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61 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
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Bee & ant communication
Ant & wasp navigation Evidence for-- |
1. Symbolic communication system
2. Mind as symbol processing device (symbolic computation) 3. Mental maps |
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Alternative models of cognition:
Behaviorist / Stimulus-Response |
all states of an organism are behaviors, without any recourse to
hypothetical constructs like, ‘mind’, abstract or symbolic thought |
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Alternative models of cognition:
Connectionist / Neural Net / Sub-symbolic |
learning is simply reinforcement of connections in dense,
uniform networks. There is no place for symbolic logic. |
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Alternative models of cognition:
Symbol processing / mediated cognition |
The currency of thought consists of abstract symbols, minds are
symbol processors. |
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symbolic systems
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a symbol (variable)
set of operations performed on values of the symbols |
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symbolic systems:
discrete |
symbols are not merely values on a continuum
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symbolic systems:
combinatory |
symbols can be meaningfully combined
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symbolic systems:
compositional |
symbols maintain their meaning when combined
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symbolic systems:
non-iconic |
symbol does not resemble object it represents
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Round dance properties
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-food is relatively nearby ( 3 to 80 meters)
-value is hard coded in each sub-species, and cannot be modified by learning -dialects mutually incomprehensible -rate / agitation / duration indicate food quantity -three bees follow along and receive information (tactile, olfactory, visual, auditory) -they then execute a random search within the defined circle |
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Tail-wagging dance properties
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walks straight line while waggling tail,
then circles back to begin again. number of circuits per time unit inversely correlates to distance duration of waggling run directly correlates to distance (75ms waggling = 100 m distance) dance axis ‘symbolizes’ or references sun--direction to the goal compass / earth’s magnetic field agitation and duration indicate food quality |
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Iconic vs. symbolic
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vertical surface: axis
of dance with respect to vertical (as determined by gravity) = sun compass angle |
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How do bees measure distance?
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flicker rate: bees measure
distance by the motion of images received by their eyes as they fly (optical flow, also called “motion parallax”. |
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other bee info
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Time sense = metabolic rate (chilled bees calculate time
differently) Other behaviors also deploy dance (swarming, water collecting) Distance = effort: Bees flying with tiny weights attached, or in a crosswind, or forced to walk indicate greater distance |
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Bee dance vs. human language
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• Both have infinite range of possible
expressions. • Bee dance has continuous variation along the dimensions, it is a “blending” system, like color. • Human L. is a “discrete combinatorial system” (Pinker) “A finite number of discrete elements are...combined to create larger structures.” • Bee dance has an infinite number of possible messages, but they only say one thing. |
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Weaver ants’ chain communication:
iconic vs symbolic? |
”...gestures used in recruiting for fighting resemble in
some ways the movements employed in actual combat” |
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Cognitive map
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Symbolic representation
“A map that resides in the brain of an animal rather than on a sheet of paper or in the memory banks of a computer is called a cognitive map.” “A cognitive map is a mental encoding (symbolic representation) of the relative spatial positions of goals and landmarks. “If there is a cognitive map, then somewhere in the nervous system there must be neurophysiological states or activities that physically realize the position vectors that constitute the map |
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Bee triangulation
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“If a single landmark was used and it was made
bigger on some test trials, then the bees searched farther away as they would if they were locating the source by reference to the apparent size of the landmark.” “When three cylinders were used, the bee was no longer influenced by their individual apparent sizes. It centered its search for the food source at a point defined by the angular separations of the landmarks. In other words, the bees behaved as if during training they had taken what in conventional navigation is called a three-point fix.” (Cartwright & Collett 1983) “A three-point fix specifies a position in the framework defined by three landmarks. It specifies that position by recording two angles.” |
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Digger Wasp
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“The fact that the digger wasp can set off on an appropriate course for a destination she cannot currently perceive after she
has been displaced to a known point in her environment suggests that she, too, can compute courses from her cognitive map.” (Gallistel) |
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Wasp landmarking
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return to familiar landmark
• survey flight (Zeil, 1993a) • easily disoriented (Tinbergen and Kruyt (1938) ) |
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Hockett's Design Features:
Mode of communication (modality) |
vocal-auditory, tacticle-visual, or chemical-olfactory
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Hockett's Design Features:
Rapid Fading |
Message does not linger in time or space after production.
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Hockett's Design Features:
Interchangeability |
individuals who use a language can both send and receive any permissible message within that communication system.
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Hockett's Design Features:
Feedback |
users of a language can perceive what they are transmitting and can make corrections if they make errors.
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Hockett's Design Features:
Specialization |
Human language sounds are specialized for communication. When dogs pant it is to cool themselves off, when humans speak it is to transmit information.
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Hockett's Design Features:
Semanticity |
there are associative ties between signal elements and features in the world; in short, some linguistic forms have denotations.
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Hockett's Design Features:
Arbitrariness |
there is no logical connection between the form of the signal and its meaning.
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Hockett's Design Features:
Discreteness |
messages in the system are made up of smaller, repeatable parts; the sounds of language (or cheremes of a sign) are perceived categorically, not continuously.
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Hockett's Design Features:
Displacement |
linguistic messages may refer to things remote in time and space, or both, from the site of the communication.
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Hockett's Design Features:
Productivity |
users can create and understand completely novel messages.
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Hockett's Design Features:
Cultural transmission |
the conventions of a language are learned by interacting with more experienced users.
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Hockett's Design Features:
Duality (of Patterning) |
a large number of meaningful elements are made up of a conveniently small number of meaningless but message-differentiating elements.
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Hockett's Design Features:
Prevarication |
linguistic messages can be false, deceptive, or meaningless.
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Hockett's Design Features:
Reflexiveness |
In a language, one can communicate about communication.
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Hockett's Design Features:
Learnability |
A speaker of a language can learn another language.
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Central Design Features of Human Language:
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productivity, displacement, and duality
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Vicki
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raised like/with a human child in 1950s
• intensive spoken English • manipulation of mouth / lips • after 3 years, could speak 4 words ‘mama’ ‘papa’ ‘cup’ ‘up’ • comprehension of about 40 words |
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Washoe
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• lived with Gardner family from birth
• intensively studied for 30 years • Used over 1,000 “ASL” signs • Mastered 200 signs (strict criteria) • lexical innovation HAIR COAT WATER BIRD CANDY BANANA • syntax? ROGER TICKLE WASHOE = WASHOE TICKLE ROGER • displacement? FOOD, DOG |
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Nim Chimpsky
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• Behaviorist assumptions (Terrace et al)
• intensively trained over 4 years in lab • Nim learned 125 signs • two-handed signing • creation of novel signs (iconic? HAND CREAM) • deceptive signing DIRTY, SLEEP • no increase in utterance size (MLU) • extreme repetitiveness, more signs ≠ more meaning • interrupting (no turn-taking) • prompting by handlers? imitative? Critics: Nim was either imitating or emitting behaviors he knew would be rewarded. “The fact that Nim’s utterances were less spontaneous and less original than those of a child and that his utterances did not become longer, both as he learned new signs and as he acquired more experience in using sign language, suggests that much of the structure and meaning of his combinations was determined, or at least suggested, by the utterances of his teachers.” |
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Kanzi (bonobo)
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No formal training.
Acquired Yerkish by observation of mother. Uses keyboard spontaneously, in absence of trainer More spontaneous (89%), less reward-driven Also spoken to in English, responds Produces 2 or 3 lexigram sentences Uses limited gestures, multi-modality of utterances |
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critiques of primate work
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• prompting problem (Nim, Koko)
• highly repetitive, MLU not tied to progress • interruptive (Washoe, Nim) • almost all “mand” and no “tact”(Nim, Koko, Washoe) • unlicensed extensions (Nim’s DIRTY) • multi-modal (Kanzi) • researcher bias, over-interpretation, editing |
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Dolphins and proto-language
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Some impressive results
Preliminary evidence for proto-semantics and proto-syntax Useful comparison to primate studies. Not just training, interspecies communication word order crucial to meaning |
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dolphin experiments:
Pros |
Pro
– intelligence – social nature – natural vocalizations, echolocation – trainability – possible self-awareness |
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dolphin experiments:
Cons |
Con
– undeciphered acoustic communication system – one-way communication – cueing & conditioning problem |
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dolphins & displacement
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The key finding then is that the dolphin
understood symbolic references to absent objects. She understood, therefore, that the gestural symbols used on her language system represented things even if they were not immediately present. The dolphin's ability to tell us what is or is not present also shows her awareness of the contents of her physical world. |
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Chomsky’s directive
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• Descriptive adequacy
• Explanatory adequacy A Trade-off between formal, elegant cognitive models, and idiosyncratic, messy details |
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Cartesian dualism
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Animals are non-conscious automata
We have minds, souls, consciousness; entirely diff from body |
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Dualist paradox
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What's the interface b/n body & mind?
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Constructive naturalism
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physical existence is exhaustive
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Materialism
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mental not distinct from physical
“Indeed all mental states, properties, processes and operations are in principle identical with physical states, properties, processes and operations” |
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Limits of behaviorism
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persistent illusion of mental causes,
beliefs, intentions (“folk psychology”) (cf. Dennett) • development of Psychology as a field (elaboration of mental states and processes needed to explain behavior) • Chomsky’s discoveries about innateness of Language |
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Searle's biological naturalism
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consciousness is irreducible and subjective ; important aspects of consciousness (intentionality and subjective quality) can't be computed
leading proponent of "anti-computational" thought |
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Fodor's functionalism
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Goal: a materialist theory of mind that allowed
for mental causes. • Focus on information/symbol processing and finding the right level of abstraction. • Mind as “software”, programming that could be run on devices other than a brain. • “Systems as diverse as human beings, calculating machines and disembodied spirits could all have mental states.” In the functionalist view the psychology of a system depends not on the stuff it is made of (living cells, metal or spiritual energy) but on how the stuff is put together. |
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Searle
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consciousness that part of mind not
reducible to functional explanations. |
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• Dennett
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Mind as continuum of increasingly
complex algorithms, rising to the level of intentionality and consciousness. |
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• Fodor's functionalism
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a fully computational view of mental
states. They can be modeled. |
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Functionalism critique
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for Descarte’s “nonphysical mental
substance” read “software” • “no search for the mechanisms of cognitive function” (P.S. Churchland 2002) • renders neurophysiology irrelevant Even if we accept a reductionist, materialistic view, there is a lot to be explained, but no consensus about precisely what that is. |
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what is the target for a theory of C?
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• simple awakeness
• self-awareness • availability for verbal report (ability to communicate inner states) • availability for control of intentional action (informational poise) • raw feeling / experience (Qualia ) In other words, “access, poise, reportability and qualitative feel” |
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Qualia
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the contents of consciousness
"we can say that a mental state is conscious if it has a qualitative feel - an associated quality of experience. These qualitative feels are also known as phenomenal qualities, or qualia for short.” |
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Philosophical Zombie:
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A being that
behaves like us and may share our functional organization and even, perhaps, our neurophysiological makeup without conscious experiences or qualia. A provocative (re)statement of the consciousness problem, intended to refute functionalism. |
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zombie critique
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if zombies are indistinguishable
from us, it is ‘not unlikely they would evolve a mentalistic vocabulary.’ (Dennett 1998) • linguistic possibility does not establish possibility of existence • empirical science not required to refute logical possibilities (e.g., down with “thought experiments”) |
