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155 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
4 types of evaluative standards
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aesthetic, rules of etiquette, legal, moral
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4 reasons why legal rules are better
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they're more important socially, more formal, subject to procedures for deliberate change, and backed by formal coercive sanctions
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positive/conventional morality; mala in se
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acts that are wrong in themselves
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critical/objective morality; mala prohibita
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acts that are wrong because they are prohibited by law (ex. overtime parking)
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consequential morality
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moral theory that decides whether or not something is right based on the result
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deontological moralists
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moral theories that say some things just are right or wrong.
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ethical egoism
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an act is right if and only if the result promotes the actor's best interests
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utilitarianism
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an act is right if and only if the result maximizes happiness
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Utilitarian view on punishment
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punishment makes everyone feel happier overall that they are safe.
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Act utilitarian
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raw utilitarianism, an act is right if and only if the result maximizes human happiness
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rule utilitarianism
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an act is right if ad only if it conforms to a set of rules, adherence to which causes greater overall happiness than any other set of rules. (promises important, for example)
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Divine command theory
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an act is right if and only if it is obedient to God's will/commands; something is wrong because God says so
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problem with Divine Command theory
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why are things right or wrong?
-is something right simply because he commands it? this is arbitrary -or is it right on independent grounds? so why God at all? |
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Kantian
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treat others as ends in themselves, not as means to your own end; respect the rights of autonomous people to freely determine their own destinies.
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Kant's view on golden rule
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does not approximate theory, people are different. Morality is the consideration and respect of others wishes and desires.
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Principle of guilt
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there must be an act of guilt and there must be a guilty mind and an appropriate connection of the two
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temporal concurrence
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guilty act must go with guilty mind at the same time, act must be intended at that moment. Guilty must be the cause of the act
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actus reus
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an overt, voluntary act contrary to law
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duress and actus reus
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acts performed under duress count as voluntary under the law
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principle of legality/liability
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there is no crime without clear, pre-established law
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principle of legal ignorance
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ignorance of the law is no excuse; harsher than morals in this way
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defense of principle of legal ignorance
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1. anyone can claim ignorance in court; law is an expression of public morality,
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counter to defense of principle of legal ignorance
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many laws do not represent public morality
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problem with conviction for status crimes
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no actus reus. We punish for being likely to commit crime
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Robinson v. California
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court found unconstitutional law that made drug addiction illegal
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Powell v. Texas
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court upheld law that made public drunkenness illegal. "public drunk has done something harmful, drug addict has not"
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vicarious liability
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where one person is responsible for the acts of another simply because they were supposed to control the acts of the other (i.e. parent to child, employer to employee)
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laws of attempts
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the law punishes attempts less severely than completion (except conspiracy, solicitation, I think); sometimes punished for attempting to do impossible.
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strict liability
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'no fault liability.' No mens rea or fault, only a lack of objective level of care required to be liable.
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mens rea
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knowledge of circumstances plus foresight of consequences; absence of excusing conditions
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transferred intent
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unintended consequences of intentional act
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constructive intent
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going farther than intention
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conditional intent
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threaten to harm, but no intention (I think)
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recklessness
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conscious disregard of a substantial and justifiable risk to others; no intention, but one still subjects others to risk. subjective v. objective (where objective is negligence or strict liability)
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negligence
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failure to take reasonable care; care of a reasonable man of ordinary prudence; no subjective element of guilt
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2 ways to determine negligence
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level of risk others are exposed to; does exposing to risk have social importance (i.e. flying a plane is very risky, but travel important)
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problems with 'reasonable man' measure
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very many people are not average: insane, stupid, rotten judgment, etc
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United Novelty Co v. Daniels
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guy who cleaned vending machines, flaming rat
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Palsgraf v. Long Island RR Co
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went over a million times: man with firecrackers, fallen weights
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Cardozo's view on causation
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not transitive: only liable for foreseeable consequences, otherwise life is too uncertain; known as fault arguement
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Andrew's view on causation
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transitive: not fair to victim to not blame actor; known as fairness arguement
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Simmons revised principle of guilt (what he says the principle we actually use is)
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actus reus plus connection between the source of fault and the actus reus (where being at fault could involve either: 1) mens rea, 2) carelessness, or 3) knowingly causing harm)
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Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.
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ship owner didn't want to leave dock or storm would sink him. He stayed, and storm caused his ship to destroy dock. Court found ship owner responsible, but admitted he had no choice
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examples of strict liability in civil law
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workmen's compensation, no-fault auto insurance
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strict liability: regulatory and public welfare examples
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violations of food/drug regulations, anti-pollution laws, liquor regulations
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strict liability: basic offenses
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sexual crimes, felony murder, statutory rape laws
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people v. Stampe
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guys robbed bank, in pursuit, cops shot each other, robbers liable
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US v Dotterweich
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guy who re-packaged drugs found guilty of sending 2 mis-labeled items. Could not know.
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Regina v. Prince
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man had sex with girl who claimed to be 18. She looked and dressed 18 but was actually 15. Was accused of 'soiling young girl'
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People v. Hickman
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men robbing liquor store, mid-chase, man ran towards police with gun so they shot him, turns out he was detective, robbers held liable for death
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justifications
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one did the best they could given the circumstances (i.e. self defense)
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mistake
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psychological state of actor would make it unjust to punish. One didn't know, or misunderstood.
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mitigating factors
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defense enhancements; only reduce punishment/liability (i.e. 'the stolen jewels fell into my lap!' or 'at least I cleaned up the dead body for the kids!'
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2 types of excuses
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1) 'I didn't mean to:' mistake, ignorance, accident
2) 'I couldn't help it:' insanity |
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2 insanity rules
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McNaughton rules and A.L.I. (or Brawner rules). Both cite the actor's inability to realize what they did and to conform to the law, know that it's wrong.
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provocation
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arousal of criminal by some other party to a fever pitch of emotion, results in temporary loss of control and crime
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provocation accepted as excuse when
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marital infidelity, prolonged taunting (racial, religious slurs)
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duress
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subject to unlawful threat of force by another, and where that threat produces a reasonable fear of death or bodily injury and results in a criminal act
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moral guilt theory/retributivism
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we should not hold someone legally liable unless he has done something morally wrong
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economy of threats theory (utilitarianism)
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law should recognize legal excuses because it's inefficient not to. Punish only when necessary to get maximum deterrent value out of law
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Hart's response to Moral Guilt Theory
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morally hysterical; our system as a whole morally defendable; more good than evil in upholding laws
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Hart's response to Economy of Threats Theory
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what about insane? punish for society? no deterrence. Law is also interested in setting example and deterring people from pretending to be insane
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Mercantile Theory; Law as a Choosing system
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allow people to choose their fate; don't impose on people who do not have chance to avoid liability; against routinely strict liability
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Wootton's defense on strict liability
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no mens rea ever, it's trying to 'mind read'; be forward thinking; 'social hygiene'; thinks criminals are sick
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Some problems with Wooton's logic:
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1) inability to read minds but ability to read social dangerousness? 2)arbitrary condemnation 3) denies rights for social benefit - NOT just
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Wasserstrom's limited defense
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strict liability should only sometimes be imposed because 1) no deterrent value, 2) counter to standards of culpability; causes people to be more careful
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determinism
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anything can be determined at any point from laws of nature
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compatablist
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agrees with determinism, still thinks they're fine
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libertarian
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says everything is the individual's descision
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3 main benefits of Hart's mercantile theory
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1) maximize power of individual 2) choose what consequences come about 3) punishment fits the crime; without these: lose predictive power, lose control
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'tough' liability
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the goal of the law is not to punish those who are VERY careful. so stricter than negligence but not as strict as strict liability.
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conditions for imposing tough liability
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1) regulated activity is highly specialized 2) end advanced by statute 3) special position of control held liable 4) punishment assigned without statute = fault; require that people take MORE THAN reasonable care
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misfeasance
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doing harm to others (prohibited by law)
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nonfeasance
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allowing harm to be done
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Good Samaritan Laws
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prohibit nonfeasance
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some forms of good samaritan laws
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1) general criminal liability 2) restricted criminal liability 3) civil liability for failure to rescue 4) compensation 5) legal immunity
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perfect duty
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a duty that must be performed on all occasions, and concerns the rights of others
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imperfect duty
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I guess something you don't always have to do, for example, giving money to the poor - there are so many.
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negative duty
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duties to refrain from doing something. These are prefect: always refrain from harming others
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positive duty
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requiring that we act for others
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Jones v. US
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kids in the basement case - she had no duty to rescue since she was not receiving payment for it anymore
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Only times rescue is required by law:
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1) a stature requires it (for example reporting fires) 2) a special relationship: status (parent/child), contractual, or seclusion (no one else can)
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Harris/utilitarian view on duty to rescue
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help others until it no longer maximizes happines
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problem with Harris/utilitarian view on duty to rescue:
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no special relationships involved; many don't want to spend life helping others; does not say why we must help others
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Mack/Libertarian view on duty to rescue
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no positive duty to help others, only contractual and remedial (that you caused); would take away rescuers right to live without interference; also slipper slope idea
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Woozley/Liberal position
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some rescues are morally required but not all; risky v. cost-free rescues
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duty (v. superogation)
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things morally required, failing to do them is morally wrong, doing it is minimum, not praise-worthy
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superogation/superogatory
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above and beyond what's required, saints/heroes level, earn high moral praise
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act utilitarian and duty v. superogation
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does not recognize difference between the 2
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main arguments against good samaritan laws
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1) can't catch everyone who does not rescue
2) requiring this would diminish the moral value of voluntarily rescuing |
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There is a liberal duty to rescue if (3 things)
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1) the rescue is easy
2) rescuer is in special position to rescue 3) costs of rescue are minimal |
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the "but for" account of causation
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the cause of an event is that "but for which" the event would not have occurred
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problem with "but for" account
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doesn't distinguish between causes and conditions. There are infinite conditions for something to happen, but less direct causes
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Hart and Honore's view on omissions
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an omission is a cause if it is abnormal in the circumstances; distinguishes what happens in certain cases and what normally happens.
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Harris's view on negative causation
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X's failure to perform A caused consequence B where: X could have done A, A would have prevented B, AND either 1) A is expected or required of X, or 2) B involved harm to human beings.
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Harris's basic argument
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1) Our failure to prevent harm causes harm 2) we have a duty not to cause harm 3) so we have a duty to prevent harm 4) so the law ought to compel us to do so
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Harris's reconstructed basic argument
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adds: 2) we expect people to prevent harm 4) we have a duty not to cause harm
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theory of punishment: retributivism
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the only legitimate purpose of a system of criminal justice is to punish immorality
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problem with retributivism as a theory of punishment
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only concerned with responding to wrongdoing, no concern for social implications or small deterrent value
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3 points of retributivist punishment
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1) moral guilt required for punishment to be justified 2) moral guilt justifies punishment regardless of consequences 3) punishment fits drime
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theory of punishment: utilitarian
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the only purpose of criminal system is to promote general welfare
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3 points of utilitarian punishment
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1) punishment justified with gain in total happiness 2) gain in happiness justifies punishment 3) kind/amount of punishment determined by what produces the most happiness
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Hart's hybrid theory of punishment
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we should distribute punishment like a retributivist, but with the aims of a utilitarian; allows greatest possible freedom
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Gilpin's argument against capital punishment
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1) no deterrent value 2) juries won't convict 3) possible conviction of innocent 4) unequal treatment 5) shows disregard for life 6) religious reasons 7) irreversible
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triggerman rules
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only the one who 'pulled the trigger' can be executed
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execution of retarded, Atkins v. Virginia
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not made unconstitutional until 2002 with 8th amendment
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Mill's view on death penalty
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everyone dies, no big deal, death penalty does not show a disregard for human life, shows regard for victim
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McClesky
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whole thing about racial prejudice in use of death penalty
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comparative justice
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treat everyone who commits crime the same way
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non-comparative justice
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treated the way the law says to be treated
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non-comparative injustice
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get what you deserve but others not punished
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Furman v. Georgia 4 bullets
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1) it degrades human dignity
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Mack's 3 strategies for GS laws: Positive Duty Strategy
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Woozeley: we owe positive duties to strangers
MACK - only if contractual or remedial |
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Mack's 3 strategies for GS laws: Causation strategy
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we have a moral duty not to cause harm, sometimes not preventing is a cause -> harm
MACK - difference between cause and condition |
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Mack's 3 strategies for GS laws: Responsibility strategy
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responsibility to help others, therefore not helping is a cause
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Simmons conclusion on GS laws
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Harris is too broad, Mack is too narrow (no general duty). Simmons like liberal view, there is a duty with clear connection and low-cost, and easy
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Brennan on 8th amendment (in Furman) a punishment is cruel and unusual if:
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1) degrades human dignity 2) is inflicted arbitrarily 3) rejected as wrong or unjust by society 4) unnecessary or ineffective
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Guys who like death penalty
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Murphy, Burger, Mill
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Murphy's contribution to Pro-death penalty
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1) death penalty not degrading or severe 2) some criminals deserve death
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Burger's contribution to Pro-death penalty
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1) safeguards are possible, flexibility must be preserved 2) is is accepted by society
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Mill's contribution to Pro-death penalty
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1) effective deterrent 2) safeguards possible, cost of innocent life worth it 3) shows high regard for human life 4) better than life in prison 5) some criminals deserve death
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guys who don;t like death penalty
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Brennan, Douglas, Gilpin, White, Murphy*
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Brennan's POV anti-death penalty
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1) degrades human dignity or too sever 2) inflicted arbitrarily 3) rejected by society 4) unnecessary/does not deter 5) disregard for life 6) worse than life in prison
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Douglas POV anti-death penalty
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inflicted arbitrarily
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Gilpin's POV anti-death penalty
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1) inflicted arbitrarily 2) unnecessary/does not deter 3) innocent may be irreversibly convicted 4) disregard for human life
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White & Murphy*'s POV anti-death penalty
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WHITE: unnecessary
MURPHY: worse than life in prison |
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some points from Murphy on DP
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punishment is inherently degrading ad dehumanizing; just because we're a democracy doesn't mean a majority like the death penalty
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Mill's harm principle
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the sole reason society may interfere with the conduct of an individual is the prevention of harm to others
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paternalistic laws
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where society uses the law to prohibit one harming themselves
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moralistic laws
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where society prohibits acts it sees as immoral
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private harms (2 parts)
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1) violations of basic interests (life, liberty, security) 2) offenses to sensibility (annoyance, discomfort)
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public harms (2 types)
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1) impairments of public welfare (treason, conterfeiting) 2) violations of governmental interests (bribing, tax fraud)
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Intentions of Mills Harm Principle
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to rule out laws preventing things that don't hurt anyone (gambling, temperance)
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Wolfenden committee
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Britain stepped into private lives (no idea)
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Devlin's main argument concerning community morals
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nothing should be beyond scope of the law; law's job is to enforce community's popular moral code, whatever it may be
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Devlin's Control Argument (6 points)
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1) each society has public moral structure 2) above is essential to society's existence 3) society has right to require what is necessary for existence 4) may use criminal law for above 5) even private immorality endangers public morals 6) law can prohibit provate immorality
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Mill's view on public morality/harm
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there is a private sphere where law should not be allowed to interfere; some offensive behavior is unavoidable; public consensual immorality not okay
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seamless stocking metaphor
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if you poke hole in society's morals, whole thing will unravel
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Devlin and Hart's disintegration thesis
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law is glue holding society together or will fall apart; seamless web
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Hart's moral pluralism theory
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multiple moralities can survive in society if there is tolerance, public morals always changing, perhaps Devlin is scared of change
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Devlin's elastic principles
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protect liberty as best we can; society act when disgust is involved; preserve society by preserving morality, not punishing what society dislikes
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Feinberg's Private Harm Prinicple
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legitimate to prohibit acts which harm other individuals (rape, murder)
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Fbergs Public Harm Principle
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ok to prohibit acts that harm society as a whole (treason, conterfeiting)
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Fbergs Offense Principle
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ok to prohibit acts that offend others (nudity, homosexuality, prostitution)
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Fbergs paternalism principle
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ok to prohibit acts that harm the actor
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Fbergs welfare principle
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ok to prohibit failure to benefit others (bad samaritan laws)
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problem w/ Fbergs Offense principle
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no vital interests at stake; self-relying
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Fberg's corollaries to Offense Principle (2 parts)
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1) standard of universality - some things offend everyone
2) standard of reasonal avoidability - if you can avoid offense, no right to complain |
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attitude-dependent offensiveness v. natural
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A-D O: everyone's attitudes different, something not all offended by (public drunk) NO: something quite commonly offensive (smelly garbage)
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conscientious offense v. non-conscientious offense
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CN: intention of shocking people into more extreme political positions (fuck the draft shirt)
NC: one offends others not on purpose |
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Jacobellis v. Ohio
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obscene protected by first amendment if has scientific, literary, or intellectual value
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3 qualifications for obscene in Miller v. California
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1) would average person say appeals to prurient interests? 2) does work depict sexual content in offensive way
3) does it lack value? if all 3, obscene |
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problems with 3 Miller v. California things
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1) what about sex-ed tapes?
2) what makes it offensive, many people watch porn 3) how will artist know whether public will find value in work? |
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Indiana court
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use of porn by men harms women
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2 arguments of Longino
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1) porn defames women, tells criminal lies 2) harms women in criminal way, encourages men to act like this
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