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109 Cards in this Set

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Rationalism - all knowledge is innate (nature)

use reasoning
Empiricism - experience is source of knowledge

use observation
observation --> theory
theory --> hypothesis
John Locke
British Empiricist

mind develops through experience
use informal introspection
Logical Positivists
determine rules of science - objective or subjective
elements of conscious experience
trained introspection
William James
mental processes
introspection and objective observations
Behaviorist - science of overt behavior
E.g. Pavlov's dogs (S-->R)
intervening variables, infer these variables through overt behavior
animals have expectations
create routine, change things up, look for disruption in behavior
Tinklepaugh (1928): monkeys and bananas
monkey with banana under cup, switch to lettuce, see if looks under other cups
-shows animals can have intentions, make associations (cog. processes)
Groen & Parkman (1972): how kids add
vary size of smaller and larger number
-lesson on how to conduct an exp. and infer cog. processes
Observe and then infer
Sternberg (1966): Serial or Parallel
Scanning through STM:
Serial or Parallel (S)
Self-Terminating or Exhaustive (E)
-shows how to conduct exp, make inferences
Sperling (1960): span of apprehension (Part 1)
Whole report procedure (4-5 items)
Partial Report: 76% correct
Small Capacity?
Large Capacity: register all 12 items but decays before processing
Iconic Memory: Characteristics
Pre-attentive, veridical, pre-categorical, large capacity, quick forgetting/decay rate
Sperling (1960): Partial Response matrices (Part 2)
Varied delay of signal:
image available until 300ms
high capacity with quick delay
takes time to recode stimuli into an acoustic form
Erikson & Collins (1967): superimposed dots
Random dot patterns:
column A, B superimposed
if present A and then B less than 300 ms after, see superimposed image
evidence of literal store of A
Averbach & Coriell (1961): mask after visual presentation
Fixation Field --> Matrix w/ letters --> Blank or Mask
Evidence of literal store:
Mask erases icon (decays after 300ms anyway)
visual erases visual
Von Wright (1968): matrix with letters and numbers
Evidence of Pre-Cat store:
Matrix with both letters and numbers
tone cues response: either recall row or recall letters/numbers
76% with row, 30-40% with category
Purpose of Sensory Info Stores
preserves stimulus for further processing
Eyelids and Eyeblinks
clean eyes every 330ms
brain signals eye to blink and then inhibits incoming info, brain processes icon and processes while closed
Volkman, Riggs, & Moore (1980): light in mouth while saccading
Eyeblink (Saccade)
light in mouth, see through mouth
change intensity (when eye closed, open, blink)
open and closed: good detection
blink: poor detection
rapid involuntary eye movement
habituation otherwise
unlike saccades and eye blinks
Saccatic supression
saccades all over sentence, page every 200 ms
don't take in new info during saccade
Latour (1962): light detection while saccading
Light (light) Light
-alt. which light on (right or left) and fixate
-detect light intensity while fixating (100%)
-then vary intensity while switching (poor detection)
Implication: process icon from fixation while saccading
Loftus, Johnson, & Shimamura (1985): mask after landscape
Landscape, then either blank or mask
-present 270ms. better recognition with no mask
-present 370ms, no difference
Implication: icon existing gives 100 extra ms to process (over mask)
Weiskrantz (1974): Blindsight - two vis. pathways
-damage to occ. lobe w/ no conscious vision
-several visual pathways
Eye --> Occiptial (90%)
Eye --> Midbrain/Superio Colliculus (10%), reflexive and unconscious
Occipto-Temporal Stream
-identifies "what" objects are
Occipito-Parietal Stream
-identifies "where" in location, or "how" to get there
Characteristics of Perception
-omit, add, and distort features to produce organized rep.
-perception is "hard"
Inverse Projection Problem
3D world on a 2D retina
-lose info
-make psychology perception 3D reality
Ecological Approach
what's on retina really rich set of subtle cues giving info about reality
Computational Approach
assumes info arriving at sense doesn't completely explain, so we need to compute a rep.
Likelihood/Simplicity Rule:
E.g. Dime tilted is actually a circle
E.g. Door - rectangle or trapezoid
Gravity Rule
Square or Diamond?
Shape rule
Constancy Scaling Theory
Compute perceived size = Ret. Size + Perceived Distance
rapid and unconscious
Factors that affect Perception
-nature of physical stimulus
-physiological system
-knowledge of the world
Bottum-Up Processing
"data driven"
-initiated by data arriving at the sensory store
Top-Down Processing
"conceptually driven"
-conceptual knowledge influences the process or interpretation of lower level perceptual processes
use both
Functions of Visual Perception
1) Id objects
2) Navigate in the environment
Visual Agnosia
can't id objects from visual input
-see objects but can't give meaning
can't recognize faces
-damage to ventral stream
Fusiform Gyrus
-where brain recognizes faces
Template Matching Theory
-mental copy of environmental stimuli
-need exact copy to id
Problems w/ Template Matching
-recognize things never seen
-need infinite # templates
but, use parallel processing
Pre-Processing Operations (Template Matching)
-clean up stimuli
-normalize size
Prototype Theory
"Multiple View"
-best match
-include pre-processing ops.
Viewer-Centered Theories
Template Matching and Prototype
-multiple reps. in memory
-patterns recognized wholistically
-view dependent
-assume pre-processing
Object Centered Theories
-have one rep. in memory
-composed of features that go together (geons)
-break down into component parts and then see relations to each other
Feature Analysis Theory
Selfridge: Demons
Image, Feature, Cognitive, and Decision Demon
Hubel & Wiesel
evidence we break stimulus down into features
-single cell recording
-cells responsive to lines
-each one 10% + or -
-if 5%, both fire equally
Receptive Field (Hubel & Wiesel)
area on retina that a neuron is responsive to
Hypercolumns (Hubel & Wiesel)
collections of 200+ neurons that all have same receptive field
-more complex cells more ventral
Current Thinking of Pattern Recognition
use both viewer and objective centered theories
Simple cat.: OC
Fine Disc.: VC
Limitations of Pattern Recog. Theories
bottom-up only
-but we recognize ambiguous stimuli
-read faster in context
Miller (1962): words with white noise
Words in random or meaningful order with white noise in background
Random: hear 50% words
Grammatical: hear 100%
-bottom-up same, so top-down influences
Pollack & Pickett (1963): isolated words vs speech recog
ID of isolated words in normal speech is poor
-normal convo in normal room (95% id)
-isolate words and put in random order (id 50%)
-importance of TD processing in perception
Samuel (1987): crogress
Phonemic Restoration Effect
-present non-word (crogress) and replace phoneme
cr[cough]gress (hear literal)
pr[cough]gress (hear "progress" with cough in background)
-phoneme coming from top-down
Davenport & Potter (2004): Football player/priest
Consistent/Inconsistent scenes (football player and priest)
-id object or background after quick presentation and mask
Obj: C - 85%; IC - 70%
Bgr: C - 50%; IC - 35%
Neely (1977): "pear" and prime
Priming in LDT
-no prime or prime
-faster when related prime beforehand
-threshold of activation - no prime all buttom-up
-prime - top-down too which sends out activation to all assocations of "pear" which speeds up activation
Characteristics of Attentional System
1) selectively attend
2) some processing of unattended info (ability to switch)
Cherry (1953): DLT physical characteristics
DLT: remember only physical characteristics of unattended message
-present or absent, male or female
-not language, not meaning, not speech vs. non-speech
Moray (1959): LDT - recog on unattended channel
LDT: chance recog. and minimal memory of words presented in unattended ear
-very little processing
-supports Early Selection
Attention Theories
Early Filter/Bottleneck, Late Selection (Filter), and Resource Capacity
Early Filter (Selection)/Bottleneck
-attend only one message at a time
-process both for physical analysis only
Problems with Early Selection Theory
-not adaptive (can't switch to important task)
-research shows we do process (somewhat) unattended stimuli
Triesman (1960): "at the ballgame...the pitcher threw"
-shows limitation of Early Selection
-"At the ballgame...word word"
-"Word word...the pitcher threw"
-switch to ear that makes more sense, more consistent
Late Selection Theory
-process both messages for physical and meaning, then select
-bias to select message consistent with task
-bias to select most highly activated signal (important/expected)
Problems with Late Selection
-assumes memory for meaning of unattended
-perhaps it's in unconscious (implicit memory)
Eich (1984): homophones in unattended (DLT)
-shadow, present 16 homophones in unattended
- (some have bias word: "window" pane)
-bad explicit memory for them
-if had bias word, more likely to write down homophone they saw (implicit)
-suggests late selection (implicit mem for unattended channel)
Marcell (1980): Priming LDT - top down processes
-xxx--> wrist (slow)
-palm --> wrist (fast)
-palm (mask) --> wrist (still fast)
-aid of top-down processes (even with mask)
Resource Capacity Theories
Kahneman, 1973
-finite pool of attentional resources, allocate pool
Johnson & Heinz (1974): DLT same message
DLT: with same message repeated
-light intensity changes
-Early trials: slow in detection (shadow takes up resources)
-Late trials: faster (shadowing takes up less, know better - more automatic)
Green & Bevelier (2003): Flanker Compatibility Task
-see square, then compatible (circles with a square, and square distractor)
-incompatible, see square, circles with squares but triangle distractor
Low Load: Late Selection theory
High Load: Early Selection theory
Kahneman (bus driver study)
DLT: switch from attended to unattended when light changes intensity
-ability to selectively attend predicts accident records
Characteristics of Auto Processing Theory
1) require few resources
2) extensive training
3) rarely conscious
4) occurs w/o intention (Stroop)
James Reason/Action Slips
unintended, often automatic actions inappropriate for current situation
Flanker Effect experiment
-only supposed to read bottom word (top word a flanker)
-non-word (510ms); unrelated word (510ms)
-related word (480ms)
-we automatically read flanker, unintended (obligatory access)
Spelke, Hirst, & Neisser (1980): comprehension and dictation
-read stories aloud for comprehension
-or, read aloud and dictate other words
-better comp. for condition 1
-however, after a ton of practice, dictation condition equals condition 1
-automaticity from practice
Inattentional Blindness
failure to consciously perceive clearly visible objects (in center of visual field)
Implications of Inattentional Blindness
-Late Selection theory: still processing, just unconsciously
-intuition: unconscious processing
Beilock, Carr, et. al (2002)
-Attention and Automatic Performance
Experiment One
-experienced golfers putting from different spots
-C1: divided attention --> hear "thorn" and say aloud
-C2: focused attention --> focus on swing, say "stop" at end of swing
Results: better putting in C1 (divided attention)
Beilock, Carr, et. al (2002)
-Attention and Automatic Performance
Experiment Two
-novice and experienced soccer players dribbling around cones
-C1: divided attention ("thorn")
-C2: focused: hear tone and report if last touched ball with inside or outside
-Novice (r): better in focused attention
-Experienced (r): better in divided
-Experienced (l): better in focused
-Implication: when learning - pay attention; when automatic - divide attention
Binding Problem
in parallel distributed processing, simultaneously process all aspects of (ex. red ball rolling)
-how are all these features bound as a unified perception?
Feature Integration Theory (Triesman)
-Bind Problem
1) when processing, do pre-attentive processing (parallel feature analysis) - free floating, not attached
2) in parietal lobe, focused attention does binding
Cohen & Terry (1989)
Binding Problem
-two numbers, report bigger font
-meanwhile, an F (or X) and a distractor (O) digit appear in periphery in either red or greeen
-report whether X or F presented
-report in what color
-can report on letter, but had to guess what color
-had encoded letter, but not color to letter (still pre-attentive)
Robertson & Triesman (1987)
Case Study: Bind Problem
-patient who can't focus attention
-show either blue square or green circle
-can report if square or circle, and can report if blue or green, but can't attach red to square nor green to circle
-as if free-floating
Limits to Performing two tasks Simultaneously: Pashler vs. capacity theory
-against capacity theory, which says that limits correspond to task demands and individual response capacity
-thinks more severe limits: can't perform two decisions at same time
Pashler (1992)
Limits to Simultaneous Decisions
Exp. 1
-Simple Tasks
-present "1" and press red key; see "2" press green key (left hand)
-Task 2: "A" = left key; "B" = right key (all with right hand)
Task 1: Perceive S1 / Response Selection / Execute Response 1
-wait 150ms
-Task 2: ---- Perceive S2 / Response Selection / Execute Response 2 (Capacity)
-Task 2: ---- Perceive S2 / .... Response Selection / Execute Response 2 (Pashler)
Pashler (1992)
Limits to Simultaneous Decisions
Exp. 2
T1 more difficult: Capacity
-Task 1: P -- S1 / RS / Ex R1
-Task 2: -- P S2 / RS / Ex R2
-takes same time
-Task 1: P -- S1 / RS / Ex R1
-Task 2: -- P S2 / ---- / RS / Ex R2
-takes more time than Cap. Theory
Pashler (1992)
Limits to Simultaneous Decisions
Exp. 3
T2 more difficult: Capacity
-Task 1: P S1 / RS / Ex R1
-Task 2: -- P --- S1 / RS / Ex R2
-Task 1: P S1 / RS / Ex R1
-Task 2: -- P --- S1 / RS / Ex R2
-takes as much time as Cap. Theory
Yerkes-Dodson Law (1908)
Arousal and Performance
-Low arousal = low performance
-Med arousal = high performance
-High arousal = low performance
Berkun (1964): unethical arousal study with army parachute
-Phase 1: recruits learn ditching procedure and lists personal belongings
-Phase 2:
-Exp: on plane, think going to crash, told to remember D procedure and belongings
-Control: not going to die, but list D and belongings
-Exp. 30% worse recall on D procedure and 10% worse on belongings
-high arousal decreases performance
de Quervian (2000)
-Cortizone and Arousal/Performance
Group 1: different levels of cortizone (cortisol/stress)
Group 2: control
-med. level of cortizone better performance than control
-high and low levels worse performance than control
Cue Utilization Hypothesis (Easterbrook, 1959)
1) Arousal takes up attentional capacity
2) Arousal reduces # cues used to direct performance
Ex. number pattern
-Low: won't restrict range, think of either possible pattern
-High: restrict range, only think of limited cue
-Med: proper range of cues
How to overcome high arousal/low performance
-lower arousal
-overlearn response (so that more capacity available for arousal)
Yerkes-Dodson (1908) Law
-Real law
-Easy task
-Low: low performance
-Med: low performance
-High: high performance
arouse a lot, want restricted range
Yerkes-Dodson (1908) Law
-Real law
-Med task
-Normal Y-D curve
Yerkes-Dodson (1908) Law
-Real law
-Complex task
-Low: high performance
-Med: low performance
-High: low performance
need many cues, so don't arouse much
Thought Suppression
unwanted thoughts often interfere with attention
-Ex. quitting a bad habit, always think about it
Wegner et. al (1987)
Thought Suppression
Report stream of consciousness
-Group 1: Expression (can think of white bear, ring bell) then Suppression (don't think of bear, but ring bell)
-Group 2: Suppression then Expression
-G1: Expression (response decreases; Suppression (response decreases)
-G2: Suppression (response decreases); Expression (response increases
Thought Suppression Theory
when suppressing, do "controlled distractor search"
-this is conscious and takes up resources
-soon, all distractors associated with forbidden thought
Limits to Wegner's Thought Suppression experiment
-demand characteristics
-introspection used
Ventral (vs. Dorsal)
e.g. towards feet
Dorsal (vs. Ventral)
e.g. towards head
Shiffrin & Schneider (1997)
Auto=Reduced attn.
Memory set, search cards to see if they have letter (distractors)
Cat. Condition: one pool for mem set, different one for distractor
Mixed condition: one big pool for them all
if visual search auto, take same amount of time to process cards no matter how many stimuli
Shiffrin & Schneider (1997)
Auto=Reduced attn.
became auto in C Condition only
shows that through practice, it becomes auto
need consistency
theories: better memory, or losing middle processes, or a secondary process takes over