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10 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
INTRO |
-Emerged as a reaction to the behaviourist doctrine -Physicalist theory which argues that mental states are identical to brain states -They 'just are' numerically the same -Mental states are sensations -Better theory than dualism because it is more parsimonious |
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TYPE & TOKEN |
-Two types of identity theory -A type is a kind like a dog -A token is an instance like a poodle -Mental type: a kind of sensation e.g. pain -Brain type: a kind of neural process e.g. C-fibres -Mental token: an instance of a sensation (stubbing your toe) -Brain token: Instance of a neural process (brain state whilst stubbing toe) |
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TOKEN IDENTITY |
-For every psychological state a human being is in, there is a corresponding physical state for it -As it is the broader of the two theories it is less controversial -Most people will accept this |
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TYPE IDENTITY |
-A particular type of mental state is literally identical with some type of brain state -A stronger claim than token identity -A type identity theorists needs to be able to defend the view that there is some kind of brain state that is common to all instances of a kind of mental state |
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LEWIS' CAUSUAL ROLE ARGUMENT |
1) Mental state (M)= the state that occupies causal role R 2) Brain state (B)= the state that occupies causal role R 3) Therefore, M=B -This argument is valid |
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EXPLANATORY ADEQUACY OF PHYSICS |
-Mental states are categorised by the causal role that they fill (its syndrome of cause and effect) - The explanatory adequacy of physics says we are able to explain all the causal relations of physical phenomena - Since mental states cause physical phenomena, and only physical things are needed to explain such causal relations, mental just is physical -Argues in favour of type identity theory |
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LEWIS' LOCK EXAMPLE |
-The state of being unlocked is a functional state -With regard to a specific lock, we can see what it is which fulfils that functional state -In the case of a bike lock, the functional state of being unlocked is the proper alignment of slotted disks (a physical state) -The same is true of mental states which fill functional states in theories of mind |
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LEIBNIZ' LAW |
-Strict identity is selfsameness -If A and B are strictly identical (A=B) then anyproperty of A must be a property of B and vice versa -We can decisively establish that some A is notidentical with some B if we can show that A possess some property that B lacks -We can say that minds and brains could not beidentified if minds had properties lacked by brains, or brains possessedproperties not possessed by minds |
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MULTIPLE REALIZABILITY |
-Mental states are multiply realisable -They can be realised by many distinct physical states -Putnam: The brains of animals differ in the genetic makeup, so if they are in pain, there is no common mental state -If you have two creature of X and Y who both share M but not N then, M does not = N -Identity theory is too narrow because it does not allow for organisms without brains to have mental states -If a given mental kind is multiply realisable bydistinct physical kinds then it cannot be identical to a specific physical kind |
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KRIPKE'S MODAL ARGUMENT |
-Objects to the identity theory by advancing a modal argument against it -Rigid designator: an expression that refers to the same object in every possible world 1) If X and Y are rigid designators and X=Y, then 'X=Y' is necessarily true 2) Pain is a rigid designator and C-fibre is too 3) But pain = c fibre is not necessarily true 4) Therefore pain does not = c-fibre stimulation -Valid by modus Tollens |