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48 Cards in this Set
- Front
- Back
Prisoner’s Dilemma
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there are two prisoners who have together committed a crime. They are now in custody and being separately questioned. Punishment will vary based on whether each prisoner admits to the crime (defects) or keeps mum (cooperates). If prisoners A and B both cooperate, the payoff will be 3,3 – they will both serve time for a minor offense, say, weapons possession. If A and B both defect, the payoff will be 2, 2 --they will both serve time for the crime they committed together. If A cooperates and B defects, meaning that A does not confess and B confesses, then the payoff will be 1,4 – A will serve a sentence for the crime committed, but B will go free for ratting out A. If A defects and B cooperates, the outcome would be 4,1 – equal but opposite. Therefore, since neither has any information available about the other player’s intentions, both players are expected to defect, so the outcome will be 2,2 – less than optimal.
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Stag Hunt
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the players are working together to hunt a stag. If player A and player B cooperate and hunt for the stag together, the outcome will be 4,4 – each player will have stag for dinner, and more left over. If both players defect, the outcome will be 3,3 – each player still gets to eat, but since they’ve hunted separately, each will only catch a rabbit. If A cooperates but B defects, the outcome will be 1,3 – A tries to kill a stag but fails due to hunting alone, but B, who has gone off on her own, gets a rabbit to each. If A defects and B cooperates, the outcome would be 1,4 – equal but opposite. Player B will always want to do what B thinks A will do, because in Stag Hunt, the optimal outcome is elicited through cooperation (unlike PD, where the highest outcome would be achieved if one player dupes his naïve partner-in-crime).
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Chicken
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two players in cars, and they’re driving towards each other head-on at full speed. The loser of the game is the first one to swerve. If A and B cooperate (ie, swerve), the outcome is 0,0 – they’re both labeled “chickens.” If A and B both defect, the outcome is -10,-10 – they crash and both die. If A cooperates and B defects, the outcome is -1,+1 – A is labeled a “chicken” and B wins. If A defects and B cooperates, the outcome is +1,-1 – equal but opposite.
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Balancing
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States align with other states to counter the power of a stronger state and prevent it from becoming a hegemon.
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Bandwagoning
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Aligning with the most powerful state to gain security.
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Realism
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A paradigm based on the premise that world politics is essentially and unchangeably a struggle among self-interested states for power and position under anarchy, with each competing state single-mindedly pursuing its own national self-advantage without altruistic concern for others of sentimental attachment to moral values
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Constructivism
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A scholarly approach to inquiry emphasizing the importance of agents (ppl and grps) and the shared meanings they construct to define their identities, interests, and institutions – understandings that influence their int’l behavior
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Liberalism
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A paradigm predicated on the hope that the application of reason and universal ethics to int’l relations can lead to a more orderly, just, and cooperative world, and that int’l anarchy and war can be policed by institutional reforms that empower orgs and int’l law for global governance
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Neoliberal Institutionalism
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A philosophy that maintains that peaceful change w/ prosperity can be encouraged through multilateral cooperation in institutions that knit the states and ppl of the world together into a true global community
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Democratic Peace Theory
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Democracies have never fought a war between each other. THis is because the people have a say over whether wars happen. Leads to much caution.
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Military Industrial Complex
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The huge interlocking network of governmental agencies, industrial corporations, and research institutes, working together to supply a nation's military forces.
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Anarchic world order
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The nations of the world have no governance there for it is anarchic.
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Self-help system
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The principle that because in international anarchy all global actors are independent, they must rely on themselves to provide for their security and well-being
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Arms race
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When one state adds military capability and another sees this as decreasing their security therefore they add military capability. The first state sees this as decreasing their security so it increases its military capability. This continues on and on.
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Security dilemma
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An increase in one state’s security decreases the security of others therefore arms races occur. One state will increase its security by building up its military and another state must also do the same to bring its security back up. The first state must now increase its arms to achieve what the first increase was meant for, increasing security.
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Reciprocity approaches
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Good things are rewarded with good things and bad things are given bad things. Works positively and negatively.
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Identity approaches
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Find something in common that will make you want to do something for others out of common identity.
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Dominance approaches
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Establishes a power hierarchy to resolve conflicts and promote stability. Oppresses the lower members and they may harbor resentment.
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Hegemonic Stability Theory
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One state dominate the world and this creates stability because it establishes some sort of pseudo world.
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Game theory
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Branch of mathematics dealing with predicting outcomes. Two or more players play games either once or iteratively. Tells what one player will do given other players' preferences.
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ICBMs
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Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. They allow rapid and devastating attacks at any location in the world. A great source of world power.
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Offensive versus Defensive weaponry
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Weapons that can be used for either offense or defense. Hard to tell the difference.
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First-strike capability
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The ability to destroy a states nuclear arsenal before they can be launched.
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Standard Operating Procedure
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General principals which guide the decisions of low level decision makers or just the least controversial and most standardized decision. Can possibly not reflect the high level policies and have taken on a life of their own in the Bureaucratic Process Model.
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Bureaucratic Processes model
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The model in which most foreign policy makers follow the Standard Operating Procedure.
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Rational Model
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Decision makers set goals, evaluate their relative importance, calculate the costs and benefits of each possible course of action, then choose the one with the highest benefits and the lowest costs.
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League of Democracies
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An idea that would involve democracies of the world getting together and getting things done without the rest of the world because they would agree on more things.
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Mutually assured destruction
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The idea that each side can withstand a first attack so that they can both launch a second attack and thus destroy each other. In this situation it is believed that no rational actor would initiate a war that would lead to this.
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International organizations (IOs)
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Includes IGO's and NGO's can have power in and of themselves.
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Domestic Politics explanations for foreign policy
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Things like public opinion, lobbyists and interest groups have impact on how states act on a global scale.
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Collective goods problems
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Problems of how to provide something that benefits all members of a group regardless of what each member contributes to it.
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Zero-sum game
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A game in game-theory which is one in which one player's gain is equal to other players' losses.
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Deterrence
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Strategy using a threat to punish another actor if it take a certain negative action.
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Compellence
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Strategy of forcing a state to make a certain action.
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Non-state actors
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IGOs, NGOs, MNCs (Multinational Corporations), Individuals, Cities, Groups, etc.
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Transnational activist networks
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Forms of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange
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Global governance
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the complex of formal and informal institutions, mechanisms, relationships, and processes between and among states, markets, citizens and organizations, both inter- and non-governmental, through which collective interests on the global plane are articulated, rights and obligations are established, and differences are mediated
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Payoff structure
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The different scores that players can get for different outcomes in game theory games.
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Human rights
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The rights of human beings against certain abuses of their own governments
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Diplomatic immunity
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The legal doctrine that gives a country’s officials (e.g. diplomats and ambassadors) when abroad release from the local legal jurisdiction of the state when they are visiting or stationed abroad to represent their own gov’t
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Club goods
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Things that states only have access to if they are in the club.
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International Political Economy (IPE)
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Trade and financial relations among nations and focuses on how nations have cooperated politically to create and maintain institutions that regulate the flow of international economic and financial transactions.
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Collective security
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the formation of a broad alliance of most actors in an international system for the purpose of jointly opposing aggression by any actor
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NATO
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization
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UN and UN Security Council
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United Nations and its Security Council which is made has 5 permanent members with veto power China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States
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World Court
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the primary judicial organ of the United Nations
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NGOs
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Non-Governmental Organizations - private organizations which can have substantial power but not equal to states
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WTO
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World Trade Organization - an IGO which has substantial power over trade agreements
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