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35 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Preference List Ballot (PLB) |
A ranked ordering of candidates. Usually most-preferred to least-preferred |
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How many PLB's can be cast in an election with "k" candidates? |
k! |
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MAJORITY RULE |
for choice between 2 cand.s; when the most-preferred cand. out of 2 wins all cand.s treated the same monotone |
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May's Theorem |
In a 2-cand election, majority rule is best way |
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CONDORCETS METHOD |
system for 3 or more candidates beats everyone in a 1-on-1 contest |
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Formula for how many methods in condorcet's method: |
k(k-1)/2 |
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Condorcet's Voting Paradox |
with 3 or more cand.s, theres times where it yields NO WINNERS (if there's a different winner every time) |
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Plurality Voting |
3 or more cand.s Cand. with the MOST 1ST PLACE VOTES wins |
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Condorcet Winner Criterium (CWC) |
satisfied if: -theres no condorcet winner OR -the voting system produces the same winner as condorcet winner |
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Plurality Voting doesn't satisfy WHAT? |
CWC |
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Borda Count |
for more than 3 cand.s when each rank is assigned a number, 0,1,2,3... their borda score is the sum of all of their borda counts, and the one with the largest borda score wins |
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Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) |
satisfied provided that: for every election, ints impossible for a cand. to move from loser to winner unless someone switches that cand. and the winning cand. |
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Borda count doesn't satisfy what? |
IIA |
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Sequential Pairwise |
agenda 1-1 matches through agenda |
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Hare system |
runoff system least preferred (FEWEST 1ST PLACE VOTES) eliminated |
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Plurality Runoff |
most 1st-place runoff (or most 2nd place) |
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Approval Voting |
each voter gives a check to every acceptable cand. winner is the one who receives the most approval votes |
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Disingenuous ballot |
ballot that misrepresents a voter's true preferences |
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When is the Borda count manipulable? |
Only if there are FOUR OR MORE CAND.S |
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How is sequential pairwise differently manipulable? |
it's subject to AGENDA MANIPULATION. |
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How is plurality differently manipulable? |
not individually manipulable, but is GROUP MANIPULABLE. |
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What makes a weighted voting system? |
Voters have varying levels of power. VOTING WEIGHTS |
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QUOTA |
the # of votes needed to pass a motion quota can't be higher than total weight of voters can't be less than half of the total weight |
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Dictator |
there's only one person who can make the motion pass |
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Dummy Voter |
someone who NEVER has the deciding vote |
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Veto Power |
someone whose vote is necessary to pass any notion (but isn't greater than the quota, like a dictator) |
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POWER INDEX |
numerical measure of voting power |
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SHAPLEY-SHUBIK POWER INDEX (SSPI) |
PERMUTATIONS PIVOTAL VOTER number of permutations: n! you list every permutation, the weights, and then determine the pivotal voter SSPI for the system is listed in fractions, they should all add up to 1 a SSPI of 0 means you're a dummy voter a SSPI of 1 means you're a dictator |
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PERMUTATION |
an ordering of a set of items (ex: ABC, ACB, BAC, BCA, etc.) |
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PIVOTAL VOTER |
the voter that gets you above the weight of the quota
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LOOK AT YOUR SSPI SHORTCUT |
JUST DO IT |
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Banzhaf Power Index (BPI) |
VOTING COMBINATION CRITICAL VOTER EXTRA VOTES number of combinations: 2 to the n list combination, binary, and whether it's winning or losing (outcome). Then for JUST THE WINNING COMB.S, list the weights, extra votes, and who the critical voter(s) were. count up the # of times each letter was the CV, multiply by 2, and that's your BPI (winning comb: w-q) (losing comb: q-w-1) |
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THE COMBINATION FORMULA |
# of ways to choose k outcomes, not regarding order, from n possibilities nCk = n!/k!(n-k)! "n choose k" so if you have 7 skittles and you want to choose 4 of them, you would say 7C4 7!/4!(3!) |
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COALITIONS |
winning losing blocking minimal winning |
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Minimal Winning Coalition |
where every voter in the coalition is needed (if any one of them left, it would lose) |
