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27 Cards in this Set

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Rimm and Hill were fooling around with a pistol in Hill's den. Rimm aimed the pistol in Hill's direction and fired three shots slightly to Hill's right. One shot ricocheted off the wall and struck Hill in the back, killing him instantly. The most serious crime of which Rimm can be convicted is

A. murder.
B. voluntary manslaughter.
C. involuntary manslaughter.
D. assault with a dangerous weapon.
The correct answer is A. By firing multiple shots from a pistol, in a residence, dramatically close to Hill, Rimm was acting with implied malice aforethought sufficient for a murder conviction. At common law, murder is defined as the unlawful killing of another human being with malice aforethought. Malice is not a specific intent crime. However, malice can be shown by having an intent to kill, or by having an intent to inflict great bodily harm. Malice can also be implied in actions that show gross recklessness toward human life. Rimm caused the death of Hill with an extreme reckless disregard for human life, and can be convicted of murder. Answer B is incorrect because voluntary manslaughter is a less serious offense of murder and there was no "heat of passion" defense available that would allow for a finding of voluntary manslaughter. Answer C is incorrect because it is a less serious offense than murder and ignores the gross recklessness toward human life that Rimm acted with when he shot just slightly to Hill’s right. Answer D is incorrect because it assault with a dangerous weapon is a less serious offense than murder. Rimm acted with implied malice aforethought and can be convicted of murder.
What is M'Naughten rule?
The M'Naughten rule is the test that should be applied to determine if a defendant will be held criminally responsible for his actions, or if he was insane at the time of the commission of the offense. The test is whether at the time of committing the act, the accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing or, if he did know it that he did not know what he was doing was wrong.
The definitions of lanceny by trick, false pretenses, embezzlement under the common law
At common law, larceny is the taking possession and carrying away of the personal property of another, without the owner’s consent and with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of said property. At common law, larceny by trick is the obtaining possession, with the owner’s consent, of the property of another by fraud or misrepresentation, with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of said property. At common law, false pretenses is obtaining the possession and title of property of another through fraud or misrepresentation. At common law, embezzlement is the fraudulent conversion of another person’s property by someone who had lawful possession of said property.
Davison was driving through an apartment building area plagued with an unusually high incidence of burglaries and assaults. Acting pursuant to a police department plan to combat crime by the random stopping of automobiles in the area between midnight and 6:00 a.m., a police officer stopped Davison and asked him for identification. As Davison handed the officer his license, the officer directed a flashlight into the automobile and saw what appeared to be the barrel of a shotgun protruding from under the front seat on the passenger side of the car. The officer ordered Davison from the car, searched him, and discovered marijuana cigarettes and a shotgun. At Davison's trial for unlawful possession of narcotics, his motion to suppress the use of the marijuana as evidence should be

A. sustained, because the marijuana was discovered as a result of the unlawful stopping of Davison's automobile.

B. sustained, because the use of the flashlight constituted a search of the interior of Davison's automobile without probable cause.

C. denied, because the officer's conduct was consistent with the established police plan.

D. denied, because the discovery of the gun in plain view created the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify the arrest and search of Davison.
The correct answer is A. Random stopping of automobiles, even if done in a high crime area, is a violation of the Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. Since the initial stop of Davison’s vehicle was improper, evidence found as a result of that police misconduct will be suppressed, including the marijuana found on his person.
Suspecting that Scott had slain his wife, police detectives persuaded one of Scott's employees to remove a drinking glass from Scott's office so that it could be used for fingerprint comparisons with a knife found near the body. The fingerprints matched. The prosecutor announced that he would present comparisons and evidence to the grand jury. Scott's lawyer immediately filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the fingerprint comparisons to bar its consideration by the grand jury, contending that the evidence was illegally acquired. The motion should be

A. granted, because, if there were no probable cause, the grand jury should not consider the evidence.

B. granted, because the employee was acting as a police agent and his seizure of the glass without a warrant was unconstitutional.

C. denied, because motions based on the exclusionary rule are premature in grand jury proceedings.

D. denied, because the glass was removed from Scott's possession by a private citizen and not a police officer.
The correct answer is C. Motions to suppress evidence based on the exclusionary rule are premature in grand jury proceedings and will be denied.
Smith is a new lawyer who has three clients, all of whom are indigent. To improve the appearance of his office, he decided to purchase some new furniture and to pay for it out of future earnings. Wearing an expensive suit borrowed from a friend, Smith went to a furniture store and asked to purchase on credit a desk and various other items of furniture. Smith told the store owner that he was a very able lawyer with a growing practice and that he expected to do very well in the future. The store owner agreed to sell him the items on credit, and Smith promised to make monthly payments of $800. Smith has never had an income from his practice of more than $150 a month. Smith's business did not improve, and he did not make any payments to the furniture store. After three months, the store owner repossessed the items. If Smith is charged with obtaining property by false pretenses, his best argument for being NOT guilty would be that

A. even if he misled the store owner, he intended to pay for the items.

B. he did not misrepresent any material fact.

C. the store owner got his property back and so suffered no harm.

D. the store owner could have asked for payment in full at the time of the purchase.
The correct answer is B. Obtaining property by false pretenses requires the transfer of title to the property through fraud or false statements. Smith, when he obtained the property, did not misrepresent any material fact, and so did not obtain the property through fraud or false statements. Smith intended to pay for the property, he honestly believed his business would grow and, although his payment schedule was over his income level, he did not perpetrate fraud on the owner. Smith’s best argument for being not guilty is that he did not obtain the property as the result of knowingly fraudulent misrepresentations of fact.
Dunbar and Balcom went into a drugstore, where Dunbar reached into the cash register and took out $200. Stone, the owner of the store, came out of a back room, saw what had happened, and told Dunbar to put the money back. Balcom then took a revolver from under his coat and shot and killed Stone. Dunbar claims that Stone owed her $200 and that she went to the drugstore to try to collect the debt. She said that she asked Balcom to come along just in case Stone made trouble but that she did not plan on using any force and did not know that Balcom was armed. If Dunbar is prosecuted for murder on the basis of felony murder and the jury believes her claim, she should be found

A. guilty, because her companion, Balcom, committed a homicide in the course of a felony.

B. guilty, because her taking Balcom with her to the store created the risk of death that occurred during the commission of a felony.

C. not guilty, because she did not know that Balcom was armed and thus did not have the required mental state for felony murder.

D. not guilty, because she believed she was entitled to the money and thus did not intend to steal.
The correct answer is D. Dunbar cannot be found guilty of murder on the basis of felony murder, unless the murder was committed during the commission or attempted commission of a felony. If the jury believes Dunbar’s claim that she was collecting a debt properly owed, she was not committing a dangerous felony, and thus cannot be convicted under felony murder. Without the underlying offense actually being committed, Dunbar cannot be convicted of felony murder. Answer A is incorrect because, if the jury believes Dunbar, there was no felony being committed by Dunbar. Balcom likewise, was not committing a distinct and separate felony which would allow for the application of felony murder. Answer B is incorrect because there was no felony being committed and simply having somebody accompany you may not be sufficient creation of risk. Answer C is incorrect because there is no specific intent required for felony murder, separate from that in the underlying felony. Dunbar would not have needed to know that Balcom was armed to be responsible under the felony murder rule if she had actually committed a felony. Since, if the jury believes Dunbar, there was no underlying felony committed, Dunbar cannot be convicted of felony murder.
Dent, while eating in a restaurant, noticed that a departing customer at the next table had left a five-dollar bill as a tip for the waitress. Dent reached over, picked up the five dollar bill, and put it in his pocket. As he stood up to leave, another customer who had seen him take the money ran over to him and hit him in the face with her umbrella. Enraged, Dent choked the customer to death. Dent is charged with murder. He requests the court to charge the jury that they can find him guilty of voluntary manslaughter rather than murder. Dent's request should be

A. granted, because the jury could find that Dent acted recklessly and not with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm.

B. granted, because the jury could find that being hit in the face with an umbrella constitutes adequate provocation.

C. denied, because the evidence shows that Dent intended to kill or to cause serious bodily harm.

D. denied, because the evidence shows that Dent provoked the assault on himself by his criminal misconduct.
The correct answer is B. To instruct a jury as to voluntary manslaughter, there must be some evidence presented that there is a "heat of passion" defense that would mitigate the malice aforethought necessary for a murder charge. "Heat of passion" means there must be legally adequate provocation that caused a sudden and passionate response, which would mitigate the malice aforethought and allow for a finding of voluntary manslaughter. In this case, it is possible for the jury to find that being struck in the face with an umbrella constituted adequate provocation and that Dent’s response was done in the heat of passion. Since there was some evidence presented as to "heat of passion," the jury must be instructed as to voluntary manslaughter. Answer A is incorrect because it misstates the elements of voluntary manslaughter. If the jury found that Dent acted with gross recklessness with disregard for human life giving rise to malice aforethought, they should convict of murder, not voluntary manslaughter.
Miller was indicted in a state court in January 1985 for a robbery and murder that occurred in December 1982. He retained counsel, who filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Miller had been prejudiced by a 25-month delay in obtaining the indictment. Thereafter, Miller, with his counsel, appeared in court for arraignment and stated that he wished to plead guilty.

The presiding judge asked Miller whether he understood the nature of the charges, possible defenses, and maximum allowable sentences. Miller replied that he did, and the judge reviewed all of those matters with him. He then asked Miller whether he understood that he did not have to plead guilty. When Miller responded that he knew that, the judge accepted the plea and sentenced Miller to 25 years.

Six months later, Miller filed a motion to set aside his guilty plea on each of the following grounds.

Which of these grounds provides a constitutional basis for relief?

A. The judge did not rule on his motion to dismiss before accepting the guilty plea.

B. The judge did not determine that Miller had robbed and killed the victim.

C. The judge did not determine whether Miller understood that he had a right to jury trial.

D. The judge did not determine whether the prosecutor's file contained any undisclosed exculpatory material.
The correct answer is C. A guilty plea must be knowingly and voluntarily entered, or else it will be subject to a motion to set aside. Before a guilty plea will be found to be knowingly and voluntarily entered, a defendant must be fully advised as to each of his constitutional rights and knowingly and voluntarily waive each of those rights. A motion to set aside a guilty plea will be granted if the defendant was not fully apprised of his constitutional rights and waived them at the time of the guilty plea. If the judge did not determine whether or not Miller understood that he had the constitutional right to a jury trial, Miller could not voluntarily waive that right, and the motion to set aside the guilty plea should be granted. Answer A is incorrect because it is not necessary for the judge to rule on all pre-trial motions, whether they could have been successful or not, before a guilty plea will be found to be knowingly and voluntarily entered. Answer B is incorrect because the judge is also not required to make a factual determination that the defendant committed the offense before acceptance of the plea. Answer D is incorrect because the judge is not required to inquire as to any potential discovery violations by the prosecution before the acceptance of the plea. Only Answer C provides a constitutional basis for relief to Millers’ guilty plea.
Dan entered the police station and announced that he wanted to confess to a murder. The police advised Dan of the Miranda warnings, and Dan signed a written waiver. Dan described the murder in detail and pinpointed the location where a murder victim had been found a few weeks before. Later, a court-appointed psychiatrist determined that Dan was suffering from a serious mental illness that interfered with his ability to make rational choices and to understand his rights and that the psychosis had induced his confession.

Dan's confession is

A. admissible, because there was no coercive police conduct in obtaining Dan's statement.

B. admissible, because Dan was not in custody.

C. inadmissible, because Dan's confession was a product of his mental illness and was therefore involuntary.

D. inadmissible, because under these circumstances, there was no valid waiver of Miranda warnings.
The correct answer is A. The exclusionary rule is a rule meant to deter police conduct that would violate the protections afforded the accused in the Constitution, and suppressing the evidence in this case would serve no purpose in enforcing those constitutional rights. Since there was no coercive police conduct in obtaining Dan’s statement, the statement should not be suppressed and the confession is admissible. Answer B is incorrect because it ignores the non-coercive effect of the police conduct, and Dan may well have been in custody at the time of the interrogation. Answer C is incorrect because the scope of the exclusionary rule does not include the right of the defendant to confess to a crime only when totally rational and property motivated. There must be some type of coercive police activity necessary to find that Dan’s confession was not voluntary and inadmissible. Answer D is incorrect because the protections of Miranda, as well as the exclusionary rule, will only apply to cases involving police misconduct, and because the confession was voluntarily given. The United States Supreme Court held so in Colorado v. Connelly.
Smith and Penn were charged with murder. Each gave a confession to the police that implicated both of them. Smith later retracted her confession claiming that it was coerced.

Smith and Penn were tried together. The prosecutor offered both confessions into evidence. Smith and Penn objected. After a hearing, the trial judge found that both confessions were voluntary and admitted both into evidence. Smith testified at trial. She claimed that her confession was false and the result of coercion. Both defendants were convicted.

On appeal, Smith contends her conviction should be reversed because of the admission into evidence of Penn's confession.

Smith's contention is

A. correct, unless Penn testified at trial.

B. correct, whether or not Penn testified at trial.

C. incorrect, because Smith testified on her own behalf.

D. incorrect, because Smith's own confession was properly admitted into evidence.
The correct answer is A. Penn’s confession is inadmissible against Smith unless Penn testified at trial and Smith is given the opportunity to confront Penn with the substance of his confession. The Confrontation Clause of the Constitution, in co-defendant confession cases, requires that a defendant must be given the opportunity to cross-examine a co-defendant whose confession is being used against the original defendant.
Which of the following is most likely to be found to be a strict liability offense?

A. A city ordinance providing for a fine of not more than $200 for shoplifting.

B. A federal statute making it a felony to possess heroin.

C. A state statute making it a felony to fail to register a firearm.

D. A state statute making the sale of adulterated milk a misdemeanor.
D is the correct answer and can be reached through the process of elimination. A strict liability crime is a light-penalty public welfare offense, which does not require that the actor have mens rea, only that the action be prohibited by statute. Answers B and C can be eliminated immediately as they are both felony crimes, which are subject to more severe penalties. Answer A is not the best answer because it is not a public welfare offense, but an ordinance against theft. This leaves Answer D as the best answer. The sale of adulterated milk is clearly a matter of public welfare and as such could be subject to a strict liability statute. A, B, and C are incorrect.
Trelawny worked at a day-care center run by the Happy Faced Day Care Corporation. At the center, one of the young charges, Smith, often arrived with bruises and welts on his back and legs. A statute in the jurisdiction requires all day-care workers to report to the police cases where there is probable cause to suspect child abuse and provides for immediate removal from the home of any suspected child abuse victims. Trelawney was not aware of this statute. Nevertheless, he did report Smith's condition to his supervisor, who advised him to keep quiet about it so the day-care center would not get into trouble for defaming a parent. About two weeks after Trelawney first noticed Smith's condition, Smith was beaten to death by his father. Trelawney has been charged with murder in the death of Smith. The evidence at trial disclosed, in addition to the above, that the child had been the victim of beatings by the father for some time, and that these earlier beatings had been responsible for the marks that Trelawney had seen. Smith's mother had been aware of the beatings but had not stopped them because she was herself afraid of Smith's father. Trelawney's best argument that he is NOT guilty of murder is

A. he was not aware of the duty-to-report statute.

B. he lacked the mental state necessary to the commission of the crime.

C. his omission was not the proximate cause of death.

D. the day-care corporation, rather than Trelawney, was guilty of the omission, which was sanctioned by its supervisory-level agent.
The correct answer is B. Trelawny will not bear criminal responsibility for the actions of another unless he intended those actions be committed and aided and abetted in the commission of the offense. Since Trelawny never intended that Smith be murdered, he should be found not guilty.
Jack, a bank teller, was fired by Morgan, the president of the bank. Jack decided to take revenge against Morgan, but decided against attempting it personally, because he knew Morgan was protected around the clock by bank security guards. Jack knew that Chip had a violent temper and was very jealous. Jack falsely told Chip that Chip's wife, Elsie, was having an affair with Morgan. Enraged, Chip said, "What am I going to do?" Jack said, "If it were my wife, I'd just march into his office and blow his brains out." Chip grabbed a revolver and rushed to the bank. He walked into the bank, carrying the gun in his hand. One of the security guards, believing a holdup was about to occur, shot and killed Chip.

If charged with murder of Chip, Jack should be found

A. guilty, based upon extreme recklessness.

B. guilty, based upon transferred intent.

C. not guilty, because he did not intend for Chip to be shot by the security guard.

D. not guilty, because he did not shoot Chip and he was not acting in concert with the security guard.
The explanation for the answer is:

The correct answer is A. Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Malice does not require the intent to kill, in some cases, there exists "implied malice" if there was gross or extreme recklessness to human life on the part of the defendant. In the question, Jack, knowing Chip to be violent and jealous, lied to him, and suggested he commit murder. By taking actions that ensured Chip would be walking into a heavily guarded bank with a gun, Jack acted, with extreme reckless, which would lead to a finding of implied malice aforethought. Jack should be found guilty of murder. An additional facet of the question raises the issue of whether Jack was a "proximate cause" of Chip’s death. The general test is whether the death was foreseeable; a defendant will be held criminally liable for foreseeable consequences of their actions. In this case, by ensuring Chip would enter a heavily guarded bank with the intent to kill Morgan and armed with a gun, it was foreseeable that Chip would be killed.
A grand jury indicted Alice on a charge of arson, and a valid warrant was issued for her arrest. Paul, a police officer, arrested Alice and informed her of what the warrant stated. However, hoping that Alice might say something incriminating, he did not give her Miranda warnings. He placed her in the back seat of his patrol car and was driving her to the police station when she said, "Look, I didn't mean to burn the building; it was an accident. I was just burning some papers in a wastebasket." At the station, after being given Miranda warnings, Alice stated that she wished to remain silent and made no other statements. Alice moved to suppress the use of her statement to Paul as evidence on two grounds: first, that the statement was acquired without giving Miranda warnings and second, that the police officer had deliberately elicited her incriminating statement after she was in custody. As to Alice's motion to suppress, the court should

A. deny the motion.

B. grant the motion only on the basis of the first ground stated.

C. grant the motion only on the basis of the second ground stated.

D. grant the motion on either ground.
The correct answer is A. The exclusionary rule is a rule meant to deter police conduct that would violate the protections afforded the accused in the Constitution, and suppressing the evidence in this case would serve no purpose in enforcing those constitutional rights. Since there was no coercive police conduct in obtaining Dan’s statement, the statement should not be suppressed and the confession is admissible. Answer B is incorrect because it ignores the non-coercive effect of the police conduct, and Dan may well have been in custody at the time of the interrogation. Answer C is incorrect because the scope of the exclusionary rule does not include the right of the defendant to confess to a crime only when totally rational and property motivated. There must be some type of coercive police activity necessary to find that Dan’s confession was not voluntary and inadmissible. Answer D is incorrect because the protections of Miranda, as well as the exclusionary rule, will only apply to cases involving police misconduct, and because the confession was voluntarily given. The United States Supreme Court held so in Colorado v. Connelly.
The correct answer is A. Miranda warnings need to be given only if the person is subject to custodial interrogation. Alice was in custody pursuant to the warrant; however, she was never subject to interrogation. Her voluntary statement in the vehicle to the officer should not be suppressed because the officer failed to give her the Miranda warnings. Merely hoping for incriminating statements is insufficient action by the officer to be an interrogation that requires the giving of Miranda warnings. The officer did not ask any questions, he did not deliberately elicit any statement, and the statement was knowingly and voluntarily made.
While browsing in a clothing store, Alice decided to take a purse without paying for it. She placed the purse under her coat and took a couple of steps toward the exit. She then realized that a sensor tag on the purse would set off an alarm. She placed the purse near the counter from which she had removed it. Alice has committed

A. no crime, because the purse was never removed from the store.
B. no crime, because she withdrew from her criminal enterprise.
C. only attempted larceny, because she intended to take the purse out of the store.
D. larceny, because she took the purse from its original location and concealed it with the intent to steal.
The correct answer is D. Larceny is the taking possession and carrying away of the personal property of another, without the owner’s consent and with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of said property. Alice took the purse, concealed it under her coat, and had the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the purse. Alice committed larceny. Answer A is incorrect because Alice does not need to have left the store before she has committed larceny; her taking it and concealing it with the intent to deprive the owner of it is sufficient.
Donald was arrested in Marilyn's apartment after her neighbors had reported sounds of a struggle and the police arrived to find Donald bent over Marilyn's prostrate body. Marilyn was rushed to the hospital where she lapsed into a coma. Despite the explanation that he was trying to revive Marilyn after she suddenly collapsed, Donald was charged with attempted rape and assault after a neighbor informed the police that she had heard Marilyn sobbing, "No, please no, let me alone." At trial, the forensic evidence was inconclusive. The jury acquitted Donald of attempted rape but convicted him of assault. While he was serving his sentence for assault, Marilyn, who had never recovered from the coma, died. Donald was then indicted and tried on a charge of felony murder. In this common-law jurisdiction, there is no statute that prevents a prosecutor from proceeding in this manner, but Donald argued that a second trial for attempted rape and assault would violate the double jeopardy clause. His claim is

A. correct, because he was acquitted of the attempted rape charge.
B. correct, because he was convicted of the assault charge.
C. incorrect, because Marilyn had not died at the time of the first trial and he was not placed in jeopardy for murder.
D. incorrect, because he was convicted of the assault charge.
Answer A is correct. The attempted rape charge cannot be the basis for the felony-murder charge because Donald has been acquitted of the charge and to use it would violate the double jeopardy clause. The double jeopardy clause forbids the State from prosecuting, or punishing, a defendant twice for the same action. In this case, Donald was placed in jeopardy during the original trial for attempted rape, and to use that charge again as the underlying felony in a felony murder charge would put him in jeopardy again.
A statute in the jurisdiction defines murder in the first degree as knowingly killing another person after deliberation. Deliberation is defined as "cool reflection for any length of time no matter how brief." Murder in the second degree is defined as "all other murder at common law except felony-murder." Felony-murder is murder in the third degree. Manslaughter is defined by the common law. At 2 a.m., Duncan held up an all-night liquor store using an assault rifle. During the holdup, two police cars with flashing lights drove up in front of the store. In order to create a situation where the police would hesitate to come into the store (and thus give Duncan a chance to escape out the back) Duncan fired several rounds through the front window of the store. Duncan then ran out the back but upon discovering another police car there, surrendered quietly. One of the shots he fired while in the store struck and killed a burglar who was stealing items from a closed store across the street. The most serious degree of criminal homicide Duncan is guilty of is

A. murder in first degree.
B. murder in the second degree.
C. murder in the third degree.
D. manslaughter.
The correct answer is B. Duncan’s actions of firing an assault rifle through the front window of the store to aid his escape and knowing there were people out there, clearly were grossly negligent enough to provide malice aforethought for a murder charge. Therefore, Duncan killed a human being, the burglar, with malice aforethought, and is thus guilty of second degree murder. Answer A is incorrect because the statute defines murder in the first degree as "knowingly" killing another person after deliberation. Duncan did not "knowingly" kill another person after deliberation; in fact, Duncan lacked the specific intent to kill or to do great bodily harm to anyone, and did not even know the burglar existed. Answer C is incorrect because, although Duncan likely did commit murder in the third degree (felony murder), that is not the most serious degree of criminal homicide Duncan is guilty of committing. Answer D is incorrect because it ignores Duncan’s guilt as to both felony murder and the murder in the second degree. Duncan did kill another with malice aforethought, but did not knowingly kill another person after deliberation. He is guilty of murder in the second degree.
Rachel, an antique dealer and a skilled calligrapher, crafted a letter on very old paper. She included details that would lead knowledgeable readers to believe that the letter had been written by Thomas Jefferson to a friend. Rachel, who had a facsimile of Jefferson's autograph, made the signature and other writing on the letter resemble Jefferson's. She knew that the letter would attract the attention of local collectors. When it did and she was contacted about selling it, she said that it had come into her hands from a foreign collector who wished anonymity, and that she could make no promises about its authenticity. As she had hoped, a collector paid her $5,000 for the letter. Later the collector discovered the letter was not authentic, and handwriting analysis established that Rachel had written the letter. In a jurisdiction that follows the common-law definition of forgery, Rachel has

A. committed both forgery and false pretenses.
B. committed forgery, because she created a false document with the intent to defraud, but has not committed false pretenses, since she made no representation as to the authenticity of the document.
C. not committed forgery, because the document had no apparent legal significance, but has committed false pretenses, since she misrepresented the source of the document.
D. not committed forgery, because the document had no apparent legal significance, and has not committed false pretenses, since she has made no representation as to authenticity of the document.
The correct answer is C. At common law, false pretenses is obtaining the possession and title of property of another through fraud or misrepresentation, with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property. At common law, forgery is the false making or material alteration of a writing where the writing has the apparent ability to defraud and is of apparent legal efficacy with the intent to defraud. Rachel did not commit forgery, because the document, by itself, has no legal efficacy or significance, it was merely purporting to be a letter. However, Rachel did commit false pretense because she obtained the property and title to property, the $5,000, by fraud and misrepresentation, and she had the intent to permanently deprive the owner of that property. Even though she did not specifically promise anything about the letter’s authenticity, Rachel misrepresented the nature of the letter by saying it was from a collector rather than created by herself, she misrepresented who owned the letter, and how she obtained the letter. Those misrepresentations induced the buyer into giving her the money.
Joe and Marty were coworkers. Joe admired Marty's wristwatch and frequently said how much he wished he had one like it. Marty decided to give Joe the watch for his birthday the following week. On the weekend before Joe's birthday, Joe and Marty attended a company picnic. Marty took his watch off and left it on a blanket when he went off to join in a touch football game. Joe strolled by, saw the watch on the blanket, and decided to steal it. He bent over and picked up the watch. Before he could pocket it, however, Marty returned. When he saw Joe holding the watch, he said, "Joe, I know how much you like that watch. I was planning to give it to you for your birthday. Go ahead and take it now." Joe kept the watch. Joe has committed

A. larceny.
B. attempted larceny.
C. embezzlement.
D. no crime.
The correct answer is A. Joe took possession of the watch without the owner’s consent and with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of it, and is thus guilty of larceny. The fact that Marty later gave Joe permission to take the watch does not change the fact that Joe, when he took the watch, did not have Marty’s permission to take it and did have the intent to steal it. Answer B is incorrect because Joe did not just attempt to take the watch, he did take it with the intent to steal it. The attempted larceny charge merged into the larceny charge when Joe committed the larceny.
While testifying as a witness in a civil trial, Walters was asked on cross-examination if he had been convicted in the circuit court of Jasper County of stealing $200 from his employer on August 16, 1977. Walters said, "No, I have never been convicted of any crime." In fact, Walters had pleaded guilty to such a charge and had been placed on probation.

Walters was then charged with perjury on the ground that his statement denying the conviction was false. A statute in the jurisdiction defines perjury as knowingly making a false statement while under oath.

At trial, the state proved Walter's statement and the prior conviction. Walters testified that the attorney who represented him in the theft case had told him that, because he had been placed on probation, he had not been convicted of a crime. Walters had served his probationary period satisfactorily and been discharged from probation. The alleged advice of the attorney was incorrect.

If the jury believes Walters, it should find him

A. guilty, because his mistake was one of law.
B. guilty, because reliance on the advice of an attorney is not a defense.
C. not guilty if the jury also finds that his reliance on the attorney's advice was reasonable.
D. not guilty, because he lacked the necessary mental state.
The correct answer is D. The statute defines perjury as knowingly making a false statement while under oath. The mental state required by this statute is that the Defendant knows he made a false statement. If the jury believes Walters and finds that he honestly believed he had not been convicted of a crime, then they should find him not guilty of perjury, because he did not knowingly make a false statement. Walters lacked the knowledge that his statement was false, and thus did not have the requisite mental state for a conviction of perjury.
Ralph and Sam were engaged in a heated discussion over the relative merits of their favorite professional football teams when Ralph said, "You have to be one of the dumbest persons around." Sam slapped Ralph. Ralph drew a knife and stabbed Sam in the stomach. Other persons then stepped in and stopped any further fighting. Despite the pleas of the other persons, Sam refused to go to a hospital or to seek medical treatment. About two hours later, he died as the result of a loss of blood. Ralph was charged with the murder of Sam. At trial, medical evidence established that if Sam had been taken to a hospital, he would have survived.

At the end of the case, Ralph moves for a judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, for an instruction on the elements of voluntary manslaughter.

The court should

A. grant the motion for acquittal.
B. deny the motion for acquittal, but instruct on manslaughter because there is evidence of adequate provocation.
C. deny both motions, because Ralph failed to retreat.
D. deny both motions, because malice may be proved by the intentional use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the body.
The correct answer is B. Ralph’s motion for acquittal should be denied because there is sufficient evidence for the jury to find Ralph guilty of murder. Sam’s refusal to seek medical treatment is an insufficient intervening act to allow Ralph to escape criminal liability for stabbing Sam. Whether an intervening act is sufficient to break the chain of causality in a homicide cases rests on the foreseeability of the intervening act. A defendant will be held criminally responsible for the foreseeable consequences of his actions, however, if an unforeseeable act intervenes, a defendant will not be deemed responsible for the death. Ralph stabbed Sam in the stomach, and as a result of the injury, Sam died. A refusal to get medical treatment by the victim is foreseeable and is insufficient to allow Ralph to escape criminal responsibility for his actions. The motion for judgment of acquittal should be denied.

A jury should be instructed as to voluntary manslaughter if there is at least some evidence that the murder was done in the "heat of passion."
Unprepared for a final examination, Slick asked his girlfriend, Hope, to set off the fire alarms in the university building 15 minutes after the test commenced. Hope did so. Several students were injured in the panic that followed as people were trying to get out of the building. Slick and Hope are prosecuted for battery and for conspiracy to commit battery.

They are

A. guilty of both crimes.
B. guilty of battery but not guilty of conspiracy.
C. not guilty of battery but guilty of conspiracy.
D. not guilty of either crime.
The correct answer is B. At common law, battery is a general intent crime, and is defined as the unlawful offensive touching of another. Hope and Slick as her accessory, by pulling the fire alarm, caused many of the students to be offensively touched to the point of injury. These unlawful touchings were completely foreseeable from the pulling of the fire alarm and they were the direct result of Hope and Slick’s intentional act. Since battery is a general intent crime, Hope and Slick are guilty of battery. Conspiracy to commit battery, on the other hand, is a specific intent crime and requires an agreement to commit the crime of battery. For a proper conspiracy charge, both parties must have an agreement and the intent that the crime of battery be committed. Since conspiracy is a specific intent crime, there must be proof that both Hope and Slick specifically intended for people to be the victims of criminal battery.
Dann was an alcoholic who frequently experienced auditory hallucinations that commanded him to engage in bizarre and sometimes violent behavior. He generally obeyed their commands. The hallucinations appeared more frequently when he was intoxicated, but he sometimes experienced them when he had not been drinking.

After Dann had been drinking continuously for a three-day period, an elderly woman began to reproach him about his drunken condition, slapping him on the face and shoulders as she did so. Dann believed that he was being unmercifully attacked and heard the hallucinatory voice telling him to strangle his assailant. He did so, and she died.

If Dann is charged with second degree murder, Dann's best chance of acquittal would be to rely on a defense of

A. intoxication.
B. lack of malice aforethought.
C. self-defense.
D. insanity.
The correct answer is D. At common law, second degree murder is the killing of a human being with malice aforethought, but without premeditation and deliberation. Dann’s best defense to a charge of second degree murder is that he was not criminally responsible for his actions because he was insane at the time of the killing. Auditory hallucinations and the belief that he was being unmercifully attacked may show that he was acting under a mental illness which caused a defect in reasoning such that Dann did not know that his actions were wrong. Dann believed, because of the hallucinations, that he was properly acting in self-defense and that he should kill his assailant. He could properly raise an insanity defense, and it is his best chance of acquittal.
Larson was charged with the murder of a man who had been strangled and whose body was found in some woods near his home. Larson suffers from a neurological problem that makes it impossible for him to remember an occurrence for longer than 48 hours. After Larson was charged, the police visited him and asked if they might search his home. Larson consented. The police found a diary written by Larson. An entry dated the same day as the victim's disappearance read, "Indescribable excitement. Why did no one ever tell me that killing gave such pleasure to the master?" Larson was charged with murder. His attorney has moved to exclude the diary from evidence on the ground that its admission would violate Larson's privilege against self-incrimination. Counsel has also argued that Larson could not give informed consent to the search because more than 48 hours had passed since the making of the entry and hence he could not remember the existence of the incriminating entry at the time he gave his consent. There is no evidence that the police officers who secured Larson's consent to the search were aware of his memory impairment. With regard to the diary, the court should

A. admit it, because Larson's consent was not obtained by intentional police misconduct and Larson was not compelled to make the diary entry.
B. admit it, pursuant to the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
C. exclude it, because Larson was not competent to consent to a search.
D. exclude it, because use of the diary as evidence would violate Larsons' privilege against self-incrimination.
The correct answer is A. The exclusionary rule serves to protect persons from illegal police conduct. There is no evidence the police had acted improperly, and had, in fact, obtained consent for the search. The consent to search was voluntarily given, and the fact that the police were completely unaware of Larson’s condition, shows the police acquired the diary without violating his constitutional rights. The statement in the diary was not made under any police coercion or as the subject of custodial interrogation, so it too should be admissible.
At a party for coworkers at Defendant's home, Victim accused Defendant of making advances toward his wife. Victim and his wife left the party. The next day at work, Defendant saw Victim and struck him on the head with a soft-drink bottle. Victim fell into a coma and died two weeks after the incident. This jurisdiction defines aggravated assault as an assault with any weapon or dangerous implement and punishes it as a felony. It defines murder as the unlawful killing of a person with malice aforethought or in the course of an independent felony. Defendant may be found guilty of murder

A. only if the jury finds that Defendant intended to kill Victim.
B. only if the jury finds that Defendant did not act in a rage provoked by Victim's accusations.
C. if the jury finds that Defendant intended either to kill or to inflict serious bodily harm.
D. if the jury finds that the killing occurred in the course of an aggravated assault.
The correct answer is C. If the jury finds that the Defendant intended to either kill, or intended to inflict serious bodily harm, they are finding that the Defendant killed the Victim with malice aforethought, and he should be found guilty of murder. Answer A is incorrect because it misstates the requirements of malice aforethought. Malice aforethought can be found, not only in the intent to kill, but also if the Defendant has the intent to inflict serious bodily harm.
Sally told Michael she would like to have sexual intercourse with him and that he should come to her apartment that night at 7 p.m. After Michael arrived, he and Sally went into the bedroom. As Michael started to remove Sally's blouse, Sally said she had changed her mind. Michael tried to convince her to have intercourse with him but after ten minutes of her sustained refusals, Michael left the apartment. Unknown to Michael, Sally was 15 years old. Because she appeared to be older, Michael believed her to be about 18 years old.

A statute in the jurisdiction provides: "A person commits rape in the second degree if he has sexual intercourse with a girl, not his wife, who is under the age of 16 years."

If Michael is charged with attempting to violate this statute, he is

A. guilty, because no mental state is required as to the element of rape.
B. guilty, because he persisted after she told him she had changed her mind.
C. not guilty, because he reasonably believed she had consented and voluntarily withdrew after she told him she had changed her mind.
D. not guilty, because he did not intend to have intercourse with a girl under the age of 16.
The correct answer is D. An attempt charge requires that the defendant has the intent to commit the crime, and that the defendant take substantial steps toward the commission of the offense. Michael did not have the intent to commit rape in the second degree, and, therefore, should be found not guilty of attempted rape in the second degree.