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24 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
Heuristics
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Simple rules or "mental shortcuts" that aid in making complex judgements and decisions. Used when we have limited or incomplete information.
(+)Reduce time and effort required to make reasonably good judgement (+)Usually leads to correct judgements (-)May lead to systematic "biases" |
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Representative Heuristic
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Judging likelihood of something by degree to which it resembles something else
-Category membership judgements -Cause-effect judgement Problem: Factors that affect actual likelihood do not affect perceived similarity |
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Law of large numbers
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States that the larger the sample you draw from a population, the closer its average will be to the population average
Problem: People believe that random samples of a population will resemble each other and the population more closely than sampling theory would predict (law of small numbers) |
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Local representativeness
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People assume that a sequence will look "random" at every point and fail to realize that long runs will occur by chance alone
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Gambler's Fallacy
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Belief that a series of independent trials with same outcome will be followed by the opposite outcome
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Hot Hand Fallacy
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Mistaken belief that a player is more likely to make a shot after one or more successful shots than after missing a shot
-Basketball study: Fans thought player's chances of making a shot increased after that player had made several successful shots. Statistical analysis showed that the chances of making next shot were no different from player's overall average |
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Base Rate Neglect
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-"base rate" is the actual frequency with which an event occurs
-judging by representativeness leads people to ignore base rates -Lawyers and Engineers Problem: participants used personality sketch to determine occupation and ignored base rates |
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Regression to the Mean
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A law of nature. When two variables are imperfectly correlated, cases that are extreme on one variable will tend to be less extreme on the second.
-Most people assume a case that is extreme on one variable will be equally extreme on second variable -ex. height of parents and children, grades on two exams, Israeli flight instructors, Sports Illustrated jinx, measures designed to stem a crisis like an increase in crime will seem to have more impact than they actually do |
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Experts and the RH
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Experts still use it
-"Experts study": expert's predictions are less accurate than predictions based on statistical models -"Diagnoses study": Diagnoses of progressive brain dysfunction among physicians, statistical model accurate 83%, experienced physicians 63%, and inexperienced 58% |
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Recommendations for RH
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1. Avoid being misled by highly detailed scenarios
2. Pay attention to base rates 3. Chance is not self-correcting 4. Don't ignore regression to the mean |
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Availability Heuristic
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Judging frequency or probability by the ease with which instances or occurrences come to mind
Problem: Ease of recall (or imaginability) not perfectly related to actual frequency -Letter K Study -Famous Names Study |
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Guacamole study
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Results: vividness had no effect on judgements at first session, but strong effect one week later.
Presumably, vivid information was easier to recall, and thus had more of an effect following a delay |
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Overclaiming effects
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Our own contributions to a group activity are more available in memory than other member's contributions, thus we tend to overestimate our own relative contributions
-study with husbands/wives estimating how often each did household activities |
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False consensus effects
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People overestimate the extent to which others share their attitudes, traits, and characteristics
Our own preferences and traits are more "available" in memory than those of others so use them more when judging others' characteristics |
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Unpacking effects
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Single instances are often easier to recall (or imagine) than groups or categories of instances, and thus judged more probable
-ex: how many people die a year from cancer vs. how many people die a year from (1) lung cancer, (2) brain cancer, (3) liver cancer, (4) skin cancer |
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Anchoring and Adjustment
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Making estimates by starting from an initial value (anchor) that is adjusted to yield a final answer
Adjustments tend to be insufficient, thus the anchor biases judgements Occurs even if anchor is arbitrary and completely irrelevant to the judgement -ex: United Nations study |
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Standard anchoring procedure
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1. Compare target value to anchor - is target value higher or lower than anchor?
2. Give numeric estimate of target value - what is the target value? |
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Why do anchoring effects occur?
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1. Priming explanation: the anchor value makes anchor-consistent information more available in memory which influences decision [German Temperature Study]
2. Insufficient Adjustment explanation: people attempt to adjust their judgments away from anchor, but their adjustments tend to be insufficient, particularly true when anchor is known to be wrong or arbitrarily selected [President Washington Study] |
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Confusion of the inverse
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People interpret one conditional probability - p(x given y) - as being equal to the reverse conditional - p(y given x). They are not equal
-ex: 70% of people with lunger cancer are smokers, misinterpreted as 70% of smokers get lung cancer which is untrue |
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Unique invulnerability
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Most people think their outcomes will be better than everyone else's
-ex: unrealistic optimism study found that participants rated themselves 15% more likely than the average student to experience positive events and 20% less likely to experience negative events |
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Compound events
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-Conjunctive events: several events must occur together for overall outcome to occur, ex. win money if coin is flipped twice and lands heads both times
-Disjunctive events: any one event must occur for overall outcome to occur, ex. win money if coin is flipped twice and lands heads either time -people overestimate the probability of conjunctive events and underestimate the probability of disjunctive events |
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Conservatism
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People revise their probability estimates far more conservatively than is warranted by the data
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Dimensions of risk perceptions
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1. Dread risk
-uncontrollable, catastrophic potential, fatal consequences -examples: nuclear power, nuclear waste 2. Unknown risk -unobservable, unknown to those exposed, new or unfamiliar, delayed harm -ex: genetic, chemical technologies |
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Bracing effect
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People become more pessimistic in the face of potential bad news
-helps avoid shock of a negative surprise |