Human Rights

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Case digests.

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a. Carino vs CHR

ISSUE: WON CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations - NO

The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e. receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi judicial agency or official.  The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking.

b. Epza vs CHR

Issue: WON CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against supposed violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts complained of. 

Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court.

c. Civil liberties Union vs exec sec

Issue: WON cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold multiple offices or employment in addition their primary position in the government and government corporations

No. It is in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

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Case digest

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CHAPTER 6 (remedies and procedures for responding to human rights violations and hr abuses)

a. Republic vs Sandoval

Facts: Farmer-rallyists marched to Malacanang calling for a genuine land reform program. There was a marchers-police confrontation which resulted in the death of 12 rallyists and scores were wounded. As a result, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 11 creating the Citizens Mendiola Commission for the purpose of conducting an investigation. The most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the heirs of the deceased and wounded victims to be compensated by the government. Based on such recommendation, the victims of Mendiola massacre filed an action for damages against the Republic and the military/police officers involved in the incident.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not there is a valid waiver of immunity
(2) Whether or not the State is liable for damages

Held: The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity as claimed by the petitioners. The recommendation made by the Commission to indemnify the heirs of the deceased and the victims does not in any way mean that liability attaches to the State. AO 11 merely states the purpose of the creation of the Commission and, therefore, whatever is the finding of the Commission only serves as the basis for a cause of action in the event any party decides to litigate the same. Thus, the recommendation of the Commission does not in any way bind the State.

The State cannot be made liable because the military/police officers who allegedly were responsible for the death and injuries suffered by the marchers acted beyond the scope of their authority. It is a settled rule that the State as a person can commit no wrong. The military and police officers who were responsible for the atrocities can be held personally liable for damages as they exceeded their authority, hence, the acts cannot be considered official.

b. This case stems from alleged seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila," Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.

Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the respondents postulate the view that as public officers they are covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done in the performance of official duties or function

ISSUE:whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages conducted by personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. If such action for damages may be maintained, who can be held liable for such violations: only the military personnel directly involved and/or their superiors as well.

RATIO DICIDENDI:

SC: We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. The cases invoked by respondents actually involved acts done by officers in the performance of official duties written the ambit of their powers.


It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were merely responding to their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre- emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.

Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.

Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for damages 5 Section 1, Article 19. to 'acts of alleged physical violence" which constituted delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or in any manner impeding or impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties enumerated therein, among others —

c. Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo
G.R. No. 180906
07 October 2008

PONENTE: Puno, C.J.

PARTIES:

PETITIONERS: SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
RESPONDENTS: RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO
NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:

Supreme Court: Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order
Supreme Court: Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to treat their Existing Petition as Amparo Petition
Court of Appeals: Upon order of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals summarily heard the Petition of Amparo. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued a judgment which is the subject of the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
FACTS:

On 14 February 2006, at past noon, Raymond Manalo (hereafter referred to as “Raymond”) and Reynaldo Manalo (hereafter referred to as “Reynaldo”) were abducted by military men belonging to the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the New People’s Army (NPA). After eighteen (18) months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on 13 August 2007.

On 23 August 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order before the Supreme Court to stop the military officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. In a Resolution dated 24 August 2007, the Supreme Court ordered the Secretary of the Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), their agents, representatives, or persons acting in their stead, and further enjoined them from causing the arrest of Raymond and Reynaldo. Forthwith, they filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs.

While the aforementioned case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on 24 October 2007. Raymond and Reynaldo subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing peti tion as amparo petition.

On 25 October 2007, the Supreme Court resolved to treat the 23 August 2007 Petition as a petition under the Amparo Rule. The Supreme Court likewise granted the Writ of Amparo and remanded the petition to the Court of Appeals to conduct the summary hearing and decide the petition.

On 26 December 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The Court of Appeals ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the custody of Raymond and Reynaldo, confirm the present places of official assignment of two military officials involved, and produce all medical reports and records of Raymond and Reynaldo while under military custody.

Aggrieved, the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP filed an appeal with the Supreme Court.

PERTINENT ISSUES:

Whether or not statements from the victims themselves is sufficient for amparo petitions.
Whether or not actual deprivation of liberty is necessary for the right to security of a person may be invoked.
ANSWER:

It depends on the credibility and candidness of the victims in their statements.
No.
SUPREME COURT RULINGS:

1.    ON EVIDENCE REQUIRED ON AMPARO PETITIONS

Effect of the nature of enforced disappearance and torture to the quantum of evidence required – With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during detention, it logically holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where they were detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no surprise.

2.    ON RIGHT TO SECURITY AS A GROUND FOR AMPARO PETITION

Permutations of the Right to Security – A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this right. First, the right to security of person is “freedom from fear.” In its “whereas” clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that “a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people.” Some scholars postulate that “freedom from fear” is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international human right. It is the “right to security of person” as the word “security” itself means “freedom from fear.” Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

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Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one’s body cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person.

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Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State “guarantees full respect for human rights” under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice.

Freedom from fear as a right – In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, “freedom from fear” is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the “right to security” is actually the “freedom from threat.” Viewed in this light, the “threatened with violation” Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.

Deprivation of liberty is not necessary before the right to security may be invoked – While the right to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9, the Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can exist independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be invoked.

DISPOSITIVE:

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 December 2007.

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What are the three basic rights that children everywhere should have?

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a. Right to survival

b. Right to develop to the fullest, to protection from harmful influences, abuse and exploitation

c. Right to participate fully in family, cultural and social life.

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Who are persons with disabilities?

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Persons with disabilities are those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments, which in interaction with various barriers may hinder them full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.

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Who are indigenous peoples?

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Indigenous peoples are those that have historically belonged to a particular region or country before its colonization or transformation into a nation, state and may have different, often unique, cultural, linguistic, traditional and other characteristics to those of the dominant culture of that region state.

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What is the ICC?

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ICC deals with and has the power to investigate, prosecute and convict individuals.

It exercises international jurisdiction over criminals. This addresses the problem of preventing human rights violators and criminals who may have escaped from the national jurisdiction where they committed serious crimes, namely, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression.

Note: A human rights victim may opt to file a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights whose task is solely fact-finding investigation. Afr investigation, prosecution will be handled by the DOJ until the case is resolved by the Court.

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What are the proactive and preventive responsibilities of the High Commissioner of the UNCHR?

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a. Promoting and protecting the effective enjoyment by all of all civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights

b. Overall supervision of the Office of the High Commissioner

c. Enhancing international cooperation for the promotion and protection of human rights

d. Engaging in dialogue with governments in the implementation of his/her mandate, with a view to securing respect for all human rights

e. Promoting and protecting the realization of the right to development

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What are the international minimum standards for an effective national human rights institution?

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a. independence

b. broad human rights mandate

c. adequate funding

d. inclusive and transparent selection and appointment process

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Discuss the acknowledgement of the Filipino family under the Constitution?

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The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines acknowledges the importance of the family by the inclusion of Article XV entitled "The family"

Sec 1 is about the state's recognition of the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.

Sec 2 is about marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family.

Sec 3 is about the state's obligation to honor and defend right that pertain to spouses, children, family or family associations and the elderly.

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Pope Francis's 'education and Human Dignity'

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'Education is an essential dimension of human dignity and the fight against exclusion and poverty,' declared Pope Francis.‎ 

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Declaration on Human Rights Education and Training

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The United Nations General Assembly in New York adopted the Declaration on Human Rights Education and Training on 19 December. This landmark document recognises the right of every one of the planet's seven billion people to have access to human rights education, a lifelong process involving all ages, all parts of society, and every kind of education, formal and informal

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Apolinario Mabini's Letter to his brother Alejandro Mabini

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Having been informed that a ship will soon arrive from America and bound for Manila, I wrote my brother, Alejandro Mabini, the following letter with the same date as above.

MY DEAR BROTHER: I guess you have been waiting to hear from your Kuya and me, so let me give you a brief account of what happened.

We boarded the ship Rosencrans in the morning of Tuesday, last January 18 and left Manila Bay in the afternoon of the next day. We sailed toward the south, passing in front of Camarines and Albay. We crossed the strait of San Bernardino and finally we reached the Pacific Sea, heading for the island of Guam toward the east, if I am not mistaken, where we arrived at about noontime on the 24th day.

Don’t ask me about the details of our trip, since I could not leave my cabin even once, during the journey. I do not know of any accidents that happened, except an engine trouble of the ship, which constrained us to stop until past noon in the vastness of the Pacific Ocean. I got a little seasick when I inhaled its saline sea breeze. Kuya has no news to tell you.

According to them, for lack of accommodation, we had to stay on board for a period of 28 days. We disembarked in the afternoon of the 12th of this month in a barrio called Piti. Then we started to walk, which we did most of the time, while the others were carried in carts, towards the direction of Agaña, the former capital of the Marianas Islands. Now it is Guam. After a road’s journey for three fourths of an hour, we came to a barrio called Asan, which they claim, is an hour’s walk from Agaña (4 miles approximately), where we had encamped.

(In spite of having remained on board the ship for quite sometime, the prison house is not constructed yet. In view of this, we are temporarily housed in tents. We are occupying a place which used to be a hospital for the lepers during the Spanish rule. This was burned when the Americans took over the island. Apparently, they are telling us that this place is just the most appropriate for us, for our mind is afflicted with a contagious illness forcing them therefore, to isolate us and prevent us from mingling with our own kind, just like the lepers. I hope our isolation contributes to the pacification of our beloved land, because notwithstanding my exile, I think not of myself, but of all of you out there, who are exposed to so much risk while the war is going on.)

At first glance, this is an arid land. As we took the road from the time we disembarked, we have seen only a few houses. The mountains, as well as the plains we saw have scarce vegetation and the little that we have seen seems to have been scorched by the sun. Seeing it, one is tempted to say that the summer season is just about to end, rather than begin.

Nevertheless, we are occupying a beautiful lot. Can you imagine a land covered with very fine sand? It is even planted with coconut trees all over, whose trunks, I would wish were well-formed and whose foliage more lush and luxuriant, to prevent the scorching sun from penetrating through the canvas roofs of our tents. Facing the North, I behold the ever raging sea; a steep hill hides my back and my left side, and to my right, I could figure out a street, the little huts in the barrio, hidden among the coconut trees and half-destroyed by the last storm. Yonder is another almost shaven hill and behind which, they say, is Agaña hiding, toward the northeast.

At first glance, the natives of this island seem to belong to our race and their climate is the same as ours.

For one who views life not in terms of comfort and ease, our situation is bearable. We have good food, which is indispensable for one’s survival. The Prison’s commanding officer has so far done everything possible that would give us embarrassment and unnecessary work. Since this letter has to pass through him, I don’t want to praise him lest he thinks I’m flattering him. Besides he doesn’t need praises from any one of us.

The next day, after handing over the preceding letter to Mayor Orwig, he came to see me. There was annoyance in his face because he did not like what I’ve written in the paragraph marked with parenthesis. I said I did not mind erasing it, which in fact, I did, sending him the letter again which has not been returned to me. Because of this incident, I have decided not to write anymore, except in extreme cases, so as not to offend the sensibilities of these people

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Independence of the Judiciary:
A Human Rights Priority

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While United Nations troops grab headlines as peace-keepers throughout the world, thousands of other UN personnel are working on quieter, less dramatic fronts to ensure that peace endures.
After first addressing such rudimentary human rights as food, health care and education, the United Nations advises and assists with the rebuilding of institutions of governance -- particularly the system of justice.

The connection between justice and peace was recognized by the Charter of the United Nations in 1945, when the founding nations said they were determined to "establish conditions under which justice and respect for obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained".

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted three years later, enumerated certain essentials to the achievement of individual dignity and social order. It affirms that everyone is entitled to the equal protection of the law; that the accused must be presumed innocent until proven guilty, in a fair and public hearing, by an "independent and impartial" tribunal; and that no one should suffer arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

A treaty adopted in 1966, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, enshrines judicial rights as a matter of law, not just principle. These include the right of every human being to a fair trial, immunity from arbitrary arrest and immunity from retroactive sentences. The Covenant and two Optional Protocols -- along with the 1966 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Universal Declaration -- together make up the five-part omnibus document known as the International Bill of Human Rights.

The Glue for Lasting Stability

Implementing universal judicial rights involves a wide range of steps, from the drafting of legislation to the training of judges and lawyers and the modernization of court systems, police forces and prisons. The aim is to develop respect for human rights among lawmakers and law enforcers and to buttress their roles as protectors of those rights.
The work proceeds slowly, with day-to-day results difficult to measure, particularly where the culture of justice has been deformed by war or military rule. Yet it provides the glue for lasting stability.

Due process -- the rules and routines of fair treatment for suspects of wrongdoing -- is almost invariably a casualty of war. The formalities of charges, defenses and appeals are whittled away as fighting drags on, until even the pretense of neutrality is dropped by prosecutors and judges and the rights of the accused forgotten.

In their place, arbitrary arrests, summary executions and enforced disappearances all too often become the mechanisms for eliminating perceived enemies of the State. The police and paramilitary guards inspire fear rather than confidence, and citizens cease to rely on them for protection. Prison wardens and guards freely use force to quell riots and prevent escapes.

When peace finally opens the door to more freedom, citizens must develop enough trust to submit their disputes to authority rather than resort to violence.

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Aberca vs. Ver Case Digest L-69866 April 15, 1988

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FACTS:

This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila," Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.


Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the respondents postulate the view that as public officers they are covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done in the performance of official duties or function

ISSUE:whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. If such action for damages may be maintained, who can be held liable for such violations: only the military personnel directly involved and/or their superiors as well.

RATIO DICIDENDI:

SC: We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. The cases invoked by respondents actually involved acts done by officers in the performance of official duties written the ambit of their powers.


It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were merely responding to their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre- emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.

Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.

Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for damages 5 Section 1, Article 19. to 'acts of alleged physical violence" which constituted delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or in any manner impeding or impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties enumerated therein, among others —

The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and details, how plaintiffs' constitutional rights and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were violated and impaired by defendants. The complaint speaks of, among others, searches made without search warrants or based on irregularly issued or substantially defective warrants; seizures and confiscation, without proper receipts, of cash and personal effects belonging to plaintiffs and other items of property which were not subversive and illegal nor covered by the search warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under irregular, improper and illegal circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places of 'safehouses" where they were kept incommunicado and subjected to physical and psychological torture and other inhuman, degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose of extracting incriminatory statements. The complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs violative of their constitutional rights.

Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violation.

The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth in the complaint. It is well established in our law and jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action must be based on what appears on the face of the complaint. 6 To determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no others, should be considered. 7 For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. 8

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Republic vs. Sandoval 220 SCRA 124

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Facts: Farmer-rallyists marched to Malacanang calling for a genuine land reform program. There was a marchers-police confrontation which resulted in the death of 12 rallyists and scores were wounded. As a result, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 11 creating the Citizens Mendiola Commission for the purpose of conducting an investigation. The most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the heirs of the deceased and wounded victims to be compensated by the government. Based on such recommendation, the victims of Mendiola massacre filed an action for damages against the Republic and the military/police officers involved in the incident.


Issues:
(1) Whether or not there is a valid waiver of immunity
(2) Whether or not the State is liable for damages


Held: The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity as claimed by the petitioners. The recommendation made by the Commission to indemnify the heirs of the deceased and the victims does not in any way mean that liability attaches to the State. AO 11 merely states the purpose of the creation of the Commission and, therefore, whatever is the finding of the Commission only serves as the basis for a cause of action in the event any party decides to litigate the same. Thus, the recommendation of the Commission does not in any way bind the State.

The State cannot be made liable because the military/police officers who allegedly were responsible for the death and injuries suffered by the marchers acted beyond the scope of their authority. It is a settled rule that the State as a person can commit no wrong. The military and police officers who were responsible for the atrocities can be held personally liable for damages as they exceeded their authority, hence, the acts cannot be considered official.

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concerned citizens of obando vs ecoshield dev

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Citing the need to revive a river in Bulacan province and to clean up  Manila Bay, the Court of Appeals (CA) last month dismissed a petition of residents in Obando town to issue a writ of kalikasan  and temporary environmental protection order  against a sanitary landfill being built there.

The Supreme Court, on Feb. 21, 2012, issued a writ of kalikasan against the project and remanded the case to the CA for hearing, reception of evidence and rendition of judgment, as well as for the acceptance of the return of the writ.

But the CA’s former 10th Division, in its decision issued on Aug. 29, also denied the privilege of the writ of kalikasan that the high court issued two years ago.

Mercy Dolorito, one of the 16 petitioners, said she and other members of  Concerned Citizens of Obando had yet to receive a copy of the decision. Ecoshield Development Corp. (EDC), the project proponent, furnished the Inquirer a copy.

“Contrary to the petitioners’ assertion, the establishment of the Obando sanitary landfill will significantly facilitate the cleanup of Manila Bay, in direct response to the SC’s continuing mandamus,” a part of the decision read.

Associate Justice Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla penned the decision that was concurred by Associate Justice Jose Reyes Jr., who chairs the division, and Associate Justice Agnes Reyes Carpio.

Obando residents sought the writ fearing that the landfill would damage the town’s mangrove ecosystem and worsen pollution and flooding there.

They were also outraged over the cutting of thick stands of mangroves near a barge docking area being built by EDC.

The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) failed to identify who was responsible for the cutting of mangroves. The EDC had blamed charcoal makers.

The EDC landfill sits on 44 hectares of company land in the coastal village of Salambao.

The landfill site, which faces  Manila Bay, is a former fishpond area beside a mangrove forest. It is about a kilometer away from the nearest cluster of houses in the coastal village of Salambao.

Rafael Tecson, EDC vice president and general manager, said the landfill was almost complete as of August.

“Its features are safe for residents and the environment,” he said in a telephone interview on Saturday.

The CA relied on the testimony of Lormelyn Claudio, director of the DENR’s Environmental Management Bureau in Central Luzon, that the landfill would “accept only residual wastes for the secondary material recovery facility and no large-scale dumping of unprocessed garbage will be involved.”

This, she said, was stipulated by the environmental compliance certificate (ECC) that she issued for 10 ha of the EDC project.

The CA decision said a landfill in the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando River System (MMORS) area “is clearly not enough to cater to all these wastes,” referring to the 1,500 tons produced by Bulacan and 1,600 tons from adjacent local governments.

The United States-based Blacksmith Institute ranked the MMORS the fifth dirtiest river system in a 2005 survey of 200 rivers all over the world, it said.

“The proposed sanitary landfill will be the final disposal point of the dredged materials for the implementation of a 10-year action plan on the desilting of the MMORS,” the decision said. “The sanitary landfill will, therefore, serve as Bulacan’s contribution to rehabilitate Manila Bay.”

The decision cited the commitments of EDC to provide a motorized boat to haul wastes collected within the MMORS, build a compartment for garbage and dredged materials from the MMORS, and construct a treatment plant that will remove hazardous coliform from the water.

The CA said it recognized the precautionary principle under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.

“[The] protection of the environment, through the putting up of a pollution control facility like a landfill, should not be postponed [as] there is a big threat to the environment due to illegal and indiscriminate dumping,” it said.

“It is time to give the project a chance to carry its commitment to resurrect this waterway and provide solution for proper garbage disposal,” the CA added.

It directed the project’s multipartite monitoring team  to monitor the construction of the landfill and its operation as well as report on the compliance of EDC to the ECC.

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Thomas Lubanga Dyilo

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(born 29 December 1960) is a convicted war criminal from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the first person ever convicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC).[1] He founded and led the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) and was a key player in the Ituri conflict (1999–2007). Rebels under his command have been accused of massive human rights violations, including ethnic massacres, murder, torture, rape, mutilation, and forcibly conscripting child soldiers.[2][3][4]

On 17 March 2006, Lubanga became the first person arrested under a warrant issued by the ICC.[5] His trial, for the war crime of "conscripting and enlisting children under the age of fifteen years and using them to participate actively in hostilities",[6] began on 26 January 2009,[7] and he was found guilty on 14 March 2012.[1] He faced a maximum sentence of 30 years.[1] On 10 July 2012, Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) sentenced Lubanga to a total period of 14 years of imprisonment, also ordering that the time from Lubanga's surrender to the ICC in 2006 until the sentencing day should be deducted from the 14 year term, which means he will spend 8 more years in jail.[