Implied Trusts Of The Home

Front 1

Abbott v Abbott

Back 1

Privy council case

Baroness Hale: "It is now clear that the constructive trust is generally the more appropriate tool of analysis in most matrimonial cases."

Advocated a 'holistic' approach with regard to quantification of an inferred CICT. Requires the court to look at the sacrifices made, and if nothing can be inferred you can impute an intention to share

Front 2

Adekunle v Ritchie

Back 2

involving a purchase of a council house at a discount allowed to the tenant, the tenant- mother and her youngest son living with her bought the house in their joint names, the son having to be a joint mortgagee as his mother was unemployed

The presumption was rebutted on the basis that the primary purpose of the acquisition was as a home for the mother, even though the son also lived there and contributed to the mortgage, and therefore there was no intention that their interests should be equal, especially when she would have wanted all her sons to benefit on her death from her only significant asset.

Front 3

Bull v Bull

Back 3

House bought by mother and son, with son providing the majority payment. Mother held her share in the house as a tenant in common under a resulting trust.

Point of law: a contribution to the purchase price will give rise to a resulting trust in proportion to this contribution

Front 4

Burns v Burns*

Back 4

Fox LJ: “If there is a substantial contribution by the woman to the family expenses and the house is purchased on a mortgage, her contribution is indirectly referable to the acquisition of the home since, in one way or another, it enables the family to pay the mortgage instalments. Thus a payment could be said to be referable to the acquisition of the home if, for example, the payer either (a) pays part of the purchase price or (b) contributes regularly to the mortgage instalments or (c) pays off part of the mortgage or (d) makes a substantial contribution to the family expenses so as to enable the mortgage instalments to be paid.”

Women paid telephone bills

Front 5

Clarke v Meadus

Back 5

Facts: Parents promised their daughter a house if she moved in and looked after them. Held: Detrimental reliance as she gave up her life and business. Reliance varied express declaration.

Front 6

Clough v Killey

Back 6

ECICT will give effect to agreement - "everything's 50:50" is express, everything was therefore 50:50

Front 7

Cobbe v Yeoman's Row Management Ltd

Back 7

Proprietary estoppel

Front 8

Cowcher v Cowcher

Back 8

Presumed resulting trusts: later financial contributions (e.g. not at the time of mortgage) are generally disregarded

Front 9

Eves v Eves

Back 9

Excuse case: not put on legal title because she was too young; she did DIY with a sledgehammer

Front 10

Fowler v Barron

Back 10

"Registered in the name of both parties, presumtion of 50:50 beneficial split is very hard to rebut: a man, who had paid the deposit, all the mortgage payments and direct outgoings, was unable to rebut the presumption of joint beneficial ownership"

Front 11

Simon Gardner's critcism of the "excuse" cases

Back 11

The party season is upon us. You get invited to parties, you don’t want to go to every party you are invited to. If you make an excuse, it is because you don’t want to go to the party. How can these excuses be seen as a positive intention to share.

You must act to your detriment in response to what is said to you. It works in the same way as consideration. It is only what you do after the agreement that counts. Anything you do will be assessed objectively.

Front 12

Quantification of an Express CICT

Back 12

Effect is given to the initial express agreement. The court will give effect to 50:50 if declared.

Front 13

Gissing v Gissing

Back 13

"Matimonial home, owned by the man. Woman contributed to family clothes, furniture and garden. No cCommon intention to share the house - no contributes to purchase price initially or through mortgage payments, and no evidence of express discussions. Lord Diplock: ""effect is given to the inferences as to the intentions of parties to a transaction which a reasonable man would draw from their words or conduct"

Front 14

Grant v Edwards*

Back 14

"Excuse case: told she was not put on the legal title as it would have been detrimental for her divorce proceedings; she also did significant improvement work, which included using a sledgehammer to break up the concrete covering the front lawn and subsequently preparing the ground for turfing. What counts as detrimental reliance? ""conduct on which the woman could not reasonably have been expected to embark unless she was able to have an interest in the house"" - LJ Nourse. LJ Nourse also felt that the contributions that the woman made to other areas of their life (e.g. childcare) enabled the man to continue to make his mortgage payments; held interest at 50:50; Browne-Wilkinson V-C ""In my judgment where the claimant has made payments which, whether directly or indirectly, have been used to discharge the mortgage instalments, this is a sufficient link between the detriment suffered by the claimant and the common intention."

Front 15

Greasley v Cooke

Back 15

Remedy under proprietary estoppel: granting rights of occupation

Front 16

Hammond v Mitchell

Back 16

Facts: Husband stated 'half yours'. Held: An ECICT could be found. Need an express discussion about ownership of land/property. The context is invaluable. - Mr Justice Waite 'Even the tenderest changes might take on added significance when looked at under equity's microscope'.

Front 17

Holman v Howes

Back 17

If they agreed to share but not on proportion, look at all the factors listed by baroness Hale in Stack v Dowden.

Front 18

James v Thomas

Back 18

No detrimental reliance

The true position had been that the woman had worked with the man in the business, and contributed her labour to the improvements to the mans property, because she and the man were making their life together.

Front 19

Jones v Kernott

Back 19

Supreme Court clarified Stack v Dowden

The Supreme Court confirmed the main Stack v Dowden principle that where a family home is bought in the joint names of a cohabiting couple who are both responsible for any mortgage, but without any express declaration of trust, the starting point is that equity follows the law and they are joint tenants both in law and equity. This presumption can be displaced by showing (a) that the parties had a different common intention at the time when they acquired the home, or (b) that they later formed the common intention that their respective shares would change.

Jones makes it clear that in finding the parties’ intentions as to quantification of shares, the court can impute intention, not just infer it.

Front 20

Lalani v Crump Holdings Ltd

Back 20

Conducting relating to joint lives is not necessarily detrimental reliance

In this instance, minor decorations to a property did not count as detrimental reliance

Front 21

Laskar v Laskar

Back 21

Where property is bought as an investment rather than a joint home, Stack v Dowden does not apply.

Resulting trusts more appropriate for business ventures and investments.

Front 22

Levi v Levi

Back 22

She had acquired the beneficial half share in the property under a constructive trust, but that entitlement was extinguished when she expressly agreed to relinquish her share if she was repaid the loan immediately

Front 23

Le Foe v le Foe

Back 23

ICICT: Pooled their resources so she paid bills and he paid mortgage

Confirms Burns v Burns

Front 24

Lloyds Bank v Rosset*

Back 24

To claim a beneficial share under a constructive trust you need to show a common intention by the parties followed by detrimental reliance. This intention can be either express or implied. "it is at least extremely doubtful whether anything less will do" Lord Bridge, in relation to contributions other than providing part of the initail purchase cost or contributing to the mortgage. This is a restrictive position, and a more broad approach is taken. The words "let's share a family home" not enough for ECICT

Front 25

Midland Bank v Cooke

Back 25

If a parent gives financial assistance to a newly married couple to acquire their matrimonial home, the usual inference is that It was intended as a gift to both of them rather than to one alone

Front 26

Oxley v Hiscock

Back 26

Calculating beneficial shares

Chadwick LJ: "the answer is that each is entitled to that share which the court considers fair having regard to the whole course of dealing between them in relation to the property"

Front 27

Parris v Williams

Back 27

demonstrates that the acts of detrimental reliance do not have to have been agreed or anticipated by the parties and confirms that whether those acts are sufficient to count as detrimental reliance will depend on the circumstances of the particular case. In Parris It was held that P held a flat bought in 1998 for £64,000 on trust for W absolutely. The flat had been put into P’s name because W’s impecuniosity had led him into an Individual Voluntary Arrangement. The rents covered the mortgage payments and W contributed £2,000 towards repairs and maintenance as well as spending two days painting the flat.

Front 28

Pascoe v Turner

Back 28

Promissary estoppel remedy: an order to the defendant to transfer the legal estate to the claimant

Front 29

Pettitt v Pettitt

Back 29

Express declaration is conclusive

Front 30

Samad v Thompson

Back 30

Contradicts Tinsley v Milligan: only a resulting trust at the time of acquisition.

Front 31

Stack v Dowden*

Back 31

"Lord Walker: "in my opinion the law has moved on" - in relation to Lord Bridge in Rosset saying nothing less than financial contributions will do

But when considering, look at:
o The financial contributions that each party made
o Whether there were any discussions
o Relationship
o Who took responsibility for the outgoings
o Personalities of the parties – did one of them force their will onto the situation
o Whether there are any children
o How the parties deal with their finances
o (this is a non-exhaustive list of factors, court will also look to other ones)

Case was decided 75%: 25% largely on basis of financial contribution

Lord Neuberger, dissenting: "To say that factors such as a long relationship, children, a joint bank account, and sharing daily outgoings of themselves are enough, or even of potential central importance, appears to me not merely wrong in principle, but a recipe for uncertainty, subjectivity, and a long and expensive examination of facts"

Front 32

Thomson v Humphrey

Back 32

Facts: 'You and the children will be looked after'

Held: No ECICT. Doubtful that the couple appreciated the significance of the words used.

Front 33

Tinsley v Milligan

Back 33

Held: If anticipated at the outset, later contributions will give rise to a resulting trust. (Contradicted by Samad v Thompson)

Front 34

Walsh v Singh

Back 34

“Your financial future is secure” (no ECICT, too informal)

Front 35

Webster v Webster

Back 35

ICICT: Non-legal owner unlikely to get as much as 50%

Front 36

Law Commission's paper: 'Sharing Homes' (2002)

Back 36

“If the question really is one of the parties' ‘common intention’, we believe that there is much to be said for adopting what has been called a ‘holistic approach’ to quantification, undertaking a survey of the whole course of dealing between the parties and taking account of all conduct which throws light on the question what shares were intended.”

- Concedes the current law is complicated and difficult to apply.
- Law commission attempted to devise a scheme based solely on contributions of the parties and independent of their intentions. Such contributions would include direct/indirect contributions in the form of household expenditure.

- Advantages: Certainty and predictability. Make value contributions objectively.

- However, they concluded it was not possible to devise a scheme that operated fairly and evenly across all circumstances. No proposals for legislation, only mere encouragement for express agreements.
- Plans for updated legislation shelved

Front 37

Express declaration has to comply with s53(1)(b) LPA 1925

Back 37

evidenced in writing and signed by the person or persons creating the trust

Front 38

Imputing v Inferring

Back 38

“An inferred intention is one which is objectively deduced to be the subjective actual intention of the parties, in the light of their actions and statements. An imputed intention is one which is attributed to the parties, even though no such actual intention can be deduced from their actions and statements, and even though they had no such intention. Imputation involves concluding what the parties would have intended, whereas inference involves concluding what they did intend.”

A further issue was whether there is much practical difference between inferring and imputing. Lord Walker, Lady Hale and Lord Collins thought there was not much difference in practice. Lords Kerr and Wilson thought there was, and decided the case on the basis of imputed intention rather than inferred intention.

(all from Jones v Kernott)

Front 39

Morris v Morris

Back 39

Conduct alone will only give rise to ICICT in exceptional circumstances