |
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Glove example
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RYLE
-dualism makes the category mistake of::: -asking to see the right & left glove THEN asking to see the pair (same thing) -same thing as mental & physical--->they're the same thing just said different ways |
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University Example
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-ryle example of category mistake
-foreigner sees all building/teachers then asks where the university is -the university exists on a different level than the buildings & such |
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Ryle's argument that minds aren't totally private (for behaviorism)
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-there must be something about our minds that isn't totally private bc we don't doubt that other people have minds
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Functionalism
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neither materialism (though davis says so) or dualism
-we worry too much about what the minds made up of and not the function of the mind -the whole of : input->internal processing->output -allows for robots (they have internal processing--doesn't matter what kind of internal processing you have) |
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Turin Machine
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explains functionalism
input->internal processing->output symbol->recognizing, deleting, replacing->new symbol stimulus->internal processing->response |
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Toaster Example
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-for functionalism
-you can talk about the plastic/metal/parts but you don't know what its function is. -*it Browns*(function) --focus on what mind does not its properties |
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Functionalism's criticism of
-behaviorism -identity theory |
-behaviorism doesn't account for internal processing
-identity theory focus on internal processing and forget about the behavior aspects |
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Why could Q's story be another reason to reject determinism?
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it breaks subjective awareness into objective facts
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Nagel's
rejection of Behaviorism |
refers mental states to behavior... doesn't account for subjective awareness
-we both call a shirt "blue" but you see green and i see blue -we're acting the same but internal experiences are different |
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Nagel's
rejection of Identity Theory |
means if we have the same brain state we have the same mental state
-in perceiving green its your favorite color and not mine --something isn't accounted for something isn't right |
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Nagel's
rejection of Functionalism |
in turin machine the wavelength of color is compared
-the machine can process info but doesn't take subjected awareness into account---it doesn't have a favorite color |
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Bat Example
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we can't describe our subjective awareness to one another --why the other theories don't work
-we don't know what its like for a bat to be a bat we can only imagine what its like for us to be a bat -we can't have a theory that takes awareness into account because describing awareness would be objectifying in itself |
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"we don't know what its like to say a mental state 'is' a physical state"
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NAGEL
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why don't functionalism & materialism work
according to Nagel |
they're both objectifying (external accounts)
-they can't take consciousness into account |