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13 Cards in this Set

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The Problem of Other Minds
This conclusion is deeply implausible, but the skeptical problem is quite robust. Belief in other minds requires inferences from behavior; such inferences require generalizations about creatures in general; such generalizations can only be justified by experience of creatures in general; but experience of one's own case is all one can have. This is the classical problem of other minds.
Solution 1 to the problem of other minds:
argument from analogy. One can observe If the generalizations are true of me, then it is a reasonable inference, by analogy with my own case, that they are also true of other humans.
1st Refutation of the argument from analogy (inductive generalization)
The first problem is that it represents one's knowledge of other minds as resting on an inductive generalization from exactly one case.
2nd Refutation of the argument from analogy
If one's knowledge of other minds is ultimately limited by what one can observe in one's own case, then it will not be possible for color-blind people justly to believe that other humans have visual sensations that are denied to them. One can reasonably ascribe to other minds, on this view, only what one finds in one's own mind.
3rd Refutation of the argument from analogy
If I am to distinguish between and clearly recognize the many varieties of mental states, thereafter to divine the connections they bear to my behavior, I must possess the concepts necessary for making such identifying judgments: I must grasp the meaning of the terms "pain", "grief", "fear", "desire", "belief", and so forth. But the meaning of those terms is given, largely or entirely,by a network of general assumptions connecting them with terms for other mental states, external circumstances, and observable behavior. One's understanding of our folk-psychological concepts, therefore, must derive from something more than just the uninformed examination of one's own stream of consciousness.
Solution 2: to the problem of other minds (philosophical behaviorists):
The philosophical behaviorists argued that if the generalizations connecting mental states with behavior cannot be suitably justified by empirical observation, then perhaps that is because those generalizations were not empirical generalizations to start with. Rather, it was suggested, those generalizations are true by sheer definition. They are operational definitions of the psychological terms they contain. As such, they stand in no need of empirical justification. And a creature that behaves, or is disposed to behave, in the appropriate ways is by definition conscious, sentient, and intelligent.
Solution 3: to the problem of other minds ("hypothetico-deductive" justification):
if we assume certain hypotheses, and conjoin with them information about observable circumstances, we can often deduce statements concerning further observable phenomena, statements which, it subsequently turns out, are systematically true. To the degree that any theory displays such explanatory and predictive virtues, that theory becomes a beliefworthy hypothesis.. In sum, a theory about unobservables can be beliefworthy if it allows us to explain and to predict some domain of observable phenomena better than any competing theory. This is in fact the standard mode of justification for theories in general.
Solution 3: to the problem of other minds ("hypothetico-deductive" justification):
if we assume certain hypotheses, and conjoin with them information about observable circumstances, we can often deduce statements concerning further observable phenomena, statements which, it subsequently turns out, are systematically true. To the degree that any theory displays such explanatory and predictive virtues, that theory becomes a beliefworthy hypothesis.. In sum, a theory about unobservables can be beliefworthy if it allows us to explain and to predict some domain of observable phenomena better than any competing theory. This is in fact the standard mode of justification for theories in general.
Incorrigibility thesis
The thesis that it is logically impossible to be mistaken about such things as whether I am now in pain or am seeing or seeming to see something red.
The Theory-Ladenness of All Perception
All perceptual judgments, not just introspective ones, are 'theory-laden': all perception involves speculative interpretation. This, at least, is the claim of more recently developed versions of empiricism.
The network argument.
1. Any perceptual judgment involves the application of concepts (for example, a is F).
2. Any concept is a node in a network of contrasting concepts, and its meaning is fixed by its peculiar place within that network.
3. Any network of concepts is a speculative assumption or theory: minimally, as to the classes into which nature divides herself, and the major relations that hold between them.
Therefore, 4. Any perceptual judgment presupposes a theory.
"de dicto"
is a belief that a certain proposition is true. Clark Kent is weaker than superman. Contradictions are possible.
"de re"
Is a belief about a particular thing that it has a certain property. Clark Kent cannot be weaker than superman (because they are the same strength. Contradictions are not possible.