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35 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
The thesis advanced by the argument is called its...
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conclusion
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The reasons cited in favor of that conclusion are called its...
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premises
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Rhetorical force:
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power to persuade
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Literary merrit:
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is the argument clearly stated
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Rational strength:
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what philosophers consider. does the argument make you believe that the conclusion is true
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4 basic principles of argument reconstruction
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completeness-charity-economy-clarity
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The argument is deductively valid if..
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the truth of the premises would gurantee the truth of the conclusion
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Non deductive arguement
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the conclusion ventures beyond the information contained in the premises
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Inductive arguments..
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are stronger or weaker according to the sample size and the unbiasedness of the sample
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An argument is sound iff...
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it is deductively valid and all of its premises are true
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Affirming the consequent
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concluding that the conclusion is true because the premise is
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Fallacious argument
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is flawed in its logic (premise) or form (structured form)
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Informal fallacy
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may have a valid logical form but is wrong due to mistake in its reasoning
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Formal fallacy
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arguments that are falacious due to an error in their form or technical structure
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An inductive conclusion is either...
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a generalization or a prediction about a future case
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An argument is inductively strong iff...
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the truth of the premises would make the truth of the conclusion probable but not definite
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Factors affecting inductive strength
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sample size and bias
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Hedonism:
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the doctrine that pleasure and pleasure alone is good. pleasure is the most important pursuite of mankind. all actions can be measured on the basis of how much pleasure and how little pain.
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Utilitarianism and the principle of utility
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the moral worth of an action is determined by its outcome. an act is right iff there is no other action that the agent could have done which had higher utility than the action performed
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Benthams rule of utility
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good is whatever brings the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people
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Greatest happiness principle:
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one must always act so as to produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people
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Benthams measures of pleasure: intensity
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how strong is the pleasure
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Duration
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how long will the pleasure last
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Certainty
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how likely is it that the pleasure will occur
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Propinquity
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how soon will the pleasure occur
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Fecundity
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probability that the action will be followed by sensations of the same kind
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Purity
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probability that the pleasure will be followed by sensations of the opposite kind
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Extent
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how many people will be affected
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Qualitative pleasure (mill)
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there is not one universal pleasure. pleasures can be higher or lower. those who have experienced both tend to prefer one over the other
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Mills test of competent judges
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1. judges are those who have experienced both types of pleasure. 2. they would prefer x over y even if y were to be given at a higher frequency. 3. this x preference is shared by the majority of the judges. 4. if all these are true then x is the more desirable pleasure and is the best worth having.
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Objection to Mills view
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the swine objection: the utilitarian doctrine is unfit for humans because it recognizes no higher purpose to life than the mere pursuit of pleasure
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Nozicks argument against hedonism
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if hedonism is true then the best life would be a life lived entirely in the experience machine. but life lived in the EM is not the best life. therefore hedonism is not true
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Act utilitarianism
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judge actions in terms of the goodness of their consequences without reference to rules of action
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Rule utilitarianism
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moral actions are those which conform to the rules which lead to the greatest good
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Desire satisfaction view
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interest is a generic term covering many types of desires and preferences
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