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10 Cards in this Set

  • Front
  • Back

INTRO

-Emerged as a reaction to the behaviourist doctrine


-Physicalist theory which argues that mental states are identical to brain states


-They 'just are' numerically the same


-Mental states are sensations


-Better theory than dualism because it is more parsimonious

TYPE & TOKEN

-Two types of identity theory


-A type is a kind like a dog


-A token is an instance like a poodle


-Mental type: a kind of sensation e.g. pain


-Brain type: a kind of neural process e.g. C-fibres


-Mental token: an instance of a sensation (stubbing your toe)


-Brain token: Instance of a neural process (brain state whilst stubbing toe)

TOKEN IDENTITY

-For every psychological state a human being is in, there is a corresponding physical state for it


-As it is the broader of the two theories it is less controversial


-Most people will accept this

TYPE IDENTITY

-A particular type of mental state is literally identical with some type of brain state


-A stronger claim than token identity


-A type identity theorists needs to be able to defend the view that there is some kind of brain state that is common to all instances of a kind of mental state

LEWIS' CAUSUAL ROLE ARGUMENT

1) Mental state (M)= the state that occupies causal role R


2) Brain state (B)= the state that occupies causal role R


3) Therefore, M=B


-This argument is valid

EXPLANATORY


ADEQUACY OF PHYSICS

-Mental states are categorised by the causal role that they fill (its syndrome of cause and effect)


- The explanatory adequacy of physics says we are able to explain all the causal relations of physical phenomena


- Since mental states cause physical phenomena, and only physical things are needed to explain such causal relations, mental just is physical


-Argues in favour of type identity theory

LEWIS' LOCK EXAMPLE

-The state of being unlocked is a functional state


-With regard to a specific lock, we can see what it is which fulfils that functional state


-In the case of a bike lock, the functional state of being unlocked is the proper alignment of slotted disks (a physical state)


-The same is true of mental states which fill functional states in theories of mind

LEIBNIZ' LAW

-Strict identity is selfsameness


-If A and B are strictly identical (A=B) then anyproperty of A must be a property of B and vice versa


-We can decisively establish that some A is notidentical with some B if we can show that A possess some property that B lacks


-We can say that minds and brains could not beidentified if minds had properties lacked by brains, or brains possessedproperties not possessed by minds

MULTIPLE REALIZABILITY

-Mental states are multiply realisable


-They can be realised by many distinct physical states


-Putnam: The brains of animals differ in the genetic makeup, so if they are in pain, there is no common mental state


-If you have two creature of X and Y who both share M but not N then, M does not = N


-Identity theory is too narrow because it does not allow for organisms without brains to have mental states


-If a given mental kind is multiply realisable bydistinct physical kinds then it cannot be identical to a specific physical kind

KRIPKE'S MODAL


ARGUMENT

-Objects to the identity theory by advancing a modal argument against it


-Rigid designator: an expression that refers to the same object in every possible world


1) If X and Y are rigid designators and X=Y, then 'X=Y' is necessarily true


2) Pain is a rigid designator and C-fibre is too


3) But pain = c fibre is not necessarily true


4) Therefore pain does not = c-fibre stimulation


-Valid by modus Tollens