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42 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Ethan D. Scheiner
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(Why did the LDP dominate? -> Opposition failed to co-op, so clientelism and the centralization of power gave the incumbents a major advantage)
(W/ Thies in response to the effects of 90s reforms: There have definitely been changes over time, as people are much more POLICY oriented and there IS LESS MONEY in politics0 |
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Ohmura
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On public demands and MACRO-POLITY: The people demanded, and the LDP responded (correlation of law indexes). Except for agriculture and education.
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Krauss and Pekkanen
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Wrote the book on LDP rise and fall. Also saw in the Koenkai some neat stuff like politicians not even mentioning their name but still sponsoring major sporting events getting amazing photo ops with randoms AS WELL AS THE KOENKAI
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Yves Tiberghien
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Japanese bubble occured from actions in the 80s. U.S. pushed deregulation, and global markets wanted more exports. Domestic sectors wanted less supervision, and the banks pushed for deregulation. The outcome was ill-supervised deregulation.
The main cause was the liberalization of domestic finance, which exacerbated investments into real-estate. Thesis: Japan deregulated because it was the path of least political resistance in the face of global pressures to liberalize, and domestic pressures to back off from regulating. |
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Murakami
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With his boys on immigration: Zainichi Koreans were not considered members of a nation-state (instead of a state-nation), but japan inevitably gave them rights due to their global position. As well, their old ties with the JCP and other dirty commies kept them from being recognized as proper Japanese
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Steven R. Reed
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Why did Japan reform so much in the 90s?
- New party receptacle (JRP and ozawas babies) GAINED STEAM and caused gov't change. This was in response to the 1994 money scandals. |
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Arai
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Enforced voters theory: Voters keep voting and showing up if they like expressing and/or their party succeeds
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Ben Nyblade
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On why the PM's have turned over so much: hyper-accountability.
PMO has presidentialized and taken on a lot more accountability than before. As well there are many more independent/volatile voters. |
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Izumikawa
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Pacifists strictly follow A9, while anti-traditionalists want a more entrenched democracy
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Maruyama
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Japan's imperialism showed up because the Japanese obeyed whatever someone told them above.
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Tsutsui
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The most important power relationship was between cabinet and the military
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Fukumoto and Murai
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Gunbu daijin system of no MoD/MoW positions for non-active generals/admirals DID NOT HAVE AN EFFECT ON CABINET LONGEVITY
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Junnosuke Masumi
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1955 system occurred against the backdrop of the labor-management conflict (between left and right parties).
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Chalmers Johnson
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Developmental State theory. Japan grew via natural consequences (geo, labor stock), low security concerns, and STATE-LED PLAN RATIONAL ECONOMY. A part of this is about administrative guidance uses, and the CONVOY SYSTEM
Wrote the book on MITI. Believes Sumitomo lost the battle against MITI |
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Convoy System
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A result of administrative guidance. The act of gov't/bureau elites controlling/guiding industries through regulations. They regulated the speed at which businesses grew and produced. ALL ABOUT PLANNING MOF'KA
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Mowa and Ramseyer
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Believed that Sumitomo Metals beat MITI by winning the quota battle as well as pushing MITI off from a lawsuit
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Jun Saito
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The more pork barrel **** the LDP made, the worse they did in the area with voters due to time, needs, and urbanization.
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Kurt Vogel
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Japan took incremental changes in financial restructuring. It took until OBUCHI in 98-2000. Japan is a coordinated market economy so the keiretsu kept this from occuring (reform).
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T.J. Pempel
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Regime Shift: it occured in the 90s. It's caused by socioeconomic institutions and coalittions changing, as well as changes occurring in political institutions and public policy circles. The CONSERVATIVE REGIME DIED IN THE 1990s
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Kobayashi
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In response to the structural and financial reforms: He says that not much effect came about because pork barrel politics still existed.
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Immigration Gate Control
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Letting immigrants in with visas: VERY strict (the strictest component of its policy), Jpn has 1pct of population as foreign-born, though they've let a few more in lately.
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Nikkei-Jin
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Japanese mass emigration to Brazil - in early 20th c. They came back for the most part.
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Zainich Koreans
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2.3m came during/before the war, and 1.5m went back. The remaining 500k+ are Zainichi
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Cornelius and Tsuda (2006)
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Outlined the three fundamental principles of Japanese immigration policy:
1) NO UNSKILLED WORKERS 2) Only highly skilled workers 3) All will only be TEMPORARY |
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Liberal immigration changes in 2012
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"Alien registration" abolished. Maximum length of stay with a single visa was extended.
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Illegal immigration accommodation chart (x=gate control dimension, y=integration)
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Where does japan lay? more to 0 for both X/Y.
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Why is gate control so strict?
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Economy: high population rates meant they didn't want more people. Now they need younger skilled people. No businesses pushed for this before, and there is currently a labor shortage
Domestic political opportunities: No pro-immigration parties, and MoJ has been against it. Culture: racists, exclusive, etc. |
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Why is Japan racist?
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No hate speech law! Also more websites/apartments are saying foreigners are okay.
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Integration policy
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0.6% get nationalized. its very strict. Most of them are the koreans.
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Why are Zainichi allowed to stay?
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1. Norms and institutions of Japan
2. Liberal democracy theory, they need to be nice to humans man 3. Political ideology: DPJ is pro-social democracy |
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Japanese media consumption
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Japanese have a very high newspaper circulation rate, LOTS of people watch TV News
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Kisha Club
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Gov't operated reporters club, with a patronage system involved giving more way to major journalists and organz. High incentive towards those to conform to authority or else they won't get sources at all.
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Krauss and Lambert on dogs
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Found that Asahi Shinbun were not extremely watchdogs, lapdogs, or "lead-dogs". Instead its very objective info with 80pct of info from officials. 80pct is neutral.
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Tsubaki Incident (1993)
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Major reporting chief in Asahi wanted to be anti-LDP. LDP lost, he got suspended, and Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications was given administrative guidance for NEUTRALITY purposes.
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Tone of the paper correlates with cabinet support
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When tone is positive, cab support increases. When negative, support decreases
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Human and non-human coverage
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NHK is objective, public, and non-human mostly. Private TV stations are more human and dramatized.
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Taniguchi (2002)
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KUME EFFECT. Watching more TV news makes you more cynical.
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Judicial system
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Three-tiered. Supreme court, high court, then lower district/summary/family courts. Supreme Court judges can be removed by votes in each HoR election. CONSIDERED DYSFUNCTIONAL.
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Saiban-in system (lay judge) since 2009
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Limited to serious crimes, lay judges decide on punishments, and its more like a JURY system
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Judicial independence (Ramseyer and Rasmussen)
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There are political biases attached to career incentives. INCUMBENTS TEND TO WIN so LDP benefits
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Kobayashi
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This author did not believe that pork barrel politics changed much in 1994. There were still strong relationships between local subsidies and the LDP vote share. This continued in the 2000s.
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Nakasone
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82-87. perpetuated bubble and did reaganomics
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