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83 Cards in this Set

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Definitions: PM vs RM
PM: remembering to perform an action in the future
RM: memory for past events
why PM an interesting topic
1) Important for everyday life (more failures, embarrassing)
2) Failures can have serious consequences (1/2 Americans take med)
3) Little research despite importance and prev.
Typical PM Paradigm
1) Engage in ongoing task (e.g. LDT)
2) In addition, PM task (e.g. press Q when see "rake")
3) Delay: other activities (e.g. vocab test)
4) Reintroduce ongoing task, don't mention PM task (PM measure: how often still press Q)
Diffs in PM and RM: recall
for RM, it is cued recall - given "train" and requested to search memory
for PM, given "Katherine" but no request to search mem
to remember PM, must see Katherine as a cue, not just a friend
PM Theories: Monitoring (Smith)
1) capacity consuming process (in part)
2) monitoring necessary for PM retrieval
Smith (2003): Evidence for monitoring
ongoing task, vary if have PM task or not
if have PM, LDT responses slowed down than if no PM task
suggests monitoring, less capacity for LDT, slower time
those with slower times had better PM performance
but, gave Ps 6 cues, which necessitates monitoring
PM Theories: Multiprocess (Einstein & McDaniel)
1) remembering to perform action in future is critical
2) adaptive to have flexible system that uses a variety of mechanisms
3) In addition to monitoring, there are SR proceses
Spontaneous Retrieval (PM)
-occurrence of a cue that has been associated with an intention can cause an intention to pop into mind even when not monitoring
-retrieval occurs in response to a target mem
Reflexive Associate Theory (PM)
1) During planning, people form an assoc between target and intended action
2) later, when target cue encountered, an assoc system (hippocampal) delivers intended action to consciousness (KEY is making assoc)
3) occurs rapidly, obligatorily, and with few cog. resources
Scullin et al (2010): discourage monitoring - Part 1
Discouraged monitoring by having 1 target item, emphasized importance of ongoing task and de-emphasized PM task, delayed onset of one target event for a long time (500 trials after instructions)
response times equal in both groups (whether PM task or no)
-Monitor prediction: low performance; MP prediction: good performance (good: .73)
Scullin et al (2010): discourage monitoring - Part 2
Key variable: focal (SR) and non-focal (monitor)
w/ non-focal cues, had low performance (.18)
Monitoring and MP would both predict this
Focal processing:
when ongoing task encourages processing of the target and especially those features processed at encoding
-SR likely (e.g. press Q when see rake)
both rake and LDT meaningful task - uses same processes
Non-focal Processing:
ongoing task doesn't encourage processing of target at encoding
-Monitoring likely (SR unlikely) (e.g. press Q when see word that begins with "r")
"r" not meaningful, but LDT is - different processes
Einstein et al (2005): PM task suspension
give image rating task with PM intention (press Q when see rake)
then, suspend PM task for later (should be no monitoring then) - do LDT task purely for speed, yet still present old PM target 5 times
if SR: slower response when see suspended rake (thought pops into mind, must supress)
if no SR: same speed
Results: Ps slow down; older adults still press Q (less inhibition)
Aging and PM effects (in general)
mixed findings (some show effects, some don't)
Craik's theory: auto processes don't slow with age, but non-auto do
-SR auto, monitoring non-auto, so monitoring slows
Non-focal shows effects, Focal does not
Mullet et al (in press): Age diffs for Focal and Non-focal
3 blocks of LDT (Control - no PM, Focal - see printer, Nonfocal - see c word)
LDT response: no slowing for focal, but slowing for non-focal (evidence of monitoring)
Performance: age declines for non-focal, no diffs for focal (even for oldest adults)
-explains mixed findings: maybe SR processes are preserved in older adults
Implementation Intentions: Gollwitzer (1999)
1) although people form strong intentions, they are often general (e.g. take BP later)
2) people must form II, more specific (e.g. when x happens, I'll do y - take BP at breakfast)
3) II allows one to switch from conscious control (monitoring) to automatic control (SR)
-at breakfast tomorrow, BP med will spontaneously pop into mind
Imp Intention Study: breast examination
teach women to examine breasts daily (by video); either make general or imp. intention (where and when will examine vs. will examine)
women with sp. intention were more successful, had more checks
Implication of Imp Intention: leaving child in car
in half of deaths, parent forgets child - cause of irresponsible parenting or PM failure?
vulnerability to forgetting in absence of good cues (see case of Mark Warschauer)
Explicit Memory definition
Declarative - memories that can be consciously recalled
includes episodic and semantic mem
Episodic Mem def.
1) mems about episodes ("I remember")
2) associated with a particular time and place (I had a hamburger for dinner)
3) autobiographic (personal past); only happened once
remember when actually happened, when learned, etc
vary from person to person
Semantic Mem def
1) general world knowledge ("I know")
e.g. vocabularly
don't remember when learned, just know in general
same as with others
Episodic and Sem mem as Interdependent
use sem mems to create ep mems (e.g. have conversation at Starbucks, but remember later)
at one time, sem mems were ep mems (when you learn something)
Tulving (1989): KC case study
motorcycle accident, all he remembers are SM, not Ep Mems (e.g. know has car, can't remember driving it)
also can't think about future
-suggests Sm and Ep Mem mediated by diff brain systems
-ep mem important for both past and future
Tulving: Brain imaging data on Sm and Ep mem
think about episode vs think about planet's orbit
Ep: more activity in right hemi
Sem: more activity in left hemi
Tulving: only humans have Ep Mem, only humans can plan for future
Explicit Memory vs. Imp Mem
EM: conscious and deliberative use of mem (e.g. free recall, recog)
IM: tasks do not require conscious recollection - tests for prior exposure
Repetition priming
change in speed and accuracy and bias in test phase processing of an item due to study phase experience with item
-effect in IM
Types of IM tests
1) Perceptual ID - present items quickly (35 ms); detect old items better than new items
2) Word Fragment Completion - _ef_; _ab_e - know more old fragments
3) LDT - faster responses to old words
Old item - new item
Dissociation definition
-find that variables have an effect on one component of the cog system but no effect on another component
-sp. finding a diff effect on EM and IM
-suggests that diff brain structures control diff functions (e.g. Goldman-Rakic monkey study) - double dissociation
Jacboy & Dallas (1981): Levels of processing in IM and EM
-do either deep (pleasantness) or shallow (rhyme) task
-be tested either with EM test (recog) or IM test (Perc. ID)
-No diff between deep and shallow task in IM test condition
-dissociation: deep processing only improves EM but not IM
Mitchell & Road (1988): Amnesia and IM/EM
-give 96 pics, name image (dog, apple)
-1/2 items test by recog (EM), 1/2 by pic naming test (speed of response - IM, old and new pics)
Normal people better performance on EM than amnesiacs, but equal performance on IM test
Dissociation: amnesia affects EM, not IM
Benzodiazepines study: IM/EM
-give placebo or drug, learn list of words
-delay, let effects of drug (or placebo) wear off
-give either IM or EM test
Dissociation: no effect or drug on IM but effect on EM
Aging and IM/EM
aging only effects EM, not IM
Subliminal Presentation
perception w/o awareness, but behavior affected
-1956 - Drink Coca-Cola movie theater (sales went up)
can behavior be controlled w/o our knowledge?
tested by EM tests, see no effect
Kunst-Wilson & Zajanc (1980): Subliminal effects from IM tests
present at fast speeds 20 irregular octagons (10 ms)
-1/2 items tested by recog; 1/2 items tested by preference test
Recog: chance
Pref: liked old items better than new, greater than chance)
Perfect & Askew (1994): Incidental exposure to advertisements
show incidental ads, test with IM or EM tests
no effects of EM, but slightly IM effects (more pref. to incidental ads)
IM/EM Explanations: Memory Systems View (Tulving) - general
-Different mem systems responsible for processing IM and EM
-supports parallel dist. processing
IM/EM Explanations: Memory Systems View (Tulving) - EM
conscious and meaningful analysis of events, keeps record of that processing (e.g studying)
in hippocampal / medial temporal lobes
IM/EM Explanations: Memory Systems View (Tulving) - IM
automatic and unconscious perceptual analysis (e.g. pattern recog) and keeps record of it
in occipital - temporal stream / temporal auditory cortex
-also increases neural efficiency of that process (next time you read dog, you'll do so more quickly and efficiently)
Gabrielli et al (1995): MS
-Normal, dense amnesiacs, and MS (epileptic, no right occ. lobe) as participants
-read 24 items (conscious process) - 1/2 recog, 1/2 Perc ID (16.7 ms)
Norms: good on IM and EM
DA: good on IM, bad on EM
MS: good on EM, bad on IM
- MS has no priming; right occ lobe holds some IM processing
IM/EM Explanation: Conscious and Unconscious Processing (Jacoby) - general
-Automatic Ret - unconscious: prior exposure leads to more fluent processing (faster, easier)
-feeling of familiarity
-just need prior exposure
Controlled Ret. - Conscious: invoked by the intent to remember
-need full attn, good processing, etc
Jacoby: process pure
an EM test not entirely controlled ret. (some IM too)
e.g. see dog - circle dog (don't remember it but know it)
Mandler: Butcher on the Bus
see face on bus, say I know him, figure out it's the butcher
Ways Conscious and Unconscious processes work together to affect behavior (Jacoby)
1) Automatic ret. stimulates a conscious ret. search (e.g. Butcher on bus)
-aging and divided attn affect controlled ret.
2) Conscious ret. processes oppose auto ret. process
-telling same story twice: b/c feels familiar but control search fails (don't remember telling it)
Jacoby, Woloshyn, & Kelley (1989): Non-famous names - Part 1
-read 40 non-famous names; either with full attn. or divided attn (1 digit every 2 seconds, press key if hear 3 consecutive odd digits)
-told all Ps names not famous
-give fame rating task (old non-famous, new non-famous, famous) - interested if rate old non-famous as famous b/c fimiliar
DA: have familiar feeling but can't consciously recall b/c attn. divided (27% false rating)
FA: better conscious ret. search (19% false rating)
Jacoby, Woloshyn, & Kelley (1989): Non-famous names - Part 2
give recog test (10 old NF not presented during test phase, and 10 new non-famous)
FA: 63% hits, 0% false alarms
DA: 30% hits, 11% false alarms (poorer controlled search)
Deja vu and Familiar Feeling
Thought: there before but attn divided; so once there again, familiar feeling but can't remember actual context
Actual: false though - old adults have less deja vu
Perception/Memory as a Video Recorder
False - only veridical for 300 ms, then a construction of a representation
-use bottom up and top down, add and omit
Retrieval: don't just dump out mems, you reconstruct them (top down)
-post-event info also affects mems
The importance of Comprehension of memory
relating what you're learning to what you already know (but we supply info not in original message)
Logical Inferences
we add these necessarily true inferences at comprehension
Ex. Sentence - The 3 turtles on a floating log, fish swam beneath it
Delay: then " " them. - say same; or " near log"... - say no (remember meaning)
Pragmatic Inferences
we add reasonable but not necessarily true inferences
Ex. sentence: karate guy hit the brick
day later, we say broke the brick, or hit the brick with his hand
Bagget (1975): Barber shop pics (pragmatic inf)
-give series of pics (long-haired dude goes into barbershop, comes out with short hair)
-either immediate test (pic of actually getting hair cut) or test 1 week later (same false pic)
-imm. test - say no; delay test - say yes
example of prag inf - blends stimulus and inference
Events prior knowledge influences at retrieval?
Typical events, NOT atypical ones
Bartlett (1932): First Schema study (canoe)
-read Native American folk story to English boys; many elements foreign to them
-recall influenced by schemas (added, omitted changed details to fit schema)
-e.g. change "canoe" to "boat"
Reconstruction (Bartlett)
in retrieval we use info from both memory storehouse and from knowledge of world (schema) to reconstruct what probably happened
NOT just pulling info from mem storehouse
Bower, Black & Turner (1979): Script study
-script of restaurant scene, does not mention about patron paying bill
-recog test about confidence in seeing sentences in story
-high confidence in script sentences actually in story, but also in script sentences NOT in story (5.46-3.49)
-low confidence in sentences neither in script nor story
Dooling & Christiaansen (1977): Helen Keller study
-read story about "Carol Harris" (Helen Keller's real name)
-1 wk delay - was sentence "She was deaf, dumb, blind" in story?
-some right before recog test told that Carol was Helen Keller's real name or not told anything
-those not told don't believe sentence in story, those told do (falsely recognize sentence to be in story)
-shows reconstruction at ret., b/c told after encoding happened, right at ret.
Roediger & McDermott (1995); Deese (1959): "Sleep" false mem study
read list of words that all have to do with concept of sleep (but "sleep" not on it)
-either immediate or delay recall
-immediate: recall "sleep" on as often as words that were actually on it
-high confidence, even when told they will be tempted to recall associates not on list
-with 2 day delay, report "sleep" even more often than actual list word (McDermott, 1996)
Why does "sleep" false memory recall occur (from Roediger & McDermott, 1995, study)
1) Background knowledge (that "sleep" is related to other list words) becomes folded into mem for list w/o participant intended it to
2) Or, hear list of sleep-related words and then think about "sleep" at encoding; at recall, can't remember if just thought about it or actually perceived it (source mem error)
Source Memory & Source Confusion
-remember the source from which information originated
-mistaking one's own thought for an event (did I shut the garage door or just think i did)
like reality monitoring
Gonsalves et al (2004): Reality Monitoring - from Exam 2
show 350 words; 1/2 followed by pic of word, 1/2 by black rectangle (mental image word)
-test: see word or imagine it?
-27% of time thought saw pic when really image
-more activity in visual imagery of brain, more likely false mem
Loftus, Miller, & Burns (1978): Crash scene photos
-show slide show of crash scene
-fill out questionnaire regarding scene
-some questions misleading (did car pass other car when stop at yield sign - when really it was a stop sign)
-later, when selecting which sign they saw (stop or yield), those who were misled had false mem twice as often as those not misled
-prob source confusion - remember seeing about yield sign, but forgot saw it in question, not actual pic
Loftus & Palmer (1974): "Smash" "Hit" study
-short film of crash scene, estimate speed at which cars were going when collided
-alternate verb: "hit" / "smash" / "bumped" etc
-estimated higher speeds when more violent verb used
-also asked if saw any broken glass (1 wk later) - more likely to say yes if violent verb used
Effect of providing misleading info on false mems
1) Stronger with longer delay
2) Works better with peripheral events rather than central
Bruck & Ceci (2004): READING - Forensic Development Truths about Misconceptions
1) Children do delay in divulging abuse, but will tell all (not in denial); can answer open-ended questions fine
2) Suggestiveness of interview indexed by interviewer bias (not leading question - it's the bias of Q and response to the A)
3) Suggestibility affects older children too, even adults
4) All it takes is one suggestible interview to taint a response
Kassin & Kiechel (1996): READING - false confessions ALT key
-experimenters read list of letters, Ps typ on computer
-some have confederate, some don't (some lie, some don't)
-either experimenters read fast or slow
-pressing ALT key ruins program
-esp. if witness present and lies, P will sign, internalize and confabulate
-also heightened in fast condition
Lindsay et al (2004): READING - Photos and False mems
-two real events, one false (1-2 grade); either have class pics from that year or not
-hear events, respond if can remember/image
-during week, think about the false mem
lots of false mems, but more in photo condition
Dywan & Jacoby (1990): READING - false fame and source monitoring
-judge if famous or not (20 and 20)
-pronounce nonfamous (40)
-test if famous or not (40 new famous; 20 old non-famous, 20 new NF)
-recog test (10 old non-famous read in Phase 2 but not tested in Phase 3)
-old adults more likely to make familiarity error (false fame), even though recog names less
-must be due to source monitoring - name is familiar, but can't remember if b/c famous or b/c seen before
Jacoby (1983): from Riesberg - No context, context, generate
-No context (XXXX, Dark), Context (Hot, Cold), or Generate (Low, ???) conditions
-normal effects on EM test, but also given IM test (tachistoscopic)
-reverse effects - best performance on NC, then C, then G
-due to perceptual contact - really have to perceive in NC, don't perceive at all in G, kind of perceive in C
Begg, Anas, & Farinacci (1992): from Riesberg - Henry Ford forgets reverse gear
Hear sentence, rate how interesting (some true, some false; some told if true before [man's voice vs women's voice])
-rate credibility when presented later
-if heard before, more likely to be true (even if earlier told would be false)
-familiarity leads to greater credibility ("illusion of truth")
Jacoby, Allan, Collins, & Larwill (1988): from Riesberg - Noise level and IM
-presented with some sentences
-burst of noise, judge how loud (within each burst is a sentence)
-naturally, they easier hear old sentences (even in burst of noise)
-but, they rate those bursts of noise (with sentences they could ID) as quieter, b/c reason if I can hear sentence must be quieter
Brown, Deffenbacher, & Sturgill (1977): from Riesberg - Mug Shot
-witness staged crime; 3 day delay, see mug shots of people alleged to be in crime (weren't though)
-4 more day delay, asked to ID guilty person from lineup
-29% falsely ID guilty person as person from mug shot (not in actual crime scene)
-source confusion - recognized person but thought familiarity due to being in crime
Familiarity (Riesenberg's textbook)
1) Encountered stimulus before
2) Due to prior exposure, now more fluent in processing
3) Detect that fluency is greater than expected
4) Decided that fluent b/c encountered before
5) Draw conclusion about when or where you encountered that stimuli
Familiarity in essence (Riesenberg's text)
a conclusion you draw, based on a feeling (of specialness) that is triggered by the stimulus
IMs are specific (Riesenberg's text)
Perceptual - skill will only emerge if you encounter that exact stimulus
Conceptual - combination of ideas, so altering stimulus won't matter
Modality Transfer study: from Risenberg's text
-either see list of words, then do LDT; or hear list of words and do LDT
-changing modality (hear to see) reduces priming effect
Usefulness of inferences
requires less detail, makes communication more efficient
Misinformation effect (Loftus)
memory for an event can be altered by info after event
How to implant a memory (Loftus)
1) Introduce delay between event and misinformation
2) Slip in misinformation
3) Delay before final test
Discrepancy Detection Principle (Loftus)
misinformation effect more likely when people don't detect discrepancy between original event and misinformation
How misinformation works (Loftus)
1) Hear event, have memory
2) Hear question, have memory for question
3) After delay, becomes a blended memory, lose source of information (source confusion)
Memories are malleable
Childhood sexual abuse: Possibility 2
1) No abuse
2) Therapist believes: memories faithful, sexual abuse rampant, and wide ranging sx
3) Misinformation implanted by therapist
4) Person eventually confuses actual mem with false mem
Loftus (1995; 1996): 3 true, 1 false mem
-3 true events, 1 false event (lost at shopping mall when younger - emotional)
-think about false event for one month
-by last interview, 25% falsely remembered event
-many even came up with vividly detailed account