International Organization

Front 1

What is a problem structure?

Back 1

type of problem at hand, characteristics in the absence of international organization and what affects them; first someone needs to perceive a problem

Front 2

Aspects of problem structure

Back 2

opportunities, capacity, and power (some problems are caused by a lack in capacity, others are not)
(some problems can be caused or solved by the balance of power - hegemonic stability theory, or tragedy of the commons, in which no one state has enough power to make others comply)
incentives and interests, information and transparency

Front 3

when do problems need IOs for solving

Back 3

- when the problem transcends state borders
- when countries agree that there is a problem that needs solving (nuclear proliferation v human rights abuses)
- different problems need different solutions

Front 4

international issues in problem solving

Back 4

- degree of transparency
- issue of information
- issue of membership
- issue of institutional behavior
- issue of enforcement

Front 5

characteristic of the social sciences

Back 5

- proscribes normative statements (the unemployment rate IS 7% - versus a normative statement, which says unemployment OUGHT to be lower)
- systematic and rigorous explanations
- cummulative gain in knowledge or expanding on current knowledge
- GENERALIZABILITY - make a prediction about how the world works, needs to be general enough

Front 6

what is a theory? what are its parts?

Back 6

a theory is a statement of relationship between cause and effects. It is composed of:
- assumptions...
- from which we derive hypotheses (state's the theory's expected relationship between causes (x) and effects (y))...
- which link independent and dependent variables

Front 7

necessary V sufficient conditions

Back 7

- necessary conditions must exist or be present for an outcome to occur (taking the LSAT is a necessary condition for getting into law school) OR (it is necessary for there to be clouds for it to rain)
- sufficient conditions ensure that an outcome will occur, but doesn't necessarily mean it absolutely will. (taking the LSAT is not a sufficient condition to enter law school, an excellent LSAT score is) OR (there can be clouds and it may not rain, clouds are not sufficient to predict rain)

Front 8

criteria for theory evaluation

Back 8

(1) accuracy - do the theory's predictions match empirical evidence
(2) internal logical consistency - do the theory's hypotheses follow logically from the assumptions?
(3) falsifiable - can we identify what factors or evidence would prove this theory incorrect?
(4) non-spurious - the variables in the study are not spuriously related, that they only seem to be related but there is a lurking variable
(5) relative parsimony - can I explain more with less than competing theories? the simpler the better.
(6) generalizability - can I predict results or relationships beyond the cases that I am examining?
(7) do not reject one theory before developing a new one

Front 9

neorealism's core assumptions

Back 9

- bipolarity is more stable than multi-polarity
- distribution of power tends to be balanced - easier to maintain
- relative gains are more important than absolute gains
- unipolarity is the safest option available, as long as the hegemon is benelovent

Front 10

liberalism's core assumptions

Back 10

- international system is hierarchic - international law and IOs constrict state behavior
- states pursue wealth as much as security
- power is not fungible but issue-specific
- international politics is primarily concerned about collective action problems (not a 0-sum game)

Front 11

solving collective actions problems

Back 11

- hegemons can enforce agreements
- iteration, where players value long-term payoffs over short-term
- set-up of mechanisms that identify and punish cheating

Front 12

IOs can facilitate cooperation by:

Back 12

- setting standards of behavior (that change payoffs)
- reducing transaction costs of joint decision-making, makes cooperation smoother
- verifying compliance via monitoring
- resolving disputes by providing information and a forum for discussion

Front 13

two logics of behavior

Back 13

(1) rational choice
- made by cost-benefit calculations
(2) appropriateness (constructivism)
- not about cost-benefit calculations - states are worries about doing the right thing.
- what you get depends on the behavior of others, therefore you need to cooperate

Front 14

logic of behavior and institutions
"thin" interpretation
"thick" interpretation

Back 14

- "thin" interpretation - actors may want to act in a certain way, but institutions keep actors from acting in that way, but does not change the actor's preferences.

- "thick" interpretation - institutions change the preferences of its actors.

Front 15

The Five Questions: determining the elements

Back 15

(1) Do countries believe that the behavior of other countries influence them in a negative way?
(2) Do countries causing the problem have the opportunity and capacity to engage in good behavior
(3) Do the material consequences of bad behavior for those causing the problem depend on other's behavior? How?
(4) Are the consequences of bad behavior unknown to those causing the problem? (otherwise they might engage in good behavior)
(5) Are the consequences of bad behavior not material, but considered illegitimate or bad by others?

Front 16

Pareto frontier

Back 16

the point at which no other gains gan be achieved without others losing benefits. This is important for international organizations – you want to be at the Pareto frontier, make situations better off, but making sure that no one is made worse off by the solution.

Front 17

game theory

Back 17

the analysis of interdependent decision-making

Front 18

nash equilibrium

Back 18

set of strategies in a game such that no player has a unilateral incentive to switch to another strategy, as long as the other doesn't switch strategies either

Front 19

game theory: zero-sum conflict

Back 19

both sides unambigously prefer harming the other side - nash equilibrium is one where they both continue fighting

Front 20

game theory: positive externalities and incapacity

Back 20

all states are better off if they cooperate in addressing the problem, but some states lack the capacity - because a whole side of the game is impossible, the capable state ends up contributing to the problem-solving while the incapable state free rides off the positive externalities

Front 21

game theory: upstream/downstream

Back 21

upstream states receive no direct benefits from cooperation and probably incur costs to cooperate. they cooperate only if they receive side payments that outweigh these costs.

Front 22

game theory: coordination, or battle of the sexes

Back 22

Two possible equilibriums, one of which benefits one side and one of which benefits the other, but both prefer cooperation to non-cooperation

Front 23

game theory: assurance

Back 23

all states want to collaborate and believe they will be better off if they do, but they lack information and so may fail to coordinate their behavior by accident and because of lack of trust. States decide to go for what is secure and sure instead of risking collaboration problems.

Front 24

game theory: collaboration, or prisoner's dilemma

Back 24

there are costs to all players of cooperating and the value of cooperation depends on all others contributing. It makes little sense to contribute if nobody else does, or if everyone else does (free ride). All sides prefer mutual cooperation to mutual cheating, but both prefer even more their own unilateral cheating.

Front 25

more problems and issue areas

Back 25

- number of actors (IO members v. actos causing or afected by the problem)
- types of actors (governments v. NGOs)
- transparency (uncertainty about others' preferences and behavior)
- broader context: problems not occuring in a vacuum (variations across regions, time)